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Academics and practitioners alike recognize that global governance institutions suffer 
from a democratic deficit. A large body of literature suggests that civil society can 
reform global governance, but a countervailing body of work indicates that civil 
society may actually facilitate new forms of elite domination.
This thesis seeks to contribute to this debate by examining the impact of civil 
society on policymaking at the World Bank. This thesis’ core question is: ‘Do data 
about the World Bank support the idea that civil society can democratize global 
governance?’ Using three case studies, the thesis examines how civil society 
organizations engaging with the Bank interact with one another, set their agendas, and 
achieve their impacts, and how these organizations engage with local civil society and 
governments in developing countries. The resulting data are analyzed using a 
framework for democratic legitimacy derived from the work of Uhlin, Scharpf, and 
Dingwerth.
The case studies reveal civil society is far more atomized than indicated in 
much of the literature. Strong ideological commitments, coupled with financial 
incentives, inhibit dialogue between organizations and make it difficult for 
international organizations to respond to the concerns of grassroots stakeholders. Civil 
society advocacy increases stakeholder control over the World Bank, but new channels 
of influence are controlled primarily by elite organizations based in the global North. 
Civil society organizations also utilize state power to achieve their objectives, 
soliciting the assistance of the Bank’s major donors in ways that marginalize 
developing country governments.
The thesis finds that civil society has abundant impact on the World Bank and 
that some impacts, like improved transparency and accountability, facilitate direct 
stakeholder influence over the institution. However, the thesis concludes that because 
transnational civil society consolidates that influence in the hands of a minority of 
stakeholders, it does not democratize the World Bank.
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Introduction
Academics and practitioners alike recognize that many global governance institutions 
suffer from a democratic deficit. They are subject to the political influence of 
powerful actors; they may advance the interests of an economic elite; and they have, in 
some well-documented instances, severely harmed poor populations. A large body of 
academic literature indicates that civil society can or will reform global governance by 
improving citizen representation and control over governance institutions. However, a 
countervailing body of literature suggests that civil society may be just as elite- 
dominated as global governance institutions, ignores the poor, and may magnify 
existing power imbalances.
This thesis seeks to contribute to this debate by examining the impact of civil 
society on policymaking at the World Bank. This thesis’ core question is: ‘Do data 
about the World Bank support the idea that civil society can democratize global 
governance?’ The first half of this chapter frames this question. It begins by 
discussing the power and importance of global governance mechanisms and details 
their observed democratic deficits. It then defines transnational civil society and 
provides an overview of the claims made about the capacity of civil society to improve 
global governance. It also presents the critical literature and highlights concerns about 
civil society’s conduct and impacts. Finally it details the specific ways in which this 
research will address this debate and contribute to academic knowledge about 
transnational civil society and its influence on international institutions, particularly 
the World Bank.
The latter part of the chapter develops the approach this thesis uses to examine 
the impacts of civil society. It defines democracy and describes in greater detail how 
democratization at the World Bank will be examined. Next, it enumerates a series of 
specific sub-questions which will facilitate the assessment of civil society’s impacts on 
the World Bank. Third, it describes the selection of the three case studies used in this 
thesis: the central case study of a major turning point in the Bank’s relationship with 
civil society, which this thesis uses to generate several hypotheses; and two subsequent 
case studies used to test these hypotheses. Fourth, it details the methods used to gather
9and analyze data for the research. The chapter then highlights some potential 
limitations in the research while supporting the thesis’ overall approach. The chapter 
concludes with a preview of the overall findings of the thesis and the contents of 
subsequent chapters.
The Necessity and Danger of International Institutions
At their best, international institutions and regimes represent a certain form of 
optimism. In theory, organizations like the UN, World Bank, and World Trade 
Organization exist to preserve peace and enhance prosperity. Nonetheless, these 
institutions have often been shown to advance the interests of their founders or various 
global elites (see, for example, Gwin 1994; Stigliz 2002; Woods 2000; Apodaca 2001). 
Yet, in an increasingly globalized world, international institutions are also often 
regarded as necessary tools for handling complex, transnational problems, ranging 
from trade disputes to climate change. The combination of power, necessity, and 
dubious history leads to questions of legitimacy and control.
A Brief History o f Modem Global Governance
Many of the most prominent contemporary supranational institutions were created 
around the close of World War n. The World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) were founded in 1944 and the United Nations (UN) was formed in 1945. 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the forerunner of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), was established in 1948. Their creation reflected a 
fundamental recognition by the powerful states of the time of the ways in which the 
political and economic activities of nations affected one another.
In the decades since, the number of international institutions has grown. In 
1956 the International Finance Corporation was founded to promote private enterprise 
and in 1960 the International Development Association (IDA) was created to enable 
the World Bank to lend to developing nations. The UN established the United Nations 
Development Program in 1965 to assist economic development, while newly 
independent nations sought to exert greater control over their own development with 
the founding of the African Development Bank in 1963 and the Asian Development 
Bank in 1966.
Numerous global regimes, in the form of multilateral agreements governing 
international elements of trade and commerce, have also been developed. For
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example, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), 
founded in 1975, monitors and regulates the trade of certain animals, plants, and goods 
derived from them. Other international regimes govern air travel, financial 
transactions, and whaling.
As these institutions have grown in scope and number, so too has their 
membership grown. The original IMF and World Bank charters were signed by less 
than 30 states; the GATT by only 23. Even the UN had only 51 states at its inception. 
Currently the membership in each of these institutions approaches or exceeds 150.
At the same time, global interdependency has increased. Changes in 
technology have facilitated trade between far-flung nations, and the internet has 
created an affordable network of global communications (Meyer 1997). The end of 
the Cold War reduced the political barriers between states, while the reintroduction of 
market economies in many Communist and post-Communist states has resulted in new 
commercial links (Apodaca 2001; Sachs et al. 1995; cf. Cingranelli et al. 1999). The 
rapid movement of people, goods, and ideas has also accelerated the spread of 
international criminal networks, transnational terrorism, and disease (Mittelman et al. 
1999; Cronin 2002/3; Charrel et al. 2007; Beaglehole et al. 2003). Global climate 
change, deforestation, and fisheries depletion have all drawn attention to the global 
nature of environmental problems.
Dealing with the problems of a globalized world is increasingly seen as the 
responsibility of international institutions (see, for example, Mittelman et al. 1999; 
Beaglehole et al. 2003). The Global Environmental Facility was founded in 1991 to 
fund efforts to protect the global environment. The World Trade Organization grew 
out of the GATT in 1995. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee, although formed in 1960, 
has more recently taken a lead role in coordinating aid flows from developed nations to 
the global South. The European Union has created a common currency and eliminated 
most barriers on trade and travel among its member states.
These institutions not only manage or govern some portion of global affairs; 
they also increase global interconnectedness. The World Bank borrows money from 
international investors using guarantees made by a few dozen wealthy nations and 
lends it to middle- and lower-income countries. The GATT and WTO have helped 
reduce trade barriers. The IMF has promoted a global norm of liberalized financial 
markets, facilitating (for better or for worse) capital flows among counrties. In short,
11
international institutions are the product of a globalized world, but they also facilitate, 
perpetuate, accelerate, and manage the impacts of globalization.
The Democratic Deficit o f International Institutions
As the power and importance of international institutions has increased, so too have 
concerns about how their power is used and who controls it. In the 1980s, the growing 
environmental movement drew public scrutiny to the work of the World Bank. 
Concerns about the impact of structural adjustment focused attention on both the 
World Bank and the IMF in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Protests against the WTO 
in Seattle in 1999 created greater awareness of the problems posed by globalization 
and the arguments of its detractors. Alternative ‘people’s forums’ have sprung up 
around meetings of global power brokers, like the World Economic Forum in Davos or 
the meetings of the G8. The net impact of such activities, of which this list is just a 
sampling, has been to challenge the legitimacy of existing power arrangements.
Academics examining this question of legitimacy have identified a ‘democratic 
deficit’ in global governance. Zum (2004 p. 262) describes the situation as follows:
There is broad agreement that currently the functioning of 
international institutions such as the WTO or the UN does not meet 
democratic standards. Acknowledged democratic deficits include the 
lack of identifiable decision-makers who are directly accountable for 
wrong decisions made at the international level, as well as the 
inscrutability of international decision-making processes and thus the 
advantage the executive decision-makers have over others in terms of 
information. Furthermore, particularly the prime actors in 
international politics, such as multinational businesses and 
superpowers, are at best accountable only to a fraction of the people 
affected by their activities.
Other authors affirm and reinforce this view. Held, for instance, writing about the UN, 
describes its dominance by powerful members, weak enforcement of norms and 
agreements, underfunded agencies, and inadequate environmental regimes as 
“indicative of the very limited efficacy and reach of democracy at the global level” 
(2006 p. 307).
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The structures of many international organizations lend evidence to this 
critique. In the UN, for instance, the permanent members of the Security Council1 
exercise disproportionate power over the institution’s actions. In the World Bank and 
IMF, voting rights on the governing boards are assigned based on commercial 
principles. Countries are allotted voting rights proportionate to the capital they have 
contributed to the institution, not unlike shareholders in a corporation. Wealthy 
nations have frequently used their influence to advance their own agendas, such as 
when the US used World Bank funding to help counter Soviet influence in the 
developing world during the Cold War (Gwin 1992). As a result of such dynamics, the 
voting rights system in the World Bank and IMF has been critiqued as antithetical to 
good governance (Woods 2000; cf. Scholte 2004 pp. 211-3).
The impacts of international institutions have added to their scrutiny. A 
combination of academic authors and practitioners have attacked the ways in which 
undemocratic or unaccountable systems have contributed to negative impacts on 
certain populations, particularly poor populations in developing countries. Some have 
attacked structural adjustment polices, which forced macroeconomic reforms on 
developing countries, for destroying social safety nets or damaging local economies 
(cf. Jolly 1991; Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative 2004). 
Environmental activists have attacked the World Bank for damaging ecosystems, 
displacing populations, and spreading disease (Rich 1994; Udall 1998). Stiglitz has 
written that some interventions in developing nations threaten to undermine local 
democratic governments (1999). Echoing the sentiment of many academics and 
practitioners, he argues that international institutions might do less damage “if they 
were indeed more democratically accountable” (p. 583).
One should note as well that the problem is not wholly one of dominance by 
powerful members. Scholte writes that national governments have often allowed 
global governance institutions “considerable unchecked prerogative” in their activities. 
If states are unwilling to exercise control over such institutions, preferring to leave key 
decisions in the hands of technocrats, then equalizing state authority might not yield 
more democratic global governance (2004 p. 212). Barnett and Finnemore likewise 
find that international institutions are “more than the reflection of state preferences” 
and can have considerable autonomy (1999 p. 700). They argue that such autonomy
1 These are the United States, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, China, and France.
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only enhances the need for a critical approach to international institutions, since it 
indicates that the failures of such institutions result from endogenous bureaucratic 
pathologies (Barnett and Finnemore 1999).
Civil Society to the Rescue
“In this unhappy situation,” Scholte writes, “some citizens have looked to civil society 
activity as a way to obtain greater democratic accountability” for international 
institutions (2004 p. 212). Exactly how civil society will do this, however, is 
somewhat contested. In essence, there is a continuum of possibilities ranging from the 
reform of international institutions to their outright replacement.
At one level, civil society is depicted as enunciating the needs of stakeholder 
populations in existing policymaking fora and monitoring the activities of governance 
institutions (see Price 2003 p. 581; Colas 2001). Summarizing the concept of civil 
society as spokesperson, one author writes that civil society “rescue[s] the causes of 
marginalized or excluded groups”, amplifying their claims and bringing them to the 
attention of policymakers and opinion leaders (Grzybowski 2000 p. 442; see also 
Shihata 1991 pp. 250-4). When the popular will or common good has been enshrined 
in a policy, civil society can push for implementation or monitor compliance (Keck 
and Sikkink 1998 p. 3; Clark 2001; cf. Rich 1994). Common elements of such 
campaigns are efforts to make international institutions transparent or externally 
accountable (Udall 1998; Fox 2003; cf. Scholte 2004).
An element of this process is the creation or promotion of new global norms. 
Risse, for instance, argues that transnational civil society has helped define and protect 
human rights via an iterative process of norm formation and implementation (Risse 
2000; cf. Clark 2001). The creation of environmental and social safeguards at the 
World Bank, for example, is attributable to civil society efforts to promote a global 
norm of environmental conservation (Wade 1997; cf. Rich 1994). Such norms 
influence not only current conduct, but form a standard for future conduct and may 
become enshrined in new international law.
Implicit in many of the discussions of norm formation is the belief that civil 
society has changed the international order, rupturing the old system of state 
dominance (Price 2003; Turner 1998; see also Shaw 1992; Lipschutz 1992). Some 
authors argue that civil society will form the basis for a new system of governance. 
Such a system might be anarchical and stateless (Korten 1998); involve new, globe-
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spanning structures (Held 2004; 2006; Archibugi 2004);2 or replace representative 
systems of democracy with more deliberative ones (Nanz and Steffek 2004).
This thesis will discuss these various claims in more detail in Chapter 2. For 
the thesis to engage with such claims, however, it must first define transnational civil 
society.
Defining Transnational Civil Society
The definition of civil society is complex and contested. A typical definition is offered 
by Florini and Simmons, who state that transnational civil society is defined by three 
elements: separation from government or commercial entities; cross-border linkages; 
and a variety of forms (2000 p. 7). This tripartite construction forms a useful starting 
point for building a more detailed definition.
To begin with, contemporary usage of the term ‘civil society’ refers to groups 
of publicly engaged actors without a formal role in government or profit-making 
intent. (It is thus distinct from other, more philosophical usages of the term ‘civil 
society’, such as its Hobbesian usage to describe a properly ordered populace.) Civil 
society has occupied such a role for hundreds of years, fighting for causes like 
women’s rights and the abolition of slavery (Florini 2006; Keck and Sikkink 1998). 
Thus the existence of civil society long predates the contemporary revival of the term. 
Religious groups, social movements, and civic associations are all common examples.
It is important to note that some authors define civil society as any form of 
nongovernmental, noncommercial association, even if the resulting group is not 
civically engaged. Most notably, Robert Putnam has included groups like bowling 
leagues and bridge clubs in his understanding of civil society (2000). He has argued 
quite persuasively that such groups form a fabric of associations that enhance the 
effective functioning of democracy. This understanding of civil society has some 
relevance for debates on global governance. Robert Dahl in particular has argued that 
the lack of a global identity is one of the reasons why democratic global governance is 
impossible (Dahl 1999). This idea has been given some attention by cosmopolitan 
theorists, who discuss the role of transnational civil society in the creation of a global 
demos or “multilevel citizenship” (Held 2004 p. 386; see also Nanz and Steffek 2004).
2 It is important to note that Held, Archibugi, and other cosmopolitans do not envision the end of the 
state, but rather the creation of a new level of formal government above the state, such as a “world 
parliament” (Archibugi 2004, p. 451).
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Nonetheless, trust-building informal relationships do not seem to be a key 
element of transnational civil society or the literature studying it. There are several 
reasons for this. First, a significant portion of transnational civil society consists of 
professional nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Such professional 
organizations, while very effective and sometimes very large, do little to build personal 
connections between their members (Putnam 2000 pp. 153-4). Moreover, there is 
significant evidence that links between organizations or membership in transnational 
networks is resource-intensive and thus limited to well-resourced groups of individuals 
(Spiro 1995; Stone 2005 pp. 88-9; cf. Simmons 1998). Thus it seems unlikely that 
transnational civil society is linking persons or organizations of widely different 
income or status in the way, for instance, a local football supporters club or church 
parish might. Third, theoretical questions about the link between demos and 
democracy have been supplanted by empirical examinations of the current institutions. 
Global governance is taking place: global problems exist, international institutions 
have been established, and empirical questions are being asked about who controls 
those institutions. The experience of the European Union has indicated that 
democratically legitimate transnational government can exist even in the absence of a 
strong common identity (Moravcsik 2004; Habermas 2003). Thus transnational civil 
society’s impact on citizenship or identity has become less central to the examination 
of its role in democratic global governance.
As a result of these three factors, the vast majority of the literature on 
transnational civil society focuses on publicly engaged actors (cf. Price 2003 p. 580). 
Following in this pattern makes sense given the reasons described, and it facilitates 
critical engagement with the literature. Therefore this thesis will define civil society as 
any association of citizens that is involved in the creation, reform, or implementation 
of policies and norms, provided that the association is not primarily a part of a 
government or a governance organization, nor of a profit-making enterprise.
Transnational civil society (sometimes also known as global civil society) 
stretches beyond the state.3 Its most obvious representatives are international NGOs 
(INGOs), defined as nongovernmental organizations with offices, operations, or 
members in multiple countries; and ‘global’ justice movements, i.e. ad hoc citizens’
3 Although both terms are used in the academic literature, I generally prefer the term transnational civil 
society; it is more precise insofar as it references the specific phenomenon of crossing state boundaries.
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campaigns with members in multiple states. However, INGOs frequently partner with 
citizens and smaller civil society groups whose interests are purely local; global justice 
movements may do likewise. Such connections can involve exchanges of ideas, 
information, or funds, or even result in formal contractual arrangements (as when 
service-delivery NGOs subcontract with local organizations). A number of authors 
have therefore used the language of transnational networks to discuss civil society 
beyond the state (cf. Keck and Sikkink 1998; Stone 2005). In order to reflect these 
empirical realities and engage as much as possible with the existing literature, this 
thesis defines transnational civil society as those civil society actors who engage in 
activity beyond the borders of their own state, or whose domestic activities are linked 
to nongovernmental, noncommercial actors beyond their own state.
Lastly, one must address civil society’s diversity. Uhlin, for instance, describes 
transnational civil society as consisting primarily of social movements and activist 
networks (which lack “formalised organizational structure”); advocacy NGOs;
“service delivering” NGOs; and religious organizations (Uhlin forthcoming). Florini 
and Simmons touch on many of the same categories (2000 pp. 7-8). Such assessments 
manage to describe well the varieties of transnational actors. However, the impacts of 
informal actors on policy are difficult to identify, prove, or assess. A number of 
amorphous ‘global movements’ have campaigned for changes in global policy, for 
example, by opposing deforestation or advocating debt cancellation. Nonetheless, in 
most cases in which such movements have resulted in clearly identifiable impacts, the 
movements’ demands have been articulated by formal organizations, usually advocacy 
NGOs. In the interests of identifying clear causal linkages, this thesis will focus on 
formally constituted actors, and regard informal movements as constituencies or 
backers who lend weight to the positions or demands of formal organizations.
Taking these elements into account then, this thesis defines transnational civil 
society as all associations of individuals which are (a) not primarily a part of a 
government or a governance organization, nor of a profit-making enterprise, (b) 
involved in the creation, reform, or implementation of policies and norms, and (c) 
engaged in activity beyond the borders of their own state, or domestic activities linked 
to nongovernmental, noncommercial actors beyond their own state.
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Rigorous Standards, Unevenly Applied
Empirical research has demonstrated that civil society can influence the behavior of 
international institutions and the outcomes of transnational policymaking. Yet as 
evidence of civil society’s influence has grown, so too have the number of questions 
about its own legitimacy and its capacity to democratize global governance. Simmons 
writes, “Hailed as exemplars of grassroots democracy in action, many NGOs are, in 
fact, decidedly undemocratic and unaccountable to the people they claim to represent” 
(1998 p. 83).
In essence, when the standards of accountability, transparency, equality of 
access, and representivity that Zum uses to critique international institutions are 
applied to transnational civil society, civil society is found lacking (2004; cf. Scholte 
2004). A growing body of critical literature has highlighted the negative impacts of 
transnational civil society. Woods, for instance, has suggested that Northern advocacy 
NGOs may use international institutions to force their agendas on the global South.
She asks, “[W]hom do the NGOs represent? and [sic] to whom are they accountable?” 
If the answer is Northern citizens, she writes, then the problems of Northern 
dominance in international institutions is increased rather than rectified by civil society 
organizations’ involvement (2000 p. 827; cf. Woods 2005).
A parallel critique can be made of the internal dynamics of civil society. The 
representivity of international campaigns is predicated on the assumption that the 
policy positions presented by activists and advocates in fact represent the desires of the 
stakeholders they claim to represent. As indicated earlier, such campaigns generally 
claim to represent marginalized stakeholders in the developing world. However, 
abundant evidence exists that relations between NGOs are prone to disequilibrium. 
Nelson, for instance, indicates that the UK-based Christian Aid ignored or 
marginalized the opinions of its own local partners in constructing its global campaign 
against structural adjustment (Nelson 2000). Murphy notes that large Northern NGOs 
have endorsed the World Bank’s plans for education in Niger, despite strenuous local 
objection (2005). Other research in development studies stresses the principal-agent 
relationships which can develop when international civil society organizations provide 
funding to Southern partners (for example, Simbi and Thom 2000).
Examinations of service providers further highlight this problem. Researching 
aid delivery NGOs operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Bosnia, 
Cooley and Ron find that such organizations are driven by a need for organizational
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survival, particularly continued funding for overhead and staff salaries. As a result, 
NGOs compete against one another and curry favour with the international institutions 
that supply their funding, behaving “much like firms do in markets” (2002 p. 7). The 
focus on funders and the pressure of competition leaves little room for grassroots input 
and may undermine optimal aid outcomes. This theme is echoed by Manji and 
O’Coill, who argue that development NGOs may advance and serve the political and 
economic agendas of their Western donors in a fashion reminiscent of some colonial- 
era missionaries and voluntary organizations. The result is that the work of 
development NGOs “contributes marginally to the relief of poverty, but significantly 
to undermining the struggle of African people to emancipate themselves from 
economic, social, and political oppression”. The authors also point out that some of 
the major NGOs involved in international advocacy, groups like Oxfam and Christian 
Aid, still implement government-funded aid contracts as “their ‘bread-and-butter’” 
activity (2008 p. 582).
What is striking in much of the critical writing is its detailed empirical 
evidence. Although some of the academics who favorably discuss transnational civil 
society use detailed case studies (for instance Keck and Sikkink 1998), many appear to 
stress theory-building over field research. The detailed case studies in several 
academic-edited volumes are, in fact, written by civil society leaders previously 
involved in the campaigns they describe (see, for example, Fox and Brown 1998;
Clark, Fox, and Treakle 2003; also Florini 2000). Thus some of the best empirical data 
in support of transnational civil society are also the least objective. Tvedt also 
suggests that researchers in international relations have focused too much on a 
normative agenda of using NGOs to legitimate global governance. The result is that 
prevailing IR theory ignores the much more nuanced empirical data in development 
studies on the complex and ambiguous impacts of NGOs (2002).
A lack of empirical data may also be contributing to another question, one 
regarding the mechanisms of civil society impact. Insofar as many of the critiques of 
international institutions focus on their opaque or inaccessible power structures, 
understanding how civil society itself exerts power is important. Nonetheless, Price 
writes, it is “no small puzzle” how civil society has achieved its impacts (2003 p. 582). 
Although the traditional constructivist view of global civil society has focused on civil 
society’s ability to create norms, more recent authors note that civil society influence 
(including its capacity to propagate and enforce norms) is also often tied to the state
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(e.g Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse 2000). Connections between the state and civil 
society, in turn, “may well undercut any claims of the autonomous power of civil 
society” (Price 2003 p. 582).
In short, there is a reasonable concern that transnational civil society may not 
be able to stand up to the very critiques its proponents have leveled at international 
institutions. Transnational civil society as a whole has been shown to impact 
international policymaking. However, there is a substantial body of critical literature 
that challenges the benefits of civil society influence for those populations currently 
lacking power in international policymaking and that questions the independence of 
transnational civil society organizations. Contrasting these concerns with the earlier 
descriptions of civil society’s democratizing impacts highlights a fundamental 
disconnect in the literature: some authors maintain that transnational civil society is 
democratizing global governance; others indicate that it is making the existing 
democratic deficit worse.
Contributions to Knowledge
This thesis seeks to contribute to this debate by assessing civil society impact on 
policymaking at the World Bank. One of the challenges of contributing to the 
academic debate over civil society’s capacity to democratize global governance, 
however, is that the definitions of democracy employed by different authors vary 
substantially. Writing on civil society features several strands of democratic theory. 
These include representative democracy, which emphasizes the ability of citizens to 
choose political proxies and hold them accountable; participatory democracy, which 
stresses direct participation; and deliberative democracy, which focuses on the process 
of public deliberation rather than majoritarian structures.4 Moreover, some writing on 
democracy in global governance combines criteria from these different models.5 This 
makes it difficult to identify specific criteria for assessing civil society’s impact on 
policymaking at the Bank.
To address this challenge, this thesis proposes a new framework for examining 
civil society’s contribution to democratic global governance. This framework, which
4 Bexell, Magdelena, Jonas Tallberg, and Anders Uhlin (2008) “Democracy in Global Governance: The 
Promises and Pitfalls of Transnational Actors”. Paper presented at the Annual Conference of 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, London, October 25-26, pp. 5-6.
5 Ibid p. 7.
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is explained in more detail in Chapter 2, is this thesis’ first contribution to the 
academic debate on civil society. The framework, which builds on the work of Uhlin, 
Dingwerth, and Scharpf, identifies three different aspects of democratic governance: 
input, throughput, and output (forthcoming; 2007; and 1999, respectively). Following 
Uhlin’s model, the thesis groups different democratic values within these different 
categories. Input includes representation and inclusion; throughput includes 
transparency, accountability, participation, and deliberation; and output focuses on 
consequences (Uhlin forthcoming). The thesis then builds on this model by 
demonstrating how the importance of civil society contributions in the different 
categories (input, throughput, and output) varies depending on the political context in 
which civil society is operating. For instance, in an established democracy where most 
citizens access representation through existing government mechanisms, civil society 
may contribute to democracy primarily by enhancing throughput: for example, by 
holding policymakers accountable to acting on citizen input or facilitating citizen 
participation in decisionmaking. In an autocratic state, throughput may be irrelevant 
because there is no established norm of government responsiveness to citizens. 
However, civil society may contribute to democracy by working to establish such a 
norm through promoting citizen representation and inclusion.
This context-based framework incorporates the different values found in each 
of the traditional models of democracy described earlier (representative, participatory, 
and deliberative), as well as hybrid models. This allows the thesis to organize the 
existing literature, identifying fault lines between authors who previously may have 
seemed to talk past one another. It also enables the thesis to incorporate the 
development studies literature (which tends to focus on certain democratic values, such 
as participation, without always using the languages of democracy) into its analysis. 
Lastly, identifying the clear points of contention in the existing literature and 
establishing a framework for assessing civil society’s contributions to democratic 
governance facilitates the analysis of the data generated in this thesis. It enables the 
thesis to determine how its own findings reinforce or challenge viewpoints within the 
existing literature on civil society and the democratization of global governance.
This thesis’ second major contribution to the academic understanding of 
transnational civil society and its impact on global governance is through the 
generation of new empirical data. As noted earlier, the political science literature in 
particular features a dearth of academic-authored, empirical research on the impacts of
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civil society on global governance. Using a series of detailed case studies, this thesis 
examines the make-up of global advocacy campaigns, the mechanisms of civil society 
influence, and the outcomes of civil society engagement in transnational policymaking. 
As a result, the thesis engages with many key contentions in the literature regarding 
civil society’s identity, behavior, and impacts. Its findings reinforce some elements of 
the existing literature and challenge others.
The data generated present new insights into the impacts of civil society on 
policymaking at the World Bank. The Bank is an extremely influential global 
governance institution with direct influence in those nations to which it lends money 
and strong ties to the donor nations that help fund it. Thus developing new data on the 
World Bank is itself significant simply because of the institution’s reach and impact.
At the same time, the World Bank has been heavily targeted for reform by civil 
society organizations and, compared with other global governance organizations of 
similar power and influence, the Bank has been relatively amenable to engagement 
with civil society. As a result, the Bank has the potential to act as a leading indicator 
of civil society’s potential impact on global governance.6 Thus this thesis’ findings in 
the context of the World Bank may constitute an important confirmation of existing 
theories, as well as a starting point for new theory-building and additional research.
The Research Plan
Assessing civil society’s impact on democratic governance at the World Bank requires 
both defining democracy and determining how one would expect civil society to 
contribute to making World Bank policymaking more democratic. It also requires 
identifying case studies, and developing a methodology. The remainder of this chapter 
deals with these issues, and describes the specific research questions that the thesis will
6 It is important to acknowledge that the World Bank is unique among global governance institutions in 
terms of its scope of impact and degree of intervention: no other international institution lends money 
for ground-level projects on a global scale. The Bank’s level of intervention makes it easy to identify 
many of its stakeholders (including the farmers, fishermen, school children, and others affected by its 
lending) while its scope of lending makes this stakeholder base extremely large. Although the Bank’s 
footprint has made it an appealing target for reformers, it is only a leading indicator insofar as: (i) civil 
society organizations demonstrate an equal will for engaging other international institutions; and (ii) the 
stakeholders of other institutions can be clearly identified and their needs invoked as a grounds for 
reform. Nonetheless, regardless of whether this occurs, the degree of attention the Bank has received 
makes Bank policymaking an excellent environment in which to observe civil society behavior and 
influence.
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pose within its chosen cases. It also lays out the limits of this research and previews its 
findings.
Defining Democracy
As noted above, this thesis holds that the components of democracy can be divided 
into the categories of input, throughput, and output. This framework can allow 
different definitions of democracy and the theories of civil society impact based 
around them to be analyzed and compared, but the framework itself does not define 
democracy. Therefore, from an analytical standpoint, it is necessary to identify the 
particular definition of democracy to be used by this thesis. This definition of 
democracy will determine how different democratic values are placed in the input, 
throughput, output matrix. In effect, this thesis will identify its own definition of 
democracy and then use the input, throughput, output framework to compare other 
definitions of democracy and others’ theoretical findings with the thesis’ own 
definition and findings.
Defining democracy is complicated by the presence of multiple, competing 
definitions (Dahl 1999). Dahl points to two commonly held definitions: representative 
democracy, defined by citizen control over government exercised or enforced through 
regular elections, and liberal democracy, defined by the protection of basic human 
rights and political freedoms (1999).7 Moravcsik identifies four types of democracy 
commonly used in critiques of international institutions. His pluralist definition is akin 
to Dahl’s representative view, while his “libertarian” view parallels Dahl’s rights- 
based notion (2004 p. 339). To these two conceptions he adds social democratic and 
deliberative definitions. The former judges institutions on their success in balancing 
disequilibria in wealth and power. The latter stresses individual participation in 
decision making. Individual participation is substituted for representation, and 
vigorous debate, in which the best ideas should become manifest, replaces majoritarian 
politics (cf. Nanz and Steffek 2004). Held describes no fewer than 10 models of 
democracy, ranging from the classical to the cosmopolitan (2006). Choosing a 
definition is further complicated by the fact that, in practice, most commentators on 
civil society and global governance avoid adhering strictly to a single established
7 These rights are usually expressed in negative terms. The emphasis on creating an environment of 
personal and political freedom, rather than guaranteeing economic and social provision, is what 
distinguishes this view from the social democratic view described by Moravcsik.
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definition. Instead they tend to blend multiple elements into unique models of their 
own. Although these models bear many similarities, often in their emphasis on free 
participation, dialogue, or representation, their distinctions are such that it is difficult 
to compare them directly.8
Criteria fo r  the Definition
Choosing a definition for this thesis involved several considerations. First, the 
definition must be equally applicable to states, institutions, and civil society 
organizations and networks. Much of the literature on civil society and global 
governance is implicitly (or explicitly) a comparison of the relative democratic 
legitimacy of these three categories of actors. To fairly judge between them, the 
definition must apply to all three.
Applicability to states is particularly important because of the ways in which 
state-based democracy helps us understand democracy in practical, empirical terms.
As Moracvsik has noted, any definition of democracy must distinguish between a real- 
world application of that definition and the ideal, theoretical version. The levels of 
citizen participation, voter knowledge, or government transparency described in 
theoretical models are rarely, if ever, realized in practice. Nonetheless, nations 
approaching a certain theoretical ideal are recognized as democratic by academics, 
other states, or their own citizens. The compromises used in states help us identify 
empirically the ways in which theoretical ideals of democracy are adapted for 
implementation (Moravcsik 2004; cf. Dahl 1999).
Second, the definition used must facilitate this thesis’ engagement with the 
existing literature. The literature constitutes the current store of research and thought 
on this topic. This thesis necessarily builds on that work, and testing the conclusions 
of this thesis against existing ideas is crucial to the intellectual integrity of this 
research.
It is also important to note that, insofar as the focus of this thesis is on civil 
society’s contributions to democratizing global governance (albeit in the context of the 
World Bank), the definition must be designed to apply to global governance. Some of 
the recent discussions of civil society’s democratizing impacts seem to have conflated
8 Magdalena Bexell, Jonas Tallberg, and Anders Uhlin, “Democracy in Global Governance: The 
Promises and Pitfalls of Transnational Actors”. Paper presented at the Annual Conference of 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, London, October 25-26, 2008.
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democratic civil society (i.e. civil society organizations or movements that are 
internally democratic) with democratic global governance (i.e. global governance 
decisions reflecting the will of the impacted population). The assumption seems to be 
that if civil society has democratic attributes, it is de facto democratizing (or that if it 
does not, it is not). This thesis aims to avoid this conflation by establishing criteria for 
determining civil society’s contributions to democratic global governance that focus on 
civil society’s impact on citizens’ roles in transnational decisions.
Majoritarian, Liberal Democracy
To satisfy the aforementioned criteria, this thesis defines democracy as majoritarian, 
representative rule, accompanied by established protections for basic citizen rights.
The majoritarian, representative elements will be interpreted in the broadest possible 
terms, as equal authority among individual stakeholders and stakeholder control over 
national government or international institutions. Equal stakeholder authority refers to 
a combination of equal access to policymaking mechanisms, either directly or through 
a chosen representative, and equal value for the input of all stakeholders who choose to 
engage in the process. This could result in a unique voice for each individual, but in 
practice, authority is likely to be assigned to representatives in proportion to the 
number of stakeholders they represent. The concept is equivalent to the ideal of ‘one 
person, one vote’ found in most modem democracies, coupled with the proportional 
representation of, for example, political parties in some parliamentary systems. 
However, the term ‘equal authority’ is used because, for this democratic standard to be 
applied to civil society or to global governance institutions, it cannot be restricted 
specifically to voting or formal governance structures. Similarly, rights may include 
both formal constitutional or legal protections, or the establishment of a widely 
respected and accepted norm such as may be protected and upheld by citizen 
watchdogs.
This definition has been constructed to allow the definition to meet the criteria 
laid out in the preceding section. State-based democracy utilizes majority rule, in 
which some equally distributed measure of voice or authority is used by citizens to 
exercise control over the government (Dahl 1999). Historically, state democracy is 
almost always representative, and, at least in recent history, it commonly encompasses 
some measure of liberal protection of the rights of all citizens (ibid.). This 
understanding of democracy is not only embraced by state actors, but also a large
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number of practitioners, particularly those from the developing world (see, for 
example, Mobogori and Chigudu 1999; Naidoo and Tandon 1999; Wiesen, Prewitt, 
and Sobhan 1999; Marschall 1999). At the same time, eliminating the strict emphasis 
on voting allows this definition to accommodate pluralistic or participatory standards 
of democracy and creates space for the evolving representative mechanisms of the 
international institutions. Likewise, using both laws and norms as means of 
establishing rights creates common ground on which to evaluate the contributions of 
states, institutions, and civil society to rights protection. Using the language of both 
laws and norms also allows this definition to engage with both constructivist and 
realist literature.9
To elaborate, some measure of majority rule is inherent in almost every 
conception of rule by the people. Granted, Habermasian depictions of deliberative 
democracy take issue with this, but deliberative democracy requires open access in 
order to function. Only when all ideas can be brought to the debate is it guaranteed 
that discussion will reveal the ultimate good. Empirically speaking, there is abundant 
evidence that international policy discussions are not universally accessible, and that 
civil society itself may be dominated by elites (Nelson 1997; Simmons 1998;
Anderson 2000; Stone 2005; cf. Murphy 2005; cf. Edwards 2001 p. 9). In such a 
context, deliberative democracy has relevance primarily for future-oriented, normative 
debates, at least with regards to global governance. Were it currently applied to civil 
society, it seems unlikely that any international network or campaign would pass 
muster. Moreover, it is inapplicable to contemporary states.
In addition to being majoritarian, democracy is representative. There are two 
reasons for this. First, representative practices are nearly universal in democratic 
states. As Dahl notes, “in practice, all democratic systems, with the exception of a few 
very tiny communities, allow for, indeed depend on, delegation of power and 
authority; the citizen body delegates some decisions to others” (1999 p. 21). These 
designated persons are commissioned to represent or act on behalf of a particular 
population (ibid). Second, as noted earlier, data suggest that much of transnational
9 Examples found in this thesis include Barrnet and Finnemore (1999) and Dahl (1999), respectively. 
These terms are defined in more detail in Chapter 2. Each school describes a different view of the 
driving forces in international affairs: socially constructed norms or the military and material interests of 
individually states (Wendt 1995). Significantly, constructivists maintain that the power of norms, and 
the capacity for nonstate actors to propagate norms, has mitigated the state dominance of the 
international system.
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civil society is elite-driven. Nonetheless, many of its advocates argue that dominant 
elites can be representative. The issue is whether elites are representing the people 
they claim to represent. Put in terms of this thesis, the question is whether civil society 
in its aggregate represents the majority of the people impacted by the activity or policy 
in which it has involved itself.
Democracy includes the protection of citizen rights, as stipulated in Dahl’s 
liberal definition and Moravcsik’s libertarian one. Thus civil society may also effect 
democratization by seeking to protect certain recognized rights. Indeed, many civil 
society organizations claim to advocate for specific rights -  for global justice, human 
rights, environmental rights, and the like.
Some measure of rights protection, applicable to both majorities and minorities, 
is a commonly recognized feature of democratic states. Moreover many of the attacks 
on the ‘democratic deficit’ of global governance actors, i.e. states and international 
institutions, have focused explicitly on these actors’ perceived violations of citizen 
rights.10 Thus it is important to include rights as a component of democracy. Of 
course, some of the ‘rights’ protected by civil society groups are quite controversial, so 
a specific list of recognized rights is useful. Following Dahl, I would suggest that such 
a list include two categories of rights: those rights necessary for the effective 
functioning of democracy, including the freedoms of speech, press, and assembly; and 
those individual rights common to established democracies, including the rights to 
property, privacy, habeas corpus, freedom of religion, and equal treatment under the 
law (Dahl 1999 p. 20; see also Moravcsik 2004 p. 339). This list, of course, could be 
made more specific still. However, as Held has pointed out, the understanding of 
liberalism (and its constituent rights) has shifted historically (Held 2006 p. 59). The 
evolving nature of national and international law only underscores the fact that it 
continues to shift. For the purposes of this thesis, it is more important to establish that 
democracy involves both popular sovereignty and the protection of rights than it is to 
enumerate those rights in great detail. Moreover, most of the arguments I will make 
focus on the representative aspects of democracy. Thus, rather than trying to freeze
10 For example, several World Bank projects, such as Polonoroeste in Brazil, Sardar Sarovar in India, 
Indonesian Transmigration, and China Western, involved the forced resettlement of up to tens of 
thousands of citizens. Critics o f Polonoroeste, Indonesian Transmigration, and China Western in 
particular allege that these projects were used by authoritarian regimes to control internal dissent (Rich 
1994; Clark et al. 2003).
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the evolving concept of liberal rights, this thesis will simply describe democratic rights 
as those individual rights common to the majority of democratic states.
In summary, this thesis defines democracy as a system or pattern o f equal 
citizen authority or value expressed via some representative mechanism and resulting 
in government or institutional responsiveness to the will o f the majority, but under 
which the government or institution is also constrained to protect the liberal rights o f 
its citizens or stakeholders. The definition does not require that all citizens make use 
of their voice or actively participate, only that the mechanism of input (such as voting 
or otherwise) be equally accessible and provide for all participating voices to be 
equally valued. It also requires that the governance organization respond to the 
expressed will of the majority, and protect commonly recognized rights. This 
definition of democracy will be used to evaluate civil society’s contributions to 
democratic global governance in the context of the World Bank.
Determining Stakeholders
Global governance itself involves multiple institutions and regimes. Each has its own 
stakeholder population, because not all policies or governance decisions will 
necessarily affect the entire world. In practical terms, testing civil society’s capacity to 
democratize global governance requires identifying an institution or regime and its 
stakeholders. Although the World Bank claims that its mission is to “reduce global 
poverty”,11 some poor people are not eligible for Bank assistance. Only Bank member 
countries may receive Bank loans; thus only their citizens are likely to benefit directly. 
Moreover, the Bank’s reliance on regular donations from industrialized countries 
makes the citizens of those countries stakeholders as well. In principle the Bank is 
spending their money on their behalf. Therefore this study defines the Bank’s 
stakeholders as the citizens of the 186 nations holding membership in the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank’s central institution.12 
The words stakeholder and citizen are used interchangeably in this thesis to refer to 
members of this group.
11 World Bank, “About Us”, http://go.worldbank.org/DM4A38OWJ0, accessed 15 July 2009.
12 What is commonly referred to as the ‘World Bank’ actually consists of two institutions, the older 
IBRD, and the IDA. Other components of the World Bank Group include the International Finance 
Corporation and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. However, these are “affiliates” of the 
World Bank, not part of the Bank itself. Http://go.worldbank.org/3QT2PlGNH0, accessed 4 July 2009.
28
Assessing Democratization at the World Bank
Democracy, as defined above, requires equal citizen authority, majority rule, 
institutional responsiveness, and the protection of rights. This is not to ignore the 
importance of accountability, participation, or any of the other democratic values 
discussed earlier, in the description of the input, throughput, output framework. 
However, some elements of democracy are more crucial than others to achieving the 
sort of majoritarian, liberal democracy outlined above. Chapter 2 elaborates on this 
issue in greater detail and discusses how different elements of democracy fit into the 
input, throughput, output framework.
Here, however, it is necessary to note that not all elements of democracy can be 
directly tested in the context of the World Bank. In particular, determining whether 
the will of the majority of stakeholders is reflected in global governance decisions is 
nearly impossible. Determining the majority will would require some sort of global 
referenda or, from a research perspective, surveying millions of people in dozens of 
nations (cf. Held 2004). No such surveys have been conducted, nor has a referendum 
been held on any global policy,13 let alone any World Bank project or policy.
It is also difficult to examine changes in the Bank’s regard for liberal rights. 
Because of the World Bank’s role as an international financial institution lending 
money to support development and economic growth, relatively little of its work 
touches directly on issues of rights. Granted, the World Bank may impact individual 
rights. Its projects may support corrupt governments, undermine public safety, or 
abrogate the property rights of people living in its project areas. However, there is no 
evidence that the Bank deliberately engages in such activities, nor that it has such 
impacts consistently across the majority of its projects. Moreover, most of the Bank’s 
negative impacts result from project-specific decisions made by local, regional, or 
sectoral staff in conjunction with the government of a borrowing nation. They are not 
the result of a Bank-wide policy of malfeasance.
The Bank’s capacity to support liberal rights is also limited by its charter, 
which precludes its direct involvement in political issues. (In the later 1990s the Bank 
began to address borrower corruption, but only by designating it a barrier to 
development.) The Bank has developed a series of social and environmental
13 The EU constitution may be considered a partial example, except that referenda were not held in all 
EU states. Moreover, the EU is a regional body, not a global one.
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safeguards influenced by civil society, but these safeguards tend to focus on 
environmental or social impacts in ways that do not ascend to the level of commonly 
recognized rights. Moreover, they only pertain to Bank-funded activities. They may, 
in theory, create new precedents or norms, but because no country is bound to 
implement them outside of Bank activities, they do not create enduring rights.
Nonetheless, one can test whether civil society has contributed to other aspects 
of democracy, including equal citizen authority and institutional responsiveness. One 
can also examine the role of other democratic values, such as accountability and 
transparency, in achieving these ends. For instance, civil society could expand the 
access of currently marginalized stakeholders to international institutions, force a 
technocratic institution to respond to the demands of at least some citizens (even if the 
demands of the majority cannot be concretely identified), or hold leaders accountable 
to previously negotiated agreements or policies.
In the absence of reliable evidence of the majority will, demonstrating civil 
society’s contributions to these other components of democracy will not prove that 
civil society is democratizing policymaking at the World Bank. However, this thesis is 
primarily a test of existing claims. Therefore its focus is on attempting to falsify those 
theories which promote transnational civil society as a means of democratizing global 
governance. Data indicating that civil society fails to uphold any one aspect of 
democracy would be sufficient to qualify or amend those theories which claim that 
transnational civil society is democratizing global governance. At the same time, 
findings showing that civil society contributes to democratizing policymaking at the 
World Bank, even incompletely, would give some support to those theories which 
depict civil society as a solution to the democratic deficits in global governance. It 
also might support specific tenets of such theories even without proving them in their 
entirety, and it would highlight avenues for further research.
The Research Question
As noted earlier, the central question of this thesis is: do data about the World Bank 
support the idea that civil society can democratize global governance? To answer 
this question, the thesis will examine whether transnational civil society actually is 
democratizing Bank policymaking. There are three reasons for this. First, the best and 
most definitive evidence of transnational civil society’s capacities is demonstration of 
concrete achievement. This is particularly important in the realm of global
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governance, where the hypothesized capacities of international actors and regimes 
have frequently failed to live up to expectations.14 Second, it has been almost 20 years 
since civil society’s capacity to democratize global governance was discussed by 
scholars like Lipschutz and Shaw. In the intervening decades, civil society has 
demonstrated that it is indeed capable of changing the international system. Thus if its 
capacity to democratize global governance is real, then one would expect to find 
concrete evidence of democratizing impacts. Finally, a substantial portion of the 
literature on civil society and the democratization of global governance argues that 
civil society is democratizing on the basis of the impacts that civil society has already 
had. Thus, testing whether civil society is democratizing global governance on the 
basis of civil society’s concrete impacts allows the thesis to investigate directly some 
of the claims made in the literature.
A couple of caveats should be specified. First, one must differentiate between 
democratizing World Bank policy and democratizing the World Bank’s internal 
processes. A substantial body of literature exists examining how organizations 
themselves may be governed internally by representative processes, but it is not 
considered in this thesis. Creating internal democratic processes at the World Bank 
would do little to guarantee the balanced consideration of stakeholder interests. The 
Bank staff themselves are not the designated representatives of any group of 
stakeholders (except perhaps the president, who is chosen by the United States) and 
make most day-to-day decisions on a technical, rather than a political, basis. This is 
not to say that the Bank is apolitical; to the contrary, it is extremely political.
However, its political nature comes from the constant external pressure exerted on it 
by the governments of its various stakeholders to promote their national interests. 
Given the Bank’s technocratic internal environment and the high number of external 
inputs into its decisions, internal organizational democracy would do little to assure the 
equal representation of stakeholder interests or stakeholder control over policy 
decisions. Moreover, the thesis is using the World Bank to test the prevailing theories 
on the democratization of global governance, most of which focus on the impact of 
external forces on international institutions. Thus the focus is on the Bank’s responses
14 Numerous examples come to mind, the most recent being that the UN Convention on Genocide did 
not, despite anticipations, lead to UN intervention in Darfur once a genocide was publicly declared. See 
Bellamy, Alex and Paul Williams. 2006. The UN Security Council and the Question of Humanitarian 
Intervention in Darfur. Journal o f  M ilitary Ethics 5 (2): 144-160.
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to external pressure brought by transnational civil society, not on the democracy of the 
Bank’s internal processes.
It is also important to note that the Bank has a significant history of engaging 
with civil society in the course of project implementation. The Bank has long 
recognized that civil society involvement in development projects can increase the 
effectiveness and success rate of such projects. Consequently, the Bank has been 
regularly engaging with local civil society since the early 1990s. This involvement 
may have an admirable effect on democratizing local development (cf. Clark 1991; cf. 
Long 2001). However, local, project-specific decisions rarely translate into 
transnational policies. Moreover, many of the civil society organizations involved do 
not meet the definition of transnational civil society as their activities and connections 
are wholly local. For these reasons, this thesis focuses primarily on civil society 
engagement with the World Bank’s Washington-based policy processes.
To determine whether civil society is democratizing Bank policymaking, this 
thesis poses six sub-questions designed to ascertain how civil society contributes 
towards developing democratic input, throughput, and output at the World Bank. The 
questions are also designed to help the thesis engage with specific claims made in the 
literature.
Which civil society organizations are involved? The literature supporting civil 
society’s democratizing capacity indicates that civil society organizations from both 
the developed and developing nations are involved in transnational policymaking. The 
diversity of transnational civil society is part of what enables it, in theory, to represent 
the global citizenry. However, as noted earlier, there is some disagreement in the 
literature regarding whether transnational civil society is dominated by organizations 
from the developed world. Understanding which civil society organizations are 
involved is necessary to verify civil society’s diversity and it is an important 
preliminary step in determining whether some organizations have disproportionate 
power or impact.
How do civil society organizations interact with one another? Inclusivity, 
participation, and deliberation are all important democratic values used in the literature 
to support the idea of civil society’s democratizing capacity. The literature implies, or 
sometimes explicitly states, that civil society organizations dialogue with one another
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and engage in deliberative or consensual decision making. This sub-question tests that 
premise. Such testing is important because much of the literature on transnational civil 
society focuses on ad hoc campaigns in which the participating organizations hold very 
similar positions. Policymaking at the World Bank, however, has featured a greater 
diversity of views. By examining interactions between civil society organizations at 
the World Bank, this thesis aims to contribute to the understanding of how civil society 
organizations identify and handle differences and whether they engage in dialogue 
with each other.
How do civil society organizations choose their policy positions? A significant portion 
of the literature supporting transnational civil society’s capacity to democratize global 
governance posits that civil society advocacy arises from grassroots interests.
Although it is not possible to test how well civil society policy positions represent the 
interests of grassroots stakeholders due to the lack of data on such interests, it is 
possible to investigate how civil society organizations choose their policy positions.
For instance, some authors claim that international organizations consult with local 
partners in constructing policy positions, whereas critics have implied that 
organizations based in the rich world focus primarily on the demands of their rich 
world membership.
At the same time, several authors have suggested that funding concerns 
influence the activities of different organizations, especially NGOs providing 
development services. In particular, critics indicate that some NGOs tailor their 
activities to curry favor with their major donors. If this is the case in policy advocacy, 
civil society organizations may act as proxies for donor interests rather than as 
grassroots representatives. This sub-question addresses these tensions in the literature. 
It explores whether civil society organizations seek to include and represent more 
voices in constructing their policy positions, and also explores the influence of funding 
on advocacy.
What impact has civil society had on the World Bank? Two elements of democratic 
input and output are equal citizen representation and citizen control over governance 
institutions. By associating changes in Bank policy or behavior with the policy 
positions of specific organizations, the thesis can help determine whether some 
organizations are more powerful than others and contribute to debates in the literature
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about equality of stakeholder influence. Likewise, verifying that civil society actually 
can influence World Bank policy is an essential part of testing claims made about 
transnational civil society’s democratizing capacity.
By what mechanisms has impact been achieved? As noted earlier, the literature has 
yet to agree on exactly how civil society organizations achieve their impacts. One 
important theory is that civil society organizations rely on state power for their 
influence. This, in turn, leads to questions about civil society organization’s 
independence and agency, as well as the inclusivity of civil society as a whole.
Examining the mechanisms of influence also helps address the questions of 
equal access and authority among stakeholders. If the mechanisms by which civil 
society achieves its impact are accessible only to certain civil society organizations, 
this finding might strengthen the contention, made by some critics, that a small number 
of elite organizations (generally from the developed world) dominate civil society 
influence.
What impact does civil society have on the power o f developing country governments 
in transnational policymaking? Much of the concern about the democratic deficit in 
global governance focuses on the perceived marginalization of developing countries 
within the governance structures of international institutions. Thus the literature 
implies that the states may be an important means of representation for developing 
country citizens. Moreover, some civil society organizations and most international 
institutions recognize states (particularly democratic states) as important partners. 
However, some civil society organizations contest the legitimacy of states as popular 
representatives, and some researchers have indicated that civil society advocacy may 
further reduce the power of developing country governments in international 
policymaking. Explicitly examining the interaction between civil society and 
developing nations enables this thesis to address these issues and to develop a more 
nuanced and holistic picture of citizen input into transnational decision making.
Selection of Case Studies
These questions will be answered using a single, primary case study and two 
secondary case studies. A case study approach was chosen because of the number of 
‘how’ and ‘why’ type questions, described above, embedded in the larger thesis
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question. Although some aspects of the research question, such as the composition of 
civil society, could be answered by other methods such as surveying, most of the 
thesis’ sub-questions explore complex cause-and-effect relationships. Answering such 
questions requires examining “operational links needing to be traced over time”, an 
activity for which case studies are particularly well suited (Yin 1994 p. 5-6).
Moreover, the events to be researched have all taken place within recent memory or 
were taking place concurrently with the thesis, thus allowing the effective use of 
interviewing and participant observation. The combination of core questions and 
available methods suggested that a case study approach would be most appropriate 
(see Yin 1994 pp. 9).
The primary case study, the 10th replenishment of funds for the World Bank’s 
International Development Association, uses in-depth primary-source analysis of 
significant events in the Bank’s history to create a preliminary set of answers to the 
research questions. The study was based on extensive archival research using Bank, 
government, and civil society records, some of them privately held. Documentary 
analysis was complemented by intensive interviews with senior government, Bank, 
and civil society leaders with firsthand knowledge of key events. The hypotheses thus 
generated were tested in two subsequent case studies, the Arun III dam cancellation in 
Nepal and the Bank’s country systems policy. These cases were evaluated using a 
combination of primary-source information, including documentary research, 
interviews, and participant observation of the ongoing country systems negotiations, 
and as well as some secondary sources. The following sections explain why these case 
studies were chosen.
The Primary Case Study: The IDA-10
In 1960 the World Bank’s donors established the International Development 
Association (IDA). The IDA provides loans to clients on concessional terms, i.e. with 
long repayment periods and little or no interest. The IDA can also provide outright 
grants. For these reasons, it is the World Bank’s primary tool in addressing poverty in 
the world’s least developed countries. Because IDA lending, unlike normal Bank 
lending, is not readily repaid to the Bank, the Bank’s donors must replenish the IDA 
approximately every three years. These replenishments have become a major focus for 
the struggle to control the Bank, as interested parties seek to attach conditionalities to 
the Bank’s funding.
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thBetween 1992 and 1995, civil society organizations seized on the 10 
replenishment of the IDA (referred to simply as ‘the 10th IDA’ or ‘IDA-10’) to force 
reforms at the World Bank. Transnational civil society organizations sought to reduce 
the size and influence of the Bank, change its approach to development, and create 
new mechanisms for outside oversight and accountability. The resulting campaign 
was arguably the first truly global civil society reform effort. While the term ‘global 
civil society’ was already in use in 1992, the studies which popularized the term 
generally depicted campaigns centered on small groups of US and European NGOs 
(see, for example, Lipschutz 1992). Although these groups had global spheres of 
operations and influence, their membership was largely limited to the citizens of 
industrialized nations. These campaigns sometimes involved local partners, but such 
partners’ involvement tended to be ad hoc, focusing on mitigating the domestic 
impacts of a specific project (such as deforestation or forced resettlement) rather than 
the reform of a global policy. In contrast, campaigning on the 10th IDA involved 
nongovernmental organizations from every inhabited continent, and its reform agenda 
impacted scores of World Bank borrowers. In many regards then, the 10th IDA marks 
a key milestone for transnational civil society as an acknowledged international player 
in the modem era.
Moreover, this case formed a turning point in the Bank’s interactions with civil 
society. Many elements of the campaign were extremely successful. Civil society 
organizations succeeded in obstructing a significant portion of EDA funds. This 
funding cut forced the World Bank to recognize the importance of civil society actors 
in the international system and to create both formal and informal mechanisms for 
their continued involvement in Bank affairs. Following the cut in its IDA funding, the 
Bank’s management invited NGOs into more frequent policy consultations in an effort 
to forestall further attacks, giving civil society much greater influence over the 
institution’s policies. The World Bank also made specific concessions, including the 
creation of a new information disclosure policy and the World Bank Inspection Panel, 
that facilitated future civil society impacts.
Lastly, the IDA-10 has not been subjected to a detailed study. It has been 
given brief treatment in the Bank’s official history and one scholarly article, and some 
mention in various histories of the Bank’s Inspection Panel (see Kapur et al. 1997; 
Nelson 1997; Clark, et al 2003). However, the 10th IDA has yet to be the focus of a 
thorough investigation that treats it as an organic whole rather than simply highlighting
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selected outcomes. Thus, in addition to the political science contributions described 
earlier, this thesis is also contributing to the body of knowledge in political science and 
development studies by making a detailed study of an important milestone in the 
Bank’s policymaking history.
The Secondary Case Studies
The secondary case studies include the 1994-1996 campaign to cancel the World 
Bank’s Arun HI dam project in Nepal and the World Bank’s adoption of borrowers’ 
national systems for managing project procurement and finances in 2007-2008.15 The 
Arun ID case is significant because it involved the first appeal to the World Bank’s 
Inspection Panel. It is also interesting because it highlights the ways transnational 
activism can impact local democratic processes. The case study on the creation of the 
Bank’s Use of Country Systems for Procurement policy (commonly known as country 
systems) was chosen largely because it is very recent. It allows the thesis to test 
whether earlier trends continue through present day. Additional details on the 
selection of these case studies are given in Chapter 7.
Limits of this Approach
This thesis’ primary limitation is its number of case studies. The thesis has only three 
case studies, with just one forming the backbone of the thesis. However, in this 
research, depth has been preferable to breadth. The use of numerous, relatively 
shallow case studies can sometimes facilitate a ‘cream-skimming’ effect in which 
superficial examination and selective use of data creates the appearance of patterns 
where few exist. Some of the more theory-oriented literature on transnational civil 
society uses the sort of broad-brushstroke approach which may be susceptible to this 
problem. Therefore detailed empirical research is necessary to test and explore 
existing theories. Naturally the time and resource constraints of doctoral research limit 
the scope of the thesis. To facilitate maximum depth while still checking the 
applicability of my findings, I have chosen to focus on detailed research into a seminal 
moment for transnational civil society and for the World Bank, and then verify my 
findings via two additional case studies.
15 Additional details on the research methods used in these cases are found in Chapter 7.
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Methodology
In making its enquiry, the thesis uses individual civil society organizations as its unit 
of analysis. Many of the existing works on civil society referenced above use one or 
more civil society campaigns as their unit of analysis, or even civil society as a 
perceived whole. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, this can lead to a 
number of problems. A tendency to focus only on successful campaigns can lead to an 
overly rosy view of civil society. By examining a particular campaign from its 
endpoint and tracing it backwards towards it roots, researchers may overlook 
competing campaigns that died out or alternative voices that were excluded from the 
main effort. Looking at civil society as a universal whole (for example as Held or 
Nanz and Steffek do) can facilitate theory building, but the lack of data on the behavior 
and motivations of individual civil society organizations makes such an approach less 
useful for developing policy. To avoid or minimize these problems, this thesis 
examines the behavior of the forty-plus organizations involved in the IDA-10 
individually, and then builds a picture of civil society as an aggregate of their traits and 
actions.
Research for this thesis used a combination of document analysis, semi­
structured interviews, and participant observation. Most research was conducted in 
Washington, DC, with some phone interviews conducted with persons outside 
Washington. Research began with the collection and review of relevant documents, 
which allowed me to identify key actors for interviews. Interviews were also 
cascaded, with each informant suggesting additional contacts. Participant observation 
was used to collect data on the ongoing process by which the Bank was developing its 
policy on the Use of Country Systems for Procurement.
Document Analysis
Document analysis formed the backbone of the thesis. Document research began in 
October 2007 and was a major source of data for all three of the case studies used in 
the thesis. Six types of documents were analyzed: legislative records from Bank donor 
nations, particularly US Congressional records; World Bank records; US Treasury 
documents; civil society documents; contemporary media accounts; and published 
memoirs. The content of the documents was analyzed comparatively to establish a 
chronology of events and identify key actors. Communications between key actors
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were used to identify networks. Correspondence between actors also at times revealed 
actor motivations and causal linkages.
US Congressional records were obtained via the US Library of Congress.
These included all bills and amendments proposed in the House or Senate relevant to 
the IDA-10, including those that were not passed into law, as well as records of floor 
debate on these items. It also included the text of the final laws governing IDA 
appropriation and authorization. In addition, it included records of the three 
Congressional hearings held on the IDA and the World Bank in 1993, including all 
documents submitted by the civil society organizations participating. UK records of 
floor debates and voting on the IDA were also examined, and the Finnish decision not 
to fund the IDA-10 was verified from secondary sources.16
World Bank records included the various Operational Directives related to the 
demands made by civil society during the IDA-10 negotiations, as well as directives 
related to the Arun III project and draft copies of the Use of Country Systems (UCS) 
proposal. They also encompassed Bank press releases and Bank reports. These 
included Bank reports on specific projects and Inspection Panel reviews of certain 
loans. Bank records also included summaries of some Bank meetings with civil 
society on the IDA-10 and UCS.
US Treasury records provided accounts of the international IDA-10 
negotiations taking place between donor country deputies. I also obtained Treasury 
reports from 1992-93 detailing the Treasury’s proposed negotiating points for some of 
the deputy meetings. Some of these reports specifically noted the demands of US civil 
society. For research on later events, specifically the Use of Country Systems, 
confidential informants provided copies of Treasury emails to key actors.
Civil society documents came from a variety of sources. The Bank 
Information Center (BIC) provided hundreds of pages of faxes and letters from the 
IDA-10 campaign, revealing the patterns of interaction among dozens of civil society 
organizations. Because BIC provided documents it had received as well as those it had 
sent, this collection gave me access to memos and correspondence authored by 
Environment Defense, Greenpeace, Narmada Bachao Andolan, Rainforest Action 
Network, and a host of other organizations. The Charles Stewart Mott Foundation
16 As will be discussed in Chapter 3, Finland and the US were ultimately the only countries to withhold 
IDA-10 funding.
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provided a record of all of its grants related to international environmental advocacy 
between 1990 and 1994. Bread for the World provided copies of internal reports on 
the IDA from 1992 and minutes of its board of directors meetings from 1993. For 
some organizations, like 50 Years is Enough, historical records were also available via 
their websites. Actors involved in country systems negotiations also provided emails, 
including both internal strategy discussions and correspondence with US government 
officials.
Media accounts were used as an additional window on civil society and World 
Bank action. During the IDA-10 and Arun ID campaigns, the Bank and civil society 
organizations engaged each other through press conferences in Washington and Brazil 
and statements made in England, India, and Nepal. Media accounts also provided 
insight into the positions of borrowing country governments. Borrowers were 
excluded from IDA deputy meetings, so there are few contemporary records of their 
positions. Careful review of the media records, however, yielded a number of 
borrowing government statements on the IDA. The Nepalese government, including a 
number of key political figures, also used the press to express their views on the Arun 
ED project, the campaign against it, and the Bank’s cancellation of the project.
Published memoirs provided invaluable firsthand recollections of key events. 
Several government and civil society staff had written accounts of the Narmada Dam 
campaign for William Fisher’s Struggle Over a River, published in 1995.17 Others had 
contributed to Kevin Danaher’s Fifty Years is Enough, published in 1994. Bruce Rich 
had recorded his reflections on the 1980s global environmental movement in 
Mortgaging the Earth, published in 1994. Lori Udall, who led the Arun HI campaign 
for International Rivers, wrote about it in 1998, and one of the Inspection Panel 
members, Richard Bissell, published an account in 2003. These firsthand accounts, 
many of them written very close to the events being researched, provided invaluable 
detail.
Interviews
17 The Narmada Dam campaign focused on a World Bank project in India, with the most vociferous 
campaigners seeking the cancellation of the loans funding the dam. The campaign directly informed the 
attitudes and policy agendas of some of the major NGOs involved in the IDA-10 and helped lay the 
groundwork for the creation of the World Bank Inspection Panel. The Narmada campaign is discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 3.
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Intensive interviewing complemented the documentary research by providing 
additional details and insights, as well as giving the narrative a more human aspect. I 
conducted 26 interviews for this thesis between October 2007 and August 2008. 22 of 
these interviews were with senior sources in civil society, government, and the World 
Bank.
Interviews lasted an average of sixty minutes, with some interviews exceeding 
90 minutes in length. The interviews were extremely detailed. Major themes were 
maintained in each interview for the sake of consistency. However, aspects of each 
interview were tailored to the interviewee on the basis of the archival data. I also 
followed up with most interviewees via email, clarifying key points from the interview 
and garnering additional information.
The vast majority of interviews (19 out of 26) focused on the informant’s role 
in the IDA-10 process. Two interviews also emphasized the informants’ roles in the 
Narmada Dam project. Two interviews garnered additional background on the 
Country systems negotiations. (Most information on UCS, however, came from 
participant observation and is discussed below.) Three interviews were conducted 
with relevant Bank staff to develop information on the evolving role of the Bank’s 
Civil Society Team, pursuant to writing my policy recommendations. Additional 
interviews focused on the impacts of civil society advocacy since the IDA-10 period.
Interviewees for these interviews were chosen for their direct, personal 
involvement in the IDA-10. As noted, interviewees were initially identified via 
document analysis. Content analysis of the Congressional records and media accounts 
and network analysis of the BIC faxes helped identify key actors. I also cascaded my 
interviews, asking each interviewee to recommend other potential sources. Lastly I 
used my network of contacts from previous research at the World Bank and business 
consulting in Washington to identify those Bank staff and US government staff who 
had been directly involved in the IDA-10.
I wanted to be able to readily compare data from different interviews and to 
solicit the responses of a diverse group of actors to certain questions I had already 
identified. However, I also wanted the freedom to explore new lines of questioning as 
they presented themselves.18 Therefore I chose to make my interviews semi-structured
18 For instance, the thesis’ exploration of funding evolved out of early interviewee responses to 
questions about sources of divisions among civil society actors.
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(cf. May 1997 p. 111).19 Areas of enquiry included the history and background of the 
interviewee’s organization; their connection to the IDA; their organization’s major 
issues of concern; its position on whether the IDA should be replenished; and why and 
how that position had been chosen. I also asked them with which other organizations 
they collaborated, how that collaboration developed, and whether there was tension 
among the CSOs involved in the IDA (and if so, what sort of tension and why). I 
enquired about their funding sources and any impact that funding had had on their 
organization’s behaviour. I also asked about the post-ID A-10 period, including how 
alliances built during the IDA-10 had fared later and what sort of work their 
organization was doing now.
Most of the civil society, Bank, and US government staff involved in the IDA- 
10 were still in Washington, DC. Many of these persons had enjoyed successful 
careers, so most interviews were very high-level. Some interviewees also worked for 
organizations that did not permit their staff to speak on the record. Most interviewees 
are not identified by name in this thesis, but nearly all interviewees agreed to be 
identified to the examiners for the purpose of the viva. A list of the interviewees and 
their organizations will be made available to the examiners but will not be bound with 
the thesis.
Because fifteen years had elapsed between the IDA-10 and the interviews, it 
was important to control for recall error. This was done by asking respondents 
questions the answers to which I could check against documentary sources. First, 
interviewees were asked questions about the history of their organization’s 
involvement with the IDA-10, which encouraged them to lay out a timeline. This, in 
turn, was checked against the chronology of key events established via the 
documentary research. Similarly, respondents were asked about key associations or 
participation in key meetings for which I already had records. Most respondents had a 
very clear recollection of events. However, where their memory of verifiable facts 
contradicted the written records, that section of the interview was viewed as unreliable 
and data from it was not used in the thesis.
Because people actively construct memories, another concern was that 
interviewees might have reconstructed their impressions of events over time (see, for 
example, Lewis 2008). For instance, my documentary research led me to believe that
19 A sample interview protocol will be provided to examiners upon request.
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there was significant tension between some development NGOs and environmentalists 
over the tactics employed by the latter during the IDA-10, particularly the 
environmentalist-led effort to cut IDA funding. In conducting interviews, however, I 
was initially concerned that some actors from development NGOs would be inclined to 
remember those tactics more favorably because the tactics eventually produced 
outcomes, such as the creation of the World Bank Inspection Panel, that are now 
widely seen as positive. The danger of such reconstruction was mitigated in two ways: 
through the stmcture of the interview and a diversity of sources. First, each interview 
began with a series of factual, historical questions designed to help interviewees recall 
the specific historical context of key events. Interviewees were then asked to share 
their more subjective impressions from within that historical mental space (e.g. ‘How 
did you feel about X at the time?’), rather than to share their current reflections on past 
events (e.g. ‘Looking back, how do you feel about X?’). Second, interviews were 
conducted with a diverse group of sources. Actors came from civil society, 
government, and the Bank. Within civil society, interviewees came from a diversity of 
organizations. Within the Bank and government, they came from a diversity of 
departments. Some were retired; some were actively employed. While any given 
individual may have reconstructed elements of his or her experiences, it was unlikely 
that all sources would redact their experiences in the same way. There was little 
likelihood of group-think, nor were there consistent career pressures. Thus I am 
confident that those points agreed upon by multiple sources represented an accurate 
description of events. In the case mentioned above, regarding development NGO 
impressions of environmentalist tactics, I found over time that most development NGO 
respondents had nuanced reflections that I perceived to be accurate: some articulated to 
me how their impressions of environmental advocacy had changed over time and one 
even provided a specific date for when his organization began considering the benefits 
of environmentalist advocacy tactics.
Participant Observation
I used participant observation to collect data on the ongoing negotiations over the 
Bank’s proposed policy on the Use of Country Systems for Procurement. Observation 
involved attending three meetings between November and December 2007: a Bank 
consultation with business in Washington; a Bank consultation with business in New 
York; and a Bank consultation with civil society in Washington. All meetings were
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public and ‘on the record’. I observed and made notes on the proceedings of each 
meeting. I posed questions in the New York meeting and in the Washington civil 
society consultation. I also spoke with as many of the participants in each meeting as I 
could, either before or after the meeting, to gather information on their organizational 
affiliation and views on the proposed policy.
I corresponded with some participants over email subsequent to the meetings in 
which we had both participated. These participants provided me with records of other 
consultations and of their meetings with key policymakers.
This engagement served several purposes. Attendance at multiple meetings 
allowed me to observe how the Bank’s public presentation of its policy evolved in 
response to criticism. I was also able to compare Bank staff promises during the 
meetings regarding what would be included in the policy to what was ultimately 
included in the final version; this provided some measure of the sincerity of the Bank’s 
public statements. Various participants in the meetings had developed transnational 
networks of colleagues also engaging with the Bank on the UCS policy. Meeting the 
participants and tying into their networks gave me a cross-section (albeit still a limited 
one) of the organizations involved. Lastly, I compared my personal records of the 
meetings with the Bank’s public reports on the meetings to verify claims that the Bank 
was omitting critical comments from its public reports.
Limits o f the Research
Not all of the data collection attempts made for this thesis were successful. Two 
instances stand out: my effort to obtain additional information on CSO funding and my 
efforts to contact developing country leaders and civil society members involved in the 
IDA-10. Given the potential significance of funding in determining participation in 
the IDA-10,1 sought to locate objective documentary evidence on organizational 
funding. I therefore filed requests with the Internal Revenue Service in the United 
States for summaries of the 1992 tax records for all 18 of the US-based organizations 
involved in the IDA-10. These records would have listed summaries of organizational 
income and provided an indication of the types of funding received (grants, aid 
contracts, membership fees, etc.) The IRS responded that it had no record of tax 
payments by certain of these organizations (for example, the US Catholic Conference 
of Bishops). For the majority, it responded that it no longer retained tax records from 
the year requested. Since I was lacking tax information on approximately half of the
44
IDA participants, I did not attempt to obtain tax records for organizations based 
outside the US. Instead I relied on the recollections of participants regarding funding 
for their organizations. In many cases this was verified by cross-reference to 
documents supplied by the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation (which had retained 
records on its giving from the early 1990s) or substantiated by research into 
organizations’ histories and current funding structures.
The actions and opinions of developing country actors (both civil society and 
government) feature throughout the thesis. Because these actors were scattered 
throughout the world, traveling to interview them was economically unfeasible. I 
sought contact information on many key actors for the sake of arranging phone 
interviews, but these efforts were unsuccessful. Developing country government staff 
involved with the IDA-10 were no longer in Washington and contact information 
could not be identified via internet searches. Some of the civil society organizations 
involved in the IDA-10 were likewise untraceable and some may have no longer been 
in existence. Requests for interviews or for contact information on the leaders who 
had been involved in the IDA-10 went unanswered. In the case of the Forum of 
African Voluntary Development Organizations (FAVDO), one of the key developing 
country actors involved, I also sought contact information through a senior source at 
InterAction, which had previously provided office space for a FAVDO representative. 
This arrangement had ended, however, and my source had no information on how 
FAVDO’s representative from 1992-1993 might be contacted. Documentary evidence, 
however, provided significant information on the positions and behavior of developing 
country governments and organizations. Developing country organizations featured in 
Bank records, Congressional hearings, the BIC faxes, published memoirs, and 
contemporary media accounts. Borrower government opinions were likewise featured 
in contemporary media accounts and published memoirs. Information was sufficient 
to form a detailed picture and to cross-reference information to verify specific aspects.
I therefore used documentary sources alone for this portion of the research.
Structure of the Thesis
Including this introduction, this thesis has eight chapters. Chapter 2 provides a review 
of the relevant literature on transnational civil society and global governance and 
identifies the key questions in the literature. It then uses the work of Uhlin,
Dingwerth, and Scharpf to divide democracy into input, throughput, and output
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components. The chapter then builds on these authors’ work by identifying the 
different contexts and roles in which civil society can operate, ranging from 
undemocratic states to supranational policymaking, and shows how civil society must 
support different components of democracy in order to democratize governance in 
each context. It uses this analysis to organize the literature and to highlight limitations 
in the existing research.
Chapter 3 is a chronology of the 10th IDA. It covers the interactions between 
civil society and the World Bank leading up to the IDA-10, highlights key events in 
the negotiations, and details the outcomes. The chapter identifies the key transnational 
civil society actors engaged with the IDA, and finds that the actors formed two distinct 
groups with diverging policy interests, one supporting full IDA funding and one 
opposing it. This fracture within civil society allows the thesis to analyze civil 
society’s motivations, impact, and representation via comparisons between the two 
factions in subsequent chapters.
Chapter 4 examines the possible explanations for the divisions within the IDA- 
10 civil society group. It explores the roles of Northern and Southern affiliation, 
ideology, and financing. Ideology or mission appear to have determined the policy 
positions of most organizations, while financial incentives influenced which 
organizations participated in the IDA-10 process. The chapter gives particular 
attention to the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, which funded the activities of 
several key participants, and identifies a possible principal-agent relationship. 
Diverging financial interests are also found to lead to a lack of dialogue or compromise 
among the organizations being researched.
Chapter 5 analyzes the mechanisms by which civil society organizations 
exerted influence over the World Bank. It explores the roles of transparency, 
accountability, and dialogue in increasing institutional responsiveness to stakeholders 
and shows how these elements were used during the 10th IDA. The evidence collected 
shows how the most effective tool used was financial leverage exercised via the US 
government. Such leverage was only available to US-based NGOs with strong 
political connections. This explains why the anti-IDA faction was able to carry its 
agenda over the objections of the numerically larger pro-IDA faction. These findings 
highlight the role of nation-states in facilitating civil society influence on global 
governance. They also indicate that although civil society may increase institutional
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responsiveness to certain stakeholders, its reliance on powerful states may undermine 
the cause of improved stakeholder equality.
Chapter 6 examines the impact of transnational advocacy on the capacity of 
states, particularly Bank borrowers, to act as representatives of stakeholder 
populations. It looks at the effect of transnational advocacy on the role of states in 
Bank policymaking, and at the effect of international campaigns on the internal 
policymaking processes of target countries. It also examines the role of local partners 
in transnational coalitions. The chapter finds that transnational civil society weakened 
the bargaining power of borrowing state governments during the IDA-10 by 
challenging the credibility and authority of borrower governments in World Bank 
policymaking. The data indicates that the presence of local partners in international 
coalitions is no guarantee of their representivity and that transnational civil society 
activity targeting borrower countries has the potential to negatively impact the self- 
governance of the national population.
Chapter 7 tests whether the patterns observed in the IDA-10 are repeated in the 
Arun IE anti-dam campaign and the World Bank’s adoption of country systems for 
procurement. The chapter finds strong support for civil society’s reliance on national 
influence in policymaking, and strong indications that this privileges better-connected 
actors. It also finds some indication that civil society involvement in policymaking is 
driven by a combination of financial and ideological pressures, and that dialogue 
among civil society organizations is limited. The Arun m  case provides particularly 
strong evidence of international civil society ignoring the expressed will of local 
stakeholders and hindering national democratic practices.
Chapter 8 summarizes the findings of the thesis and examines the implications 
of the data from the World Bank research for the understanding, particularly within 
political science, of transnational civil society and its contributions to democratic 
global governance. Among other things, this chapter highlights the significance of the 
context-based assessment of civil society contributions to democratization, challenges 
claims of civil society’s representivity, and elaborates on the importance of North- 
South-North patterns of global advocacy. It also makes recommendations for further 
academic research on transnational civil society and global governance. Finally, this 
chapter suggests ways in which the World Bank can channel civil society influence to 
produce more democratic policymaking processes and puts forward some ways in
which civil society itself can enhance its representivity through improved 
accountability, transparency, and internal dialogue.
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Chapter 2
Context, Role, and Legitimacy
In order to better understand how the data generated in this research interacts with 
existing theories on transnational civil society and global governance, this chapter 
reviews the relevant academic literature. This chapter also presents a new framework 
for organizing that literature and for examining civil society’s impact on the 
development of democratic global governance. These two components, the review of 
the literature and the framework for assessing democratization, allow the thesis to 
analyze civil society’s impact on global governance in the context of the World Bank 
and to understand how those findings reinforce, challenge, or expand on the existing 
literature.
As transnational civil society has become a prominent feature of world politics, 
a number of problems have arisen regarding its study. Early research and analytical 
theory on civil society in international relations was dominated by a desire to 
demonstrate the potential for an alternative to the state-based study of international 
affairs. Thus the early literature, particularly from the constructivist school, focused 
on demonstrating civil society’s impact. Now that that impact has been proven, new 
questions have arisen regarding the civil society’s impacts and behavior. Civil society 
is frequently heralded as a key component of more responsive, just, or democratic 
global governance. Nonetheless, as noted in the previous chapter, a variety of 
researchers have called into question civil society organizations’ motivations, 
representivity, and democratic credentials (for example, Bowden 2006; Cooley and 
Ron 2002; Foley and Edwards 1996; Nelson 1997). These concerns, in turn, raise 
questions about civil society’s capacity to democratize global governance.
The majority of authors still hold that civil society can contribute positively to 
global governance, but they suggest a wide variety of prescriptions forjudging or 
improving civil society’s performance. Some authors stress transparency or 
accountability (Scholte 2004; cf. Nelson 1997). Others emphasize participation or 
deliberation (Nanz and Steffek 2004; Payne 1996). Representation of disempowered 
populations is another common source of credibility (Keck and Sikkink 1998;
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Grzybowski 2000; Nelson 1997). Still others judge civil society primarily by its 
impacts, usually emphasizing its positive ones (Rich 1994; Florini 2003; see also 
Lipschutz 1992). This wide divergence reflects a clear lack of consensus on the 
criteria by which democratization should be judged. This lack of consensus, in turn, 
has led to a fractured literature and a dearth of clear-cut debates. The literature itself 
fails to highlight clear axes of argumentation which might be evaluated and 
comparatively judged.
This chapter seeks to identify common flaws in the standards used for 
evaluating civil society’s impact on global governance and to develop an analytical 
framework based on civil society’s contributions to democratization. In keeping with 
the existing literature, this thesis uses the term ‘democratic legitimacy’ to describe 
civil society’s capacity to contribute to democratic governance. As applied by Scharpf 
to the European Union, the term democratic legitimacy refers to the characteristics 
which make a government or international institution democratic. Its application to 
civil society, however, should be clarified since civil society does not directly govern 
world affairs and because the thesis seeks to assess civil society’s contributions to 
democratic governance of the World Bank, rather than the internal characteristics of 
civil society itself.1 Therefore, this thesis uses ‘democratic legitimacy’ to describe 
civil society’s contributions to creating or maintaining a democratic system. Civil 
society organizations (individually and collectively) are judged to be democratically 
legitimate when they contribute to creating or maintaining democratic governance 
within the context in which they operate.
Drawing on the definition of democracy laid out in Chapter 1, this chapter 
shows how, in different contexts, civil society occupies different roles and must be 
judged differently. Dividing the concept of democratic legitimacy into three 
categories, this chapter shows how the relative importance of civil society’s input, 
throughput, or output legitimacy varies depending upon the other democratic 
protections available to the applicable demos.
To help highlight the impacts of context and the ways in which civil society 
can respond to it in a democratically constructive way, I have used the language of
1 Given that civil society organizations claim to represent only a fraction o f the world’s population, there 
is no guarantee that internally democratic organizations would yield democratic global governance. 
Moreover, research indicates that civil society organizations need not be internally democratic in order 
to contribute to democratization (Kopecky and Mudde 2004).
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‘roles.’ Within the national context, civil society can act as a Reformer, seeking to 
reform or replace an undemocratic regime and install a democratic one, or as an 
Advocate representing the interests of particular groups within a democratic system. In 
either the state or international context, civil society can act as an Agent working on 
behalf of the state or international institutions. Finally, in the global context, civil 
society may also act as an Authority contributing actively to the creation and 
enforcement of global norms and policy. The reason why each of these roles is 
associated with a specific context is explained below.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, this approach requires deconstructing 
democratic legitimacy into three parts: input (such as grassroots participation), 
throughput (such as transparency), and output (mainly impacts) and examining the 
relative importance of each element in a given context. This method has several 
virtues. First, it allows us to examine and compare the standards of legitimacy 
currently applied to civil society. This helps organize the literature, laying the 
framework for future debates. Second, by separating the state and international 
contexts, it shows which elements of domestic legitimacy may be applied to 
international actors, contributing to (and hopefully clarifying) the ongoing debate on 
the relevance of the domestic model in the analysis of international civil society.
Third, it allows me to use the national-international comparison to demonstrate the 
need to develop new standards for assessing the contributions to democracy of 
international actors.
This chapter will proceed in five parts. I will begin by reviewing the literature 
on transnational civil society and identifying questions in need of clarification. Next, I 
will disaggregate democratic legitimacy and discuss its various elements. Third, I will 
identify the four contexts in which civil society may act and elaborate the rationale for 
judging democratic legitimacy differently in each context. Fourth, using insights from 
this analysis of contextual legitimacy, I will highlight two important problems in the 
current analysis of the legitimacy of transnational nongovernmental actors. Finally, I 
will discuss ways in which this thesis will utilize a contextual understanding of 
legitimacy and contribute to the remaining questions in the literature.
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Framing the Problem
Academic writing on civil society and international affairs dates back over thirty 
years.2 In 1976 Mansbach, Ferguson, and Lampert defined “the interstate 
nongovernmental actor” as encompassing “individuals who reside in several nation­
states but do not represent the governments of these states”, and included such actors 
alongside states and intergovernmental organizations as key players in the international 
system (pp. 39-40). Other early writings focused on international pressure groups and 
the international impact of trade unions (Willetts 1982; Taylor 1984, respectively). 
Literature on international civil society, however, did not reach critical mass until the 
early 1990s, when a more regular dialogue began on the role of transnational civil 
society in global affairs (Florini and Simmons 2000 p. 8). Whereas earlier efforts were 
largely empirical, these new writings were prompted by a variety of theoretical, 
normative, and empirical interests. Since then, shifting foci within the field, combined 
with a multiplicity of approaches, have led to a fractured and at times meandering 
body of literature.
Some of the first instances of the term ‘global civil society’ appear in articles 
published by Martin Shaw and Ronald Lipschutz in 1992. Lipschutz wrote that global 
civil society was creating new “imagined communities,” a form of transnational demos 
that would “challenge, from below, the nation-state system” (p. 391). He applauded 
this change and embraced an explicitly normative agenda, calling for academics to 
“undertake the reconstruction of world politics” to facilitate civil society’s growing 
role (p. 420). Shaw took a slightly more cautious approach. He agreed that the 
growing power of civil society “challenged the principles of sovereignty and non­
intervention” at the heart of the state system (p. 432), and that civil society’s growing 
power required a rethinking of international theory. However, he did not think the 
“global society perspective” would “become central to world politics in the short or 
medium term” (p. 434). These pieces were followed by a host of others, many of them 
arguing for the potential of civil society to revolutionize global governance. Some
2 There is also a large body of practitioner-authored literature, much of it contained in high quality 
monographs and edited volumes rather than the typical reports and white papers (such as Clark 1991; 
Mehta 1992; Rich 1994; Udall 1995; Patel 1995; Treakle 1998; Naidoo et al. 1999; Long 2001). As 
Keck and Sikkink wrote in 1998, academics studying transnational civil society were “coming late to the 
party” (p. 4). These practitioner-authored works are important sources of empirical data and many are 
referenced in this thesis. However, these works have had a limited role in theory-building. Therefore 
they are not surveyed in this chronology.
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argued for civil society’s democratizing potential (e.g. Held 1995; Spiro 1995; Payne 
1996) whereas others simply emphasized its power and influence (e.g. Willetts 1996; 
Nelson 1997; Meyer 1997).
Most of this writing reflected the effort, often led by constructivists, to break 
free from a state-based, realist depiction of international relations. Constructivists 
argued that “processes of interaction produce and reproduce the social structures...that 
shape actors’ identities and interests and the significance of their material contexts” 
(Wendt 1995 p. 81). Constructivists and others contested the dominant materialist 
perspectives in international relations which depicted state power as the predominant 
explanation for international events and decisions. They also contested rational choice 
theories which depicted states and other actors as unchanged by their interactions with 
one another (cf. Wendt 1995). The influence of civil society and the existence of 
transnational networks were important proofs that states were no longer the sole 
legitimate focus of study in international relations. Civil society’s power to create 
norms and influence policy indicated that there was a locus of power outside the state 
and a means of power other than material dominance. The creation and adoption of 
international norms also indicated that states’ interests could shift over time (cf. 
Evangelista 1999; cf. Clark 2001). Similarly, the idea of globe-spanning citizens’ 
networks provided an alternative to the vision of international anarchy and isolated 
states favored by realists and rational choice theory. Many early writings reflect this 
thinking, arguing for the power of civil society to redefine norms and shape interests, 
especially for international institutions.
The focus on theory-building in the mid-1990s sometimes eclipsed empirical 
research. International relations writings about civil society often seemed to rely on 
media depictions of current events rather than carefully investigated case studies. At 
the same time, the case for civil society’s democratizing potential was more inferred 
than proven, sometimes from the precedent of the civil-society driven democratization 
of South American and Eastern European nations (Bowden 2006; cf. Fatton 1995; cf. 
Lipschutz 1992; cf. Foley and Edwards 1996). The constructivist focus on norms and 
impacts left civil society advocates open to the charge of ignoring questions of agency 
by not specifying clearly the means by which civil society achieved its influence (Price 
2003). Other critics challenged the relevance of national experiences to the global 
context (Bowden 2006; Goodhard 2005). A number of authors also suggested that
53
early writing on civil society ignored the ways in which the complexities of global 
advocacy might inhibit genuinely democratic representation. They noted that effective 
global advocacy relied on coercive power available only to a minority of NGOs and 
that the political bargaining in which powerful NGOs engaged was neither transparent 
nor accountable to many of the people it affected (Foley and Edwards 1996; Nelson 
1997; cf. Tvedt 2002).
This wave of critique resulted in a number of strong, interdisciplinary works 
that combined constructivism with rational analysis. They focused on civil society’s 
ability to upend the state system by introducing new norms while still relying on some 
state mechanisms to implement and enforce standards (Price 2003). Chief among 
these was Keck and Sikkink’s Activists Beyond Borders which laid out the ‘boomerang 
theory’ of transnational advocacy, depicting how weak advocates in developing 
nations might enlist the aid of partners in powerful states who would use pressure from 
their own powerful governments to clear the political obstacles faced by their 
developing country partners (1998). Fox and Brown’s The Struggle for Accountability 
made an empirical assessment of civil society’s impacts on the World Bank, using case 
studies authored primarily by practitioners (1998). Florini’s The Third Force 
continued this approach. It stressed civil society’s increasing importance “for the 
larger problem of global governance” while emphasizing the tendency of civil society 
organizations to pursue “their [own] conceptions of what constitutes the public good” 
(Florini and Simmons 2000 pp. 5, 7). The volume included a number of case studies, 
including Risse’s depiction of a “norm spiral” in which Keck and Sikkink’s 
boomerang of influence bounced back and forth among civil society actors and states 
for an extended period, developing new norms via repeated, incremental impacts (2000 
pp. 189-91).
These new works helped address some problems of theory and method but they 
did little to tackle growing concerns about the legitimacy of civil society. Continued 
questions remained about civil society’s democratic credentials, particularly its 
accountability and transparency (Nelson 2000; Scholte 2004). Some work challenged 
whether civil society could function democratically outside the boundaries of the state 
(Bowden 2006). Still other authors challenged constructivist assumptions about civil 
society autonomy from the state or material interests (Tvedt 2002; Cooley and Ron 
2002; Raustiala 1997).
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One persistent concern was that civil society, particularly at the global level, 
was fundamentally dominated by elites. Research from both development studies 
(Nelson 2000; Murphy 2005) and political science (Anderson 2000) highlighted civil 
society’s use of elite mechanisms -  modes of influence only accessible to a well- 
connected or well-resourced minority of the interested participants in a given process. 
Some have suggested that civil society replicated and magnified the power imbalances 
of the old state system rather than remedying them (Woods 2000, 2005; Manji and 
O’Coill 2008). Similarly, Stone has argued that the complex nature of global networks 
belies claims for their democratizing potential, noting that “the extent to which global 
and regional networks become a focal point of public affairs has meaning primarily for 
those who have the resources, patronage or expertise” to participate in transnational 
discussions (2005 p. 89). These concerns contribute to the continuing debate among 
academics and practitioners on the appropriate role for civil society in global 
governance.
Defining Lines o f Argumentation
Numerous fault-lines exist within this body of literature. Fractures center on the 
understanding of civil society, the model of global governance, and the definition of 
democracy. Further complicating factors are the divisions between normative and 
empirical approaches and among various schools of academic research. The challenge 
in organizing the literature is two-fold. First, most of these faults are multilateral, with 
a spider web of cracks separating multiple theories rather a simple binary division. 
Second, most authors writing about civil society manage to cross multiple fault lines as 
they write simultaneously about civil society, global governance, and democracy (or 
the lack thereof).
The most obvious debate centers on civil society’s behavior and motivation. 
Some authors maintain that civil society genuinely “rescue[s] the causes of 
marginalized or excluded groups” (Gryzbowski 2000 p. 442). Others insist that civil 
society pursues its own understanding of the public good (Florini and Simmons 2000; 
Nelson 1997). Some focus on the diversity of organizations, reminding us that not all 
civil society is truly ‘civil’ -  i.e. nonviolent or interested in upholding the common 
good (Foley and Edwards 1996). The skeptics insist that civil society can be highly 
parochial, with transnational actors based in the global North promoting Northern or
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rich-world policies for Southern or poor populations (Woods 2005; Nelson 2000; cf. 
Stiglitz 1999). The most pessimistic of all insist that civil society is materially driven 
and self-interested (Cooley and Ron 2002) or even assists in an imperial agenda (Manji 
and O’Coill 2008).
A second disagreement is over the shape of global governance. Authors of the 
cosmopolitan school argue for the eventual dissolution of national governments or 
predict the rise of a global superstate (Korten 1998; Held 2004, 2006; cf. Nanz and 
Steffek 2004). Others argue for the enduring power and importance of states and 
institutions, including a role for states or international organizations in implementing 
the civil society agenda (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse 2000; Clark 2001). Again, a 
critical minority questions whether democratic global governance is even possible 
(Dahl 1999) and whether civil society is just a tool of the state (Raustiala 1997).
The definition of democracy forms another set of faults. Bexell, Tallberg, and 
Uhlin have observed that while normative democratic theory manifests a “trichotomy” 
of separate representative, participatory, and deliberative models, writers on global 
governance feel free to sample from and combine these strands (2008). Held’s vision 
of cosmopolitan democracy, for instance, mixes elements of all three models (Held 
2006). Nanz and Steffek take a more purely deliberative approach (2004). An 
emphasis on participation is common among advocates for civil society participation 
in global governance (Payne 1996; Gryzbowski 2000), while others use accountability 
as a proxy for equal representation (Scholte 2004; cf. Nelson 1997).
Over this fractured ground is laid another set of complicating factors. 
Normative political theorists, many working on visions of cosmopolitan democracy, 
have created elaborate arguments for how civil society could or should be.
Researchers with a more empirical bent have taken issue with the gap between civil 
society’s idealized behavior and current reality. At the same time, variations in 
approach among international relations, international political economy, development 
studies, and non-academic practitioners further complicate the problem.
A Standard for Evaluation
As noted, this thesis is uses research done in the context of the World Bank to 
contribute to the ongoing academic dialogue on civil society’s capacity to democratize 
global governance. Much of the broader dialogue focuses on civil society’s capacity to
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democratize national or international systems. Thus a means of assessment based on 
democracy is both appropriate and widely applicable. Evaluating the literature on civil 
society, however, requires that one first define civil society in precise terms, and 
creating standards for evaluation requires defining democracy. Thus it is helpful to 
review this thesis’ definitions of civil society and democracy.
Delimiting Civil Society
In pursuing this analysis, it is helpful to distinguish between civil society and 
transnational civil society. In keeping with Chapter 1 ,1 define civil society as any 
formal or informal association o f individuals which is involved in the creation, reform, 
or implementation o f policies and norms, provided that the association is not primarily 
a part o f a government or a governance institution, nor o f a profit-making enterprise. 
This definition thus includes professional NGOs, social movements, trade unions, faith 
groups, and foundations. It makes no distinction between ‘civil’ and ‘uncivil’ groups. 
It excludes government departments and corporations, but recognizes that some civil 
society organizations will engage and even act on behalf of the political and 
commercial sectors. The definition includes all nongovernment, noncommercial 
groups acting to impact or implement policy and norms. It thus includes both 
advocates and service providers.
Transnational civil society (sometimes referred to as international or global 
civil society) refers to those civil society actors who engage in activity beyond the 
borders of their own state, or whose domestic activities are linked to nongovernmental, 
noncommercial actors beyond their own state. Thus it includes international 
nongovernmental organizations headquartered in one country yet working in another; 
foundations funding overseas work; local civil society actors receiving international 
funding; global justice movements; and any civil society organization that is connected 
to a regional or international network. As noted previously, this thesis emphasizes 
formal organizations more than informal movements. However, insofar as the 
literature deals with both, both are considered in this chapter.
It is important to note that this chapter, and the remainder of this thesis, uses 
the term ‘civil society’ to refer both to civil society as a collective, theoretical entity, 
and to corporate groups of civil society organizations and individual civil society 
actors or coalitions. The reason is that this thesis aims for an empirical approach
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whereby the theoretical ‘civil society’ is understood through the actions of real-world 
organizations. Real-world civil society is composed of organizations which may or 
may not act collectively; however, when a consistent trend or trait is manifested among 
a majority of individual actors, it impacts the behavior of the aggregate. Likewise, the 
same tests and standards which apply to the whole of civil society should also apply to 
the organizations of which it is composed.
Disaggregating Legitimacy
Democracy, as used in this thesis, refers to a system of equal citizen authority 
expressed via some representative mechanism and resulting in government or 
institutional responsiveness to the will of the majority, but under which the 
government or institution is also constrained to protect the liberal rights of its citizens 
or stakeholders. The definition does not require that all citizens make use of their 
voice or actively participate, only that the mechanism of input (e.g. voting or 
otherwise) be equally accessible and provide for all participating voices to be equally 
valued. It also requires that the governance organization respond to the expressed will 
of the majority, and protect commonly recognized rights.
The democratic legitimacy of civil society is judged on the basis of its 
contributions to the democratic well-being of the persons impacts by its actions. That 
is, the democratic legitimacy of individual civil society organizations, and civil society 
as a whole, are judged based on whether they contribute to a system of equal citizen 
authority, majority rule, and government responsiveness or the protection of basic 
rights. Applying such a standard across multiple contexts is facilitated by dividing 
democratic legitimacy into several parts. In his forthcoming work on the democratic 
legitimacy of transnational actors, Uhlin (forthcoming) writes:
In order to organize the various concepts related to democratic 
legitimacy, I find it useful to distinguish between input legitimacy (the 
relationship between the actor and its constituencies or people affected 
by its activities), throughput legitimacy (the actual procedures for 
decision making within the actor), and output legitimacy (the 
consequences of the actor’s decisions and other activities).
The concepts of input and output derive from Scharpf, who uses them to discuss 
different roles played by popular will and benevolent policies in legitimating European
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governance (Scharpf 1999 pp. 6-11). Uhlin adapts these standards to transnational 
actors but, borrowing from Dingwerth, adds the useful category of throughput 
legitimacy to assess those intermediary processes that help state and non-state actors 
channel citizen voices into actions and outcomes (Dingwerth 2007).
Each element of democratic legitimacy prompts distinct questions. In line with 
the definition of democracy outlined above, input legitimacy focuses on issues of 
representation and inclusion. It examines whether a state or nongovernmental actor is 
representative of its constituents or stakeholders, whether stakeholders have equal 
voice in formulating policy positions, and, particularly in the case of advocacy 
organizations, to what extent they advance the interests of those populations they claim 
to represent. Throughput legitimacy examines transparency, accountability, 
participation, and deliberation. It asks how actors promote participation and 
discussion, whether they are transparent, and how and to whom they are accountable.
It may also investigate the associational power of civil society organizations and the 
ways in which, as per Putnam and others, relational connections strengthen democracy. 
Output legitimacy focuses on the consequences of actors’ activities, such as changes in 
the policies or structures of the governing authority. It includes both the impacts of a 
successfully implemented policy and the ways in which activism can change the 
political system (cf. Uhlin forthcoming).
Input Throughput Output
Representation Transparency Policies/Impacts
Inclusion Accountability Structural change
Deliberation
Participation
Table 1: The components o f input, throughput, and output.
Naturally, some of these elements of input, throughput, and output, and the 
specific questions they prompt, resonate more strongly with some definitions of 
democracy than with others. They also vary by context. Uhlin suggests that “forms of 
democratic legitimacy differ... between social, cultural, and political settings”. 
However, the focus of his work is on varieties of actors rather than varieties of
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contexts so he does not elaborate on this point.3 Furthermore, he elects not to 
operationalize his framework to make a critical evaluation of the literature. This 
chapter builds on his work by taking both of these steps.
Legitimacy and Context
The implication of Uhlin’s argument is that many of the apparent disagreements over 
the meaning of democracy in the civil society literature are, in fact, implicit debates 
over the type of legitimacy most relevant to civil society. His argument is significant 
insofar as it highlights the extent to which many authors fail to explicitly define 
democracy in their work and also fail to clearly associate desired behaviors or 
outcomes, including much-vaunted standards like accountability or participation, with 
a specific democratic theory. This chapter addresses these issues by developing a 
framework for contextual, role-based legitimacy that reveals how some seeming 
tensions in the literature actually result from an effort to apply the same standard of 
democratic legitimacy in disparate contexts. Thus it provides an analytical framework 
for organizing the literature relevant to this thesis in a way that emphasizes the 
literature’s import for the study of democratic governance. The chapter also uses this 
framework to identify past weaknesses vis-a-vis the assessment of civil society’s 
contributions to democratic global governance so that they can be avoided in this work 
and in future research.
The literature on civil society and democracy tends to describe civil society as 
though it operates in a single, global context. Some authors distinguish between 
national and international civil society, but these are frequently treated as equal parts 
of transnational networks. Although potential disparities between national and 
international actors are acknowledged (Keck and Sikkink 1998), their combined efforts 
are frequently treated as monolithic campaigns (see, for example, the cases in Fox and 
Brown 1998, or Clark, Fox, and Treakle 2003). Moreover, transnational campaigns to 
change the national policies or practices of a single country (for example, by stopping 
a dam or changing trade rules) are treated as equivalent to transnational efforts to 
create new global policies (for example, banning landmines or improving financial 
regulation). Finally, cases from specific national contexts, particularly the civil
3 Types of transnational actors Uhlin considers include corporations, civil society, political parties, 
philanthropic organizations, diaspora groups, and epistemic networks (i.e. networks o f professionals 
defined by particular knowledge or expertise).
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society-driven democratization of countries in Eastern Europe or Latin America or of 
South Africa, are used as models for the democratization of global governance 
(Bowden 2006; cf. Lipschutz 1992; cf. Walzer 1995).
I would argue that, with regard to democratic legitimacy, civil society actually 
operates in three different contexts. First, it operates in undemocratic states. In recent 
history this would include places like communist Eastern Europe or apartheid South 
Africa. Second, it operates in democratic states, i.e. states which have some measure 
of liberal democracy according to the standard used in this thesis, and which are 
acknowledged as democratic by their peers. Historically this includes the United 
States and Western Europe and, more recently, much of Central and South America, 
Southeast Asia, Russia, and parts of Africa. Finally, civil society can operate in the 
international realm, where it is often beyond the control of any one state or institution. 
This is the newest of civil society contexts, but arguably the most powerful. It 
includes civil society lobbying of the UN, World Bank, or WTO, the development or 
implementation of aid programs, and campaigns working to construct new 
international norms or regimes.
These contexts should inform and shape our understanding of ways in which 
civil society can contribute to democracy, with the multiplicity of contexts leading to a 
diversity of standards for democratic legitimacy. The democratic legitimacy of civil 
society is judged by its success in developing or facilitating democracy; for any 
individual organization to be democratically legitimate, it must be to enhance the 
democratic rights of the entire population it impacts. Assessing this requires gauging 
the interaction between the civil society organization and other structures (namely state 
governments or international institutions) which could or should grant enduring 
democratic rights and protections. These governments and institutions exist, they have 
impact, and, in many cases, they have better established democratic credentials than 
civil society. If civil society claims to enhance the democratic well-being of its 
stakeholders (by protecting their rights, giving voice to their concerns, monitoring 
government performance, etc.), then the roles and impacts of states and institutions 
must be taken into account. Insofar as the legitimacy and authority of these actors vary 
by context, so too will civil society’s interactions with them.
This thesis uses the language of ‘roles’ to help categorize the requirements of a 
given context. Civil society can play four roles: it can act as a reformer, opposing a
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state government or international institution; as an advocate for groups or interests 
within a given state; as an agent, working on behalf of a state or institutional actor; or 
as an authority, exercising autonomous power to create and enforce norms. Each of 
these roles defines the means by which civil society addresses the democratic needs of 
a particular setting, as determined by the presence or absence of other democratic 
structures. Therefore role, as used here, cannot be divorced from context.
The needs of each context lead to specific legitimacy requirements for civil 
society organizations operating therein. Meeting these requirements leads to particular 
types of behavior. Roles encompass both the standards of democratic legitimacy and 
the resulting behavior. However, it is important to emphasize that these roles are used 
in an analytical sense, to assess democratic legitimacy, not as abstract descriptions of 
civil society activities. The roles are simply short-hand for the requirements of 
context. Thus, this thesis does not label a civil society organization as a ‘reformer’ 
simply because it is working to change the system or as an ‘advocate’ because it 
claims to be representing a certain group or interest. Civil society actors which do not 
meet the democratic needs of a given context are not said, on the basis of their 
behavior, to be fulfilling an alternative role. Instead, I would describe them as failing 
to meet the democratic legitimacy standards of the current context.
The Four Roles
To reiterate, for civil society to be democratically legitimate in any given situation, it 
must interact with other structures in a way that develops the democratic rights of its 
stakeholders. Each context presents one or two possible behaviors and a set of 
standards by which such behaviors may be judged. The behaviors and standards are 
summarized in the four roles.
In an undemocratic state, civil society establishes its democratic legitimacy by 
its efforts to reform or replace the existing regime. In this context, it must play the role 
of reformer.4 It is important to note that efforts to create or enforce rights are 
commonly described as advocacy activities. By the standards of this thesis, however, 
such ‘advocacy’ has a unique purpose when practiced in an undemocratic context, 
insofar as it changes the system of government to make it more democratic via its
4 Bernhard’s writing regarding Eastern Europe had a similar view. He refers to civil society working 
against an undemocratic regime as “insurgent civil society” (1996 p. 312).
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recognition of rights. Non-reformer activities, such as educating children or providing 
healthcare may certainly be judged legitimate by any number of moral or technical 
standards, but they do not provide democratic legitimacy. Providing services or 
advocating on behalf of specific interests can have little enduring effect on citizens’ 
control over government without a wholesale change in the means of governing. 
Service provision may prop up an undemocratic state, even as it mitigates its impact on 
its citizens. Advocacy which does not push for reform may likewise legitimate the 
state. Even where it wins concessions, it is reliant on an undemocratic regime to 
maintain them. Instead, civil society must promote change in government, including 
the development of representative mechanisms and the recognition of basic rights.
In this context, civil society’s legitimacy should be judged purely on outputs. 
On the one hand, representation, participation, or transparency are meaningless if 
national democracy is not established. Civil society organizations themselves might be 
internally democratic, but internal democracy will not itself succeed in obtaining 
democratic rights or protections for the country’s citizens. On the other hand, if liberal 
democracy is established, new legal or constitutional standards will be developed to 
govern representation and protect rights. Thus civil society in this context (like the 
ANC in apartheid South Africa or Solidarity in Poland) does not necessarily need to 
manifest those standards within itself. Civil society is not the government; it is the 
means to establishing or reforming the government. Reformer civil society 
organizations are judged to be democratically legitimate when their efforts succeed in 
establishing a democratic state or otherwise yield clear steps forward in an incremental 
process of establishing citizen control over government.
When acting within a democratic state, civil society may play the role of 
advocate. Democratic rights are guaranteed by the state, and civil society can enhance 
the democratic rights of its citizens by monitoring or facilitating state processes.5 It 
does this either by seeking to represent marginalized populations, ensuring that they 
are fully empowered within the political process, or by acting as a watchdog, ensuring 
that the government continues to function democratically and protect citizen’s rights.
In this role and context, civil society is judged on either input or throughput. When 
acting as a representative, civil society must be judged on both input and throughput.
5 Diamond describes these activities in detail. Anticipating the reformer-advocate distinction made here, 
he contrasts these democracy-enhancing activities with the oppositional posture which facilitated the 
national democratizations in the late 1980s and early 1990s (1994).
63
If civil society is claiming to speak on behalf of a given population, then its claims 
must be verifiable. This requires both representation and a measure of transparency 
and accountability. Without these things, civil society risks tipping the scales in favor 
of special or even imaginary interests or co-opting the causes of marginalized 
populations to achieve ends other than those desired by those populations. When 
acting as a watchdog, civil society must be judged based on its throughput. Civil 
society can and should support the practices of transparency, accountability, and 
deliberation which enhance democracy, but in order to legitimately enhance them, it 
must also model them, creating a standard for the behavior citizens should expect from 
their government. Civil society operating within the democratic state context is not 
judged on outputs. Democratic representation is already provided by the state and, in a 
majoritarian regime, sometimes civil society should lose, i.e. if it is representing an 
interest at odds with the will of the majority. The exception, of course, is when civil 
society is attempting to enforce and protect the recognized rights of a particular 
minority. However, even in this case civil society’s legitimacy is not judged by its 
outputs, because civil society ultimately has no control over the state. When a good- 
faith effort (input and throughput legitimate) to protect minority rights fails, it reflects 
negatively on the democratic credentials of the state, but not on those of civil society.
In either the democratic national context or in the international arena, civil 
society may act on behalf of a state or institution. When acting on behalf of an 
established authority, civil society operates in the role of agent. Historically speaking, 
the agent role is a result of the neoliberal shift and ‘hollowing out’ of government 
observed in some Western (i.e. North American and European) states, whereby private 
actors were delegated responsibilities previously held by the state in the belief that 
such delegation would increase efficiency or diminish financial risk to the state. The 
role of civil society as an implementer of state policy, however, features heavily in 
some of the more critical literature on civil society (e.g. Ron and Cooley 2002; Manji 
and O’Coill 2008) and in realist perspectives. Separating out this role helps isolate 
these critiques and understand the relationship between policy implementation and 
policy or norm formation.
Many civil society organizations combine the agent role with other activities. 
For instance, religious organizations in the US may receive government funds to run 
homeless shelters and yet also act as advocates on behalf of the homeless.
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Organizations like Oxfam and World Vision receive bilateral and multilateral funding 
for international development, yet are also powerful voices in debates on development 
policy. It is likely that taking on the role of agent either diminishes or magnifies an 
organization’s capacity for advocacy or revolution, but in the interest of parsimony, the 
various roles will be treated discretely.
When operating as an agent, civil society must be judged by the democratic 
credentials of the state or institution on whose behalf it acts. If civil society acts on 
behalf of a democratic state, it may be considered democratic; if it acts on behalf of an 
undemocratic one, it may be considered undemocratic because of the type of regime it 
is supporting. It is important to note that this must be examined differently in the 
national and international realms. In a wholly domestic context, in which civil society 
is funded by the government on whose behalf it works, the principal-agent relationship 
is clear. Internationally, the situation is more complex. Civil society may be funded 
by one government, or a multilateral organization, for work in another polity. In this 
case, the will of the people in the polity in which the work is done must be considered, 
insofar as they will reap the benefits or suffer the consequences of civil society’s 
action. Even in those instances in which civil society’s intervention is approved by a 
local democratic government, one must also consider whether the local government 
truly desires the civil society services or whether those services have been forced upon 
it by more powerful states or organizations. (See Tvedt 2002 for a more detailed 
discussion of these issues.) Thus civil society acting as an agent may be considered 
democratically legitimate if it works under contract to a legitimate representative of the 
people impacted by its work, or if a majority of the people themselves approve that 
work (assuming this can somehow be determined). The choice of such a principal 
(including the alignment of interests between an external principal and the local will) 
may be considered a form of input. Therefore civil society acting as an agent is judged 
based on input legitimacy.
The first three roles occupied by civil society -  reformer, advocacy, and agent 
-  have been thoroughly examined in the literature. All three have been well researched 
within the national context, although the agent role has received more nuanced 
attention in public policy and development studies than in political science. In the 
international context, development studies has also extensively researched the role of 
civil society as agent (see, for example, Lewis and Wallace 2000; cf. Tvedt 2002). It is
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tempting to assume that the observations made about civil society acting in these well- 
recognized roles and contexts transfers to civil society involvement in international 
policymaking. In reality, however, civil society involvement in international 
policymaking requires recognition of a new role.
When civil society engages in global policymaking (either in a de jure way 
through formal participation in international decision making or in a de facto way 
through the propagation of international norms), it is acting as an authority. As noted 
in the previous chapter, civil society’s reach spans national boundaries, and 
transnational activism frequently results in the creation of international networks. 
Activists make broad claims of popular support. At the same time, the rise of global 
problems (like migration, terrorism, or climate change) has necessitated international 
collaboration to a degree unprecedented in political history. Technology has further 
facilitated multilateral collaboration, and international institutions like the UN, World 
Bank, and WTO have laid the framework for global governance. Populist claims of 
non-state actors, international communication, transnational problems, and global 
governance have all combined to challenge states’ claims to act as the sole voice of 
their citizens in international fora.
At the same time, the research of the past decade has demonstrated that civil 
society has the power to change the international behavior of nation-states and 
institutions and to create new norms and regimes. Civil society has been credited with 
playing a significant role in expanding human rights standards and environmental 
norms, and even in nuclear disarmament (cf. Clark 2001; cf. Burgerman 2001; cf. 
Evangelista 1999). Civil society was the driving force behind debt forgiveness and the 
Ottawa Convention banning landmines (Barrett 2000; Anderson 2000). The 
transnational influence of civil society has given it greater agency or reach in the 
international realm than many states or institutions possess. It is not merely acting 
against them (in a reformer role) nor is it acting within them (as an advocate). Civil 
society may claim to occupy these roles and indeed often conducts itself as though it is 
a reformer or advocate. In truth, however, civil society has established itself as a new 
mechanism of citizen influence. It is a part of global governance. Thus civil society 
may be said to act as an authority.
Civil society’s legitimacy when acting in this new role is determined by the 
international context. The global arena lacks clearly defined democratic protections
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for its citizens. The possibility of structured representation has been proposed (Held 
2006), and some authors contend that the European Union is a successful test case for 
the possibility of a cosmopolitan global government (Habermas 2003; Moravcsik 
2004). Currently, however, no enforceable democratic rights exist for global politics. 
Thus, as a participant in global governance, civil society must be judged on the same 
criteria by which other international actors, i.e. states and institutions, are judged: 
whether they provide for equal representation, respond to citizen control, and protect 
fundamental rights. These are essentially questions of input and output. Thus, in this 




Reformist Undemocratic state X
Advocate Democratic state X X
Agent Dem. or Undem. state 
or International
X
Authority International X X
Table 2: Roles, context, and legitimacy criteria.
Reconsidering the Literature
Using the combination of disaggregated democracy and contextual legitimacy, we can 
begin to organize the literature on civil society and global governance. This process 
will help identify where this thesis’ findings fit into the current literature. When we 
group the works which examine civil society by their contexts, we also find strong 
similarities in their approaches. The similarities among context-equivalent writings 
supports the use of a context-based typology in establishing a broad framework for 
looking at the wider spectrum of civil society literature.
As noted, the role of civil society in national democratizations is frequently 
used to support predictions of civil society’s democratization of global governance. 
According to the standards presented here, it is most appropriate to judge organizations 
involved in national democratizations based on their output legitimacy. In looking at 
the relevant literature, one indeed finds that much of the work on civil society and 
national democratizations reflects the output-oriented standards of the reformer role 
(for example, Bernhard 1993; Fatton 1995; Bernhard 1996; Kopecky and Mudde 2004;
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Fioramotti 2005; cf. Calhoun 1994). Such literature describes undemocratic regimes 
and judges civil society, usually positively, for its role in contesting them.
The context-based framework suggests that writing on advocacy and interest 
groups and their roles in the democratic process should reflect the input and 
throughput standards of the advocacy role. Again, much of it does (see, for example, 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Diamond 1994; Berry 1999; cf. Berman 1997). The 
context and rationale of the advocacy role explains why this literature focuses on the 
behavior of organizations or coalitions, and their mechanisms of influence.
Studies of NGOs as implementers of state policy come under the agent role. 
Here we find much of the development studies literature (e.g. Clark 1991; Lewis 2005; 
Murphy 2005; Atkinson 2007). The input legitimacy criteria of this category are 
reflected in the emphasis of much of this literature on principal-agent relationships and 
the impacts of foreign intervention on local representation and autonomy.
In short, this thesis finds that despite the seeming jumble of civil society 
literature and the numerous fault-lines identified, the literature is not as self­
contradictory as originally anticipated. When viewed through the lens of role and 
context, deviations between writings take place on rational theoretical grounds. This 
pattern vindicates the use of context, role, and the disaggregated components of 
legitimacy in judging civil society’s democratic credentials. It also highlights the 
potential pitfalls of combining literature from different sub-genres without adequate 
recognition of their varying approaches. More generally, by identifying different 
perspectives on civil society and its impacts, these findings set the stage for an orderly 
critique of the existing literature as it pertains to transnational civil society’s impacts 
on global governance.
Two Critiques of Existing Theories
Although the primary purpose of this thesis is to engage with existing theory through 
the generation of new empirical data, the standards of legitimacy presented here also 
allow this thesis to make some theory-driven critiques of the literature. In particular, 
the four-role parsing suggests that there are two flaws that occur in some of the 
literature on transnational civil society actors and their role in global governance. One 
is the failure to recognize the significance of the international context, which results in 
treating the global policymaking (i.e. the authority role) as though it is taking place
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within an established state. The other is treating local policymaking (i.e. international 
civil society intervention in local political affairs) as though it is taking place within 
the global context. This section will describe these potential shortcomings in greater 
detail. These critiques can then be tested, along with the rest of the literature, using the 
data generated in the thesis.
Transnational Policymaking
Two problems are particularly common when examining transnational civil society 
involvement in international policy or norm formation, both of which revolve around 
misidentifying civil society’s legitimate role. The first is to treat civil society actors as 
though they are reformers. This attitude is particularly common among practitioners, 
who are prone to interpreting the unwillingness of some global institutions to accede to 
civil society demands as ‘evidence’ for a democratic deficit at those institutions (see, 
for example, Rich 1994; Udall 1998). Adherents to this view frequently push for the 
elimination of international governance mechanisms (as in the 50 Years is Enough 
Campaign;6 see also Korten 1998), or for them to be reformed in a way that gives 
greater voice and authority to civil society. Civil society is legitimated by its 
opposition to the perceived injustices of the current international system. The 
emphasis is thus primarily on outputs, i.e. on how much change civil society can force 
on the current order. Representative inputs are largely assumed.
The alternative error is to judge civil society as though it is acting as an 
advocate, occupying that role as it does within established democratic states. This 
perspective is more common among academics (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse 2000; 
Keck 2004; cf. Clark 2008). This attitude presupposes that civil society activism is 
legitimate as long as it is supporting someone or something. The emphasis thus is 
primarily on inputs, on civil society’s ties to its constituents, clients, or ideas. 
Throughput is sometimes suggested as an additional measure of legitimacy, usually in 
the form of transparency or accountability. However, it is not clear that such 
throughput mechanisms always make civil society organizations more responsive to 
the people whom they impact.
6 50 Years is Enough is a loose coalition of civil society organizations calling for the abolition or reform 
of the World Bank and IMF. See www.50years.org.
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Both of these approaches ignore the consequences of the absence of a 
democratic, global superstate. In the absence of a global state (and without any 
realistic, near-term hope of creating such a state), reformer or advocacy behaviors do 
little to enhance the democratic rights of citizens. As Bowden writes, quoting Hegel, 
when civil society exists without the state “the interest of individuals as such becomes 
the ultimate end of their association” (2006 p. 163). Civil society can act as an 
effective interest advocate, but there is no state association which can subject 
individuals to the concerns of others who do not share their interests or needs. 
Similarly, there is no mechanism capable of enforcing democratic representation, nor 
any superior authority capable of protecting the rights of those stakeholders without a 
powerful interest group of their own. Walzer writes regarding the synergies between 
the state and civil society:
[Ajcross the entire range of association, individual men and women need 
to be protected against the power of officials, employers, experts, party 
bosses, factory foremen, priests, parents, and patrons; and small and weak 
groups need to be protected against large and powerful ones. For civil 
society, left to itself, generates radically unequal power relationships.
(1995 p. 23)
This is indeed the problem with civil society in the global context: it is civil society 
largely left to itself. Whereas civil society may be regulated and counterbalanced 
within the confines of any given polity, transnational civil society transcends the 
authority of any state or supranational institution. Because of its power in this context, 
civil society is a de facto authority and must be judged based on its fulfillment of this 
role. (Alternatively, it can subject itself to a democratically legitimate authority and 
act as an agent.) Removing or reforming existing institutions (often in a way that gives 
civil society more power within them), only exacerbates the problems of the 
supranational context.
Acting as an advocate makes use of the situation without mitigating it, 
exploiting the absence of a superstate to advance civil society’s own agenda. Civil 
society as an advocate may be accountable to those whom it claims to represent, but 
unless it is accountable to everyone whom it impacts the situation can easily facilitate 
tyranny and the abuse of power. The result is a situation in which those who “shout 
the loudest” win (Held 2006 p. 307). Neither reformer nor advocacy behavior can be
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democratically legitimate in this context. Judging transnational civil society as though 
it is occupying a reformer or advocacy role only serves to rationalize democratically 
illegitimate behavior.
For civil society to be democratically legitimate in the transnational context, it 
must rise to the standards to which states and institutions are held. Cosmopolitan 
theorists seem to have gone furthest in recognizing this problem. Held’s 
acknowledgement that a true cosmopolitan democracy will require representative 
political structures is informative (2006 pp. 303-11). Insofar as civil society itself is 
part of global governance, civil society in the aggregate must seek to represent all 
stakeholders in any given policy, not just those to which the organizations within it are 
most closely tied, and to achieve outcomes that reflect the will of the majority while 
protecting liberal rights. Only in those cases in which civil society organizations, 
campaigns, or global movements seek to determine and enforce majority rule and the 
protection of acknowledged rights can civil society’s involvement in transnational 
policymaking be said to be democratically legitimate. Any analysis of the democratic 
legitimacy of civil society in the transnational context that does not recognize and 
grapple with the fundamental problem of statelessness is critically flawed.
Interventions in Local Settings
The context-based standard of legitimacy also suggests that one must be cautious when 
writing about the interventions of transnational civil society in the domestic policies of 
a democratic nation. Examples of such intervention abound. International NGOs or 
movements may apply direct pressure to a national government (via publicity 
campaigns, boycotts, lobbying, etc.). International actors may also apply pressure 
indirectly, for example by pushing donors to make aid funding conditional on specific 
policy change. Foundations or international NGOs may initiate ‘grassroots’ 
campaigns, establishing and staffing local offices, or fund existing indigenous 
movements. Such domestic interventions are a key means by which transnational civil 
society actors or networks have impact.
Unfortunately, much of the writing on transnational advocacy has failed to 
delineate between such domestic intervention and transnational civil society 
involvement in international policymaking. There are several reasons the two have 
been conflated. First, the majority of transnational civil society campaigns over the
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last 30 years have focused on problems and policies in the developing world. In 
developing nations, national decisions frequently involve some international 
component because many domestic policies or programs rely on international funding. 
Thus a decision by Brazil to build a rail line or an undertaking in Niger to prioritize 
primary-school education can easily be depicted as an externally driven World Bank 
project (or an EU program or an IMF policy), rather than as a national decision. 
Second, the process of global norm formation can take place on both the national and 
international levels. Transnational activists may promote an international norm of 
condemning torture or protecting children’s rights, and then seek to have that norm 
applied to individual states. Its adoption by successive states, in turn, helps establish it 
as a global norm. Third, during the initial development of modem transnational civil 
society in the 1980s and early 1990s, the majority of the world’s population did not 
live in democratic states. Ignoring the role of the local state was easy because many 
states were perceived as illegitimate. Undemocratic states and undemocratic 
international institutions were easily tarred with the same brush, dismissed as mere 
obstacles in the pursuit of ‘good’ or ‘democratic’ policy.
The most significant change of the last ten years with regards to this trend is 
that the majority of the world’s citizens now live in recognized democracies. This 
evolution has permitted more governments to function as the legitimate representatives 
of their citizens and has created an environment in which local civil society can fulfill 
the advocacy role with its functions of watchdog and representative. As two civil 
society leaders from the global South have written:
The new political context that has emerged, marked by democracy and 
citizen participation, has increasingly led to more collaborative modes 
of relating [to government]. It is civil society’s participation in 
political life, in that realm of public life in which societal decisions are 
made and carried out, that provides the conditions for sustainable 
development. (Naidoo and Tandon 1999 p. 9)
In such a context, it is imperative that academics and practitioners draw careful lines 
between national and international policies. For instance, it is helpful to distinguish 
between ‘World Bank’ projects like the Narmada Dam that are actually planned by 
national governments before the intervention of the World Bank, and undertakings like 
structural adjustment that are largely international creations. Likewise, one must
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distinguish between when civil society is developing an international norm that is 
widely accepted within national democracies, and when civil society is seeking to use 
international politics to impose the will of a well-resourced minority on weak states. 
An example of the former would be developing an international norm against torture 
and imposing it on Indonesia (see, for example, Risse 2000). An example of the latter 
would be when US-based environmentalists seek to direct development funds for 
Brazil towards decreasing energy consumption rather than building more power plants 
(see Rich 1994). The latter ‘norm’ is not democratic because it seeks to impose via 
fiduciary fiat a policy that would ordinarily be the subject of public debate in a 
developed, democratic nation.
When transnational civil society is interacting with an internationally created 
project or policy, it occupies the authority role described earlier and is subject to the 
legitimacy tests described in the preceding section. However, when transnational civil 
society is seeking to influence a domestic policy, it must be judged by those standards 
which are applied to national civil society. Essentially it can act in either the reformer 
or advocate role and its legitimacy must be assessed accordingly.
It is tempting to treat transnational networks or global social movements as 
though they are above such considerations or as though their large international 
following is an automatic source of legitimacy. Yet the nonlocal members of such 
campaigns are neither subject to the local polity nor part of the demos it governs. To 
allow such international voices to overwhelm local democratic procedures is to give 
the members of international organizations or movements power on par with that of 
local citizens despite the fact that these global citizens have no allegiance to the 
country they are impacting and are unlikely to bear the immediate consequences of the 
plan they impose. International organizations or movements should not be presumed 
to be legitimate simply because they are large.
Instead, as per the reformer and advocacy roles discussed earlier, the 
legitimacy of transnational civil society intervention in local affairs must be judged by 
the degree to which it contributes to sustainable, national democracy. Global civil 
society, at risk of being tautological, is not local. When the international network 
leaves a dam cancellation fight in India to protest a dam in Pakistan, or completes a 
forest protection plan in Indonesia and moves to fight resettlement in China, it leaves 
the local citizens behind. It is unable to offer them long-term democratic protections.
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If it does not contribute to the democratic functioning of the national state, then it has 
had no long-term impact on the democratic well-being of local citizens. It may have 
helped some of them win a particular battle, but it has done nothing to win the 
proverbial war. If the international intervention has promoted special interests (e.g. 
minority rights or environmental protections) at the expense of majority rule, the 
situation is even worse. In such a case, global activists may have actually undermined 
the function or legitimacy of the national regime responsible for ensuring most day-to- 
day democratic rights of local citizens. Granted, an exception may be made if an 
international campaign intervenes to protect minority rights against a tyrannical 
majority. In this sense it is supporting the ‘liberal’ portion of the definition of liberal 
democracy outlined earlier, provided that the rights supported rise to the level of 
internationally recognized liberal norms. However, if civil society merely swaps an 
overweening local majority for an overweening global movement, it has done little to 
support long-term, sustainable democracy. To be democratically legitimate, civil 
society must either work within (and by the rules of) any existing local democratic 
system, or seek to replace an undemocratic system with a democratic one.
Conclusion
This chapter finds that the literature on transnational civil society and the 
democratization of global governance can be ordered by dividing democracy into its 
input, throughput, and output components and creating context-specific standards of 
democratic legitimacy. Adapting a context-based standard of assessment and using it 
to organize the literature helps highlight the similarities in perspective among authors 
working in similar contexts, clarifying the literature on civil society and 
democratization. At the same time, the context-based framework reveals the difficulty 
of applying to transnational civil society engaged in global policy processes analytical 
standards developed in other contexts.
The contextual legitimacy framework has several implications for the core 
question of this thesis: whether transnational civil society’s impact on policymaking at 
the World Bank supports the idea that civil society can democratize global governance. 
First and foremost, the context and legitimacy framework presents a means of 
evaluating civil society’s impact on democratizing governance at the World Bank. As 
noted in the introduction to thesis, there are multiple means of evaluating civil
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society’s democratizing potential (or the lack thereof). This chapter establishes the 
standards that will be used in this thesis.
Civil society organizations engaging with the World Bank on transnational 
policymaking are generally operating in the authority role. As such, their impacts are 
judged based on their input and output. In order to be democratically legitimate, civil 
society must enhance stakeholder input, through improving either representation or 
inclusion, or both. Ideally civil society will represent stakeholders in an inclusive 
fashion and facilitate equal voice for all stakeholders in international policymaking. 
Civil society must also improve democratic outputs. Although it is impossible to know 
whether any particular policy output is representative of a majority of stakeholders, 
outputs should reflect the stated interests of at least some group of stakeholders or 
otherwise increase citizen control over policymaking at the institution. The thesis will 
apply this standard in the three following case studies.
The authority standard is reflected in many of the sub-questions posed by this 
thesis. For instance, examining how civil society organizations interact with one 
another will help determine whether some organizations or views are routinely 
excluded from advocacy initiatives. In examining how civil society organizations 
choose their policy positions, the thesis will explore whether policy-setting arises from 
grassroots stakeholders or is constructed in a top-down fashion. It will also examine 
whether some stakeholders have more influence than others. Exploring civil society’s 
mechanisms of influence allows the thesis to examine whether those mechanisms of 
influence are equally accessible to all stakeholders.
In considering civil society’s impacts, the thesis will examine whether civil 
society has been effective in creating new policy and whether specific changes in 
policy have increased the opportunities for future stakeholder input. This will be 
examined both with regards to future input via civil society and future input by 
developing country governments. In this way the thesis will assess whether civil 
society has created outputs reflecting the stated interests of least some stakeholders and 
facilitated increased citizen control over international policymaking.
It is important to note that transnational civil society engaging with the World 
Bank can also impact national policies, particularly when civil society organizations 
target Bank lending to a single country on the basis of particular objections about that 
country’s proposed use of the funds. This is observed in the case of the Arun ID dam,
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the second case study examined in this thesis. In this case, civil society organizations 
simultaneously sought to create a precedent for the successful use of the World Bank 
Inspection Panel and obstruct a loan to Nepal because of specific objections to Nepal’s 
development strategy. The former effort is clearly one of transnational policy and its 
impacts will be evaluated on the basis of input and output. The latter aspect of the 
effort, however, reflects an intervention in the national policy of a recognized 
democracy (as Nepal was at the time) and will be evaluated using the advocacy 
framework of input and throughput.
Second, the data presented in this chapter set the stage for much of this thesis’ 
engagement with the existing literature on civil society and global governance. This 
chapter illustrates the body of literature this thesis considers relevant for its research, 
although the chapter is illustrative, not comprehensive. It identifies common themes in 
the literature, including arguments for civil society’s democratizing potential and 
critiques of civil society. The thesis will examine how its findings in subsequent 
chapters reinforce or contradict the understandings in the literature.
It is important to note that although this thesis uses the authority standard to 
judge civil society’s impact in the context of the World Bank, this thesis does not 
engage exclusively with other literature employing this standard. As noted, the 
authority role requires both input and output legitimacy. Even authors writing about 
civil society in other contexts, where it acts as a reformer, agent, or advocate, make 
comments about civil society’s democratic input and output. This thesis will continue 
to engage with those observations. The thesis can also engage critically with writing 
on civil society in the global context that uses standards other than the one elaborated 
here. Thus the thesis will continue to interact broadly with the literature on civil 
society and the democratization of global governance.
Finally, this chapter begins the critical engagement with the literature by 
identifying two potential flaws in some of the existing work on civil society and global 
governance. In particular, this chapter hypothesizes that it is inappropriate to judge 
civil society organizations by their democratic throughput when they are operating in 
an authority role in an international context. The framework presented in this chapter 
suggests that even civil society organizations that enhance democratic throughput can 
actually inhibit democratization if they lack input and output legitimacy. Moreover, 
this chapter hypothesizes that civil society interventions in national settings must
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enhance local democratic processes. When engaging in a democratic state, civil 
society must be judged on its input and throughput legitimacy; otherwise civil society 
risks undermining the local democratic system. Both of these hypotheses will be 
tested in the coming chapters. If they are substantiated by the data about the World 
Bank, then these hypotheses will form a part of this thesis’ interaction with the existing 
theories on transnational civil society and the democratization of global governance.
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Chapter 3
Beating the Bank: Civil Society and the 10th IDA
What makes the 10th IDA significant is not merely its level of impact, but also the way 
in which a wide variety of groups and agendas converged to focus on a single aspect of 
Bank funding. As transnational civil society has evolved over the past thirty years, 
significant subsets of organizations have readily turned their attention to the World 
Bank. The Bank has a large policy footprint, and organizations have sought to 
influence the Bank in areas where its policies impact their activities or objectives. 
Service delivery organizations like Oxfam and Care have engaged with the Bank on 
development policy.1 Advocacy groups like the Sierra Club and the Environmental 
Defense Fund have targeted the Bank’s environmental and human impacts. Faith- 
based organizations like the US Catholic Conference of Bishops and the World 
Development Movement have sought to integrate social justice into Bank lending.
i L
Thus, understanding the synergies and conflicts which developed during the 10 IDA 
requires an examination of the history and agendas of the various actors seeking to 
impact the replenishment, as well as the events of the replenishment itself.
This chapter will begin by outlining the relevant trends in civil society activism 
in the decade preceding the 10th IDA negotiations. It will then describe the events of 
the 10th IDA replenishment, beginning with the initial broad coalition formed among 
civil society actors and then detailing the coalition’s demise and the eventual outcome 
of the negotiations. The chapter will conclude with analysis demonstrating why the 
10th IDA might be considered the first truly global civil society engagement with the 
Bank and how specific features of the campaign will facilitate this thesis’ examination 
of civil society’s impact on the World Bank.
1980-1990: The Origins of World Bank -  Civil Society Engagement
In the decade preceding the IDA-10, civil society engaged with the World Bank 
through a combination of formal and informal dialogues, lobbying via member
1 Some organizations, such as Oxfam and World Vision, that have historically engaged primarily in 
service delivery also now engage in advocacy activities.
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governments, and public advocacy campaigns. Engagement focused on two main 
themes: improving the Bank’s development impacts and reducing its negative 
environmental effects. The development agenda focused on defining the Bank’s 
mission more closely as one of poverty alleviation and pushing the Bank to mitigate 
the negative impacts some of its economic development practices had on the poor. It 
included many of the signature issues of the nascent international social justice 
movement, causes like debt relief and the reform of structural adjustment. The 
environmental agenda began with a series of campaigns against several Bank projects 
with well-documented, highly negative effects on both people and the environment. 
This soon evolved into an effort to promote more systematic policy reform within the 
Bank and to force greater accountability on key decision-makers. While the 
development agenda was promoted primarily by service delivery and social justice 
groups and the environmental agenda was advanced mainly by environmental groups, 
this was not exclusively the case. Individuals and organizations moved between the 
two strands as they identified causes of interest to their leadership or members.
Improving Development Impacts
The development agenda included an interesting mix of ‘do better’ and ‘don’t do’ 
items which combined to stress the Bank’s responsibility to improve the lives of 
people in developing nations. Nonetheless, the idea that the Bank should focus on 
poverty alleviation was not new. It was originally advanced by Robert McNamara 
during his tenure as Bank president (Kapur, Lewis, and Webb 1997 p. 374). A change 
in leadership, plus the commodities crises of the early 1980s, saw much of this focus 
lost. Nonetheless, a number of outside groups continued to press the Bank to make 
good on what they saw as its potential to be a poverty-fighting institution. They 
pushed the Bank to improve development via popular participation, forgive loans that 
had been made to previous corrupt governments in now-reformed states, revise its 
approach to structural adjustment, and use new sociological research to develop 
poverty-targeted interventions.
Initially some of this pressure was exerted in a somewhat collegial fashion. A 
pattern of ad hoc collaboration between the World Bank and nongovernmental 
organizations on development projects led, in 1981, to the creation of the NGO-World 
Bank Committee. The Committee, composed of a rotating group of NGO 
representatives and senior members of Bank staff, discussed possible areas for
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potential collaboration and, in some instances, NGO reactions to Bank policy (Shihata 
1991 pp. 239-241). Tensions over funding, however, disrupted this collegial 
atmosphere. In 1981, the newly elected Reagan administration sought to unilaterally 
reduce the US contribution to IDA-6 to 23 percent rather than contribute the 31 percent 
which had been negotiated by the Carter administration. Although State Department 
pressure stymied this move, the administration succeeded in stretching the period of 
US disbursement from three years to four (Gwin 1994 pp. 38-9). Then, in 1984, 
during negotiations for the seventh replenishment of funds for the International 
Development Association (IDA-7), the Reagan administration pushed to cut the total 
value of IDA funding from $16 billion to $9 billion and to contribute only 25 percent 
of the new total (Kapur et al. 1997 pp. 1143-4; see also Gwin 1994).
The Bank compromised. It replenished IDA at the levels and percentages 
dictated by the US, but it also created a Special Facility for Africa into which other 
donors, who insisted on giving at their IDA-6 levels, could direct their surplus funds 
(Kapur et al. 1997 pp. 1143-4). Certain staff within the Bank, however, believed that 
NGOs could form a useful bulwark against such national caprice. They began 
reaching out more aggressively towards NGOs and pressuring NGO allies to act as 
advocates on the Bank’s behalf. According to a source familiar with these events, 
Bank staff debated whether the role of NGOs was to assist the Bank as partners in 
development or to protect the Bank from political interference.
In this climate members of the NGO-World Bank Committee sought to exert 
their independence from the Bank. In 1984 they established the NGO Working Group 
on the World Bank (NGOWG) to facilitate dialogue among the Committee’s NGO 
members on issues of policy and advocacy. The NGOWG then used the Committee 
meetings to engage the Bank on issues of policy reform (Long 2001 p. 3).
Development and justice NGOs outside the NGOWG also began engaging with the 
Bank via informal dialogues with Bank staff and, in at least one case, an organized 
letter-writing campaign (Mitchell 1991).
Popular participation: The NGO Working Group was one of the driving forces 
behind the civil society campaign for improved popular participation. Popular 
participation focused on engaging stakeholder populations in dialogue and debate
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about the conditions and decisions affecting their well-being. Techniques formalizing 
such practices grew out of a variety of political and cultural circumstances, including 
the Latin American liberation movements of the 1960s and 1970s (see, for example, 
Freire 1970; cf. Cleaver 1999). By the late 1970s, however, participation was being 
mainstreamed as a development tool. In 1979, it was featured at the UN Food and 
Agriculture Organization’s World Conference on Agriculture and Rural Development, 
giving the concept widespread attention. Professional development organizations in 
the global north, including both voluntary organizations and government agencies, 
promoted the concept. NGO pressure helped advance participatory practices at the 
World Bank, and by 1985 the Bank’s Operations and Evaluations Department (OED) 
had issued a report documenting the link between popular participation and the 
sustainability of Bank projects (Long 2001 pp. 1-8). The OED was not a particularly 
powerful department within the Bank (see Wade 1997), but the idea eventually gained 
traction. By 1990 the Bank had incorporated popular participation into the operational 
directives governing some of its social safeguards, but civil society organizations 
(CSOs) continued to push to have stakeholders more broadly involved in Bank 
decision making, especially project planning (Shihata 1991).
Debt relief: Concerns regarding the level of debt in Bank borrower countries 
became prominent in the early 1980s. Debt to the World Bank had been steadily 
accumulating for nearly two decades and in the early 1980s it finally reached the point 
where certain countries suffered from negative aid flows, i.e. the amount they repaid to 
the Bank each year exceeded the value of new loans received (Rich 1991 pp. 109-10). 
Civil society organizations like Britain’s World Development Movement, an advocacy 
group funded almost entirely by church members, began monitoring the issue. By the 
late 1980s WDM and other faith-based groups were lobbying the Bank to give IDA 
funds as grants rather than as loans that would need to be repaid (Mitchell 1991 p.
155). The US government also acknowledged that the debt itself might be a drag on 
development and began to pressure both the World Bank and International Monetary
2 Popular participation was initially intertwined with engagement with formal NGOs. The United 
Nations Development Programme, for instance, defined participation as dialogue with NGOs for much 
of the 1980s (Howell and Pearce 2001 pp. 97-8). However, the concept as used by the World Bank and 
the NGO Working Group referred to engagement with grassroots stakeholders, especially project- 
affected people, which could occur through civil society organizations (church groups, agricultural 
collectives, etc.) or ad  hoc meetings. For the sake of clarity, I am here referring only to the evolution of 
this latter, more populist conception of participation. This is the usage most germane to the actors 
discussed in this chapter, and it has also been the more widely accepted definition since the mid-1990s 
(cf. Howell and Pearce 2001 p. 98).
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Fund to contemplate measures to reduce debt or mitigate its impacts (Gwin 1994 pp. 
42-5). The Bank, however, was slow to develop a comprehensive approach to debt 
reduction.
Structural adjustment lending: The early 1980s also yielded a World Bank 
program that would, rightly or wrongly, become one of the most notorious of the next 
two decades: structural adjustment lending. In the early 1980s a sharp decline in the 
world prices of many of the commodities, like copper and coffee, exported from 
developing nations led to significant budget shortfalls for the governments of those 
countries. The crisis was widespread and potentially persistent. To remedy it, the 
World Bank developed a system of Structural Adjustment Lending (SAL). Structural 
adjustment provided immediate financial relief in the form of new loans, but required 
that the government receiving the money reorganize government finances to bring 
expenditures into line with its new, reduced revenues. In theory, SAL would lead to 
greater efficiency, less bureaucracy, and reduced military expenditures. In reality, 
governments slashed social services, reducing access to medical care, education, and 
agricultural support. Structural adjustment lending also coincided with a decision by 
the US Reagan administration to use Bank lending to advance the administration’s 
liberal economic philosophy. It saw structural adjustment lending “as an important 
way to advance market-oriented reforms” (Gwin 1994 p. 40; see also Manji and Coill 
2008). This often meant that structural adjustment loans came with attached 
conditions mandating changes like the privatization of government-owned industries 
and the elimination of trade barriers. These rapid changes caused additional 
resentment and upheaval in recipient countries.
Not long after its implementation, adjustment began attracting critics. In 
borrowing countries, specific adjustment policies were sometimes met with forceful, 
even violent, grassroots opposition. Opponents in donor nations linked adjustment 
with a concurrent decline in the health and living standards of poor populations, 
especially poor children, in the developing world. Advocates from Oxfam and the 
World Development Movement (WDM) in particular pushed for a reconsideration of 
adjustment lending (Jolly 1991). Their concerns received substantial support when 
UNICEF published its own report, Adjustment with a Human Face, challenging 
adjustment practices (cf. Comia et al. 1987). The report, published in 1987, helped 
catalyze activism among development organizations, which pushed for the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund to reduce the frequency with which they
82
employed structural adjustment lending and to restructure their lending to mitigate the 
potential human impacts of government cutbacks.3
Poverty-targeted interventions: The idea that the World Bank and other 
development agencies should address poverty by attacking its key components, such as 
illiteracy, poor nutrition, or infant mortality, is currently a widely accepted idea. 
Objectives of these sorts, for instance, are embodied in the Millennium Development 
Goals. For nearly half of the World Bank’s history, however, such objectives were 
entirely absent. The problem was in part the Bank’s structure and ethos, which 
mirrored commercial lending institutions. Loan proposals were usually judged based 
on their macroeconomic impacts, rather than their effects on micro-level development 
issues. An additional problem, however, was the lack of reliable metrics. For much of 
the Bank’s history, the core components of poverty had yet to be defined using the sort 
of quantified measurements the Bank could address or which would be appealing to 
the economists who dominated the Bank’s staff.
This lack of metrics was remedied in the late 1970s through the work of Jim 
Grant, then head of the Overseas Development Council (ODC), a Washington-based 
think-tank. The ODC developed the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI), a 
composite measure of poverty and a forerunner to the Human Development Index (see 
Morris 1980). According to the former head of an NGO involved in these issues,
Grant used public forums to argue that Gross National Product (GNP), the most 
popular measure of economic health at the time, was not the best means for measuring 
the well-being of a country’s population. He successfully advocated for the adoption 
of the PQLI by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and attracted 
the attention of the Carter administration.
Through Carter’s influence, Grant was appointed head of UNICEF in 1980. At 
UNICEF Grant decided to focus on infant mortality. To attract political attention to 
the subject, he again used specific metrics, developing numeric targets for reductions 
in infant mortality.4 He also collaborated with the US-based advocacy group 
RESULTS, which worked to increase public awareness of the child deaths in
3 This account is also verified by a source at the World Bank.
4 UNICEF “Jim P. Grant Biography” at UNICEF.org: www.unicef.org
http://www.unicef.org/about/who/index_bio_grant.html. Accessed 30 September 2008. This account 
also confirmed by an interview source familiar with these events.
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developing countries caused by preventable illnesses.5 In the late 1980s, RESULTS 
drew in the UK-based WDM to work with UNICEF on a world conference on child 
survival, which was finally held in 1990 as the World Summit for Children.6 Staff at 
Bread for the World who had previously worked with WDM also became involved, 
helping to shape Bread’s agenda of poverty advocacy, and complementing the work of 
RESULTS and WDM. According to an informant involved in this process, the three 
NGOs represented some of the most significant development advocacy forces in the 
US and UK at the time and their work, along with that of UNICEF, helped move 
poverty-targeted interventions (PTIs) into the political mainstream.
Preventing Environmental Disasters
Environmentalists’ focus on the World Bank began in the early 1980s. During the 
1970s, environmental activists from American groups like the Sierra Club, the 
Environmental Defense Fund, and the Environmental Policy Institute (which would 
later merge with Friends of the Earth US) had achieved a number of successes in the 
US. They had fought for conservation, new legal protections for the environment, and, 
especially in the later 1970s and early 1980s, the enforcement of federal environmental 
laws against corporations (Wade 1997).7 A number of civil society organizations, like 
the World Wildlife Fund and Sahabat Alam Malaysia, were already addressing 
international environmental issues (Keck and Sikkink 1998 pp. 125, 130-1). However, 
it was small group of American activists who would force the environmental issue on 
the World Bank.
In 1983 Barbara Bramble from the National Wildlife Federation (NWF), Brent 
Blackwelder from the Environmental Policy Institute (EPI), and Bruce Rich, then at 
the National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) but later with the Environmental 
Defense Fund (EDF), began working together on an international environmental 
campaign. Their goal was to create an international regime of environmental 
regulation mirroring the legal structures their organizations had used so effectively in 
court battles in the US. They chose the World Bank as the target of their campaign not 
because it was the worst environmental offender but rather because of its prominent
5 Sam Daley-Harris, “Imagine: A Nation that Cares for Itself, and for All Humanity” at RESULTS.org: 
http://www.results.org/website/article.asp?id=31. Accessed 30 September 2008.
6 UNICEF, op. cit.
7 Wade’s account was also verified for this thesis by from two environmental staffers active during this 
period.
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role and wide recognition in world affairs. A victory against the Bank, they believed, 
would lead to other victories elsewhere (Wade 1997).
Once Bruce Rich moved to EDF in 1985, EDF, NWF, and EPI (later Friends of 
the Earth US, or FoE)8 formed the core of the new environmental campaign.
According to a informant involved in the campaign, civil society organizations from 
Germany, the Netherlands, England, Brazil, Malaysia, and Japan were also involved.
A source at NWF noted that the organization helped fund the involvement of Japanese 
environmental organizations. The organizations involved linked issues of 
environmental preservation to human suffering, for example by highlighting the ways 
in which poorly planned dam projects could spread waterborne disease or agricultural 
resettlement projects could lead to massive human rights abuses.9 Emphasizing the 
human element expanded their popular appeal.
According to two senior NGO sources who had worked on Bank issues in the 
1980s and 1990s, some environmental activists eschewed the NGO-World Bank 
Committee and the NGOWG. They believed that the Committee was little more than 
window-dressing for the Bank and that the NGOWG was more concerned with 
continued aid funding than reform.10 Instead, the environmentalists took a more 
adversarial approach. They began their work with an effort to expose the impacts of 
the worst World Bank projects and force their cancellation. Later they promoted the 
creation of new social and environmental safeguards at the Bank, including the 
creation of the Bank’s Environmental Department. Finally, they sought ways to 
develop enforcement mechanisms that could help hold the Bank accountable to its 
environmental commitments.
Exposing problem projects: The group’s first move was to request hearings in 
the US Congress on the World Bank. These were held in June of 1983. The groups 
used the hearings to publicize the impacts of a series of World Bank projects, 
including a cattle ranching project in Botswana, an irrigation and hydroelectric dam 
project on the Narmada River in India, the Polonoroeste project in Brazil, and the 
Indonesian Transmigration Project, the latter two of which involved resettling poor 
citizens in less populated areas of the recipient country. These hearings generated
8 Friends of the Earth has 76 member groups internationally. However, all references to Friends of the 
Earth or FoE in this thesis refer to Friends of the Earth US.
9 Interview source at Friends of the Earth US.
10 One source was from a major environmental group which eschewed the committee; the other was 
from a development and justice NGO which joined the committee.
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enough publicity and Congressional pressure that the Bank was forced to respond with 
statements to Congress (Wade 1997 pp. 659-60). Follow-up hearings were held in 
1984 and resulted in a series of Congressional resolutions calling for change at the 
Bank (Rich 1994 p. 119). Because Congress lacked direct authority over the Bank, the 
resolutions were not directly binding on the institution. Nonetheless, 
environmentalists viewed them as a crucial breakthrough (see Rich 1994). Activists 
continued their pressure on the Bank with the pamphlet Bankrolling Disasters, co­
written by EPI and published by the Sierra Club, a large, membership-based US 
environmental organization which had been involved in policymaking for decades.
The pamphlet featured the same four projects (Keck and Sikkink 1998).11 The 
pamphlet, published in 1986, was subtitled The Citizen’s Guide to the World Bank and 
the Regional Development Banks and was designed to facilitate the involvement of 
grassroots activists in protest against the banks. Through the Sierra Club’s ties to the 
UN Environmental Program, the pamphlet was distributed worldwide.
Polonoroeste soon became the focal point of the environmental campaign. The 
project financed the paving of a highway into the sparsely populated Amazon 
rainforest in northwestern Brazil, and provided funding for social infrastructure for 
new farmers moving to the area. Colonization was already occurring in the territory 
and the Bank saw its intervention as a means of rationalizing development that was 
potentially out of control. In actuality, the road construction drastically increased the 
flow of settlers into the region.
Opponents of the project emphasized both its environmental and human 
impacts. Farmers and cattle ranchers destroyed swaths of rainforest as they cleared 
land for their operations and the pace of commercial logging increased. The resulting 
deforestation provided dramatic images and raised concerns about rainforest 
preservation. New immigrants also affected the lives of indigenous peoples in the 
region. The deforestation devastated the livelihoods of native populations who were 
forced off their lands. New settlers also brought diseases which decimated indigenous 
communities. Violent conflicts between new settlers and locals were not uncommon 
(Rich 1994 pp. 118-23; Wade 1997 pp. 659-63; Keck and Sikkink 1998 pp. 138-40).
Brazilian activists took active part in the campaign. The Congressional 
testimony of Brazilian environmentalist Jose Lutzenberger was televised in the US and
11 Keck and Sikkink’s account was confirmed for this thesis by senior staff from two environmental 
organizations, each of who had been involved in the pamphlet’s publication.
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Brazil (Wade 1997 p. 662). Chico Mendes, leader of indigenous rubber tappers, also 
met with Congressional officials (Keck and Sikkink 1998 p. 141). Vigorous lobbying 
by civil society organizations, combined with the support of Republican Senator Bob 
Kasten, who had taken a personal interest in the campaign, helped move the issue 
forward. At Kasten’s request, Bank President A. W. Clausen, along with top Bank 
staff, held an unprecedented meeting with the Senator and US environmental 
representatives in January 1985 (Rich 1994 pp. 123-7; Wade 1997 pp. 664-7). Less 
than three months later, the Bank had halted disbursement of the remaining amount of 
the Polonoroeste loan. Like the direct meeting between Kasten and Clausen, the 
cancellation of a project on environmental or human rights grounds was unprecedented 
in the Bank’s history and provided significant encouragement for environmentalists as 
they continued their campaign (Rich 1994 pp. 126-7).
New safeguards and staff: Environmentalists saw Polonoroeste as an indicator 
of a more general malaise within the Bank. They believed that Bank staff as a whole 
failed to take ecological considerations into account when planning and implementing 
projects. Although the Bank had been one of the first multilateral development 
organizations to have an environmental staff, hiring an environmental advisor in 1970, 
the Bank’s Environmental Unit (also known as the Office of Environmental Affairs) 
was perceived to be toothless and undermanned. In 1983 it was staffed by just three 
people. When its tropical ecologist had objected to the Polonoroeste project during its 
planning phase, the project staff simply excluded him from future meetings (Wade 
1997 pp. 618, 628, 640-1, 662-3). Civil society organizations charged that the Bank 
could not become an environmentally responsible institution without concrete 
safeguards and staff able to supervise and implement them.
When Barber Conable took over as Bank President late in 1986, he moved to 
rectify these problems. He met with environmental leaders, acknowledged the 
legitimacy of their past grievances, and sought to move the Bank forward. In 1987 he 
announced a sixteen-fold increase in the Bank’s environmental staff. One hundred 
new environmental employees would fill a new central Environmental Department and 
four regional environmental units (Rich 1994 pp. 146-7; Wade 1997 p. 675). In 1988 
the Bank began urging its borrowers to create country-wide Environmental Action 
Plans (EAPs). In 1989 it began addressing specific environmental concerns by 
introducing an Environmental Policy for Dams and Reservoir Projects and giving 
specific guidance on the preparation of environmental assessments for projects. In
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1990, it issued an Operational Directive on involuntary resettlement and the treatment
1 0of indigenous peoples (Shihata 1991 pp. 250-6). Environmentalists, however, 
continued to campaign for the refinement and expansion of these policies and, above 
all, their proper enforcement.
Transparency and accountability mechanisms: Not trusting the Bank to enforce 
its own policies, campaigners sought means to monitor the Bank’s behavior and hold it 
accountable to its commitments. At one level, this involved developing new 
information on the Bank’s activities, e.g. via new reporting requirements, or pressuring 
the Bank to release the information it already had. Both of these activities brought 
greater transparency to the Bank’s impacts and decision-making processes. At another 
level accountability required some means of evaluation, reward, or punishment, which 
could incentivize the Bank to behave in a more socially and environmentally sensitive 
fashion and correct its decisions when it failed to conduct its activities in such a 
manner.
Most efforts at monitoring and accountability worked via the US government. 
Typically they involved a combination of dialogue with key policymakers and 
legislative action. In the late 1980s Washington-based environmental NGOs began 
meeting regularly with representatives of the US State Department, Environmental 
Protection Agency, Treasury, and USAID to discuss events at the World Bank and 
coordinate their positions. These meetings, held on the first Tuesday of each month, 
became known as the Tuesday Group. The government members of the group were 
also part of a closed-door government body, the Working Group on Multilateral 
Institutions (WGMI), which gave instructions to the US Executive Director of the 
World Bank. The members of the Tuesday Group concluded that they needed 
additional information to effectively form positions on new Bank projects and that it 
needed to get its information early in the project cycle. In response, Larry Williams of 
the Sierra Club and David Wirth of the NRDC authored the Early Warning System 
legislation. The legislation instructed USAID to use its then-extensive network of 
field staff to track multilateral development projects and report publicly on their 
progress. The success of NGOs in getting the legislation passed demonstrated the 
growing power of the environmental movement. The US Treasury tried to pre-empt 
the Sierra Club-NRDC effort by passing a bill using its own, alternative language, but
12 See also World Bank, “OD 4.30: Involuntary Resettlement”, 1 June 1990.
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was unsuccessful. Soon afterwards Congress, with the begrudging support of the 
Treasury, adopted the NGO proposal.13
According to a source present at the time, the Sierra Club was also instrumental 
in designing and developing support for the Pelosi Amendment, which promoted the 
use of environmental impact assessments. The amendment, attached to a 1989 bill on 
international finance, stipulated that the US executive director would be bound to vote 
against any Bank project for which the Bank’s board had not been supplied with an 
environmental assessment. The bill gave the Bank two years to implement the 
necessary changes before the US voting stricture would take effect.14 The bill not only 
forced the Bank to create a comprehensive system of environmental impact 
assessments, it also fostered greater transparency and accountability. Previously 
documents like environmental assessments were viewed by the Bank as proprietary 
documents belonging to the borrower. The Bank took the position that it could not 
disclose such documents even to its own board without the express consent of the 
owner. Consequently, the original Operational Directive on environmental 
assessments did not include a provision for the release of the data to the board.15 By 
requiring the Bank to release environmental assessments well in advance of any board 
vote on a given project, the amendment expanded the board’s access to information 
and enhanced its ability to monitor the actions of the Bank (Wade 1997 pp. 686-7).
Despite these successes, activists still worried that the Bank was largely 
unaccountable and had little incentive to effectively enforce its own safeguard policies. 
The need for an enforcement mechanism led to several proposals in the early 1990s for 
an independent appeals commission or ombudsman (see Clark 2003 p. 22)16. Such 
proposals gained the support of staff from the Environmental Defense Fund and the 
Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL); the appeals commission would 
become a central issue in later lobbying (Bradlow 1993 p. 565).
13 Information for this account comes from a senior environmental staffer directly involved in this 
process.
4 101st US Congress, PL 101-240, December 1989.
15 World Bank, “OD 4.00: Environmental Assessment”, October 1991.
16 See also, for example, Daniel Bradlow, ‘The Case for a World Bank Ombudsman”, policy paper 
submitted to the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on International Development, Finance, 
Trade and Monetary Policy of the Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Committee, May 1993.
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1990-1992: Convergence
Environmental and development concerns began to converge in the late 1980s.
Massive protests greeted the World Bank IMF Annual Conference in 1988, held in 
Berlin. Tens of thousands of people took to the street; “North, south, east, and west we 
had people turning out,” recalled one environmental leader. According to a source at 
Friends of the Earth, major environmental NGOs were involved in organizing the 
protests, but the demonstrations focused on issues like structural adjustment as well as 
environmental degradation.
Faith-based organizations in particular bridged the two sides. Less narrowly 
focused than either service-delivery NGOs or environmental advocates, some faith- 
based groups cycled back and forth between environmental and development causes. 
For instance, the Catholic church was active in supporting IDA funding during the 
1980s. In 1990, after the Pope issued an address on the environment, the US Catholic 
Conference of Bishops became involved in that issue. Later, according to a source 
who had worked with the conference during this time, when development funding 
came under threat the bishops refocused their attention on defending IDA and threw 
their support behind debt relief. Other faith-based organizations, like WDM, also split 
their attention between development and some environmental issues.17 According to 
one source involved in these events, some of these faith-based groups built 
relationships with the core group of American environmentalists leading the 
environmental campaign against the Bank.
Development advocates were also taking note of environmentalists’ successes. 
Although development organizations had been working with the Bank for years, both 
through the NGO World Bank Committee and through cooperation on various 
projects, their advocacy efforts had had only limited impact on Bank policy. In 
contrast, environmental NGOs had achieved their first major success, the suspension 
of the Polonoroeste loan, just two years after starting their campaign. The 
environmental activism surrounding the ninth replenishment of funds for the 
International Development Association had been particularly effective. In response to 
civil society threats to challenge donor funding of the replenishment, the Bank had 
created a number of new policies reflective of environmental concerns. Organizations 
like Church World Service (which although faith-based focused primarily on
17 Information comes from an informant who worked with the organization during this time.
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development) and Bread for the World recognized the effectiveness of environmental 
criticism and sought ways to use similar tactics themselves. The political landscape 
was also changing as environmental successes made environmentalism more 
mainstream. Development organizations began including vaguely defined calls for 
‘sustainable development’ in their policy recommendations and noting links between 
environmental preservation and human well-being.
As the IDA-10 replenishment approached, environmentalists also encouraged 
civil society cooperation, seeking to develop alliances with development organizations 
both in other IDA donor nations and in the developing world.18 IDA negotiations 
typically started 18 months in advance of the replenishment; donor discussions of the 
IDA-10 would begin in 1992 and culminate late in 1993. By 1992 the core of the 
environmentally based Bank-reform movement included EDF, FoE, and NWF, with 
some involvement from a number of other groups including Greenpeace, the NRDC, 
Rainforest Action Network, the Sierra Club, and CIEL. These environmental NGOs 
saw the broadening of their coalition as an important strategic step. To widen their 
appeal, they began discussing issues like debt relief and popular participation and 
developing their own poverty focus. An anonymous draft of a position paper on the 
IDA-10, circulated in January of 1992, noted that “it is unrealistic to think that the 
South will cooperate in the development and execution of an environmental agenda in 
the absence of cooperation on development and execution of a social agenda”.19 The 
same paper recommended that poverty alleviation, changes in structural adjustment, 
and popular participation be included alongside existing environmental demands for 
improved accountability mechanisms, improved resettlement policies, and sustainable 
energy development. The core environmental groups also began reaching out to 
potential allies by stressing overlapping objectives. In requesting Irish assistance with 
IDA lobbying on behalf of Washington environmentalists, one staffer wrote that 
“though our opinions about the Bank and the various issues differ broadly, we all agree 
on the need for at least putting restraints on Bank activities”.20 Similarly, in an
18 See, for example: invitation issued by the Bank Information Center (BIC), CIEL, EDF, and others for 
a cocktail party launching ‘The New International Alliance of the Indigenous-Tribal Peoples of the 
Tropical Forests”, 19 March 1992; and fax from Jonathan Miller of BIC to Andy Storey of Trocaire, 25 
June 1992. Documents provided to the author as scanned copies o f the originals by the Bank 
Information Center (BIC), December 2007. Compare with Barbara Crossette, “Movement Builds to 
Fight Harmful Projects in Poor Nations”, The New York Times, 23 June 1992.
19 Draft supplied by BIC.
20 Fax from Jonathan Miller of BIC to Andy Storey of Trocaire, 25 June 1992.
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exchange with Randy Hayes of Rainforest Action Network, Lori Udall explained that 
she had authored a group statement on the IDA using compromise language so as to 
gamer the broadest possible support.21
Such diplomacy helped blur the lines between development and environmental 
issues. Service delivery organizations, anti-poverty advocates, and faith groups 
integrated issues like transparency and environmental assessments into their lobbying 
agendas.22 Disparate civil society organizations engaged in dialogue and joint 
advocacy. In one notable example, the Development Group for Alternative Policies 
(the Development GAP), a left-leaning development advocacy group with strong ties 
to the environmental movement, worked with Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace,
Church World Service (CWS), Lutheran World Relief, Third World Network, and the 
European Network on Debt and Development to organize a 1992 forum on structural 
adjustment. The sponsors of the forum included the Environmental Defense Fund and 
the Rainforest Action Network; Caritas International and the World Council of 
Churches; and Swissaid and several branches of Oxfam (Hammond and McGowan 
1993). This sort of collaboration would be a hallmark of the early IDA-10 activism.
1992-1995: The IDA 10
The confluence of social and environmental interests was reflected in the initial 
lobbying surrounding the 10th IDA. The IDA replenishment was negotiated by a group 
of 32 IDA Deputies, each of whom represented an IDA donor nation. Borrowers were 
not allowed to send delegates or observers. The donor deputies were scheduled to 
meet five times in 1992, in January, April, July, September, and December.
Initially there was little need for strong civil society activism. Earlier 
campaigns had been sufficient to raise awareness of civil society concerns among 
member states.23 The US Treasury’s objectives, drafted in advance of the January 
meeting, included strengthening “key policy provisions” related to structural
21 Fax from Lori Udall of EDF to multiple US NGOs, 23 November 1992. Includes cover letter and draft 
statement. Cover letter notes “I have tried to draft [the statement] in such a way that both ‘reformists’ 
and ‘abolitionists’ can sign it. I took the compromise position on the $18 billion replenishment in which 
I have called for ‘significant cuts,’ rather than opposition to the whole thing.”
22 See, for example, “Position Paper from Irish Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) Regarding the 
Tenth Capital Replenishment of the International Development Association”, dated “June-September, 
1992 [sic]”.
23 See, for example Barbara Crossette, ‘The Earth Summit: What Some Preach in Rio Is Not What They 
Practice at Home”, The N ew York Times, 15 June 1992. Also Barbara Crossette “Movement Builds to 
Fight Harmful Projects in Poor Nations”, The N ew York Times, 23 June 1992.
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adjustment, energy conservation, popular participation, environmental action plans, 
poverty reduction, and gender in development. The draft noted that these were “issues 
in which the US NGO community has expressed a particular interest”.24 A more
9Sdetailed position paper, written in April, outlined these concerns in greater depth.
96Delegates from the Netherlands were also aware of civil society concerns and issues 
of popular participation and informational liberalization were debated on the floor of 
the British parliament.27
As the IDA deputies moved to prepare their draft resolution in July 1992, CSOs 
worked together to apply more pressure. At the centre of the networking effort was the 
Washington-based Bank Information Center (BIC). Established in 1987 using funding 
from the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, BIC was an information clearinghouse 
created to facilitate data-sharing among civil society organizations worldwide. 
Although BIC, in theory, worked with any and all organizations, it had an emphasis on 
the environment. BIC’s letterhead at the time described it as “A Clearinghouse for 
Environmental Information on MDB Funded Projects.” Maureen Smyth, then the 
Mott Foundation program officer responsible for BIC’s funding, recalled that the 
environmental focus was designed as a hook to attract more organizations to the BIC 
network.28 The result was that BIC became heavily involved in environmental issues. 
Although it rarely engaged in direct lobbying itself, it worked closely with the DC- 
based environmental NGOs at the core of the environmentalist campaign to reform the 
Bank.
DC-based NGOs were already engaged in the policy process through their 
connections with Pat Coady, then the US executive director for the World Bank.29 
Coady was not part of the US IDA delegation, but he still had significant sway with 
the Bank. According to government and civil society sources, many of the meetings 
with Coady were arranged by BIC, and Coady, a Republican appointee, was very
24 US Treasury, ‘Tenth Replenishment of the International Development Association (IDA 10)”, 24 
January 1992.
25 US Treasury, “IDA X: Quality of Project Lending”, 21 April 1992.
26 Information comes from a former staff member at Oxfam-UK familiar with these events.
27 See statements by MPs Michael Meacher and John Denham, during UK Parliamentary debate on a 
motion by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs that funding for IDA-10 
be approved. UK Parliamentary record, 12 July 1993, 11:10pm. Meacher criticizes the “anti-social and 
anti-development policies of the World Bank” while Denham notes that he was forced to obtain Bank 
documents via US NGOs.
28 Author’s interview with Maureen Smyth, Senior Vice President for Programs and Communications, 
Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, interview by phone, 21 March 2008. Hereafter: “Interview: Smyth”.
29 Information comes from a staff member in the US ED’s office at this time.
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sympathetic to the environmental position. American NGOs were also in direct 
contact with the US Treasury.30 Other organizations, like Oxfam-GB, the Netherlands- 
based NOVIB, and the Australian-headquartered Third World Forum, were likewise 
involved through direct interaction with their countries’ EDs and government 
representatives.31
When the IDA deputies met in Dublin in July to prepare a draft agreement, BIC 
helped develop European involvement in the process. At the behest of unnamed “US 
NGOs,” BIC recruited Andy Storey of the Catholic aid organization Trocaire to 
organize Irish support. BIC’s correspondence with Storey indicated that BIC was 
advancing an environmental platform, but stressed that environmentalists and 
development operators had certain shared interests.32 Trocaire distributed leaflets 
provided by BIC at the IDA meeting, did television and radio interviews, and 
coordinated a joint statement from Irish NGOs on the IDA replenishment.33 Trocaire’s 
press release on the IDA, picked up by Irish newspapers, was particularly critical of 
the World Bank.34 The joint statement of NGOs, however, focused more on policy 
changes. It included a blend of environmental and development proposals, including 
increased transparency, an independent appeals mechanism, popular participation, 
poverty reduction, and required environmental assessments. It was signed by twenty- 
one organizations, including Christian Aid, Oxfam in Ireland, Earthwatch, and the 
Irish Missionary Union.35
30 For example, see fax from David Reed, Director, International Institutions Policy Program, WWF 
International to George A. Folsom, Deputy Assistant Secretary, International Development, Debt and 
Environment Policy, US Treasury, 3 September 1992; also letter from Raymond Mikesell, Economic 
Advisor to the Sierra Club International Program and Larry Williams, Washington Director, Sierra Club 
International Program to George A. Folsom, Deputy Assistant Secretary, International Development, 
Debt and Environment Policy, US Treasury, 10 September 1992.
31 Information comes from a former staff member at Oxfam-UK. Also letter from John Kerin, Australia 
Minister for Trade and Overseas Development to Gregg Barrett, Third World Forum, 7 September 1992. 
Letter addresses the NGO's concerns regarding Narmada and welcomes the “vital role which NGOs and 
their widespread networks play” in monitoring the Bank. Letter also notes that Kerrin has asked Robin 
Casson, Australian's lead IDA deputy, to “arrange a meeting with interested NGOs” prior to the 
September IDA meeting and "where appropriate, incorporate [their concerns] into the Australian 
position.”
2 Fax from Jonathan Miller of BIC to Andy Storey of Trocaire, 25 June 1992.
33 Fax from Andy Storey of Trocaire to Jonathan Miller of BIC, 1 July 1992.
34 The Trocaire press release was attached to the Storey-Miller fax. The text of the release is followed 
closely by “Agencies in Attack on Bank”, Irish Independence, 1 July 1992 and “International 
Development Agency [sic] seeks funding rise”, Irish Times, 1 Julyl992. Tellingly, both articles imply 
that Irish NGOs are highly critical of the Bank, when the Irish NGO position paper on the IDA-10, cited 
earlier, is actually notable for its moderation.
35 “Position Paper from Irish Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) Regarding the Tenth Capital 
Replenishment of the International Development Association”, dated “June-September, 1992 [sic]”.
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Civil society organizations had no presence in the replenishment meetings, but 
the civil society-run publicity campaigns and relationships between civil society 
organizations and several delegations made civil society demands an open topic of 
discussion during the negotiations. At the meeting in Dublin, several governments 
expressed concern about the legitimacy of the claims of the CSOs involved; the 
German delegation even went so far as to state that “Washington-based NGOs are not 
representative”.36
In response to delegate requests, the World Bank organized a meeting between 
developing nation civil society representatives and IDA deputies, held in Washington, 
D.C. in September. The CSO participants, from Africa, Asia, and Latin America, 
affirmed their support for much of the reform agenda. In particular, they emphasized 
poverty reduction, changes in structural adjustment, and accountability. They 
explicitly affirmed the overall intentions of Northern CSOs attempting to reform the 
Bank, although the Southerners were less categorically opposed to structural 
adjustment and less focused on environmental issues. Most importantly, they 
expressed disagreement with the proposal made by some Northern CSOs to use cuts in 
IDA funding to leverage change. The IDA, in the view of the Southerners, was too 
important to poor populations to be reduced.37 This division over the fate of IDA 
would ultimately become a wedge, fracturing the reform coalition. The hammer 
driving it was the Narmada Dam.
The Narmada Dam: Testing the Bank's Will to Reform
Although some of the development organizations involved in the IDA negotiations, 
like CWS and Bread for the World, were interested in using donor funding power to 
leverage reforms at the World Bank, they had no interest in actually decreasing the 
level of IDA funding. Instead they saw the IDA funding cycle as an opportunity to 
make reasonable demands that the Bank would be bound to accept. In this regard, 
their position was akin to that of many of the Bank’s donors. Almost universally, 
development organizations believed that the IDA and even the World Bank were 
necessary development tools delivering a net benefit to the world’s poor.
Many of the Washington-based environmental NGOs, however, were far less 
certain. Some believed that the Bank’s net impact on the world’s poor was negative.
36 US Treasury, “IDA Deputies Meeting, Dublin, July 1-2, 1992, ‘The Environment”’, 30 July 1992.
37 World Bank, “Meeting Between IDA Deputies, Executive Directors, and NGOs”, 16 September 1992.
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The authors of an anonymous IDA-10 position paper obtained from BIC note, “It is 
our position that safeguarding concessional flows to poor countries is unhelpful if 
those flows are not contributing to broad-based and sustainable development”.38 Bank 
funding would be supported only if the Bank were reformed.
Such discussions featured relatively little in the early negotiations surrounding 
the IDA. The emphasis was on the reform of the Bank rather than its potential 
abolition. This approach permitted cooperation with other actors with a reformist 
emphasis, including those CSOs like Oxfam or Bread that fundamentally supported the 
Bank’s mission. Concerns about the Bank’s capacity to change itself, however, were 
brought into sharp relief by the Morse Commission report on the Narmada Dam, 
published in June of 1992, and the Bank’s subsequent handling of the commission’s 
recommendations.
The Narmada Dam, also known as the Sardar Sarovar project, was actually a 
series of dams conceived by the Indian government in the 1960s. The dams were 
intended to provide drinking water, irrigation, and electricity in northwest India, 
particularly in the State of Gujarat. The Indian government began finalizing plans for 
the dam in 1979, and by 1985 the Bank had approved the first Sardar Sarovar loan. By 
the late 1980s, the project had begun to attract international attention. The number of 
people expected to be displaced by the reservoirs from the dams was expected to reach 
approximately 250,000. Not only was the number extremely high, but many of the 
families to be displaced came from India’s marginalized tribal class. Because they 
lacked clear rights to their land, it was uncertain if they would be justly compensated 
for their resettlement. Further investigation revealed potential flaws in the design of 
the dam’s key irrigation components, namely that the irrigation might contribute to soil 
salination and thus destroy farmland. The dam’s rise to prominence also coincided 
with the birth of an international movement against dams, which accused large dams of 
destroying river ecologies and contributing to the spread of waterborne disease. The 
international attention focused on the Narmada Dam eventually forced the World Bank 
to suspend disbursement of the Narmada loan in 1991. It then appointed an ad hoc 
independent review board, known as the Morse Commission after its chairman,
38 See also fax from Korinna Horta of EDF to BIC “Indications of how EDA fails to meet its basic 
objectives of poverty alleviation and environmental protection”, 9 October 1992. Also Bruce Rich, Lori 
Udall, and Deborah Moore, all of EDF, “Letter to the Editor: Before We Let the World Bank Squander 
More”, The N ew York Times, 6 January 1993.
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Bradford Morse, to investigate claims that the Bank had violated its own resettlement 
and environmental policies in its funding of the dam.
The commission’s report confirmed many of the critics’ claims. The Morse 
Commission not only documented several key policy violations; it also implied that 
such policy violations resulted from systematic flaws in Bank practice. In the view of 
the commission, Sardar Sarovar could not easily be fixed. It recommended that the 
Bank “step back” from the project (cited in Udall 1995, p. 216).
The anti-Bank organizations involved in the IDA-10 viewed the Narmada as a 
clear test case of the World Bank’s ability to reform. They also interpreted the 
commission’s “step back” language as a clear call for project cancellation. Instead of 
canceling the project, however, the Word Bank’s board delayed making a final 
decision as the Bank’s management and the Indian government rushed to assemble a 
remediation plan.
A board date to consider the project was finally set for October 1992. In 
anticipation of the board vote and management’s attempts to defend the project, a 
group of NGOs took out full page ads in the New York Times and Financial Times 
opposing the project. The advertisements issued an ultimatum:
If the World Bank does not withdraw from Sardar Sarovar it will 
confirm that the Bank cannot implement its own stated policies.
Failing withdrawal, we will launch an international campaign to urge 
taxpayers, donor governments, and environmental and social 
organizations to oppose the $18 billion replenishment of the of the 
International Development Association.39
The advertisement, however, was not sufficient to sway the Bank’s board. Although a 
number of donor country EDs, including the representatives of the US and UK, voted 
against the project, the board agreed to continue funding.
Anti-Bank and Pro-ID A Factions
The explicit threat to the Bank’s funding triggered a sharp drawing up of sides between 
anti-Bank and pro-IDA groups. The anti-Bank faction encompassed those CSOs with 
a generally negative perception of the Bank who opposed its continued functioning in 
its present form. The anti-Bank faction included many environmental NGOs, but by
39 Advertisement, “Your Tax Money - Funding Yet Another World Bank Disaster: Why thousands of 
people will drown before accepting the Sardar Sarovar Dam”, The New York Times, 21 September 1992.
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no means all of them. Environmental Defense led the charge, joined by the National 
Wildlife Federation, Friends of the Earth, the Sierra Club, and Greenpeace. The World 
Wildlife Fund (WWF), however, had already written to the US Treasury to note that 
they were not part of the larger DC environmental coalition.40 Later WWF would side 
with the pro-IDA faction. The NRDC, which was only somewhat involved in the IDA 
negotiations, would also take a more neutral approach. Development GAP, despite its 
strong connections to the environmental community and liberal bent, stayed aloof. 
According to one source familiar with the organization, it felt constrained to heed the 
positions of its Southern partners, who opposed the attack on the IDA.
Southern CSOs within the NGO Working Group, according to a member 
present at the time, helped sway the organization towards a pro-IDA position. On 
October 30th the NGOWG published an open letter to World Bank President Lewis 
Preston expressing the support of the group for full funding of the IDA-10 
replenishment.
The NGO Working Group expresses its deep and abiding concern 
about the adequacy of funds on concessional terms being made 
available by the North to tackle poverty in the South... The NGO 
Working Group is especially concerned about the possibility of cuts in 
real terms under the current round of negotiations for the IDA-10 
replenishment.41
Although Preston himself had little direct control over the level of funding, the letter 
was an important public relations tool. Although the NGOWG affirmed “the link 
between poverty and the environment,” its letter stressed the role of the IDA in 
reducing poverty and declared that “measures to protect the global environment should 
not be at the expense of efforts to reduce poverty”.42 Members supporting the 
statement represented thirty different CSOs, many of them from the global South.
They included religious groups like the Caribbean Council of Churches and the World 
Council of Churches as well as many development groups, including the DC-based 
Interaction and the Dutch-based NOVIB. Many of the groups which had collaborated
40 Fax from David Reed, Director, International Institutions Policy Program, WWF to George A. 
Folsom, Deputy Assistant Secretary, International Development, Debt and Environment Policy, US 
Treasury, 3 September 1992.
41 Letter from Mazide N'diaye, Co-Chair, NGO/World Bank Working Group, to Lewis Preston, 
President, World Bank, 30 October 1992.
42 Ibid.
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with the environmental push in Dublin, including Oxfam-Ireland, MISERFOR, and 
Caritas International, endorsed the letter.
While the pro-IDA position was a fairly simple affirmation of the need for 
concessional aid for the poor, the anti-Bank position was more complex. In the eyes of 
its members, the Bank had failed a crucial test on refusing to cancel the Narmada loan. 
Yet they were divided on how to deal with that failure; the two camps were referred to 
as “abolitionists” and “reformists”.43 For abolitionists, the Bank had proven itself 
unreformable. The combination of its intransigence on Narmada and its perceived 
record of environmental and social degradation meant that the Bank itself should be 
closed. Some abolitionists favored a new, smaller institution or a compensating 
increase in bilateral aid. Others questioned the value of development aid altogether 
(cf. Rich 1994). Reformists took the position that although the Bank could not reform 
itself, sufficient external pressure might still yield changes. Yet reformists, like 
abolitions, still believed that the Bank had, historically, been a negative force in the 
developing world. They therefore favored sweeping reforms that would yield a 
smaller, less powerful institution which focused more on environmental preservation 
and service-delivery to the poor, and far less on economic development. They were 
unwilling to see the Bank funded until this was accomplished. In many cases they 
called for non-specific additional changes in areas like transparency and popular 
participation in which the Bank was already making significant concessions. Such 
vagueness gave little room for clear benchmarking of Bank improvement beyond NGO 
say-so.
For the abolitionists, withholding IDA-funding was the first step in eventually 
eliminating the Bank. For the Bank-shrinking reformists, the withholding of IDA 
funds was a battering ram to be deployed to force the Bank to open and change. 
However, cuts in the IDA were more than just a means to an end. Withholding IDA 
funds and redeploying them via other channels (e.g. in debt relief or selected bilateral 
agencies) would have the desired effect of diminishing the Bank’s power and 
reinforcing the alternative models of development the reformists wanted the Bank to 
adopt. There was also some indication that some of the groups with more abolitionist 
leanings took a reformist approach in public to avoid criticism. While ostensibly
43 Fax from Lori Udall to US NGOs, 23 November 1992.
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‘reformist,’ they sought to set the reform bar high enough to all but necessitate the 
cancellation of the IDA and thus financially diminish the Bank.44
The Wapenhans Report
In December 1992, the anti-Bank faction was inadvertently given an added boost by 
the World Bank itself after an internal evaluation commissioned by Bank President 
Preston was completed. The evaluation, “Effective Implementation: Key to 
Development Impact,” was known as the Wapenhans Report, after Willi Wapenhans, 
the Bank Vice President who led the evaluation task force. The report categorized 
over a third of the Bank’s loans as nonperforming and noted a significant increase in 
the number of nonperforming loans between 1981 and 1991. More damningly, the 
report attributed the Bank’s problems to a culture that stressed making new loans 
rather than careful implementation of existing loans or the evaluation of completed 
projects.
The Bank’s critics quickly seized on the report as evidence of endemic failure 
within the Bank and the need for wholesale reform or abolition. Representatives of the 
Environmental Defense Fund wrote a letter to the editor of the New York Times 
declaring:
Before agreeing to provide $18 billion more to the [World Bank’s] 
International Development Association, taxpayers in the United States 
and other donor countries should be aware that these problems are 
systemic and that without major reforms the money will continue to 
be wasted on environmental and social disasters... To dump $18 
billion into the lap of such an institution, without total reform and 
housecleaning from top to bottom, is financial folly.45
Wapenhans himself, by that point retired from the Bank, quickly responded with a 
letter of his own, charging that the EDF authors had “misread” the report: “our report 
is part of the bank’s self-assessment and should be seen as telling evidence that the 
institution is not complacent but continuously seeks to improve” 46 Despite his
44 Ibid.; fax from Randy Hayes of Rainforest Action Network to Lori Udall of EDF 24 November 1992; 
and fax from BIC to US Representative Barney Frank, 2 March 1993.
45 Bruce Rich, Lori Udall, and Deborah Moore, Director, staff lawyer, and staff scientist of EDF's 
international program (respectively), 6 January 1993.
46 Willi Wapenhans, “Letter to the Editor: World Bank Keeps Improving Its Approach”, The New York 
Times, 23 January 1993.
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protests, however, the report would continue to feature prominently in discussions 
about the Bank.
The Completion o f the IDA Negotiations
The donor deputies and the Bank concluded their negotiations in early December 1992 
with an agreement to maintain IDA funding at IDA-9 levels, adjusted for inflation.
The replenishment agreement reflected many of the concerns raised by various CSOs. 
It included an agreement on behalf of the Bank to focus on poverty and to use poverty- 
targeted interventions to offset the impacts of structural adjustment. Deputies also 
stressed that adjustment itself should be done in such a way as to preserve social safety 
nets. The Bank committed that 50 per cent of new IDA expenditures would “include 
specific actions to assist women,” such as girls’ education and family planning.47 The 
Bank also committed to continuing to assist borrowers in preparing national 
Environmental Action Plans and to prepare Environmental Impact Assessments for 
new projects, although the commitment’s language appeared to make some of this 
dependent upon the borrower’s decisions. Popular participation was also stressed, as 
were transparency and accountability. Notes on improving project quality and 
monitoring also addressed donor concerns about project management at the Bank, 
some of which predated the Wapenhans report48
In short, the CSOs involved in the IDA process got nearly everything they had 
asked for. A senior civil society source for this thesis, who had been involved in the 
negotiations, acknowledged that nearly all of the core civil society demands were met. 
However, in the post-Narmada climate, the anti-Bank organizations were no longer 
content. Not only were they pushing for a reduction in the Bank’s power or even its 
elimination; they were also seeking additional ways to control it. The creation of an 
independent appeals mechanism became a high priority. It had been only a secondary 
issue during the earlier negotiations, particularly because development and justice- 
oriented CSOs viewed it as a tool designed almost exclusively for the enforcement of 
environmental regulations.49 The anti-Bank faction also increased the volume and
47 World Bank, “Additions to IDA Resources: 10th Replenishment”, December 1992, pp. 4-5.
48 Cf. US Treasury, “IDA Deputies Meeting, Dublin, July 1-2, 1992, The Environment’”, 30 July 1992.
49 This account was confirmed both by a source who had been a senior staffer at a justice-oriented NGO 
at the time of the IDA-10 and by a Bank staffer who had previously worked in the NGO community and 
had been present at the Bank during the IDA-10.
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scope of their transparency demands, calling for further improvements in the Bank’s 
information policy.
US Exceptionalism
To reduce the Bank’s power and to leverage their new demands, the anti-Bank faction 
lobbied donor governments to cut or eliminate their IDA funding. This began in 
November, even before the final IDA agreement, and continued into early 1993. 
Parliamentarians in Canada and Britain debated the IDA’s merits, and in Sweden a 
motion was even tabled to cut IDA funding. Only in Finland, however, was the attack 
on the IDA successful, resulting in a $14 million cut to the Finnish contribution (Udall 
1995 p. 224).
IDA enjoyed broad support as the World Bank’s primary poverty-fighting 
vehicle. However, the failure of most of the political attacks on the IDA had a more 
systemic cause. Nearly all of the IDA’s donor countries had parliamentary systems 
with combined executive and legislative functions. The party in power was also 
responsible for the IDA’s negotiation and therefore unlikely to inflict on itself a 
legislative defeat.
The major exception to this was the US. Not only was the US the IDA’s 
biggest donor, with over $2.7 billion pledged, it also had a much more volatile political 
system. The US was “almost unique” among Bank donors in having “two genuinely 
independent decision-making branches that always [were] at least in semi-conflict and 
both of which [needed] wooing” (Kapur et al. 1997 p. 1145). The US government was 
also particularly porous, allowing multiple entry points for lobbyists and activists. The 
organizations opposing the IDA therefore turned their sights towards the US.
The IDA Fight in Congress
In response to civil society pressure, Congress held three hearings on the World Bank 
and IDA in the spring of 1993. Two were held before subcommittees in the House of 
Representatives and one was held in the Senate. In each chamber the IDA 
expenditures needed to go through both authorization and budgeting processes. A 
subcommittee had to authorize Congress to make the expenditures, and the authorizing 
bill then had to be passed by the whole House. A budget subcommittee also had to 
budget money for the payments, without which the authorization would be 
meaningless. The budget plan also then had to be approved by the House. Both of the
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relevant subcommittees in the House of Representatives and the authorizing committee 
in the Senate held public hearings.
NGOs including the Environmental Defense Fund, Friends of the Earth, the National 
Wildlife Federation, Greenpeace, and the Sierra Club lobbied openly for cuts to World 
Bank funding or for a complete holdback in Bank funding pending large-scale 
reform.50 Interaction, on behalf of a large number of Washington development and 
relief organizations, gave Congressional testimony calling for full funding for the IDA, 
as did CARE and Bread for the World.51 Bread even went so far as to call for funding 
to be increased.52 The Forum of African Voluntary Development Organizations 
(FAVDO) also provided a representative who made an impassioned plea for continued 
funding.53
On the whole, however, IDA advocates had relatively less representation 
before Congress than they had had with the IDA deputies. Non-US CSOs, which had 
heretofore been quite active in the IDA process, had a smaller role once the fight 
moved to the US. FAVDO, as an umbrella organization, spoke on behalf of a large 
number of African CSOs. Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA), an Indian advocacy 
group which had previously supported the replenishment, submitted a letter through 
the Environmental Defense Fund calling for an elimination of the Bank and IDA. The 
Public Interest Research Group in India submitted a similar statement calling for 
complete cancellation of the replenishment. The report of the September meeting 
between Southern CSOs and the IDA deputies, in which the Southerners expressed 
their support for IDA, was likewise submitted to Congress. Examples like these 
notwithstanding, lack of a permanent Washington presence or experience in DC-based
50 Hearings before the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing, and Related Programs on the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations for 1994, 1 March 1993; hearings before the US House of Representatives 
Subcommittee on International Development, Finance, Trade, and Monetary Policy on Authorizing 
contributions to IDA, GEF, and ADF, 5 May 1993; hearings before a US Senate subcommittee of the 
Committee on Appropriations, on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1994, 15 June 1993.
51 Hearings before the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing, and Related Programs on the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations for 1994, 1 March 1993; and hearings before the US House of Representatives 
Subcommittee on International Development, Finance, Trade, and Monetary Policy on Authorizing 
contributions to IDA, GEF, and ADF, 5 May 1993.
52 Hearings before the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing, and Related Programs on the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations for 1994, 1 March 1993.
53 Hearings before the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on International Development, 
Finance, Trade, and Monetary Policy on Authorizing contributions to IDA, GEF, and ADF, 5 May 
1993.
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lobbying excluded most non-American actors from direct involvement in the process. 
This included not just developing country CSOs, but even larger European actors like 
Oxfam.54
This vacuum permitted many of those CSOs still involved to claim to represent 
civil society in other parts of the world. These claims, however, frequently conflicted. 
FAVDO and NBA, although both ostensibly speaking on behalf of IDA recipients, 
held diametrically opposing views. US-based groups, including Church World 
Service, Friends of the Earth, and the National Wildlife Federation all made claims to 
represent either local partners or unspecified developing country populations, yet held 
strikingly disparate positions.
As discussion progressed through the spring and summer, the Congressional 
debate became not just a decision about IDA but also a referendum on the Bank itself. 
Developing this theme, staff from EDF and Friends of the Earth highlighted the costs 
of the construction of the Bank’s new Washington headquarters.55 These costs, along 
with staff salaries and the Bank’s co-ownership of a Maryland golf-course, were cited 
in floor debate as evidence of the Bank’s fiscal irresponsibility. The World Bank’s 
spending was described as akin to that of the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), whose president, Jacques Attali, had been forced to resign 
after spending millions of dollars on private planes, a lavish Christmas party, and new 
marble for the EBRD’s headquarters.56 An amendment designed to cancel all US 
funding to the Bank for the 1994 fiscal year was barely defeated on a vote of 210- 
216.57
Final Outcomes
The efforts of the IDA opponents were extremely successful. Congress reduced US 
funding for the IDA by $200 million for the first year of disbursement. The 
appropriations bill, passed in September of 1993, stipulated that the US would pressure 
the World Bank to introduce an appeals mechanism and that the US Treasury would 
report back to Congress within six months on the Bank’s progress.58 Meanwhile the 
chair of the House authorizing subcommittee, Representative Barney Frank, negotiated
54 This account comes from a former Oxfam staff member, present at the time.
55 Information comes from a senior source at Friends of the Earth.
56 Congressional Record, 103rd Congress, 1st session, June 17, 1993.
57 Ibid.
58 US Congress, PL 103-87, 30 September 1993.
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an agreement to withhold authorization for one-third of the IDA’s remaining funding 
pending further reform of the Bank’s policies. This resulted in a holdback of $1.2 
billion. He also lobbied key Bank staff personally, threatening to hold up all 
authorization unless there was rapid change at the Bank.
The Bank moved rapidly towards the creation of an appeals mechanism, the 
World Bank Inspection Panel, but was unable to overcome anti-Bank sentiment in 
Washington. In 1994, 50 percent of that year’s IDA funds, approximately $600 
million, were also withheld. The appropriations bill stipulated that such funds would 
not be released until the US Treasury provided evidence of further improvements in 
the Bank’s information disclosure policy, its resettlement procedures, and its response 
to the recommendations made to mitigate the flaws highlighted in the Wapenhans 
Report.59 The Bank moved to further reform itself, but could not forestall all cuts. In 
1995, new Bank president, Jim Wolfensohn, joined by FAVDO, Oxfam, Interaction, 
and Church World Service, appealed unsuccessfully against further reductions.60 By 
early 1996, nearly the end of the IDA-10 cycle, total US cuts amounted to $934.5 
million.61
Civil society activism was successful on a number of other scores. As noted, 
early activism resulted in a number of new commitments in areas like poverty 
reduction and structural adjustment. The later anti-Bank campaign may have 
threatened some of those goals, like increased social spending, by moving to reduce 
the funds available for IDA interventions; however, it arguably demonstrated even 
greater civil society power. First, in monetary terms, opponents reduced the size of the 
total IDA-10 replenishment (1993-96) by approximately 5 percent and the US 
contribution by approximately 35 per cent. Second, the anti-IDA campaign 
substantially eroded the independence of the Bank. The creation of the appeals 
mechanism and the liberalization of the Bank’s information policy enhanced the 
Bank’s transparency and public accountability by an order of magnitude. Both would 
greatly facilitate further civil society efforts to transform the Bank and curtail its 
actions. Moreover, by forcing the Bank to deal directly with the US legislature, CSOs 
undercut the Bank’s tradition of dealing solely with member governments via their
59 US Congress, PL 103-306, 23 August 1994.
60 Jim Lobe, “Finance: IDA on the Edge”, IPS - Inter Press Service, 9 October 1995.
61 Washington Office on Africa, “Africa: US & Internat. Programs, 04/26/96”, 
http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Urgent_Action/dc_42696.html, accessed 4 July 2009.
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finance ministries. This created a new channel for civil society action against the Bank 
and also increased US power vis-a-vis other Bank members.
Conclusions
The activism surrounding the IDA-10 represents the first truly global civil society 
effort to reform the World Bank. Previous ‘global’ campaigns had been run largely by 
international CSOs based in the global North. Where they involved Southern actors, 
they tended to do so in a bilateral fashion with Northern CSOs, often from just one 
country, interacting with civil society is a single Southern locale. In contrast, the IDA- 
10 campaign involved more than forty organizations from six different continents.
The organizations themselves were extremely diverse, representing a variety of 
environmental, economic, and religious viewpoints. Moreover, previous campaigns, 
such as the attack on structural adjustment, focused on only a single issue; the IDA-10 
activism encompassed nearly a dozen. Whereas many previous campaigns focused on 
project cancellation or the mitigation of a local or regional policy, the IDA-10 
discussion focused on multiple policies with global impact. Finally, the effect on the 
World Bank was unprecedented. Civil society activists would influence the shape of 
global governance for the next decade as the Bank increased participatory decision 
making in a host of areas, opened it records and reports to the public, engaged its 
critics, and cultivated civil society allies.
Of particular significant was the volume and diversity of civil society from 
developing nations who took part in the IDA. Prior to the IDA-10, civil society 
organizations from developing countries had primarily been focused on issues which 
exclusively impacted their own nations, or at most on narrow regional issues.
Examples included the Brazilian civil society focusing on Polonoroeste or Malaysians 
working on the International Timber Agreement and Action Plan (cf. Keck and 
Sikkink 1998). During the IDA-10 campaign, however, CSOs from Latin America, 
Africa, and Southeast Asia took active roles. Their efforts were a microcosm of the 
campaign itself, not a subsidiary effort of Northern actors. Far from engaging only on 
country-specific issues or regional policies, they campaigned for a host of broad policy 
changes whose implementation would impact the practice of development worldwide.
The data in this chapter represent a significant step in advancing this thesis’ 
research agenda. To begin with, the data answer the first research question posed in 
Chapter 1, namely: which civil society organizations are engaged with the World
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Bank? As described in the introduction, this question serves to test claims in the 
literature about the globality of civil society. The IDA-10 case supports the vision of a 
truly global civil society, hailing from a diverse array of nations and representing a 
variety of views.
Identifying the specific organizations involved, along with other data from the 
chapter, also begins the process of answering two more of the thesis’ other sub­
questions; how do civil society organizations interact with each other; and how do civil 
society organizations choose their policy positions? The events described in this 
chapter also highlight the importance of these sub-questions to achieving this thesis' 
larger goal of understanding whether data about the World Bank support the idea that 
civil society is democratizing global governance.
The forty-plus civil society organizations involved in the IDA-10 at times 
managed a striking degree of policy cohesion. At other times their positions were 
strikingly contentious. Actors formed alliances and broke them, acquired policy 
positions and discarded them. This raises questions regarding how civil society 
organizations interact with one another, and how individual organizations chose their 
policy positions. Examining further how civil society organizations chose to make or 
break alliances and whether they engaged in dialogue amongst themselves is important 
to understanding whether civil society can act to develop inclusive spaces for 
stakeholder input. Determining how CSOs chose their positions, e.g. whether on the 
basis of power, ideology, money, or grassroots pressure, bears on the debate over the 
representivity of CSOs. Both of these questions have relevance for civil society’s 
input legitimacy (which involves representivity and inclusivity) and both address 
particular claims in the literature regarding civil society’s democratizing potential. 
These issues will be explored in greater detail in the next chapter.
The data generated in this chapter also have relevance for this thesis’ sub­
questions regarding civil society’s impact on the Bank, the mechanisms of civil society 
influence, and the effect of civil society on the role of developing country 
governments.
This chapter clearly confirms that civil society is having an impact on the 
World Bank. Civil society in the IDA-10 impacted the Bank in a number of ways. 
Lobbying led the Bank to reinforce or improve the implementation of existing social 
and environmental safeguards, and to create new development practices, such as the 
use of poverty-targeted interventions and increased popular participation. Pressure
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exercised through donor governments led to the liberalization of the Bank’s 
information policy and the creation of the World Bank Inspection Panel. Some civil 
society organizations also sought to curtail the size and influence of the Bank and 
succeeded in reducing its funding. All of these impacts indicate that civil society 
managed to implement the agendas of at least some stakeholders. Some of these 
impacts, such as the implementation of the new information policy and the creation of 
the Inspection Panel, also increased citizen control over the institution. (Exactly how 
they do so is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5). These impacts substantiate claims 
made in the literature regarding civil society’s influence and indicate that civil society 
may, in terms of the context and legitimacy framework, be having democratic outputs.
At the same time, these impacts raise questions regarding the mechanisms and 
distribution of civil society influence. The IDA-10 case featured appeals to the public, 
like the New York Times advertisement; discussions with domestic politicians, like UK 
parliamentarians; negotiations with the international representatives of sovereign 
governments in the form of the IDA deputies and Bank Executive Directors; and direct 
discussions with leaders at the Bank itself. Understanding which of these channels 
were most effective and why will help address persistent questions in the literature 
regarding how civil society organizations achieve their impact. It is also important to 
examine the role of state assistance in successful advocacy as part of addressing 
concerns raised in the literature regarding civil society’s independence.
Determining which civil society organizations used which mechanisms and 
whether their actions expanded the possibilities for others to use those mechanisms 
also has bearing on civil society’s democratic legitimacy. To the extent that CSO 
activism made global governance more responsive, civil society can be seen to be 
expanding the authority of the citizens of the Bank’s member states over the policies 
impacting them. As noted, this would suggest that civil society has democratic 
outputs. However, to the extent that civil society exploited existing imbalances in 
power between donor nations or donors and borrowers, or that some civil society 
actors used exclusive channels to overcome the objections of other CSOs, CSO 
activism may be seen as advancing political elitism (and thus undermining claims of 
input legitimacy). The fact that in the latter portion of the IDA-10 campaign a small 
group of civil society actors managed to promote cuts in the replenishment over the 
objections of many other civil society organizations makes this question particularly
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salient. These questions regarding the mechanisms and distribution of influence will 
be explored in greater detail in Chapter 5.
Lastly, the data presented in this chapter indicate the importance of this thesis’ 
sub-question regarding civil society’s impact on the power of developing country 
governments. During the 10th IDA, organizations from both Bank donor nations and 
borrower nations claimed to represent the interests of the Bank’s stakeholders, 
particularly those in the global South. Yet the positions of various civil society actors 
were often contradictory, leading to confusion as to whom organizations actually 
represented and to whom, if anyone, they were accountable. Moreover, the use of US 
influence in the IDA-10 indicates that civil society may exploit power imbalances in 
the international system, utilizing powerful governments to marginalize weaker ones. 
These issues, and their implications for civil society’s capacity to democratize global 
governance, will be explored in more detail in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 4
Principles and Paychecks: Positions and Participation in the IDA-10
thDivisiveness is thoroughly manifest in the 10 IDA. Although a large number of 
actors originally sought to build a loose coalition, the coalition quickly fractured 
during the post-Narmada controversy over whether to attack the Bank’s funding. 
Nearly every civil society organization staff member interviewed for this research 
affirmed the presence of significant tensions and disagreements among civil society 
actors both during and after the IDA-10. According to one informant, organizations 
are constantly “competing for... funding and publicity”. Another, from an NGO with 
a strong anti-Bank agenda, described the staff of more moderate NGOs as being 
plagued by an intellectual inferiority complex. A former staff member with one 
development organization recalls being excluded from meetings with certain 
colleagues from other civil society organizations after he publicly disagreed with their 
position on the Narmada Dam.
This chapter examines the divisions that formed between civil society 
organizations during the 10th IDA regarding their policy objectives. The fault lines in 
the civil society coalition provide an indicator of how civil society organizations 
choose their policy positions. Identifying such fault lines is also a preliminary step in 
understanding how and when organizations form alliances. Both these issues have 
relevance for civil society’s capacity to improve representation and inclusivity, both 
key forms of democratic input, in policymaking. They also help address certain 
debates in the literature. For instance, as noted in Chapter 1, there is disagreement 
among authors regarding whether the behavior of civil society organizations is 
determined by grassroots input, elite agendas, or donor incentives. Understanding how 
civil society organizations form alliances has relevance for claims that civil society 
creates new discursive spaces and also for theories regarding network activism. 
Examining how existing theory is supported or challenged by the IDA-10 data is 
crucial to answering this thesis’ central question of whether data from transnational 
civil society engagement with the World Bank support the idea that civil society can 
democratize global governance.
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The need to address these areas of the literature is highlighted by certain limits 
in existing research. As noted in the introduction to this thesis, research on 
transnational civil society tends to begin by identifying a particularly prominent or 
successful campaign and working backwards. Those members present at the finish of 
the campaign are identified and their interests and actions are traced back to their roots. 
This creates the potential for a kind of victor’s history in which seceding partners, 
discarded ideas, and false starts are overlooked if they played no role in the final 
victory. The history of the victory becomes conflated with a history of the movement 
or the issue.
Similarly, in such analysis, data on the desires of affected populations are often 
provided by civil society actors themselves. Although copious research exists 
connecting grassroots dissent with the formation of organizations and the execution of 
activist agendas at the national level, when studying global phenomena the researcher 
may find tracing the details of the activist agenda back to distant and unorganized 
stakeholders extremely difficult. Unsurprisingly, most studies of global civil society 
treat CSOs as reasonable proxies for the grassroots interests of the stakeholders they 
claim to represent. Naturally the preference is for data from organizations based in a 
given stakeholder community, but when these are unavailable or when they have been 
subsumed by an international campaign with an international NGO spokesperson, then 
statements from large international NGOs are often used. This trend is exemplified by 
the incorporation of accounts written by NGO staff into academic texts. For instance, 
Lori Udall of the environmental NGO International Rivers Network is a contributor to 
Fox and Brown’s Struggle for Accountability (1998); Bruce Rich of the Environmental 
Defense Fund has a chapter in Pincus and Winters’ Reinventing the World Bank 
(2002); and Jo Marie Griesgraber of the advocacy organization New Rules of Global 
Finance is an author in Critical Mass by Walker and Thompson (2008). Such accounts 
generally provide excellent detail, firsthand information, and solid analysis. However, 
it is difficult to imagine that they represent neutral perspectives.1 Combined with the 
tendency to sample only those civil society organizations involved in a winning 
coalition, this practice may create or magnify the impression that transnational civil 
society is a reasonable representative of stakeholder interest. These limits in the
1 It is worth noting that a few efforts have been made to utilize the strengths o f practitioner-authored 
accounts while overcoming their potential bias by inviting input from a variety of competing actors all 
working on the same issue. Fisher (1995) exemplifies the potential of such an approach.
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literature (or its underlying research) may also encourage the impression that global 
civil society is largely unified or pluralistic. The majority of models, particularly of 
civil society in an advocacy mode, treat transnational civil society as a unified actor. If 
it is not treated as globally unified, it is at least regarded as largely united within its 
Northern or Southern hemispheres or its areas of interest like the environment or 
human rights (cf. Lipschutz 1992; Payne 1996; and Grzybowski 2002).2 In these 
models, activists share a common goal, usually defined in terms of the stakeholders’ 
best interests. Stakeholder interests can be defined clearly and unequivocally, and 
therefore unanimity in activism is relatively easy to achieve. Dissent, where it occurs, 
is a function of disagreement over methods, not objectives (cf. Nelson 1997).
Nonetheless, some significant exceptions exist. For instance, Cooley and Ron, 
in their analysis of service-delivery organizations, find them to be atomized and 
competitive (2002). Simba and Thom describe North-South relations as extremely 
hierarchical, rather than a partnership of peers (2000). This chapter explores these 
disagreements, along with other aspects of the existing literature, in the context of the 
IDA-10. It finds that during the activism surrounding the 10th IDA, ideology and 
funding worked together to determine the policy positions espoused by different 
organizations and their decisions to participate in advocacy. Examining the forty-plus 
organizations involved in the IDA-10, it finds that organizations chose their policy 
positions largely on the basis of pre-existing ideological interests and at the expense of 
genuine responsiveness to the borrowing country populations most affected by Bank 
policy. Material interests often drove the decision to participate in different aspects of 
the campaign; organizations participated when their participation was externally 
funded, supported by paying members, or when they expected a return on investment. 
The result was that neither individual organizations nor transnational civil society as a 
whole was particularly responsive to the majority of stakeholders. Moreover, tensions 
over funding undermined incentives towards dialogue, enhancing factiousness.
To arrive at these conclusions, I examined the three explanations given by 
informants for the divisions within the initial IDA-10 coalition: North-South tensions; 
ideology; and funding. This chapter tests each of these claims in turn, and finds that a
2 That is to say that other authors use as their unit o f analysis entire transnational campaigns or 
sometimes the Northern and Southern halves of such campaigns. In contrast, this thesis uses individual 
organizations as its unit of analysis, analyzing and comparing organizational behavior in three 
policymaking processes to develop a composite picture of civil society as a whole.
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combination of ideology and funding provides the most convincing explanation of 
civil society behavior during the IDA-10. It concludes with an analysis of the impacts 
of these findings on civil society’s claims to democratic legitimacy.
North versus South
In 1992, the Forum of African Voluntary Development Organizations prefaced a pro- 
IDA statement by declaring that Southern NGOs had “reached different conclusions 
from their Northern counterparts”.3 Likewise an informant from one DC-based NGO 
which stayed neutral in the IDA fight shared his impression that Southern NGOs held 
pro-IDA positions to avoid conflict with their governments. Statements such as these 
imply a North-South division within civil society. In order to evaluate such 
statements, however, it is necessary to define the terms ‘North’ and ‘South’. Although 
commonly used and perhaps deceptively intuitive, the terms can be quite vague 
references to industrialization, trade connections, geography, wealth, or power. In the 
case of the World Bank, however, defining the terms is easier: ‘Northern nations’ 
refers to IDA donors, while ‘Southern nations’ refers to IDA borrowers. This is the 
definition used in this research, and it seems congruent with the intentions of the 
informants cited here.
The assumption of difference between donors and borrowers is reflected in the 
literature on development wherein the gap in wealth and power between Northern and 
Southern nations is presumed to have an impact on the behavior of each group.
Several theories and historical analyses indicate that powerful, wealthy, or 
industrialized nations will seek to manipulate global systems to maintain their 
advantage, while weaker nations will seek to ascend to the ranks of the powerful (cf. 
Wallerstein 1987; cf. Chang 2002).
The language of global divisions has been incorporated into many areas of 
academic discourse, including political science and social policy. The globality of 
global civil society is often defined by the mutual involvement of Northern and 
Southern NGOs (cf. Korten 1998; Florini and Simmons 2000). Keck and Sikkink’s 
boomerang, in which some civil society actors convince their governments to apply 
pressure to foreign states obstructing the efforts of other CSOs, implies that civil
3 World Bank, “Meeting Between IDA Deputies, Executive Directors, and NGOs”, 16 September 1992.
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society will use the governments of strong states to change the behavior of weak ones. 
Their examples consistently feature North interventions in Southern issues.
In spite of participant claims and academic theory, however, there is little 
evidence of a North-South divide in the case of the 10th IDA. The data indicate that 
while divisions within civil society were real, position-taking on the IDA-10 does not 
correlate with North-South identity. Although some North-South differences are 
observed in the positions of governments, no parallel dichotomy is seen within civil 
society.
Divisions among Governments
The theory that developing nations and industrialized ones have different goals finds 
some support in the decade prior to the IDA-10. During the global downturn of the 
early 1980s, the Bank supported lending to developing nations as a means of propping 
up US exports (Gwin 1994 pp. 40, 43). Starting in the mid-1980s, the United States 
used the World Bank and the IMF to pursue an explicit agenda of financial and trade 
liberalization. Other donor nations supported the US emphasis on private-sector 
growth as an engine for development.
Nonetheless, there is little evidence of widespread support among other donor 
governments for the broader neo-liberal agenda (cf. Gwin 1994 p. 52). Moreover, by 
the time of the IDA-10, there was no explicit opposition from Southern governments to 
either the IDA itself or the structural adjustment lending sometimes associated with it. 
The economic ideology of the US, embraced by many economists and administrators 
at the World Bank and IMF had succeeded in reshaping the wider discourse on 
development. Trade protections and national industries were slowly falling from favor 
as perceived development best practice shifted towards private-sector led growth. For 
developing nations, economic reforms such as those promoted by structural adjustment 
had become a fait accompli.
Where Southern governments did object to a perceived Northern agenda was in 
the area of the environment. Divisions were highlighted by the Rio Earth Summit, 
held in 1992, and negotiations held in 1993 over the fate of the Global Environmental 
Facility, a multilateral fund for environmental projects. Southern nations drew a sharp 
line separating development from the environment and made clear that they wished to
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emphasize the former.4 To many, the focus on the environment was a Northern 
preoccupation being foisted on the South. According to a Ugandan government 
representative in Rio, “We don’t yet have big industries. We are lagging so far behind 
that we don’t talk of industrial pollution. [Development] finance is the most important 
thing to us”.5 Developing nations took exception to the way environmental concerns 
were used to justify the conditions attached to development aid. In the words of 
India’s minister of environment and forests, “They [the developed countries] say, ‘Yes, 
we are the major polluters, so we must pay. But now that we pay, we must dictate 
also’”.6
Alliances among CSOs
Although the North-South divide on the environmental agenda was explicit at the 
government level, it was not as clear within civil society. While Northern NGOs were 
key players in the global environmental movement, civil society organizations based in 
the global South were also involved. In discussions of development, the field was 
even more mixed.
Both Northern and Southern actors attracted media attention for their 
environmental stances during the period of the IDA-10 negotiations. Greenpeace, 
prior to the Rio summit, publicly exhorted developing nation governments to embrace 
environmental preservation.7 Friends of the Earth joined Greenpeace in using the 
summit to attract attention to pressing environmental issues.8 In June of 1992, 
Environmental Defense Fund and International Rivers lobbied against a hydroelectric 
project in Malawi, resulting in a ‘no’ vote on the project by the US representative on 
the World Bank’s board.9 Some NGOs even went so far as to attack the legitimacy of 
Southern governments. The Natural Resources Defense Council issued a joint report 
with Human Rights Watch tying environmental degradation in the developing world to
4 See, for example, John Vidal, “Earth Summit: Money the Root of All Change”, The Guardian, 4 June
1992.
5 Eugene Robinson, “At Earth Summit, South Aims to Send Bill North; Developing Nations, Putting 
Priority on Growth, Say Cleanup Is Possible — for a Price”, The Washington Post, 1 June 1992.
6 Ibid.
7 Reuters, “Save summit call by Greenpeace”, H erald Sun, 28 April 1992.
8 Rik Turner and Colin Harding, “Minister's dismissal raises green doubts about Collor”, The 
Independent, 24 March 1992.
9 Barbara Crossette, “Movement Builds to Fight Harmful Projects in Poor Nations”, The New York 
Times, 23 June 1992.
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corrupt or undemocratic government practices.10 The World Wildlife Fund made a 
similar claim, linking environmental degradation to a lack of democracy.11 Such 
claims could be viewed as implicitly justifying the Northern imposition of 
environmental conditionalities on Southern governments.
However, Southern NGOs were also involved in environmental claims at Rio. 
At Rio, the Third World Network and the Forum of Brazilian NGOs partnered with 
Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth in working to attract media attention to 
environmental concerns.12 In 1993, Narmada Bachao Andolan issued strong attacks 
on the environmental impacts of the Sardar Sarovar project. Local environmental 
NGOs in places like Indonesia and India were also critical of their own governments.13
Although Southern nations were receiving the Bank’s development aid, 
development was not exclusively a Southern issue. The statement of the NGO 
Working Group on the World Bank in October 1992, referenced in the previous 
chapter, closely echoed the development versus environment sentiment articulated by 
Southern government representatives in Rio four months prior. However, it was 
signed by eighteen NGOs based in donor nations as well as fourteen from developing 
nations. Some Northern NGOs also displayed a mix of environmental and 
development priorities during the 1993 US Congressional hearings on the World Bank 
and 10th IDA. American NGOs like Friends of the Earth, Environmental Defense, and 
the National Wildlife Federation pushed for a reduction in the World Bank’s power 
and funding, and stressed the Bank’s negative environmental and social impacts. Yet 
other US-based organizations like Interaction, Church World Service, and CARE 
joined the Africa-based FAVDO in stressing the importance of the IDA for the 
development of poor countries and the welfare of their citizens.14
10 Ibid.
11 Barbara Crossette ‘The Earth Summit: What Some Preach in Rio Is Not What They Practice at 
Home”, The N ew York Times, 15 June 1992.
12 Rik Turner and Colin Harding, “Minister's dismissal raises green doubts about Collor”, The 
Independent, 24 March 1992.
13 Barbara Crossette ‘The Earth Summit: What Some Preach in Rio Is Not What They Practice at 
Home”, The N ew York Times, 15 June 1992.
14 Hearings before the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing, and Related Programs on the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations for 1994, 1 March 1993; and hearings before the US House of Representatives 
Subcommittee on International Development, Finance, Trade, and Monetary Policy on Authorizing 
contributions to IDA, GEF, and ADF, 5 May 1993.
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A North-South Division?
The existence of a North-South divide at the government level over environmental 
conditionalities and development lending gives credence to the notion of core­
periphery divisions in international policy-setting. However, there is no clear evidence 
of division within civil society along North-South lines on the issue of the environment 
versus development. Although the environment was seen as a Northern issue in 
intergovernmental debates, some civil society actors from the global South supported 
environmental positions. At the same time, many civil society organizations from the 
global North prioritized development over the environment. No other issue shows a 
strong North-South divide at either the government or civil society level. This lack of 
clear North-South divisions effectively negates the idea of geography as a source of 
GCS division or a consistent driver of CSO policy-making during the 10th IDA.
Ideology and Mission
The idea of ideology as a driver of civil society divisions resonates strongly with the 
statements of the interviewees for this thesis. The NGO staff interviewed for this 
research were quick to associate the policy positions of their organizations with a 
particular set of values, such as the preservation of life, social justice, or environmental 
conservation. Where such association was not explicit, it was often implicit in the 
examples staff gave of either Bank malfeasance or positive Bank contributions to 
development or in the ways in which they contrasted their organization with other 
organizations.
Civil society leaders, along with outside observers including former staff from 
the World Bank and US Treasury, described two main groups of NGOs, identified by 
their mission: environmental and development NGOs. Some observers also delineated 
a third group of faith-based organizations or justice advocates. This section will 
discuss each of these groups in turn.
Environmental Organizations
There is little question that environmental NGOs formed the core of the anti­
replenishment faction which emerged midway through the IDA process. The most 
prominent members were the Environmental Defense Fund, Friends of the Earth, and 
the National Wildlife Federation. These organizations took the lead in lobbying 
policymakers and testifying before Congress. Other organizations played supporting
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roles. The Sierra Club signed the New York Times advertisement which threatened the 
IDA cuts if the Narmada Dam project was not cancelled and joined its name to 
statements made before Congress made by Bruce Rich of EDF. However, when a 
representative of the club testified before the Senate she made no mention of IDA cuts 
and stressed only the importance of funding to aid family planning.15 The Center for 
International Environmental Law (CIEL) was involved in work on the Inspection 
Panel. Greenpeace had some involvement, but was more focused on the Global 
Environmental Facility; the Natural Resources Defense Council likewise focused most 
of its attention on energy policy and resource management, although it did send a 
representative to the Congressional hearings headed by Barney Frank. Rainforest 
Action Network and Greenpeace are cited in BIC documents but appear to have had 
only minor roles in events.
These organizations varied widely in their methodologies and the ways in 
which they prioritized issues. However, they were all advocacy organizations focused 
on the environment. In general, their environmental ideology was one of conservation. 
Their advocacy efforts focused heavily on preventing the depletion of natural 
resources, particularly woodlands.16 Ending the construction of coal-fired power 
plants and promoting improved end-use efficiency as an alternative to new power 
generation were also core elements of their agenda prior to the IDA-10. They attacked 
hydroelectric power as well: in addition to opposing the Narmada project, Greenpeace, 
FoE, EDF, and others worked with the International Rivers Network17 in opposing the 
Yacyreta dam in Argentina in September 1992.18 In all of these causes, the 
environmental NGOs stressed the human consequences of environmental degradation. 
They noted the impact of forced relocation on human well-being, the ways that the loss 
of forest cover or fishable rivers could destroy livelihoods, and the potential for dam
15 Hearings before a US Senate subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, on Foreign 
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1994, 15 June 
1993.
16 Fax from Korinna Horta of EDF to BIC, “Indications of how IDA fails to meet its basic objectives of 
poverty alleviation and environmental protection”, 9 October 1992. Also letter from Raymond 
Mikesell, Economic Advisor to the Sierra Club International Program and Larry Williams, Washington 
Director, Sierra Club International Program to George A. Folsom, Deputy Assistant Secretary, 
International Development, Debt and Environment Policy, US Treasury, 10 September 1992.
17 International Rivers Network (IRN) is an NGO opposing “environmentally destructive” dams. Lori 
Udall, the staff lawyer who led EDF’s Narmada campaign, became Washington Director for IRN in 
1995.
18 Fax from Kay Treakle to ‘Tuesday Group Contacts” of US environmental NGOs, plus global northern 
partners, “Letters to World Bank Executive Directors Needed on Yacyreta”, 9 September 1992.
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reservoirs to spread malaria and waterborne diseases. However, they tended to focus 
on the social consequences for those populations most immediately and most 
negatively affected by large-scale development. The individual rights of project- 
affected people were prioritized over the development concerns of regional or national 
populations. While some organizations stressed ‘sustainable development’ or 
alternative solutions to power needs, the general emphasis seemed to be on preventing 
harm rather than advancing development.
The emphasis on ‘don’t’ rather than ‘do’ could be dismissed as the reflexivity 
common to many advocacy organizations.19 For some of the civil society 
organizations involved, however, it represented an ideological opposition to the very 
idea of development. In his book Mortgaging the Earth, published just after the IDA 
campaign, Bruce Rich of EDF described economic development and industrialization 
as misguided efforts rooted in European Enlightenment thinking and antithetical to 
most of human experience. Technological advancement, he wrote, was driven by the 
desire to subdue and dominate one’s natural surroundings, while economic 
development was rooted in the pursuit of wealth (1994 pp. 210-2). Drawing on the 
work of anthropologist Marshall Sahlins, Rich noted that “poverty is socially 
produced... through the process of economic development itself,” and concluded that 
“primitive, non-Western modes of living are largely superior to modem ones” (1994 
pp. 203, 240-1).
This value for “local knowledges [sic]” and traditional lifestyles helped justify 
the support of project-affected communities over the development interests of the 
larger population (Rich 1994 p. 241). Skepticism about pro-development forces in the 
global South was manifested in environmental NGOs’ challenges to the plans of even 
democratic Southern governments. For instance, the World Wildlife Fund declared 
that donors had a responsibility to see that funds went to “the sector that needs it most” 
regardless of government wishes, because “we can’t pass a country through a filter and 
see [if] it is democratic or not”.20 Even more strikingly, the environmental actors 
stressed the importance of population control as a necessary element of environmental 
preservation. This view was laid out most clearly by Nancy Wallace of the Sierra Club
19 This potential for reflexive opposition was noted by one member of Bank who regularly engaged with 
civil society.
20 Hearings before the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on International Development, 
Finance, Trade, and Monetary Policy on Authorizing contributions to IDA, GEF, and ADF, 5 May 
1993.
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in her Congressional testimony, in which she stated “that a rapid end to population
growth around the world... is an essential part of any effort to protect our 
0 1environment”. Thus, while environmental actors were genuinely interested in social 
welfare, they seemed to preference the needs of a specific community or local 
ecosystem over the interests or desires of larger developing world populations.
The combination of environmental conservation, development skepticism, and 
delegitimation of competing interests was well reflected by the sole Southern NGO to 
take an active part in campaigning against the IDA-10 replenishment. Narmada 
Bachao Andolan (NBA), or Movement to Save the Narmada, might best be described 
as an issue-based organization, created in 1989 to protest the Narmada project. 
Although NBA stressed the human consequences of the project, it also emphasized the 
ecological costs of the dams and the ways indigenous culture might be lost if the dams 
were built (see Mehta 1992 and NBA documents submitted to Congress22). Critics 
charged that, in its quest to halt the Narmada dams, NBA even exacerbated the human 
consequences of the project by interfering with government attempts to offer project- 
affected people new resettlement terms (see Gill 1995; Patel 1995). NBA also 
challenged the government’s agenda of economic development, even when benefits of 
development were shared with the Narmada Valley peoples through promises of jobs 
or cash compensation. NBA characterized the faith of valley-dwellers in the 
government as naive, but even NBA’s leader recognized that locals might see the 
organization as “intent on keeping [material wealth] out of their reach through alien 
concerns” (Mehta 1992). Lastly, NBA sought to privilege the interests of the Narmada 
Valley peoples over those of the surrounding population. NBA opposed the Narmada 
project in part because it believed that “an overwhelmingly large part of the power 
benefits will go to the cities, the rich farmers, and the industries” (Dharmadhikary 
1992 pp. 141-2). Instead of privileging such interests, NBA argued that the World 
Bank “should respect the primacy of poor people”.23
Their value for conservation and their opposition to large-scale development 
made environmental organizations logical opponents of the IDA-10 replenishment.
The International Development Association was the World Bank’s primary means of 
lending to the world’s poorest countries, many of which had large rural populations or
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 World Bank, “Meeting Between IDA Deputies, Executive Directors, and NGOs”, 16 September 1992.
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relatively large amounts of wilderness. On the one hand, IDA had a track record of 
supporting some of the projects most derided by environmentalists, including 
commercial forestry programs, power plant construction, and hydroelectric dams. On 
the other hand, it was an instrument of the Bank’s overall agenda of development, 
which focused on economic indicators and had become increasingly neo-liberal. Their 
suspicion of industrial development and their desire to protect the rights of the rural 
poor enabled environmental actors to ignore claims from Southern governments or 
civil society about the importance of Bank funding. In this light, the more subtle 
efforts made to institute a reform agenda earlier in the IDA-10 cycle might be seen as a 
pragmatic compromise. Environmentalists recognized the popularity of IDA and 
initially were reluctant to oppose it outright. Incremental reform seemed a better goal 
until outrage and frustration over the continuation of the Narmada project prompted a 
more radical course of action.
Compromises in Ideology?
Not all environmental groups opposed the IDA-10 replenishment. The Bank 
Information Center stayed neutral despite its explicit environmental bent. However, 
this was not necessarily a contradiction of its environmental values so much as their 
subordination to another purpose. Although BIC was environmentally inclined, its 
primary mission was to act as a clearinghouse for information for all NGOs. It worked 
more closely with anti-IDA environmental NGOs than with other groups, but explicit 
partisanship might have jeopardized its core mission. In an interview for this thesis, a 
source familiar with BIC’s activities stressed that the organization did not itself engage 
in lobbying donor deputies or Bank EDs, although it did arrange meetings for others to 
do so. This account is confirmed by staff associated with the donors and the Bank.
The Natural Resources Defense Council also demonstrated a similar pattern. 
The NRDC had worked closely with the Sierra Club on the Pelosi Amendment and 
during the IDA-10 it partnered with EDF, NWF, and Friends of the Earth. However, 
its core issues were reform of the Bank’s energy policies and forestry lending; broader 
issues of governance reform at the Bank were secondary priorities.24 It was involved 
only at the periphery of the IDA battle, although it testified before Congress in May 
1993. Echoing the sentiments of other environmental representatives, Glenn Prickett,
24 Author’s interview with Glenn Prickett, Senior Associate, International Programs, Natural Resources 
Defense Council, by phone, 25 April 2008. Hereafter: ‘Interview: Prickett’.
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a senior associate in NRDC’s environmental program, said that “our interest [in these 
hearings] is for sustainable development and environmental preservation.” He 
highlighted the Bank’s “very spotty” record of implementing environmental policies 
and argued that the Bank should enforce environmental conditions equally on both
9Sdemocratic and undemocratic borrowing nations. Because Treasury proposals for 
Bank reform reflected the NRDC’s priorities, the NRDC agreed to support the full 
IDA replenishment if a reform agenda could be agreed. Although this deviated 
somewhat from the anti-IDA position that called for withholding funding until after 
such an agenda was implemented, the NRDC still proposed benchmarking and 
verifying the Bank’s progress.26 The group continued to be well regarded by other 
environmentalists, who saw it as pursuing a more specialist agenda.
Greater ire was reserved for the World Wildlife Fund, which deviated more 
significantly from the line pursued by other environmental organizations. EDF, NWF, 
and FoE coordinated many of their lobbying positions and often borrowed from one 
another’s research, particularly when one organization had a superior network among 
some project-affect population or better connections to potential overseas partners.
The World Wildlife Fund, however, had conducted its own independent research on 
issues of sustainability and structural adjustment. It maintained its own ground-level 
contacts; it formulated its positions independently. While WWF promoted 
sustainability and, like other environmentalists, questioned the legitimacy and efficacy 
of Southern governments, it did not support the anti-IDA agenda. To the contrary, 
David Reed, director of WWF’s International Institutions Policy Program, wrote to the 
US Treasury that WWF felt that it was necessary to “reinforce the contribution of IDA 
resources”. WWF’s position stressed poverty alleviation, public accountability, and 
changes in structural adjustment policy, with relatively little space devoted to 
environmental conservation. Reed’s testimony before Congress in May 1993 
reinforced this position. He noted that “it is crucial to ensure the uninterrupted flow of 
IDA resources to alleviate poverty and to prevent further poverty-induced
25 Hearings before the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on International Development, 
Finance, Trade, and Monetary Policy on Authorizing contributions to IDA, GEF, and ADF, 5 May 
1993.
26 Ibid.
27 Fax from David Reed, Director, International Institutions Policy Program, WWF to George A. 
Folsom, Deputy Assistant Secretary, International Development, Debt and Environment Policy, US 
Treasury, 3 September 1992.
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environmental degradation”.28 Although WWF did support using IDA funding to 
leverage change at the World Bank and supported some conditionalizing of that 
funding, the WWF proposal was much more sophisticated than that of other 
environmental groups, proposing benchmarks and timelines which could facilitate the 
full disbursement of funds.29 Because it was a prominent environmental NGO taking a 
moderate position on the Bank, WWF was, in the words of one senior NGO staffer 
interviewed for this research, the “biggest problem” obstructing a unified 
environmentalist position.
In short, the efforts of the majority of environmental actors to impede or 
eliminate IDA funding show a great degree of consistency, and strong logical links 
between ideology and the resulting policy positions. The core organizations involved 
shared a strong emphasis on environmental conservation which led them to oppose 
many development initiatives. This trait was reinforced by a willingness to question 
the very concept of development and by the delegitimation of competing views. At the 
same time however, not all environmental organizations developed anti-IDA policies. 
Some environmental organizations, particularly the World Wildlife Fund, shared some 
of the dominant environmental perspectives and values but instead chose neutral or 
pro-ID A positions.
Development Organizations
Development NGOs involved in the 10th IDA ranged from service-delivery 
organizations to advocacy groups. The most active were Bread for the World, Church 
World Service, Lutheran World Relief, Interaction, and Oxfam-GB. These were 
joined by a host of other organizations, including US and European-based actors like 
CARE and NOVIB, and numerous parties from the developing world, such as the 
Malaysian-based Third World Network and the Inter-Africa Group.
The sheer diversity of these groups makes it difficult to identify a core set of 
values. Bread for the World was a faith-based advocacy group that only became 
involved in the IDA in mid-1993. Church World Service and Lutheran World Relief 
were two faith-based service-delivery organizations which shared a Washington, D.C.
28 Hearings before the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on International Development, 




advocacy office. Interaction was an advocacy group tasked with representing the 
interests of US-based providers of both development and relief services. It functioned 
primarily as an industry lobby. Oxfam-UK was a service-delivery NGO that was 
developing an international advocacy agenda as a means of supporting its operations 
and local partners in developing countries. Among these organizations, positions 
originated in moral conviction, pragmatism, and even self-interest. Organizational 
types varied widely and communications between organizations were sometimes 
limited.
The Southern organizations involved often had a local or regional focus. Some 
focused on a single country or even, like Bolivia’s Centro de Investigacion y 
Promocion del Campesinado, focused on a particular group or need within that 
country. Others, like the Forum of African Voluntary Development Organizations 
(FAVDO) and the Inter-Africa Group, represented the positions of numerous civil 
society organizations within a region, most of which focused on a single country or 
group. A few, like the Third World Network, worked on regional issues of advocacy. 
While all these groups advanced some sort of advocacy agenda, most had begun as 
service-delivery organizations. Their advocacy operations could be seen as driven by 
either principles or a pragmatic need to support their ground-level work.
The two values which seemed shared by all development organizations were a 
concern for poverty alleviation and a desire to empower the poor. Unlike some 
environmental NGOs, development organizations believed that poverty was real and 
objective, not just socially constructed or relative. Some had been involved in the 
effort to develop and popularize the new metrics of poverty measurement mentioned in 
the previous chapter. For others, particularly the highly professionalized service- 
delivery NGOs, identifying and addressing poverty was an essential part of their 
business model. For the representatives of Southern organizations, poverty was an 
inescapable reality of their daily lives in their home countries.
The value for empowering the poor derived from a combination of principle 
and pragmatism. As noted in the previous chapter, research done in the 1970s and 
1980s had shown the value of local contributions and ownership to improved project 
performance. Some of this research had been generated by development NGOs. This 
practical approach was tied to a variety of principles, including democracy and local 
control. Support for local control over development was common among the Southern 
civil society groups involved in the IDA, but it was also shared by some influential
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development NGOs. For instance John Clark, who spearheaded Oxfam-UK’s effort on 
the IDA-10, had also authored a prominent text on the subject, Democratizing 
Development, in 1991.
The overwhelming majority of development NGOs supported full 
replenishment of the IDA. In October 1992 the NGO Working Group on the World 
Bank, representing more than twenty development organizations, expressed its “deep 
and abiding concern about the inadequacy of funds on concessional terms being made 
available by the North to tackle poverty in the South,” a situation which would be 
exacerbated by “cuts in real terms under the current round of negotiations for the IDA- 
1 0 ” 3 0  jjjjg sentiment was echoed by those NGOs testifying before Congress. CARE, 
a venerable and extremely large service-delivery NGO, described the IDA as “the 
largest and most important single source of concessional development capital for the
-3 1
poorest countries”. David Beckmann, president of Bread for the World, even used 
the opportunity of an IDA hearing to call for a general increase in US foreign aid.
Their interest in empowerment prompted development NGOs to include 
frequent reference to popular participation in their agendas for Bank reform. Although 
environmental NGOs sometimes also advocated for popular participation, their version 
was more likely to include “interested NGOs” among the stakeholders to be consulted 
by the Bank on new projects and policies. In contrast, the development policy on 
participation often omitted such language and instead emphasized populations. In a 
striking gesture, InterAction even invited a representative of the Forum of African 
Development Organizations (FAVDO) to testify on its behalf during the May 
Congressional hearings. The representative, Lisebo Khoali-McCarthy, spoke for both 
FAVDO and InterAction, calling for “greater participation for grassroots people, and 
their different organizations.”33
In general, support for the 10th IDA was more consistent among development 
NGOs than opposition was among environmentalists. There were several development
30 Letter from Mazide N'diaye, Co-Chair, NGO/World Bank Working Group, to Lewis Preston, 
President, World Bank, 30 October 1992.
31 Hearings before the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on International Development, 
Finance, Trade, and Monetary Policy on Authorizing contributions to IDA, GEF, and ADF, 5 May 
1993.
32 Hearings before US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing, and Related Programs on the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations for 1994, 1 March 1993.
33 Hearings before the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on International Development, 
Finance, Trade, and Monetary Policy on Authorizing contributions to IDA, GEF, and ADF, 5 May 
1993.
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organizations, particularly some of those that signed the Irish NGO position statement 
in Dublin in July 1992, which took an initial position calling for Bank reform but never 
followed up with a clear position for or against the IDA replenishment. However, 
given the relatively limited advocacy capacities of most development organizations in 
the early 1990s, such silence most likely resulted from lack of resources, such as staff 
time or travel funds. Only one development NGO, the Ireland-based Catholic group 
Trocaire, took a more aggressively critical stance. As noted in Chapter 3, it issued 
several strong anti-Bank statements in July 1992. Like the other Irish NGOs, however, 
there is no evidence that Trocaire was involved later in the replenishment process 
when cancellation of the IDA was being discussed more explicitly.
Faith-based Organizations
i t
To limit a values-based typology of the civil society organizations involved in the 10 
IDA solely to environment and development would make for a rather blunt parsing. It 
would ignore the role of faith-based organizations, which had quite distinct ideologies. 
Numerous faith-based organizations were involved in the IDA-10 process. The 
Columban Missionaries, the Irish Missionary Union, and the Church of Ireland 
Bishops’ Appeal all lobbied IDA deputies in Dublin. The Aga Khan Foundation and 
the US-based Islamic African Relief Agency signed the NGO Working Group letter. 
Bread for the World and Church World Services, already described as development 
NGOs above, also represented faith perspectives.
In general, the driving principles of these groups appear to have been social 
justice, specifically a concern for the well-being of the most disadvantaged and least 
empowered people in their areas of service. A statement from the US Catholic 
Conference of Bishops, for instance, denounced structural adjustment on the basis that 
“it is the poorest of the poor who suffer most” from its effects.34
Such concerns, however, did not seem to have manifested themselves in a 
consistent set of policy positions or consistent participation in the policy process.
Some of the faith-based organizations involved in Dublin went silent after the IDA 
deputy meeting there. Several which were also members of the NGO Working Group 
amended their earlier criticisms in October, signing the NGOWG’s pro-IDA letter.
34 Hearings before the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on International Development, 
Finance, Trade, and Monetary Policy on Authorizing contributions to IDA, GEF, and ADF, 5 May 
1993.
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The US Catholic Conference of Bishops, which had earlier supported environmental 
causes, submitted Congressional testimony in favor of the IDA.
One informant asserted that faith-based groups involved in the IDA aligned 
themselves with whichever of the two major camps, environment or development, was 
more persuasive. Presumably, this meant whichever side made a better case for the 
social justice benefits of its agenda. While environmentalists were successful in 
making this case earlier on, the potential cancellation of the IDA changed the stakes of 
the game, pushing some faith-based groups to realign themselves with development 
activists. The only faith-based groups to hold consistent positions on the Bank and on 
IDA were those, like Bread for the World and Church World Service, with a standing 
interest in development.
An Ideological Divide?
A strong correlation exists between the ideological categories presented here and the 
related organizations’ positions on the 10th IDA replenishment, at least with regards to 
the environmental and development categories. The idea that an organization’s policy 
positions should be driven by its ideology or mission was also the perspective 
preferred by most of the informants for this research, particularly for explaining their 
own actions. Moreover, the concept also has a certain intuitive merit: environmental 
organizations should, it would seem, care more about the environment and 
development organizations should prioritize development.
Closer examination, however, reveals several pitfalls in this argument. First, 
the actual details of each organizational category are somewhat vague. Descriptions 
like “environmentalist” and “development advocate” are superficial at best. Such 
categories were not defined by an external standard or via a communal agreement on 
the part of the organizations using them, nor did they represent tenets that were 
collectively enforced. Instead, the shared values highlighted in this section represent 
the lowest common denominator among the self-selected members of these groups, i.e. 
those values most commonly held, not those which were most important to each 
organization. Thus NGOs like the World Wildlife Fund, the Bank Information Center, 
and the Natural Resources Defense Council could hold to some or all of the shared 
tenets of the environmentalist view and yet select disparate policy positions which 
nonetheless reflected the core priorities of each organization. WWF favored economic 
development as a means of conservation; BIC valued political neutrality that could
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allow it assist more organizations; and the NRDC prioritized energy issues over other 
environmental causes. Vague interrelation was even more pronounced in the 
development category, the members of which varied widely in their scope of activities 
and locus of work. Their shared focus on poverty alleviation and popular participation 
was extremely narrow considering the myriad other issues, ranging from structural 
adjustment to women’s empowerment, on which many development organizations 
were engaged. The faith-based designation is extremely loose. It is a necessary 
designation, given that many of the organizations involved in the 10th IDA fit into no 
other grouping, but membership in the category overlaps with others and manifests 
few consistent policy positions.
Second, although informants would define their organizations as 
environmentalist, development-oriented, or faith-based, those informants who used the 
language of values to explain the policy positions of their organizations most often 
spoke of a concern for human well-being, not for the environment, development, or 
faith. Bruce Rich, for instance, traced some of his involvement in Narmada to a 
personal trip, accompanied by NBA leader Medha Patkar, to meet project affected 
people in the Narmada Valley.35 Development groups used a similar emphasis, 
sometimes made even more poignant by the greater number of Southern spokespeople 
within the development category.
Third, the parsing does not explain all of the observed civil society behavior. It 
does not account for WWF’s deviation from the environmental line. Moreover, it does 
not explain why so many non-US organizations ceased to participate later in the policy 
process. WWF notwithstanding, ideology may be a good predictor of an 
organization’s policy preferences, but not necessarily of its choice to participate in or 
withdraw from advocacy.
To the extent that ideology does drive policy formation, the findings cast doubt 
on organizations’ representivity. The ideologies and interests discussed here, for most 
organizations, predated the IDA-10. These pre-existing views allowed groups to 
reinterpret or filter local demands, or patemalistically determine local populations’
‘best interests’ while ignoring their stated desires. Despite their shared value for 
human well-being, development and environmental groups chose quite divergent
thpositions on the most salient issue of the 10 replenishment, funding for the IDA itself.
35 Author’s interview with Bruce Rich, 19 February 2008, Washington, D.C.
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It seems likely that groups in each category viewed human well-being through the lens 
of their particular ideology, with environmentalists believing that well-being could be 
best met through conservation and development groups believing it would be best met 
through development. It is difficult to know which understanding, if either, reflected 
the desires of the people affected by the policy.
Funding
A final possible parsing offered by IDA-10 participants was material interests. 
Informants suggested that civil society organizations selected their policy positions in 
accordance with their financial incentives. A source at one development advocacy 
organization, for instance, suggested that the seeming divide between environmental 
and development organizations was, in fact, predominantly a divide between advocacy 
groups and service-delivery organizations. The former, funded primarily by 
foundations or member donations, were able to take more radical reformist positions 
than the latter, which relied on flows of aid funding. This opinion was echoed by staff 
at certain environmental NGOs who accused development organizations of being 
motivated by financial gain. The data, however, indicate a more nuanced reality. It 
suggests that nearly all of the organizations involved in the IDA, including both 
service-delivery and advocacy NGOs, had financial incentives to advocate for the 
policy positions they promoted. In some cases, particularly among advocacy groups 
funded by foundations, donors made explicit indications of the policy positions they 
wished their funds to support or facilitated the participation of CSOs whose stated 
aims aligned with those of the foundation. In other cases, such as groups receiving 
funding from the government or members, there was less direct pressure to assume an 
explicit position. Nonetheless, the organizations had a strong interest in preserving the 
possibility for future funding or the loyalty of current donors. It is unclear that funding 
drove the policy preferences of most actors, but it may have been instrumental in 
defining the agendas of some. Moreover, it appears to have been a key driver of 
participation, thus determining the matrix of organizations lobbying on the IDA.
Correlating Funding and Policy
If funding and advocacy are correlated, one would expect that civil society involved in 
the IDA would fall into three general categories: NGOs dependent on funding from 
governments or intergovernmental organizations, who back government or IGO
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positions or advocate for greater IDA funding; foundation-funded organizations which 
back the aims or agenda of the foundation or foundations funding them; and member- 
supported organizations whose positions reflect the desires of the majority of their 
members. Such a categorization matches almost perfectly with the divisions observed 
in IDA-10 lobbying. Organizations like Oxfam, CARE, and the World Wildlife Fund, 
which received some or all of their funding from bilateral and multilateral, gave 
unanimous support to the IDA-10. Organizations like Environmental Defense Fund, 
Friends of the Earth, National Wildlife Federation, and the international advocacy arm 
of the Sierra Club had all received foundation funding for international environmental 
advocacy and the reform of multilateral development banks; all organizations with 
such funding opposed the IDA. Member-funded organizations divided according to 
the interests of their members: Greenpeace, Rainforest Action Network, and National 
Wildlife Federation (which received more funding from members than foundations) 
were supported primarily by American environmentalists and took anti-IDA pro- 
environmental positions. Narmada Bachao Andolan was funded by dam opponents in 
India and opposed the IDA which was helping fund the dam. Bread for the World, 
along with the US Conference of Catholic Bishops and other faith groups, were 
supported by members interested in social justice and supported IDA funding as a 
means of helping the poor.
Claims o f Causation
The idea of a causal relationship between organizational funding and position-taking 
was elaborated upon by several informants. One anti-IDA environmentalist used 
funding to explain the divisions among environmentalists, noting that “the big project- 
oriented NGOs like World Wildlife Fund, Nature Conservancy International, and 
Conservation International... looked to the Bank as a funder for their projects and that 
kind of thing. So they were never particularly strong advocates [for reform]”. A 
senior staff member at Friends of the Earth, likewise noted perennial “tension” 
between activist organizations like FoE and organizations focused on ensuring that 
sufficient money is given for development. Organizations who received funding from 
aid were thought to oppose the cuts even if they did not receive direct funding from the 
World Bank, because they believed IDA cuts could precipitate a more general decline 
in US aid levels. As one environmentalist involved in the IDA-10 recalled:
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These groups were afraid to criticize the World Bank, even though 
they might have lots of criticisms, and their fear was -  and they 
managed to paint themselves into a comer of total political impotence 
or political correctness in my view -  because they... they were 
reluctant to come out publicly and say critical things about the World 
Bank, or be too critical because they were afraid that would play into 
the hands of the right wing, the Reaganites, etcetera who didn’t like 
foreign aid.
Thus concerns about both direct funding and the long-term future of aid played a role 
in some organization’s agendas.
Although some of these claims came in the form of critiques from anti-IDA 
activists, they were validated by aid organizations and their allies. InterAction 
represented over 150 US development and relief NGOs during the IDA-10. It sat on 
the NGOWG and had worked with World Bank staff in 1990 on the reform of the 
Bank’s participation policies. Its representatives were also invited to meetings with 
US legislators and to testify in Congressional hearings. According to one source 
involved with the organization, the most commonly held concern among its members 
during the IDA-10 time period was funding. Maintaining funding required a steady 
flow of aid dollars.
Moreover, the anti-IDA activists who speculated on the financial motivations 
of service-delivery organizations were themselves subject to financial pressures. One 
informant stated that environmental activists, including the core groups opposing the 
IDA, are continually “competing for money, funding, and publicity”. Conflicts never 
became public, but during at least one episode in the early 1990s they escalated to the 
point where activists from one environmental organization sought to co-opt the support 
of their competitors’ donors and draw away their funding. Another civil society 
member noted that foundation donors rewarded vigorous advocacy. One anti-IDA 
leader, the informant joked, seemed to be “paid by the column-inch” for the press 
coverage he generated.
In the case of member-funded organizations, the advocacy agenda was decided 
by or affirmed by members. NBA was supported by Indian donors, although the 
organization itself admits that these were not necessarily the project-affected people in 
the Narmada Valley it claimed to represent.36 NWF and Bread for the World had
36 Ashish Mandloi, Sanjay Sangvai, Devrambhai Kanera, Manglya Vasave, Kamala Yadav, and Medha 
Patkar, “NBA Responds to Inquiries on Foreign Funding”, The South Asian  (thesouthasian.org), 9 July 
2006.
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annual meetings at which members could vote as well as regular correspondence with 
members. Greenpeace did not have such democratic agenda-setting processes, but its 
very public position-taking created a clear brand that members chose to support. 
Faith-based organizations were also member-supported, either directly by congregants 
or individual donors or indirectly via a denomination. They had a clear brand identity 
of their own: an adherence to faith tenets which set them apart (in either principle or 
practice) from secular organizations (cf. Pallas 2004).
The Charles Stewart Mott Foundation
The Charles Stewart Mott Foundation had a particularly strong effect on the IDA-10. 
Mott provided funds to all of the core anti-IDA campaigners, i.e. Environmental 
Defense Fund, the National Wildlife Federation, and Friends of the Earth, as well as 
the Bank Information Center, which arranged meetings and disseminated information 
on the others’ behalf. Typically organizations engaged in advocacy themselves 
initiate contact with potential funders, seeking grants to support the advocacy 
organizations’ existing agendas. In this case, however, Mott sought out these 
environmental actors as part of a strategic agenda developed at the foundation.
According to Maureen Smyth, who served as the program officer for these 
grants during the IDA-10 and is now a senior vice president at the foundation, Mott 
developed its strategic vision for environmental reform in the late 1980s. The 
foundation was engaged in a planning process for its environmental program and hired 
a consultant to examine the program’s direction. The consultant identified a window 
of opportunity in international environmental policy, particularly with certain 
American environmental NGOs which were beginning to realize that they could 
influence the international environmental agenda by influencing the World Bank.
Mott concurred with this belief that influencing the Bank could influence global 
environmental policy.
Acting on this conclusion, Mott initially provided funds to the Environmental 
Defense Fund (EDF), Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), National Wildlife 
Federation (NWF), the Sierra Club, and Friends of the Earth (FoE). All of these 
organizations were putting pressure on the World Bank to stop funding projects that 
had negative environmental and social impacts. These NGOs had already begun 
lobbying the Bank on their own, but Mott was an early funder of their efforts.
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According to Smyth, “We saw that putting some early foundation money in this area 
could make a difference.”37
Mott also funded the Bank Information Center (BIC) after it was established by 
Chad Dobson in 1987. BIC’s mission was to provide Bank information to NGOs in 
less developed countries. BIC played a coordinating role, and used the environment as 
a “hook” to create an international movement of networked NGOs.38
The descriptions of Mott’s grants correspond closely to the actions taken by the 
organizations. According to Glenn Prickett, the NRDC’s primary foci were forestry 
and energy policy. Within energy policy, the group was focused on end-use 
efficiency, i.e. reducing energy consumption as an alternative to building new power 
plants.39 The descriptions of Mott’s forty-thousand dollar grants to the NRDC in 1990 
and 1991 specified that the money would fund a project to “prevent... unsound 
projects in the energy sector of the Multilateral Development Banks” and 
“substantially increase the proportion of development assistance provided for 
conservation, end-use efficiency, and other alternative investments in the energy 
sector”.40 Differences between grants to BIC and EDF also reflect their different 
activities. BIC grants specified that Mott was “helping the Bank Information Center to 
expand its capacity to track multilateral development bank projects and distribute that 
information”41. Funding to EDF was to support its efforts to “promote structural and 
policy reforms in multilateral development banks and the International Monetary Fund 
so that they cease funding ecologically destructive policy and projects”.42 Admittedly, 
the exact language of these grants was presumably written by the organizations 
themselves, even if Mott encouraged them to submit requests, and staff at some of 
these organizations note that they would have pursued these goals without Mott 
funding. Nonetheless, the history of Mott’s involvement indicated that Mott’s funding 
was reflective of the foundation’s strategy rather than a serendipitous clustering of 
grant requests. As the description of one of Mott’s grants to Friends of the Earth notes, 
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lending policies and practices so that they are environmentally sustainable and socially 
equitable”.43
Mott funds also helped develop the support of non-US actors for MDB reform. 
Three grants to Friends of the Earth, given in 1991 and 1992, specify that the money is 
to be used to “strengthen multilateral development bank campaign activities in Japan” 
and for “outreach to Third World groups”.44 Environmental Defense Fund was 
likewise given funds to “empower Third World nongovernmental organizations to 
monitor, influence and change internationally financed development projects” 45 A 
source at the National Wildlife Federation, which received strong support from 
members, noted that the organization also passed some of its Mott funding on to 
overseas partners. Relatively few groups outside of the US environmental movement 
opposed the IDA or took strong reformist positions; the implication is that the 
activities of some of those who did was facilitated, cultivated, or amplified by Mott 
funding.
A Principal-Agent Relationship?
There is also evidence of a principal-agent relationship between Mott and its grant 
recipients. There are multiple variations of principal-agent theory. At its core, 
however, it describes a relationship between one party (the principal), generally with 
greater resources or authority, and a second party (the agent) tasked to achieve a 
specific goal. The performance of the agent determines whether the principal achieves 
his or her goals, but the principal lacks direct control over or immediate information on 
the agent’s behavior. Therefore the principal imposes a system of incentives on the 
agent designed to promote the desired outcomes (Miller 2005 pp. 204-6). There is no 
doubt that Mott funding supported a substantial portion of the anti-IDA activism 
during the 10th IDA or that Mott was pursuing its own strategic agenda. The question 
of a principal-agent relationship, however, examines the extent to which Mott funding 
influenced the behavior of the groups involved.
Several of the groups involved insist that Mott had little control over their 
actions: “they had no influence whatever on us [the Mott-funded environmentalists],” 
asserted one senior staffer, because “the people working on these issues [were] strong-
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 t u : a
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willed and professional”. Nonetheless, there are several indications that Mott had a 
principal-agent relationship with its aid recipients, leading them into behaviors they 
would not have undertaken on their own in order to facilitate the outcomes Mott 
favored. These include coordinated policy-setting on the part of grant recipients and 
the initiation of new activities in response to Mott requests.
Coordinating policy: All of the civil society informants interviewed for this 
research were asked about their relationships with other civil society actors and the 
extent to which they coordinated policy positions or lobbying activities with like- 
minded organizations. Only the core group of environmental activists, EDF, NWF, 
NRDC, Friends of the Earth, and the Sierra Club, reported regular meetings to 
coordinate policy and tactics. As noted earlier, the groups shared information among 
themselves and would allow the members best informed about a particular policy or 
project to influence the position of the coalition as a whole. Thus the impact of any 
given organization in this coalition could be multiplied five-fold. The groups also used 
coordination to magnify their political footprint. For instance, when Bruce Rich of 
EDF spoke before the Senate hearing on the IDA-10 replenishment in June 1993 he 
spoke on behalf of the Sierra Club and NWF as well. He began his testimony by 
reminding the senators present that these three organizations “have more than 5.7 
million members and supporters nationwide”.46 In an earlier hearing he testified on 
behalf of EDF and the Sierra Club, while noting that his testimony was “congruent” 
with the positions of NWF and Friends of the Earth 47
This coordination was a direct result of Mott influence. Maureen Smyth, who 
oversaw the Mott grants, “strongly suggested” that the Mott-funded NGOs coordinate 
their activities. When Mott began working with the NGOs, each group had a niche 
area but their agendas overlapped. Smyth believed that groups could “do more” if they 
coordinated.48 Glenn Prickett, who worked on the NRDC effort, described his 
organization’s partnership with the other four major IDA opponents, saying that “some 
of that [partnership] was by design,” a result of Mott’s influence 49 At least one
46 Hearings before a US Senate subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, on Foreign 
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1994,15 June
1993.
47 Hearings before US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing, and Related Programs on the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 




informant indicated that his organization would not have participated in such meetings 
without Mott’s influence. Tellingly, such regular coordination has largely ended since 
Mott funding ceased.
Initiating activities: As noted, Mott sought out the five NGOs it funded for 
World Bank work. According to a staffer at one recipient NGO, Mott “liked this 
international financial institutions work” and gave money specifically for such work, 
rather than because of any broader relationship with the organization. The 
foundation’s funding led its grant recipients to initiate activities they would not 
otherwise have undertaken, either because they lacked the resources or because they 
lacked sufficient interest. “Mott was the major contributor,” according to another 
staffer, “if it hadn’t been for Mott, the whole community wouldn’t have been able to 
do what it did”.
Mott’s influence was most clearly demonstrated in the creation of 50 Years in 
Enough. 50 Years in Enough was a loosely organized campaign for the intensive 
reform or elimination of the World Bank and IMF, inspired by the two institutions’ 
fiftieth birthdays in 1994. The campaign began organizing in 1993 and announced a 
platform in 1994. The International Rivers Network, Development GAP, Friends of 
the Earth, EDF, and Oxfam America were key participants. Although the campaign, 
which still exists, describes itself as the spontaneous creation of energized activists,50 it 
actually resulted from pressure from the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation. In 1992 the 
Development GAP coordinated a forum where a variety of civil society organizations 
discussed their agendas with potential foundation funders. That forum highlighted the 
potential synergy between environmental groups and others which, like DGAP, had 
some sort of economic justice agenda. Mott approached the Development GAP and 
asked that a new, coordinated campaign be developed, and DGAP agreed. In June of 
1993, Mott provided DGAP with $130,000 for work on “global economic justice.” In 
early 1994 it provided International Rivers, which was already receiving Mott funding 
for “General Purposes,” $90,000 dollars for the “Media Outreach Project of the ‘50 
Years’ Campaign”.51 The campaign became a major source of negative publicity for 
the Bank over the rest of the decade, influencing policy-makers’ opinions of the World
50 50 Years is Enough Network, “History”, http://www.50years.org/pdt710thAnniversary/history.pdf, 
viewed 8 July 2009.
51 Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, “Mott Grants, Program Area: Reform of International Finance and 
Trade, 1990-1994”. Database print out, prepared 22 May 2008. Provided to the author by the 
foundation.
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Bank during the key 1992-1995 period during which a series of US cuts to its IDA-10 
contribution took place (cf. Mallaby 2004).
Funding, Policy, and Participation
The data indicate a clear link between funding and activism. Organizations pursued 
the positions which they had a material incentive to pursue, either choosing their 
positions or deciding their participation on the basis of financial interests. 
Representatives of service-delivery NGOs acknowledge that concerns over future 
funding played a dominant role in selecting policy positions. Advocacy NGO staff 
likewise highlighted competition among foundation-funded NGOs for donor attention. 
Leaders of organizations funded primarily by their members, particularly those 
organizations which empowered their members through democratic voting structures, 
report responding to member concerns. These findings confirm and elaborate on work 
done Cooley and Ron and discussed in Chapter 2. Cooley and Ron report that the need 
to fund the organization, particularly to pay staff and overhead costs, along with the 
need to compete with other organizations for scarce funding resources, causes most 
NGOs to prioritize economic concerns over mission, ideology, or other aspects of 
identity (cf. Price 2003 pp. 582-3).
The accusations of some actors notwithstanding, however, it seems unlikely 
that the majority of civil society organizations involved in the IDA-10 chose their 
policies on a purely mercenary basis. Many organizations chose positions that 
supported their financial goals, but causality is difficult to prove. Organizations’ pre­
existing values or ideology seem to have had a stronger impact on their policy 
preferences.
The pattern of participation indicates that the significance of funding (as 
opposed to ideology) increases as the costs of activism increase. Numerous 
organizations with an interest in IDA-related issues, such as poverty alleviation or debt 
relief, were involved in low-cost ways early in the IDA-process. Many smaller faith- 
based organizations and developing world NGOs signed the NGO Working Group 
letter, the anti-dam New York Times advertisement, or other similar positions 
statements. However, organizations engaged in sustained advocacy only when their 
activities were likely to be expected by paying members, when they believed that the 
policies being negotiated would affect their future revenue, or when outside funding 
subsidized the costs of activism. Organizations have scarce resources, and they
137
therefore choose to invest them in those activities most likely to yield a return on 
investment, be it through grant funding or continued member support. They also 
undertake those activities for which resources are specifically available.
This is not to say that the policy positions of individual organizations were 
determined or could be predicted by funding. As shown earlier, mission or ideology 
seems to play the dominant role in policy setting. Rather, in situations where advocacy 
requires greater resources, the net composition of the group of CSOs participating may 
be more likely to reflect the funding available for advocacy (and thus the interests of 
major donors), or, if the policy itself has funding impacts on some organizations, the 
population of CSOs involved may be skewed towards those financially impacted.
The influence of the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation demonstrates the impact 
of funding on participation. Mott funded the core group of American NGOs opposed 
to the IDA and its funding may have helped them cultivate the support of developing 
world partners. Mott chose its partners for their pre-existing agendas, but it induced 
them to modify their existing behavior. In response to Mott influence, Mott clients 
initiated new advocacy activities and coordinated their policy positions in ways that 
increased their political impact.
In short, during the 10th IDA time period, funding appears to have had an 
important influence on advocacy activity. According to participants in the process 
itself, funding interests may explain the seeming contradiction between the mission of 
certain NGOs, such as the World Wildlife Fund, and the positions they espoused. It 
also helps explain the radical approaches taken by those advocacy NGOs whose 
funding depended not on negotiating a specific reform with the World Bank, but rather 
advancing the overall environmental agenda supported by their donors or members. 
Similarly, it helps explain the choices organizations made to participate in or withdraw 
from different advocacy activities. The role of Mott is particularly significant because
i L
it implies that the majority of NGOs opposing the 10 IDA were functioning in at least 
some of their activities as the clients or agents of a single entity, rather than seeking to 
respond to the desires of a diverse group of stakeholders. All of these findings have 
implications for the legitimacy of NGOs as stakeholder representatives. The links 
between ideology and position, analyzed earlier in this chapter, indicate that individual 
civil society organizations may not be very responsive to the populations that their 
work impacts. The findings on funding indicate the composition of any given
138
campaign may reflect the variety of the participants’ financial incentives, rather than a 
cross-section of stakeholder interests.
Conclusion
The sharp divisions that manifest themselves over the question of continued funding 
for the IDA were among the most striking aspects of civil society participation in the
tfi10 IDA. Participants in the process noted these divisions themselves and explained 
them as a function of differences between Northern and Southern interests, 
competition between environmental, development, and faith-based ideologies, or the 
result of organizations’ concerns with funding. Each of these hypotheses has a strong 
theoretical basis. However, only ideological divisions and funding sources correlate 
with the divisions observed in this case.
Numerous organizations attributed their policy positions and subsequent 
activism to their organization’s mission and priorities. This was particularly true 
among environmental actors and, to a slightly lesser extent, development and faith- 
based organizations. Policy positions and ideology generally correlate well, 
particularly if one makes allowances for the range of interests (from forestry to clean 
air, or food aid to debt relief) present within each category.
At the same time, organizations’ policy activities correlate very closely with 
their financial interests: organizations engaged in aid work supported sustained or 
increased aid funding; foundation-supported organizations supported the positions of 
their foundations; and member-funded organizations reflected the apparent interests of 
their members. Organizations of all types seemed more likely to participate when 
activism used few resources (either through low-cost mechanisms or because the 
activism was specifically funded) or was linked to a potential return on investment. 
Significantly, the interactions between the core group of the minority of NGOs 
opposing IDA funding and their shared donor reflect some of the elements of a 
principal-agent relationship. Thus, certain NGOs were not only responding to their 
own financial or organizational interests; they may have been actively guided in their 
behavior by a third party.
Even if organizations are ideologically consistent, this by no means guarantees 
their responsiveness to the populations affected by their activism. To the contrary, 
organizations’ ideological vision may lead them to reinterpret the stated desires of a 
people impacted by a given policy, or even determine such peoples’ ‘needs’ without
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reference to their stated desires. Although most organizations claim to be acting for 
the good of certain stakeholders, it may not be a good determined by those 
stakeholders themselves.
Furthermore, if civil society participation in a given campaign is facilitated by 
donor funding, money is still the proximate cause of civil society action. It determines 
which organizations are active in any given campaign. Thus, rather than representing 
a cross-section of stakeholder interests, it will represent a sampling of financial 
incentives or fundraising capacity. The role of third-party donors in structuring 
incentives may be particularly significant, leading to international campaigns that 
primarily reflect wealthy populations or funding bodies. In the case of the 10th IDA, 
policy makers were given the impression that five prominent NGOs had each chosen 
to engage on the issues surrounding the World Bank replenishment. Arguably, 
however, the decisions made by EDF, NWF, the Sierra Club, FoE, and the NRDC to 
participate in the policy process reflected, at least in part, the financial incentives 
provided by a single entity, the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation. The agendas these 
NGOs espoused may have reflected their native inclinations; however, their 
participation was facilitated by Mott funding and Mott had chosen to support these 
organizations because their missions corresponded with Mott’s policy agenda. 
Moreover, their collaboration, which helped them develop their public consensus on 
some issues, largely resulted from Mott’s strategy and incentives.
Finally, most civil society organizations involved in the 10th IDA were unlikely 
to engage in dialogue or joint decision making with other organizations. For most 
environmental advocacy actors involved in the 10th IDA, meaningful compromise with 
development NGOs would have resulted in a violation of the fundamental interests of 
their donors (in the case of Mott-funded NGOs) or their members (in the case of NWF 
or Narmada Bachao Andolan). By the same token, for development NGOs engaged in 
service-delivery, advocating for cuts in World Bank funding had the potential to result 
in the loss of funding for their activities. Informants for this research were well aware 
of these tensions, with several indicating that they chose not to engage opposing civil 
society organizations in dialogue because they perceived the financial interests of their 
opponents to result in rigid policy positions.
In short, data from civil society’s engagement with the World Bank indicate 
that civil society organizations operating in the context of the World Bank may be 
atomized rather than unified; that dialogue among civil society organizations may be
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limited; and that funding plays a role in the behavior even of advocacy organizations. 
These findings have particular relevance for the central question of this thesis: whether 
civil society engagement with the World Bank supports the idea that civil society can 
democratize global governance. As noted in Chapter 2, this thesis evaluates whether 
civil society is democratizing global governance by assessing civil society’s inputs and 
outputs. The findings in this chapter have several implications with particular 
relevance for the question of democratic inputs, specifically civil society’s capacity to 
act as a representative of different stakeholder populations or to facilitate the inclusion 
of different populations in the policy process. It also has implications for civil 
society’s ability to facilitate majoritarian outputs.
If individual organizations are pursuing pre-determined goals or values, they 
may ignore or reinterpret local needs in line with their existing agenda. This calls into 
question the representivity of individual civil society organizations. Narrow 
representation or self-interested behavior on the part of individual organizations might 
have limited influence if policy negotiations were widely accessible and if a broad 
group of civil society organizations participated in them. However, this chapter finds 
that collective civil society activism on an issue will reflect the financial incentives 
linked to the campaign. Organizations with financial incentives for their involvement 
will participate, while those hampered by limited resources may drop out. Thus civil 
society as a whole is unlikely to be representative, nor will civil society participation in 
policymaking promote equality of input among stakeholders. At the same time, the 
lack of dialogue among most civil society organizations, combined with the financial 
barriers to involvement in policymaking, suggest that civil society may not form the 
sort of open, deliberative space thought to enhance inclusivity.
These same dynamics may inhibit civil society’s capacity to produce 
majoritarian outcomes. First, financial barriers to involvement in policymaking may 
limit the cross-section of stakeholders represented. Second, even if a representative 
group of organizations is present, financial pressures as well as ideological drive may 
inhibit them from entering into majoritarian or pluralistic decision-making processes. 
Instead, each organization may use the best means at its disposal to pursue its own 
interests.
The previous chapter indicates that some civil society organizations were able 
to significantly impact World Bank policy and operations. Yet, as this chapter shows, 
these impacts were achieved in spite of the divisions among civil society
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organizations. This naturally raises the question of how civil society achieved its 
impacts and the consequences for democracy. The next chapter explores this issue.
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Chapter 5
Mechanisms of Influence and the Distribution of Authority
The thesis has thus far identified the civil society actors involved in the IDA-10, 
examined their agenda setting and their interactions with one another, and determined 
their impacts.1 This chapter explores their mechanisms of influence. As noted in 
Chapter 3, certain civil society organizations were noticeably more successful than 
others in achieving their desired impacts. Examining how different actors engaged with 
the Bank and why some were more successful than others will help this thesis address 
persistent questions in the literature about civil society’s mechanisms of influence.
Civil society’s means of influence also has implications for the democratizing 
impacts of transnational civil society as a whole. As noted in Chapter 2, this thesis 
measures civil society’s effectiveness in democratizing global governance on the basis 
of its success in improving democratic inputs and outputs. Inputs include stakeholder 
representation and inclusion, while outputs should reflect stakeholder control over 
governance.
The Bank’s founders conceived of it as an independent, technocratic body, and 
for much of its history it has manifested the sort of democratic deficit discussed in 
Chapter 1. However, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, civil society’s influence has limited 
the Bank’s independence and forced it to consider certain stakeholder demands in its 
decision making. Nonetheless, in order to truly democratize the Bank’s policymaking, 
civil society must develop mechanisms of influence that are equally accessible to all 
stakeholders.2 Therefore this chapter contributes to this thesis’ overarching question by 
examining two issues with regards to the IDA-10. First, how did civil society 
organizations advance their agenda? Second, were the channels pioneered by 
successful civil society organizations equally accessible by all the Bank’s stakeholders? 
As described in Chapters 1 and 2, these questions address specific debates in the 
literature on civil society, and will help determine whether data about the World Bank
1 Portions of this chapter were presented at the Millennium Annual Conference 2008: Interrogating 
Democracy in International Relations, as part of the paper “Democratic Inputs and Antidemocratic 
Outcomes: Assessing Civil Society Contributions to Global Governance”.
2 For the purposes of this research, the Bank’s stakeholders are defined as the 186 members of the 
IBRD. For additional details, see Chapter 1, page 27.
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support or challenge the idea that civil society has the capacity to democratize global 
governance.
The chapter begins by describing in greater detail the different elements of 
democratization and the relevance of this multipart definition for civil society. It then 
describes the various mechanisms of influence used by civil society in the time leading 
up the IDA-10 and during the IDA-10 itself and compares specific claims in the 
literature with data from the IDA-10. Next it examines how certain mechanisms 
utilized national authority, and describes how the use of state influence allowed a small 
group of actors to advance their agenda over the objections of a much larger one. 
Finally, the chapter provides a more detailed analysis of these data, discussing whether 
they indicate that civil society is democratizing Bank policymaking.
Dissecting Democracy
As noted, in examining the democratization of World Bank policymaking, this thesis 
focuses on equal authority among stakeholders and stakeholder control over policy 
decisions. Authority among citizens need not always be exercised via direct franchise 
or a physical vote, as in functional definitions of democracy, but most models of 
democracy require that authority be equal. The desires of citizens must be represented 
on at least nominally equal terms, and all citizens must be included in some level of the 
governance process.
Not only must citizen authority be equal, but it must be effective. The will of the 
citizens must result in a response from the government or institution and the rule of the 
government or institution must be contingent on direct or indirect consent of its citizens 
or stakeholders. A contribution to either citizen control or equal citizen authority may 
be construed as democratizing. However, both elements are necessary to achieve 
democracy.
Civil society may contribute to one aspect of democratic governance while 
simultaneously inhibiting the development of the other aspect. Thus, paradoxically, 
civil society can be both democratizing and antidemocratic at the same time. Such a 
paradox has historical precedent. As Robert Goodin has observed, the development of 
modem democracy was an incremental affair in which citizen control over government 
preceded equal distribution of authority among citizens. The development of global
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democracy may be no different.3 For example, many of the structures most 
fundamental to British democracy, such as the Magna Carta or the appearance of the 
king before Parliament, were originally created to serve the aristocracy rather than the 
general population.4 Yet hundreds of years later, they are viewed as foundations of 
popular rule. This is because they served to erode the independence of executive 
authority and develop the principle of citizen control over the state, however much such 
control was originally exercised by an elite minority. Civil society impacts on global 
governance may follow this pattern. In the case of the World Bank, civil society 
developed the principle of citizen control over global governance by encouraging the 
principles and practice of transparency, accountability, and dialogue on the part of 
international institutions. Insofar as these principles and practices create the necessary 
preconditions for democracy, civil society’s impacts may be termed as democratizing.
At the same time, as described in Chapter 1, there is some indication that civil 
society activism has inhibited the development of equal authority among stakeholders 
(cf. Woods 2005). (The historical parallel might be the resistance of the aristocracy to 
sharing its hard-won power with the bourgeoisie or the efforts of early democrats in the 
US to restrict the franchise to those they considered capable of using it well.) Data 
examined in this chapter indicate that some of the most important channels of influence 
pioneered or reinforced by the civil society activists prior to and during the IDA-10 
process were open only to elite civil society actors. Moreover there is some indication 
that such elites performed a gate-keeping function, deliberately excluding other 
organizations from high-level participation in policymaking. Insofar as civil society 
created new elite structures or inhibited equal access to the levers of citizen control over 
governance, civil society’s impacts were antidemocratic.
These simultaneous and conflicting impacts indicate that civil society cannot be 
treated as an unquestioned force for improved stakeholder representation, nor that 
involvement of civil society in global affairs makes democratic global governance a fa it 
accompli. Instead it indicates that civil society has positive contributions that 
policymakers and practitioners must enhance and enable, even as they seek to mitigate 
the potential for elite domination and to grant authority equally to all stakeholders or 
their representatives.
3 Robert Goodin, ‘Global Democracy: In the Beginning’, conference paper presented at the Annual 




From the early 1980s through the period of the 10th IDA, civil society engaged with the 
World Bank in a number of ways that enhanced citizen control. This thesis divides 
such engagement into three categories, synthesizing and building on the work of a 
number of earlier scholars. The category first is improved transparency. Civil society 
has helped expose the Bank’s policies and actions to public scrutiny by circulating 
information, researching its activities, and lobbying for the release of internal reports 
and other Bank-generated data. Civil society has also encouraged accountability, by 
challenging the Bank’s public legitimacy, conditionalizing its funding, and promoting 
oversight and review mechanisms. Lastly, civil society actors have promoted dialogue, 
both over specific projects and general policies. Some of these mechanisms have been 
used successfully to pursue specific policy objectives. However, their larger 
significance in terms of democratization is that they have developed or reinforced 
patterns of citizen input which have diminished the World Bank’s independence and 
autonomy.
Improved Transparency
Keck and Sikkink identify ‘information leverage’ as one of the key tools employed by 
civil society organizations in their pursuit of specific policy goals (1998 p. 16; see also 
Nelson 2002). Information leverage may include gathering testimony, disseminating 
information, or monitoring projects. Such practices, however, may be better construed 
as broader contributions to democratic global governance than as mere means to 
achieving limited policy change (Scholte 2004 p. 211-3). Civil society contributions to 
transparency have taken three main forms: information transfer, information creation, 
and information liberalization. Each of these various types of transparency decreases 
the autonomy of international organizations by providing outside actors with the 
information necessary to evaluate, monitor, and direct the actions of international 
organizations. The forms are by no means mutually exclusive; the same civil society 
campaign may promote multiple forms of transparency, and improved transparency 
may also overlap with the other types of governance reform to be discussed later.
Information Transfer: Information transfer has been described by other authors 
as the publicizing of abuses or the dissemination of closely held information (cf. Keck 
and Sikkink 1998; Nelson 2002; Nanz and Steffek 2004). It might be more accurately
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described, however, as the provision of actionable information to independent agents 
such as government representatives or the general population. In this regard, civil 
society contributes to informed decision making and breaks elite monopolies on 
information.
Historically, civil society has done this in number of ways. It has sought to 
bring the testimony of local communities in least developed countries (LDCs) to the 
attention of Northern audiences. Civil society has also procured and publicized the 
confidential documents of governments and international organizations. Moreover, in 
institutions like the World Bank many of the most important decisions are made by 
small groups of decision-makers, often busy government representatives seeking to 
follow multiple projects or policies at once. In such situations, civil society 
organizations with sufficient access to information can also take on the role of staff 
assistant, sorting and collating data into comprehensive briefings for key officials 
outside the Bank (Raustiala 1997).
In the case of the World Bank, information transfer began in 1983 when a group 
of American environmental NGOs began opposing certain World Bank projects in 
Brazil and Indonesia. Their efforts resulted in seventeen hearings between 1983 and 
1986 on multilateral development banks and the environment (Keck and Sikkink 1998 
p. 139). During these hearings the NGOs presented information from independent 
researchers and local civil society organizations in the project affected areas. The 
hearings brought World Bank practices to the attention of both the general public and 
Congressional decision-makers, laying the groundwork for a series of US-driven 
environmental reforms at the World Bank. In 1987, the Charles Stewart Mott 
Foundation sponsored the creation of the Bank Information Center (BIC), an 
independent clearinghouse for information about World Bank activities and a repository 
for leaked Bank documents (Keck and Sikkink 1998 pp. 148-9). During the IDA-10, 
BIC played a key role disseminating information to NGOs and Congressional staffers. 
Civil society organizations also testified at three Congressional hearings related to the 
IDA and information provided by NGOs, including leaked World Bank documents, 
surfaced in British Parliamentary debate.5 Civil society organizations sponsored the 
full-page advertisements on opposing the Narmada Dam project in the New York Times
5 See statement by John Denham, during UK Parliamentary debate on a motion by the Under-Secretary 
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs that funding for IDA-10 be approved. UK 
Parliamentary record, 12 July 1993 ,11:10pm.
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and Financial Times6 and prepared briefing documents for a significant number of the 
World Bank’s Executive Directors. These actions fomented a combination of public 
awareness and informed decision making on the part of public officials that 
significantly eroded the Bank’s independence, enhancing the possibility of citizen 
control.
Information Creation: Information creation expands the amount of data 
available on international organizations. It can include independent research, 
monitoring and evaluating the implementation of new policies or projects, and the 
creation of new reporting requirements. Logically, information creation should precede 
information transfer. Chronologically, however, civil society has engaged in the 
business of information creation only after its initial successes in information transfer.
As a result of resource constraints, independent research has been relatively rare 
among civil society actors. Earlier American environmental NGOs involved in the 
IDA-10 were prone to accepting the accounts of local partners at face value or, even 
more precariously, adopting the charges of other American environmentalists as valid 
and accurate. Nonetheless, civil society engaged in some independent research. The 
Canadian NGO PROBE investigated the World Bank’s Narmada Dam project in India, 
and PROBE’s findings were used in the advocacy campaigns against the project. 
Human Rights Watch and the NRDC also published an investigation on logging in 
Malaysia with implications for World Bank policy.
Civil society also forced new reporting requirements within the World Bank 
itself. These requirements mandated that the Bank evaluate and report on the 
consequences of current or planned actions, taking into account issues like 
environmental damage, social impacts, economic sustainability, and biodiversity. Bank 
evaluations provided decision-makers with the information necessary to effectively 
oversee the Bank’s activities and provided activists with the information necessary to 
hold the Bank accountable. One of the earliest examples of this is the Pelosi 
Amendment, written by Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi in collaboration with 
representatives of the Sierra Club. Attached to a 1989 funding bill, the amendment 
mandated that the US Executive Director automatically vote against any World Bank
6 Cf. Advertisement, “Your Money -  Funding Yet Another World Bank Disaster”, The New York Times, 
21 September 1992.
7 Human Rights Watch and the National Resources Defense Council (NRDC), Defending the Earth: 
Abuses o f  Human Rights and the Environment (New York: Human Rights Watch and NRDC, 1992), pp. 
49-70
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project for which an environmental impact assessment had not been conducted. The 
amendment had a two-year grace period before taking effect and by 1991 the World 
Bank had created a comprehensive program of environmental impact assessments.
Information Liberalization: The greatest source of information on the World 
Bank is often the Bank itself, which authors dozens of reports on its own activities each 
year. Some of these reports are surprisingly critical and leaked reports have provided 
some of the strongest substantiation for the various charges civil society has leveled 
against various institutions. Therefore it is unsurprising that civil society actors have 
long sought access to this trove of data. In the case of the World Bank, success has 
significantly facilitated the independent monitoring of Bank activities, paving the way 
to greater accountability. In this regard, information liberalization has facilitated Bank 
accountability in a fashion not unlike the way “sunshine laws” and the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) have facilitated government accountability in the United 
States.
When civil society first began lobbying the World Bank, the Bank was so 
secretive that even its phone book was confidential. In 1989, the Bank began to revise 
its information policies, largely in response to NGO pressure (Shihata 1995 pp. 250- 
300). NGOs found these revisions to be insufficient and continued lobbying for greater 
disclosure. In 1993, during the IDA negotiations, the Bank again revised its 
information policy. According to a senior Bank staff member who helped draft the new 
policy, the staff team working on the revision found itself split between two factions. 
One favored a conservative information policy in which only those documents that 
could be proven necessary to release would be made public. The other faction favored 
a significantly more liberal policy, very much akin to FOIA, under which only those 
documents which could be proven necessary to restrict would be withheld. The 
conservative faction won out in team deliberations, but members of the more liberal 
faction persuaded the team to attach their alternative policy as an appendix to the final 
proposal submitted to the Bank’s board for approval. A member of the team then 
leaked the report to the NGO community, which lobbied influential Executive Directors 
to push for the alternative policy presented in the appendix. The strategy was 




Improved transparency lays the foundation for organizational accountability. Once 
external actors have sufficient information on an organization’s activities, they can 
move to punish or reward it for the actions it takes. Accountability can be defined thus, 
as the establishment of consequences for an agent’s actions. In a democratic society it 
is most often exercised through the vote, by which a wayward politician or party is not 
reelected or it loses its majority. Leaders may also be recalled from office or deposed 
by their peers in a vote of no confidence. Beyond the ballot, however, state actors are 
also held accountable by the rule of law and by the oversight of independent 
ombudsmen established for the purpose. In the case of international institutions, civil 
society has helped create both public accountability and structural accountability. Civil 
society has also, via government allies, exercised financial accountability. These three 
levers have increased outside control over international organizations by creating clear 
consequences for these organizations’ actions.
Public Accountability: Civil society’s ability to draw massive public attention to 
the actions of international organizations in one of its most frequently noted traits 
(Munck 2002 p. 350; Wade 1997 p. 708; Mallaby 2004 pp. 47-8; Keck and Sikkink 
1998 pp. 18-22). Such attention, which is almost invariably negative, can take several 
forms. Publicity stunts like the ‘World Bank Murderer’ banner unfurled by protestors 
behind Bank president Lewis Preston during a 1994 Madrid speech can attract negative 
media attention, leading to public opprobrium (Mallaby 2004). Street protests can 
make individual staff more aware of dissenting voices and even, in some cases, create 
an intimidating environment. During the World Bank and IMF annual meetings in 
Berlin in 1988, for instance, delegates were pelted with coins and spat upon, anarchists 
set cars on fire near the meeting location, and police guarded participants’ hotels 
against assault by protestors.8 Nonetheless, such protests seem to derive their power 
from the impression that the small group of protestors represent a larger, negatively 
inclined public or concerns that protestors will attract negative media attention to the 
organization.
In all cases of public accountability, civil society exercises influence via attacks 
on an organization’s reputation and legitimacy. The effectiveness of this tactic,
8 “Big Protest at IMF Site”, The New York Times, 26 September 1988; Patricia Clough, “IMF Brings 
Out Berlin’s Violence”, The Independent, 28 September 1988; Anna Tomforde, “West Berlin Counts 
Cost of Violence”, Guardian, 30 September 1988.
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however, is impeded by the fact that international organizations like the World Bank 
have little statutory need for public legitimacy. Their position is secured by 
international agreements among national governments which are not easily revoked or 
abridged. Thus protestors must rely on an organization’s concern for its reputation (cf. 
Keck and Sikkink 1998). A number of Bank staff and civil society activists interviewed 
for this thesis opined that the World Bank is very sensitive to criticism and thus 
susceptible to public pressure tactics.
During the negotiations surrounding the IDA-10, Bank was subject to numerous 
public shamings. Provocative demonstrations against the Bank by Greenpeace and 
others were a staple of the Fifty Years is Enough campaign, which began in 1992 and 
generated ample negative press (Mallaby 2004 p. 61). Protestors gathered regularly in 
the park outside the World Bank headquarters in Washington, DC to shout their 
disapproval. Critical letters have at times numbered in the thousands each month (ibid. 
P 87).
Nonetheless, this form of accountability was met with only limited success. 
Despite its alleged concern for its reputation, there is little evidence that such public 
pressure has forced major change at the Bank. Certainly the Bank has instituted 
numerous policy changes over the last twenty years, but causal links between public 
pressure and the majority of changes is unclear. Fox and Brown conclude, based on 
their review of major Bank policy changes from 1980-1995, that public pressure is 
among the least effective means of accountability exercised by civil society (p. 497).
At the same time, discussions with Bank and CSO staff make clear that the Bank 
undertook significant charm offensives and public relations initiatives both during and 
after the IDA-10 designed to build bridges with civil society and mollify critical 
elements. These may have been a low-cost alternative to more substantive policy 
reform. Thus public pressure, while dramatic and perhaps reputation-building for civil 
society, constituted a weak form of accountability.
Financial Accountability: Financial leverage can be a much more effective 
means of accountability (Keck and Sikkink 1998 p. 23). When an international 
organization is reliant on regular infusions of cash from donor nations, civil society can 
pressure donors, often using local political channels, to withhold funding or to 
conditionalize its disbursement upon organizational actions. In cases where those 
infusions are perceived to be essential to the completion of a core mission or to the 
long-term survival of the organization, such tactics can be extremely effective.
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This is exactly what happened in the case of the IDA-10. Beginning in the late 
1980s, a number of CSOs had concluded that financial pressure was the one type of 
accountability to which the Bank readily responded. Their attack on Bank funds during 
the tenth replenishment of the IDA was instrumental to the success of numerous 
reforms, including the liberalization of Bank information policy. The initial reductions 
made by the US Congress in the American IDA commitment, combined with hold­
backs, conditions, and additional cuts, led to rapid concessions from the Bank.
Financial pressure also had an impact on individual Bank projects. Large projects may 
use a combination of Bank and bilateral funds, the latter given in parallel with Bank 
funding. Civil society pressure was linked to the Japanese withdrawal from the 
Narmada Dam project in India and to other, smaller changers in bilateral aid.
Structural Accountability: Certain civil society organizations also used the IDA- 
10 to push for the creation of an independent monitor, funded by the World Bank itself, 
capable of judging organizational actions, identifying breaches in ethics or policy, and 
detailing appropriate remediation. Where such monitors are sufficiently independent 
and endowed with a reasonable ability to enforce their decisions, they can provide the 
kind of checks and balances provided by independent agencies in many democratic 
governments (Scholte 2004 pp. 221-2).
In 1992, in response to international pressure and a hunger strike by Indian 
activists, the World Bank created an ad hoc inspection group to investigate claims that 
the Bank had violated its own environmental and social policies in planning the 
Narmada Dam project in India. The panel’s findings were extremely critical and helped 
energize the nascent proposal, then being discussed between civil society and American 
policy-makers, to encourage the Bank to create an independent ombudsman. The 
Inspection Panel, created in 1994, formed a means for direct citizen appeals against the 
Bank. The Inspection Panel guidelines allow any group of two or more citizens living 
in an area affected by a planned or current Bank project to file a claim with the panel. 
The panel will review the claim and, if it deems it valid, request permission from the 
Bank’s board to conduct a full-scale investigation. Although the panel can evaluate 
only the Bank’s adherence to its own policies, the proliferation of environmental and 
social safeguards, particularly in response to civil society pressure in the late 1980s, has 
meant that the Bank’s policies, at least ‘on the book,’ are very stakeholder-friendly. In 
permitting a direct appeal by citizens, the Inspection Panel has been one of the most 
democratic means of accountability to which the Bank is subject.
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Dialogue
Deliberative democracy theorists in particular hold that dialogue is an essential element 
of democracy. Many have suggested that civil society currently contributes to such 
dialogue or may so contribute in the future (cf. Korten 1998; Held 2004; Nanz and 
Steffek 2004). It is important, however, to define what one means when writing of 
dialogue. Theorists with a more cosmopolitan orientation assume that dialogue will 
begin spontaneously among stakeholders and that international organizations will be 
somehow bound to heed the outcomes of such deliberations (cf. Korten 1998; Nanz and 
Steffek 2004). Others postulate a more structured dialogue between stakeholders and 
international organizations (Payne 1996), even if new structures must be devised to 
facilitate this institution-stakeholder interaction (Rischard 2002 p. 189; Held 2006 pp. 
303-11).
Civil society organizations have organized themselves for inter-organizational 
dialogue in a number of ways. For instance, CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen 
Participation has done much to gather and disseminate knowledge on civil society since 
its founding in 1993. According to the organization’s website, its mission is 
“strengthening citizen action and civil society throughout the world”.9 Civil society 
forums like the Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations in Cooperative 
Relationship with the United Nations (CONGO) and the World Social Forum provide 
opportunities for networking and coalition-building, and have helped civil society 
organizations drive elements of the international policy agenda, particularly with 
regards to poverty (Scholte et al. 2009). In spite of the successes of such intra-civil 
society dialogue, however, many activist organizations continue to advance agendas 
supported by local members or funders, rather than those supported by a global 
audience (Tvedt 2002 p. 367-9). Data indicate, for instance, that Northern NGOs 
readily disregard the oft-stated principle that activist agendas originate in the global 
South (Nelson 2000; Murphy 2005; Woods 2005). Research has also highlighted the 
challenges of facilitating the participation or leadership of developing country actors at 
various civil society forums (Scholte et al. 2009). In short, although dialogue between 
civil society actors is occurring, there is little evidence that it constitutes a democratic
9 Accessed 14 September 2009.
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discourse of the type hypothesized by deliberative theorists. Thus this thesis focuses on 
the second category of interaction: dialogue between stakeholders and institutions.
Civil society has helped create two types of dialogues between stakeholders and 
international institutions: project consultations and policy consultations (cf. Covey 1998 
p. 82). Both of these have been used by civil society engaging with the World Bank. 
Such dialogues may force disparate civil society actors to achieve compromise 
positions, but more importantly they allow direct citizen input into the activities of 
international institutions. Like accountability, successful dialogue relies on civil 
society’s accomplishments in building transparency. Detailed information can make 
citizens critical and independent participants and keep dialogues from rubber-stamping 
institution proposals. Unlike the inspection panels or other forms of accountability, 
dialogue can permit citizens input into planning processes, allowing stakeholders to 
actively guide future organizational actions rather than just reacting to punish past 
errors. As such, it may be one of the strongest forms of democratization.
Civil society has both driven the creation of dialogues and participated in them. 
For the purposes of reforming global governance, however, the mere creation of the 
dialogues is more significant than any particular policy initiative the dialogues have 
been used to advance. The drive to create dialogues between institutions and 
stakeholders has often been referred to as popular participation (Long 2001 pp. 1-5). 
Popular participation, however, refers back to dialogues between development agencies 
and project-affected peoples. In their original form such dialogues were intended to 
simply increase aid effectiveness, although it was later realized that they could also 
democratize the development process (see, for example, Clark 1991). Civil society 
contributions to dialogue, however, have been more expansive.
Project Consultations: Project consultations occur in international organizations 
that undertake discrete projects. At the World Bank, project consultations began in the 
early 1980s, in response to data gathered by practitioners and social scientists indicating 
that development projects could be made more effective if the stakeholders who were 
supposed to benefit from any given project were consulted on its design and 
implementation (see Long 2001). Local stakeholders were deemed to be better 
informed about their own needs and conditions than outside development agents and 
the process of consultation was also expected to increase citizen ownership over any 
given project (Long 2001; cf. Clark 1991).
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The World Bank created the NGO-World Bank Committee in 1982 in part in 
response to staff interest in popular participation as a development tool. Such interest 
was limited, however, and other members of staff sought to co-opt NGOs as allies 
against threats to the Bank’s budget (Covey 1998). However, there were some notable 
dialogues, including discussions between World Bank staff and members of Arch- 
Vahini, an Indian NGO, and Oxfam-UK in the late 1980s. These discussions, regarding 
the resettlement of tribal peoples in Gujarat to be affected by the Narmada project, 
resulted in drastic improvements in the terms of their resettlement (Patel 1995 pp. 185- 
7).
Around 1990, the Bank began sponsoring more poverty targeted interventions 
(PTIs), projects aimed at improving specific social indicators like poverty or infant 
mortality, rather than general economic development. The move towards PTIs 
necessitated the hiring of more non-economist social scientists (or ‘nessies’ as they 
were known) who believed in the value of local civil society as a development tool (see 
Kapur, et al 1997 pp. 373-75; cf. Ibrahim 1998). This shift arrived concurrently with 
the push by InterAction and other development actors to increase popular participation 
in Bank projects. This pressure, begun just before the IDA-10 and continuing through 
the IDA negotiations, helped make popular participation a standard and expected part of 
most subsequent Bank projects.10
Policy Consultations: Policy consultations refer to dialogues between 
institutions and stakeholders on issues of broader organizational policy. This is 
potentially a more powerful aid to democratization insofar as it can have more wide- 
reaching effects than discussions limited to a single, geographically isolated project. 
Although the Bank generally resisted policy input from the NGO-World Bank 
Committee during the 1980s, in 1990 the Bank formed the Learning Group with civil 
society leaders to discuss the future of popular participation in Bank projects (Long 
2001 p. 27). This helped feed into the evolution in popular participation mentioned 
above. In the late 1980s, the Bank President Barber Conable also consulted with US 
environmental NGOs about environmental reforms at the Bank. In September 1992, 
during the 10th IDA, the Bank hosted six civil society leaders from developing countries 
in a meeting with donor representatives to discuss the replenishment of the 10th IDA.
10 In 1990 the Bank formed the Learning Group on Participatory Development, which involved NGO 
input. The Learning Group issued its report in 1994. Manuals on participatory consultations were 
produced in 1995 and updated in later years.
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These examples, however, highlight two of the challenges of policy dialogue. 
The first is that the Bank only seemed to invite civil society organizations into dialogue 
when there already existed significant interest within the Bank in a policy change. Thus 
dialogue could help expand or shape a policy, as in the area of popular participation, but 
it was not an instrument of creating new policy. Second, the Bank’s location in 
Washington, DC created a barrier to access for civil society in other countries, 
particularly those from developing nations. The meeting between Bank staff, IDA 
deputies, and Southern civil society arose largely out of deputy concerns that 
Washington-based NGOs did not represent an accurate cross-section of civil society. 
Nonetheless, the role of the Bank or governments in choosing civil society 
representatives for dialogue and paying for their visits to Washington creates problems 
all its own. Civil society itself does not always constitute an honest broker when 
arranging policy dialogues: one senior Bank staffer with close ties to civil society noted 
that civil society organizations tasked with arranging a policy dialogue tend to act as 
gatekeepers, packing the dialogue with likeminded organizations. As will be discussed 
later in this chapter, the meetings between certain Washington NGOs and US legislators 
during the 10th IDA also seem to show this pattern.
The Distribution of Authority
Although each of the aforementioned mechanisms created a means of potentially 
enhancing stakeholder control over the World Bank, such authority was not equally 
distributed among stakeholders. The key reason for this is that the most effective 
mechanisms relied on assistance from donor governments or even the Bank itself. 
Among the means of transparency improvement, information liberalization relied on 
government pressure, as did the more notable forms of information creation, 
particularly the Pelosi Amendment. Even information transfer was most useful when 
the information was being transferred to public officials with some form of authority 
over the Bank. Likewise, the only form of accountability not requiring third-party 
assistance, public accountability, was the weakest form (cf. Fox and Brow 1998 p. 497). 
Financial accountability required donor action and institutional accountability required 
a combination of donor pressure and Bank consent. Dialogue too, while sometime 
prompted by public accountability campaigns, occurred largely at the Bank’s initiative 
or in response to donor pressure.
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As a result of these trends, power was concentrated among those civil society 
actors with the greatest degree of support from donor governments for Bank 
engagement. Because government policy towards the Bank was shaped by political 
processes, power redounded to those actors with the greatest domestic political clout. 
This was particularly true in the United States which, uniquely among Bank donors, had 
a two-part funding process in which any funding agreement was subject to review and 
revision by the legislature.
These trends were particularly manifest during the IDA-10. The initial victories 
achieved during the early 1992 funding negotiations, prior to the schism over the 
Narmada Dam, resulted largely from a combination of Bank acquiescence and 
government inclination. In areas like increased popular participation or consideration 
of debt relief, according to a Bank staffer familiar with these issues, the Bank had 
already been considering action prior to the start of IDA negotiations and so conceded 
willingly to demands for policy change. In other areas, like poverty reduction or the 
consideration of gender in development, donor governments had already adopted the 
civil society positions before the start of the negotiations. Such adoption reflected 
professional decisions by donor government staff rather than a reluctant response to 
civil society pressure. For instance, the US Treasury staff responsible for developing 
Treasury policy towards the World Bank were themselves expert in the area of 
development and with the capacity to determine their own reform agenda based on their 
assessment of the Bank’s performance. This was exemplified in the IDA-10 by a series 
of very detailed accountability and monitoring mechanisms proposed by the US 
Treasury which had focused on areas of management and personnel largely ignored by 
civil society. The remainder of civil society successes, particularly the funding cuts, 
information liberalization, and structural accountability achieved by the anti-IDA 
faction after the Narmada schism, relied on the political efforts of a handful of NGOs 
that used their domestic clout to persuade US lawmakers to apply pressure to the World 
Bank.
Triangulating the Bank
As noted in Chapter 3, the World Bank’s decision to continue funding the Narmada 
Dam project galvanized Bank skeptics. Although the Bank had made substantial 
concessions in the areas of development practice and environmental policy during the 
IDA-10 negotiations, the Bank’s continued support for the Indian dams signaled to
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certain civil society groups that the Bank still fundamentally supported environmentally 
destructive, industrially-oriented projects that focused on macro-economic development 
to the detriment of individuals. These groups included the Environmental Defense 
Fund, National Wildlife Federation, and Friends of the Earth, as well as the Sierra Club 
and the Natural Resources Defense Council. Greenpeace, Rainforest Action Network, 
and others played smaller roles.
By this point, around November 1992, the IDA deputies had already negotiated 
a preliminary agreement. To all appearances, this document reflected a substantial 
‘win’ for civil society. It included an emphasis on poverty reduction, mitigation for the 
impacts of structural adjustment, and popular participation and featured substantial 
increases in environmental protection, including requirements for new environmental 
assessments, a ban on IDA funding for rainforest logging, and an emphasis on energy 
conservation.11 Consensus among informants for this research, including both 
environmentalists and development advocates, was that civil society via donor 
governments got nearly everything for which it had initially asked. With the IDA-10 
negotiation process nearly complete, and few grounds on which to press for a 
renegotiation of the agreement, Bank-skeptics took their case directly to donor 
governments.
At the national level, the new anti-EDA coalition pressed donor governments to 
refuse to fund the agreement negotiated by those governments’ own deputies. The 
coalition’s success in most cases was extremely limited. Finland opted to withdraw 
funding from the IDA, but the Finnish contribution was only a small fraction of the 
whole. In the UK, the issue was debated in Parliament, but to no effect. In most cases, 
parliamentary governments were unwilling to inflict a legislative defeat upon 
themselves by overruling the recommendations of government negotiators.
In the US, however, the situation was different. IDA negotiations had been 
carried out by the US Treasury, an arm of the executive branch. Funding had to be 
approved by Congress, a separate, legislative branch. In 1992 and 1993, these branches 
were controlled by different political parties, adding to their Constitutional division. 
Moreover, Congress had a long history of using its fiduciary power to intervene directly 
in Bank affairs, in spite of the Bank’s own mandate to deal only with the finance 
ministries of its member countries. In 1979, Congress used it control over IDA funding
11 US Treasury, “IDA 10 Deputies’ Report, Revised Draft”, 1993. See also Kapur, et al (1997), pp. 
1149-50.
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to successfully pressure the Bank to commit not to fund projects in Vietnam (Kapur et 
al 1997 p. 1150). In the 1980s, the US Congress was instrumental in the Bank’s 
environmental reform. Under financial pressure from Congress, Bank President A. W. 
Clausen even agreed to meet directly with Senator Robert Kasten, Jr. and the 
environmental NGOs with whom he had allied himself in order to negotiate 
concessions. Bank staff resisted such interactions, believing that they violated the 
Articles of Agreement on which the Bank was founded (Wade 1997 p. 665), but they 
continued nonetheless.
Some of the same actors who had worked on the environmental reforms, 
including Bruce Rich of Environmental Defense, Brent Blackwelder of Friends of the 
Earth, and Barbara Bramble of the National Wildlife Federation, were leaders in the 
anti-IDA campaign. According to a source at Friends of the Earth, their experiences in 
the 1980s had led them to believe that genuine Bank reform could only result from 
financial pressure. Through years of lobbying they had also developed significant 
expertise and solid networks of contacts. As the IDA-10 agreement moved towards 
donor ratification, these leaders moved to attack the IDA at the level of Congressional 
funding. Thus pressure would flow from these civil society organizations to Congress 
and on to the Bank.
Limiting Competition
The shift in venue to the United States had the effect of excluding most non-US civil 
society members from participating in the final stage of the IDA process. With the 
exception of Forum of African Voluntary Development Organizations (FAVDO), 
which had been provided with office space by InterAction, most non-US civil society 
organizations with an interest in the IDA lacked a permanent presence in Washington, 
DC. Not only did they lack the staff and facilities necessary to lobby Congress in a 
sustained way, but their lack of presence deprived them of much of the necessary 
expertise and contacts. When asked how Oxfam-UK and other non-US development 
organizations participated in the IDA process once it moved to the US, a source who 
had worked for the organization at the time said simply, “We didn’t.”
The absence of most non-US CSOs changed the demographics of the civil 
society facing Congress. As noted in Chapter 3, most developing country actors 
involved in the IDA were in favor of full replenishment, but their voices were largely 
excluded. Other respected and venerable actors from donor countries, like Oxfam-UK
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and NOVTB, also withdrew from participation. Among the US CSOs to remain actively 
involved in the process, pro-replenishment and anti-replenishment actors were roughly 
equal in number.
Building on Experience
The core group of anti-replenishment campaigners had significant experience in 
Washington, DC. Lori Udall of the Environmental Defense Fund came from a political 
family: Morris Udall served 14 terms in the House of Representatives and had run 
against Jimmy Carter for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1976. Stewart 
Udall had been Secretary of the Interior under President Kennedy. Other members of 
the family held prominent political positions at the state level. At least one informant 
for this research noted that Lori Udall’s family history had given her significant 
expertise in Washington.
Other members of the team had substantial political connections. Rich,
Bramble, and Blackwelder (of EDF, NWF, and FoE, respectively), had been lobbying 
Congress since the mid-1980s and had cultivated noteworthy political ties. 
Representative Barney Frank, who chaired the House subcommittee responsible for 
authorizing Bank funding, was among their supporters. In late 1992, before Frank had 
even been appointed to head the subcommittee, the Bank Information Center contacted 
him on behalf of the Working Group on Appointments to the International Financial 
Institutions, an ad hoc group composed almost exclusively of US environmental 
NGOs.12 Chad Dobson wrote:
The rumor from John Issacs is that you’ll be the new chair of the 
House International Development, Finance, Trade and Monetary 
Policy Sub-Committee. Congratulations. We’re looking forward to 
working with you on issues relating to multilateral development 
banks.1
Access and Gatekeeping
By mid-January, BIC had arranged the first of a series of meetings with Frank. BIC 
described these meetings as discussions between the Congressman and “Washington 
NGOs”. BIC’s initial list of invitations, however, featured 15 environmental NGOs and
12 The sole exception being Bread for the World, represented by Nancy Alexander. According to a 
source at Bread, Alexander was known for close relationships with the environmental community.
13 Fax from Chad Dobson, Secretary of the Bank Information Center, to Congressman Barney Frank, 11 
December 1992.
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only 3 development organizations.14 Not all of the organizations invited were involved 
in the IDA-10, but among those that were, opponents of the replenishment outnumbered 
supporters 5 to 3. At the actual meeting, only 2 of the 13 organizations present were 
development organizations,15 and opponents of the replenishment outnumbered 
supporters by 4 to 2.16
Frank responded enthusiastically to the January discussion and requested that 
civil society submit a list of issues they wanted to “discuss at Hearings.” The 
compilation of the list was again organized by BIC, with nearly the same mix of 
environmental and development organizations, although the Development GAP was 
added to the list.17 The final list sent to Frank reflected closely the interests of the anti- 
IDA faction. On February 3rd, BIC presented to Frank “a list of issues NGOs would 
like to see discussed at Congressional hearings”. The top priority was the IDA 10 
replenishment, with specific reference to the Narmada Dam project, the Wapenhans 
Report,18 the “need for an independent appeals mechanism” and “better implementation 
of environmental safeguards”. The second priority was “Environmental and Social 
Impacts of IBRD Lending,” including environmental impact, popular participation and 
information policy, “sustainable forest management”, “Indigenous People’s Policy”, 
and resettlement.19
The first round of Congressional hearings were held in March 1993 by David 
Obey, chair of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations 
Committee. Obey was a supporter of the Bank and the tone of his hearings was neutral. 
Nonetheless, following these hearings, Frank invited civil society organizations to meet 
with him to “prepare a legislative options paper that might be used as a basis of the 
discussion”; again BIC facilitated the meeting and chose the participants. Thus Frank 
was planning legislation in collaboration with predominantly anti-replenishment NGOs 
even before he held hearings to investigate the matter.
14 Fax from Chad Dobson to meeting invitees, 14 January 1993.
15 Bread for the World and Church World Service.
16 Fax from Chad Dobson to Congressman Barney Frank, 27 January 1993.
17 Fax from Chad Dobson to invited NGOs, 29 January 1993. See also fax from Glenn Prickett, NRDC 
to Congressman Barney Frank, 2 April 1993.
18 Which EDF staff had highlighted in a January letter to the editor of The New York Times. Bruce Rich, 
Lori Udall, and Deborah Moore, all of EDF, “Letter to the Editor: Before We Let the World Bank 
Squander More”, The New York Times, 6 January 1993.
19 Fax from the Bank Information Center to Representative Barney Frank, 3 February 1993.
20 Fax from Chad Dobson to Sydney Key, staff for the House Subcommittee on International 
Development, Finance, Trade, and Monetary Policy, 14 April 1993.
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Anti-ID A NGOs also enjoyed access at a number of other levels, sometimes 
through BIC and at other times on their own. BIC developed a relationship with the 
staff advising representatives and senators on multilateral development bank issues and 
invited some to the Early Warning meetings, the monthly dialogue between USAID, 
Treasury, and US NGOs on the MDBs, that the Sierra Club had helped establish and
91which BIC now co-chaired. Via these contacts, the anti-IDA campaigners arranged a 
meeting with Representative Bill Orten, another member of Frank’s subcommittee. 
These same NGOs also had substantial access to US Executive Director Pat Coady 
who, although not directly involved in the IDA legislation, was still the major US voice 
at the World Bank.
Among pro-replenishment organizations, only the World Wildlife Fund seems 
to have established direct contact with US legislators. WWF corresponded with Obey 
after the March hearings to press the case for continued IDA funding to explicitly 
dissent with the views of the US environmental organizations which had testified before 
Obey’s subcommittee. WWF noted that, “We believe that concessional resources, from 
the IDA and from other sources, are both essential and presently inadequate.” 22 
However, these is no evidence of other pro-IDA organizations taking similar steps or 
gaining direct, independent access to policy-makers during the Congressional 
discussion of the replenishment.
In short, close relationships between environmental actors and politicians 
allowed environmentalists to filter participation in meetings between members of 
Congress and civil society in such a way that the environmental viewpoint was vastly 
overrepresented. Among US environmental NGOs, only the World Wildlife Fund was 
an active supporter of full IDA replenishment, whereas the others were either opposed 
or neutral. Although some development organizations that supported the IDA were also 
invited, opponents of the IDA consistently outnumbered its supporters. Ultimately, the 
hearings set to discuss the IDA, particularly those chaired by Frank, reflected closely 
the agenda of the anti-IDA faction.
21 Fax from Chad Dobson to Sydney Key, staff for the House Subcommittee on International 
Development, Finance, Trade, and Monetary Policy, 15 March 1993; Fax from Chad Dobson to Sydney 
Key, and Tim Reiser, Senate Committee on Appropriations, 4 April 1993.
22 Letter from Letter, Kathryn S. Fuller, President WWF, to Congressman David Obey, Chair US House 
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Operations, 25 March 1993.
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Setting the Record
Between March and June 1993, Congress held three hearings on World Bank funding. 
Two were held in the House of Representatives and one in the Senate. Representatives 
of the Environmental Defense Fund, National Wildlife Federation, Friends of the Earth, 
and Sierra Club testified at all three hearings. No pro-IDA actor was invited to all three 
of the hearings. InterAction testified at two, one of which was via a surrogate from the 
African Forum of Voluntary Development Associations. Church World Service, Bread 
for the World, and the World Wildlife Fund each testified once. No other pro-IDA 
organizations testified in person.
The anti-Bank actors used their predominance to depict themselves as the 
legitimate representatives of developing world stakeholders. Friends of the Earth 
submitted a statement to Congress declaring that “grassroots groups in the Third 
World” had chosen as their Northern counterparts “not traditional development NGOs, 
but environmental and indigenous rights groups”.23 Barbara Bramble testified that 
opposition to Bank activities “is an extremely broadly based problem... brought to us 
by the affected people.” She claimed that NWF had “consulted with hundreds of 
partner organizations in the south... that have asked us year after year, Why aren't you 
taking a stand on this?”.24 Lori Udall of EDF submitted statements from Narmada 
Bachao Andolan to support her claim to work on behalf of grassroots groups.25 By the 
end of his hearing on the IDA, Barney Frank was asking Bramble, “What is the Asians' 
position on the utility of the IDA, and why do they have that position?”26
Local Politics
As Congress began deliberations on Bank funding, opponents of replenishment used 
local political pressure to advance their agenda. Some of this was done via popular 
pressure. According to a source familiar with these events, the Sierra Club had 
significant DC clout due to its political action committee and close ties to many
23 Statement to US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, 
and Related Programs hearing on the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations for 1994, 1 March 1993.
24 Hearings before the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing, and Related Programs on the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations for 1994, 1 March 1993.
25 Hearings before the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on International Development, 
Finance, Trade, and Monetary Policy on Authorizing contributions to IDA, GEF, and ADF, 5 May 
1993.
26 US Congress, 5 May 1993.
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members of Congress. A source at the National Wildlife Federation noted that NWF 
also had a huge grassroots base, the largest of any organization participating. Its base 
was organized into local chapters with a track record of successfully lobbying their 
senators and representatives. The source indicated that this gave NWF considerable 
influence.
EDF and Friends of the Earth also developed a populist anti-Bank message. 
During the IDA-10, the World Bank was in the process of building a new Washington, 
DC headquarters. Staff from anti-Bank organizations circulated details of the project’s 
$250 million budget and terrazzo floors to legislators.27 These revelations coincided 
with Jacques Attali’s disastrous tenure at the European Development Bank, during 
which staff flew in private aircraft, the existing marble in the lobby of the headquarters 
building was tom out and replaced with a more luxurious grade of marble, and $78,000 
was spent on the staff Christmas party. The new building at the World Bank was easily 
conflated with the EBRD’s needless renovations and general profligacy, and raised the 
ire of many members of Congress.
This tactic was extremely successful in developing Congressional opposition to 
World Bank funding. Although it did not immediately result in a backlash against the 
IDA, it did result in other attacks against Bank funding. Concurrent with the IDA 
replenishment, the World Bank had also negotiated capital contributions for the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the arm of the Bank which 
lent to middle-income countries. When the Foreign Operations appropriations bill, 
which included the IBRD and IDA funding, was introduced on the House floor in June 
1993, it was subject to vigorous debate. Immediately after its introduction, 
Representative John Kasich offered an amendment calling for a complete cancellation 
of US funding for the IBRD in fiscal year 1994. Kasich and his allies made specific 
reference to statements by EDF, NWF, Friends of the Earth, and the Sierra Club on the 
Bank’s record of environmental destruction and forced resettlement. Kasich also 
referenced the Wapenhans Report and the cost of the Bank’s new building. His 
amendment was opposed by both Barney Frank and David Obey, but it garnered 
significant support among House members; it was defeated 210 to 216.
27 US House of Representatives Record Ref. Vol. 139, No. 86,17 June 1993.
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Final Outcomes
In the United States, Congressional spending decisions must pass through two phases. 
First, money must be appropriated for the expense, usually in the budget of the 
upcoming fiscal year. Second, the expense must be authorized, with the government 
agency responsible for the actual disbursement, such as the US Treasury or USAID, 
being given permission to spend the money. David Obey’s subcommittee, which was 
responsible for World Bank-related appropriations, yielded to anti-Bank sentiment by 
cutting the IDA appropriation for fiscal year 1994 by $200 million. Barney Frank’s 
subcommittee, which was responsible for authorizations, authorized only two-thirds of 
the remaining IDA amount, holding back the third tranche pending reform. This was a 
major break from previous US practice, in which authorization had always been made 
for the full three-year IDA period. It was hotly resisted by the US Treasury, the 
agency which was being authorized to disburse the money to the Bank. In the 
Congressional elections of 1994, the Democrats lost control of the House of 
Representatives. Republican politicians, with whom the anti-IDA environmentalists 
had consistently cultivated ties (Kasten and Kasich were both Republicans), initiated 
further cuts in the IDA disbursement.
Frank also played a key role in advancing the two major policy initiatives that 
the Bank skeptics had added to the agenda. As noted, most of the initial reforms 
requested by IDA campaigners had been included in the IDA agreement. However, 
following the Bank’s Narmada decision, the EDF, NWF, Friends of Earth, Sierra Club 
and their allies had determined that the Bank was in need of more serious reform. In 
addition to the Bank-shrinking exercise of cutting funding, these NGOs pressed for the 
creation of an independent appeals mechanism at the Bank, along with a huge increase 
in information access. According to sources familiar with these events, they believed 
that these reforms would help consolidate previous gains, particularly improvements in 
the Bank’s environmental and social safeguards.
These changes were hotly resisted by the Bank, as well as most of the Bank’s 
borrowers. Nonetheless, Frank insisted that the Bank make commitments to change 
before he permitted the authorization of any of the IDA funding. In the summer of 
1993, in gross violation of the Bank’s standard policy, Ernie Stem telephoned Frank to 
contest the Congressman’s position. Stem was the Bank’s long-time managing 
director and, having outlasted several presidents, was possibly the most powerful 
person at the Bank. During the conversation, which Frank shared with the anti-IDA
165
environmentalists and which became widely cited in the community, Stem protested 
that the reforms Frank had requested were too difficult to implement in the time Frank 
had allowed. The Bank was like a large boat, Stem said, taking time to change course. 
Frank responded simply that he was faced with a busy legislative session and that if 
Stem was too busy to make the necessary changes at the Bank, Frank might find 
himself too busy to authorize the Bank’s money.28 By the end of 1993, both changes 
in the information policy and the creation of what would become the World Bank 
Inspection Panel were well underway.
Democratization Delayed
Civil society may create the preconditions for democracy while obstructing its fmition. 
In its engagement with the World Bank in the decade leading up to the 10th IDA and 
during the IDA itself, civil society created or reinforced a number of channels of 
stakeholder influence that made significant contributions towards citizen control of 
global governance. Civil society activism helped improve knowledge about the Bank’s 
activities, and created new norms for transparency, accountability and dialogue. It 
resulted in some specific reforms, such as the liberalization of World Bank information 
disclosure or the creation of the Bank’s inspection panel, which facilitated future 
activism or gave stakeholders guaranteed access to key policymakers. These new 
norms, policies, and structures served to empower stakeholders and increase their 
authority in Bank decisions. Insofar as civil society helps erode the independence of 
international organizations like the Bank, it can be said to be establishing the 
preconditions for global democracy.
However, the biggest changes in Bank policy relied on government influence 
(cf. Fox and Brown 1998a). The broad reform agenda, focusing on participation, 
poverty targeted interventions, and structural adjustment, and which was widely 
embraced by civil society early in the IDA process, succeeded because it was supported 
by the IDA deputies of powerful donor nations. Later reforms, including information 
liberalization and creation of the World Bank Inspection Panel, resulted directly from 
US influence. Cuts in the Bank’s funding also resulted from unilateral donor decisions.
This use of national power meant that civil society influence mirrored the power 
imbalances among the Bank’s member nations, rather than correcting those imbalances.
28 This conversation was recounted to me by two different civil society leaders with direct knowledge of 
these events. It is also referenced in Wade (1997), p. 727.
166
Civil society exploited the predominance of powerful actors. The use of state power, in 
turn, facilitated imbalances within civil society. Those organizations with the strongest 
national connections had a significant advantage in advancing their agendas, whereas 
those without a strong presence in the relevant donor countries were effectively 
excluded from deliberation.
Moreover, civil society organizations were more than willing to use their 
advantages in undemocratic ways. The NGOs lobbying for cuts in the Bank’s funding, 
as well as informational liberalization and the creation of the Inspection Panel, 
exploited insider access to key US policy-makers. The Bank Information Center acted 
as a strategic gatekeeper, filling meetings with a disproportionate number of anti-IDA 
NGOs. It also vastly favored environmental NGOs over development organizations, 
although, as the last chapter showed, the former were more inclined to be skeptical of 
the World Bank.
As a result of these early connections and efforts, Bank skeptic actors enjoyed a 
significantly more prominent role in Congressional hearings than IDA supporters.
Once present, the Bank skeptics depicted their positions as representing the majority of 
civil society and the majority of stakeholders, despite the fact that the former was 
untrue and the later unverifiable. They encouraged lawmakers to accept their 
statements by emphasizing their domestic political influence and exploiting populist 
grievances with little relation to the IDA itself. They succeeded in gaining cuts in Bank 
funding that were anathema to most other participants in the process and used the 
Bank’s resulting vulnerability to push through policy reforms designed mostly to 
support their environmental agenda.
Conclusions
The data presented in this chapter have specific relevance for questions in the literature 
regarding civil society’s mechanisms of influence and its independence, particularly as 
affected by its interactions with national governments. These findings, in turn, 
contribute towards answering this thesis’ overarching question of whether data about 
the World Bank support the idea that civil society has the capacity to democratize 
global governance.
As shown in this chapter, the literature describes numerous types of civil society 
influence, including various means of improving accountability, transparency, and 
dialogue. All of these mechanisms are used in the IDA-10 in one form or another.
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Thus the case gives broad support for the existing descriptions of civil society 
influence.
However, as described in Chapter 4, the organizations involved in the IDA were 
largely atomized in their objectives. As a result, each group or ad hoc alliance pursued 
its goals individualistically. Organizations exploited personal political connections, 
ignored competing claims from other CSOs, and even acted as gatekeepers to exclude 
competing views from key policy discussions. Indeed, the possibility that one’s 
organization or group could achieve policy victory by working alone seems to have 
created a disincentive towards dialogue or coalition building; why engage in the 
inevitable compromises of coalition work when one can achieve one’s complete 
agenda? The new channels of citizen control over the Bank were thus dominated by a 
select group of powerful civil society actors. Therefore the data also lend support to 
those authors, such as Woods and Wade, who express concern regarding the ways in 
which civil society influence privileges powerful populations.
Of particular relevance in this regard is the role of state influence. The data 
indicate that some of civil society’s most powerful mechanisms of influence, including 
financial accountability, required the assistance of powerful states. This enhanced the 
power of civil society organizations with strong connections to those states. In the case 
of the IDA-10, once the US Congress became the most significant venue of debate, 
policymaking was dominated by those organizations with existing ties to Washington 
legislators, experience with US legislation, and domestic political influence. Thus the 
use of state influence may magnify the power of existing elites, particularly in an 
institution like the World Bank in which certain states (namely Bank donors) have 
significantly more power than others (Bank borrowers).
Noting the importance of state influence, however, is not to say that civil society 
is wholly reliant on the state. Although some of civil society’s influence may depend 
on the state, civil society retains significant independence. As shown, civil society can 
manipulate state behavior through its domestic political connections and its ties to key 
policymakers. Civil society may play the interests of different states against one 
another. Civil society can also act independently of the state, for example through 
international protests or publicity campaigns. This evidence of civil society’s agency 
and independent means of influence addresses concerns raised by Price and others that 
civil society may be wholly dependent on the state (Price 2003; Risse 2000). It also
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seems to contradict Raustiala’s more structuralist approach, which depicts civil society 
as a mere handmaiden of the state (1997).
These findings, in turn, have relevance for the broader constructivist-realist 
tension described in Chapter 2. The importance of state influence serves as an 
important indicator that international policymaking is not a bilateral duel between civil 
society and international institutions, fought wholly in the realm of public opinion and 
new norms. Rather, states continue to have significant influence over international 
institutions, sometimes exercised in very material ways (such as financial pressure).29 
The data at the Bank thus point to the need to perhaps merge constructivist and realist 
thinking. In so doing, the data support aspects of the work of Keck and Sikkink, Risse, 
and others who combine state power and norms in their models of civil society 
influence. Risse’s work on ‘normal spirals’ seems particularly well supported, insofar 
as Risse argues that norms gain power through their codification in international law or 
their acceptance by states (2000). The fact that civil society can act via the state, often 
through domestic political activity, suggests that the modeling of international 
policymaking (including civil society’s place therein) should be multi-layer. It should 
consider both domestic and international dynamics and the connections between the 
two (see, for example, Putnam 1993; cf. Moravcsik 1993).
In terms of the larger question of democratization, civil society’s collective 
contributions to Bank policymaking were, interestingly, both democratizing and 
antidemocratic. As argued in Chapter 2, civil society is an authority in international 
policymaking and thus must be judged on both its inputs and its outputs. The data in 
this chapter indicate that civil society has some genuine independence and agency. 
Thus, insofar as civil society can be assumed to represent some stakeholders, its 
impacts at the Bank represent a new, independent mechanism of stakeholder input. 
Moreover, civil society itself has created new means of stakeholder control over the 
World Bank, through promoting new policies of transparency, accountability, and 
dialogue. Thus it has broadly enhanced stakeholder control over the institution. These 
results may be considered democratic outputs.
At the same time, civil society seems to have exacerbated the inequality among 
the Bank’s stakeholders by concentrating power in the hands of a minority of civil
29 States also, o f course, retain control over bilateral and multilateral policy-making, which may not 
involve any international institutions. However, as noted in Chapter 1, such state-to-state negotiations 
have different dynamics than institutional policymaking, and are thus beyond the scope of this thesis.
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society actors, many of which seem closely connected to the populations of wealthy, 
powerful states. Because civil society does not improve stakeholder inclusion or equal 
representation in Bank policymaking, it cannot be said to enhance democratic input. 
Indeed, it may worsen it. This finding casts doubt on civil society’s capacity to 
democratize the World Bank. The next chapter explores the idea of input further by 
examining civil society’s impact on local representation.
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Chapter 6
Civil Society and Local Representation
Data from the IDA-10 indicate a need to consider in more detail the impact of civil 
society on the role and influence of state governments in Bank policymaking. On the 
one hand, the data presented in Chapter 5 on the mechanisms of power demonstrate 
that states continue to play an important role in Bank policymaking. As noted there, 
civil society involvement in Bank policymaking is a not simply a bilateral engagement 
between the Bank and civil society, but rather a multilateral affair involving 
interactions between civil society, the Bank, and states. On the other hand, the data 
presented in Chapters 3 and 4 indicate that civil society may not be an adequate 
representative of many of the Bank’s stakeholders. Civil society organizations from 
Bank donor nations had power in the IDA-10 and achieved notable impacts, but they 
were also unaccountable to developing country populations and were likely to pursue 
agendas defined by their pre-existing interests rather than agendas created in dialogue 
with Southern civil society organizations.
For these two reasons, governments may form an important alternative to civil 
society as an avenue of representation for their citizens in international policymaking. 
This would be particularly true for democratic governments, insofar as there is some 
measure of accountability to the national population. Democracy, according to the 
terms used in this thesis, requires equal citizen authority or value expressed via some 
representative mechanism and resulting in institutional responsiveness to the will of 
the majority. Therefore the impact of civil society on governments’ ability to act as 
representatives of their citizens has direct impact on this thesis’ overarching question 
of whether civil society engagement with the World Bank indicates a capacity to 
democratize global governance.
It is also significant to note that data from the IDA-10 reveal a direct conflict 
between many civil society organizations and the governments of Bank borrower 
nations. Statements by many civil society organizations regarding borrowing 
populations were often what Marschall calls ‘“we the people’ type of claims”, that 
challenged the representivity of any conflicting claims made by borrowing states (1999
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p. 173). Claims of the IDA-10 CSOs were either so broad as to assert a de facto 
representation of a majority of local stakeholders or otherwise alleged that the people 
the organization claimed to represent, even if a minority of stakeholders, were entitled 
to special consideration in policymaking. For instance, during the IDA-10 a 
representative of Church World Service and Lutheran World Relief claimed to be 
acting on behalf of “the people of the borrowing countries”.1 Bruce Rich of 
Environmental Defense Fund suggested that rural, pre-industrial populations ought to 
enjoy a privileged status because their lifestyles were more sustainable and natural 
(Rich 1994). In addition, the IDA-10 CSOs openly contested the right of states to 
represent their citizens; they challenged the representivity of certain states and often 
acted to undermine the influence of developing country governments in international 
policymaking. Given this thesis’ focus on comparing data about the World Bank with 
existing ideas regarding civil society’s democratizing potential, it is important to 
examine exactly what impact, if any, civil society’s attacks on government had on the 
overall democratization of Bank policymaking.
This chapter also presents an opportunity to test one of the hypotheses 
advanced in Chapter 2. In applying the context and legitimacy framework to the 
existing literature, I suggested that transnational civil society intervention in domestic 
policymaking risked undermining local democracy.2 This risk is particularly great in 
developing nations. Because most international civil society organizations are 
headquartered in the global North, they are not subject to the local laws or regulations 
of developing countries, except perhaps for those actions taking place on the soil of the 
nation affected. As seen in Chapter 4, the connections of international civil society 
organizations to populations outside their membership or funding base may also be 
tenuous. Moreover, civil society organizations may seek to privilege those portions of 
the local population that support the organizations’ international agenda. To the extent 
that such interventions may overturn decisions made by democratic governments, they
1 Letter to the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on International Development, Finance, 
Trade, and Monetary Policy, 28 April 1993.
2 This is not to say that transnational civil society should never intervene in local issues. Some 
intervention may be incidental. For instance civil society organizations developing a global norm 
against human rights abuses may wish to shine a spotlight on the abusive practices of a particular state; 
global policies on fishing or whaling affect countries that undertake such activities; etcetera. Moreover, 
democracy involves the protection of liberal rights and, as noted in Chapter 2, transnational civil society 
interventions in support of such rights is de facto democratically legitimate. Here I am referring 
specifically to targeted, local interventions which are not designed primarily to defend the rights of local 
citizens.
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undermine the function of the local democratic system and impinge upon the 
representation of the majority of citizens. In examining the interactions between civil 
society and governments, this chapter also investigates the domestic ramifications of 
transnational civil society activism, and uses the resulting data to test the Chapter 2 
hypothesis.
This chapter proceeds in four parts. It begins by examining the literature 
related to interactions between transnational civil society and states and comparing this 
literature with the data from the IDA-10. The chapter then examines briefly whether 
partnerships between international and local civil society organizations can make 
international advocacy more representative. It finds that international actors tend to 
dominate and local actors tend to become detached from local realities. In the third 
section, the chapter explores civil society involvement in the Narmada Dam project; 
protests against the dam helped catalyze some organizations’ opposition to the IDA- 
10. Based on the IDA-10 and Narmada data, the chapter concludes that civil society 
engagement in World Bank policymaking exacerbates the existing imbalance between 
donor and borrower nations at the World Bank and may impede the functioning of 
national democratic processes.
Contesting State Authority
Traditionally, citizen interests in international policymaking are presumed to be 
represented by their governments. Although even democratic governments may not 
represent all of their citizens equally, such governments are, in theory, at least 
nominally accountable to the voters that install them. Thus, when considering civil 
society’s impact on representation, it is important to consider its impact on government 
influence. As this section will show, a variety of research indicates that civil society 
involvement in international negotiations may erode the authority of the weaker 
governments participating in such negotiations. At one level, this is because civil 
society influence is of greater benefit to powerful states, such as the Bank’s big donors, 
than to weaker ones, like its borrowers. At another level, it is because civil society 
organizations allied with powerful states may encourage state activism in a way that 
limits the role of weaker players.
Civil society can magnify government influence in international negotiations. 
Civil society organizations allied with a certain government can monitor the actions of 
other parties in a negotiation, provide research and technical advice, or rally domestic
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support (Raustiala 1997). Improved information and solid domestic backing can allow 
a government to negotiate more effectively in the international arena (cf. Putnam
1993). However, the effectiveness of such assistance is proportional to the pre­
existing power of the state. If a state already has power within the World Bank 
system, civil society may enable it to use that power more effectively; however, if the 
state lacks power, civil society can do little to improve its authority vis-a-vis other 
states. Thus civil society reporting on environmental devastation in the Amazon, 
mentioned in Chapter 3, was used by the US to identify shortcomings in the World 
Bank’s environmental safeguards and push for improvement. Yet during the early 
1990s, civil society monitoring of the negative impacts of structural adjustment was 
significantly less effective in allowing poor states to contest the Bank’s structural 
adjustment policies. In short, while civil society participation may expand the impact 
of already strong states, its magnifying force has less benefit for weaker actors. The 
result, as Raustiala also concludes, is that “the benefits to states of NGO participation 
are unevenly dispersed and unevenly received” (1997 p. 726).4
Even more importantly, civil society organizations allied with powerful states 
may push those states to assume activist roles that they would not otherwise assume. 
As noted in the previous chapter, NGOs can exploit domestic political concerns to 
prompt government action in the international arena. Such action is imbued with a 
certain sense of moral hazard: policymakers bear few immediate consequences for 
their actions but may reap the domestic benefits (Wade 2001; see also Pralle 2003). 
Abugre and Alexander find that “activism by US NGOs has probably expanded the 
already disproportionate role of the United States in the international financial 
institutions, especially World Bank” (quoted in Woods 2005, p. 166).5
The past 15 years have seen a proliferation of Northern-backed conditionalities 
generated by civil society and imposed via the World Bank and other international 
institutions on developing country governments (Stiglitz 1999; Woods 2005; Manji
3 Raustiala also makes this point, noting that “NGOs need the coercive power of states to realize the 
behavioral and policy changes they seek” (1997 p. 726).
4 Raustiala draws this conclusion based on his analysis of the roles played by NGOs under in a variety 
of international environmental treaties and the role of civil society in the restructuring of the World 
Bank’s Global Environment Facility in the early 1990s.
5 Woods cites her source as: Abugre, Charles and Nancy Alexander. 1998. Non-governmental 
organizations and the international, monetary, and financial system, International M onetary and  
Financial Issues fo r  the 1990s, Vol. IX. Geneva: UNCTAD.
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and O’Coill 2008; cf. Andersen 2000).6 In exchange for loan money, borrowers are 
required to cut government spending, remove trade barriers, conduct environmental 
assessments, limit resettlement, earmark funds for social services, or focus new 
spending on primary education. By exploiting the dominant power of donor nations in 
an already undemocratic system, civil society can further marginalize less developed 
nations like the World Bank’s borrowers (Woods 2005). At the same time, such 
conditionalities have the potential to undermine the ability of developing country 
governments to respond to the needs or will of their citizens. As a result, excessive 
conditionalities risk undermining democracy in developing nations (Stiglitz 1999; cf. 
Mani and O’Coill 2008). A particularly pernicious effect can occur when donors view 
international NGOs rather than developing country governments as the legitimate 
guardians of the interests those countries’ citizens. This occurs most clearly when 
donors use development organizations to establish alternative systems of social service 
provision that parallel or replace existing government functions (Manji and O’Coill 
2008). However, since the early 1990s, advocacy NGOs have also made persistent 
claims to represent poor populations in international negotiations better than those 
populations’ own governments. In several instances, such claims have been heeded by 
international actors.7
As will be shown below, such patterns manifested themselves in interactions 
between global civil society and the World Bank during the IDA-10. The conditions 
attached to World Bank funding by donor nations had the effect of disrupting the 
marginal de facto influence enjoyed by borrowers in the loan-writing process. It pitted 
borrower governments against certain civil society organizations, and the CSOs won. 
Privileged access to donor governments also allowed certain civil society organizations 
to depict themselves as the legitimate proxies of developing country citizens. The 
result was that developing country authority in the World Bank system was diminished 
as official borrower representatives were forced to compete against foreign advocates 
for the right to speak on behalf of their own populations.
6 Robert Wade, ‘The US Role in the Malaise at the World Bank: Get Up, Gulliver!” paper presented at 
the G24, 24 August 2001.
7 Two examples, the cancellation of the Sardar Sarovar project in India and the Arun III dam in Nepal 
are discussed in this chapter and the next, respectively.
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Authority and Structure at the World Bank
The World Bank has a board of 24 executive directors, but over 150 member countries. 
Representation is assigned to members primarily on the basis of the total capital they 
have contributed to the Bank. In 1990, the US had a 15.1 per cent voting share in the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and a 17.2 per cent 
voting share in the International Development Association (IDA) (Gwin 1994 p. 55).
In the case of the events studied in this thesis, the IBRD board was responsible for 
ratifying changes in overall Bank policy, such as information liberalization, whereas 
the IDA board was responsible for IDA-specific decisions, such as the suspension of 
the Narmada Dam project. However, the boards have the same structure, and countries 
that are members of both the IBRD and the IDA are represented by the same executive 
director on both boards. Therefore the difference between the two in terms of political 
pressures and policymaking dynamics is marginal, and Bank staff generally refer to a 
single entity, “the board,” when describing administrative decisions and their impacts. 
This thesis follows that model.
As a result of the capital-voting share system, donor countries have hugely 
disproportionate power in Bank decision making. During the Bank’s 1996 fiscal year 
(1 July 1995- 30 June 1996), which marked the close of the IDA-10 period, the US, 
Japan, Germany, France, and the UK were the Bank’s most powerful members. 
Together they controlled 35 per cent of the board vote on IBRD decisions and 42 per 
cent on matters pertaining to IDA.8
Donors also had a disproportionate voice in board discussions. Each of the five 
major donors appointed their own executive director to the board. In contrast, the next 
most powerful executive director (Walter Rill of Austria), had to balance the interests 
of 10 countries, all of whom together commanded only 5 per cent of the IBRD vote 
(and 4.3 per cent of the IDA). Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Sri Lanka all shared a 
director and just 3.6 per cent of the IBRD vote. Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape 
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, 
Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Togo, and the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (then called Zaire), also had just one voice on the board and a combined 1.7 
per cent IBRD vote. In fiscal year 1996, only 5 of the 24 directors themselves came
8 World Bank Annual Report 1996.
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from countries poor enough to be eligible for IDA funds.9 In short, developing 
countries could be overridden by donor countries during votes and they had very few 
representatives in board discussions.
This situation was magnified in the IDA negotiations themselves. In 1992- 
1993, only donors to the IDA were permitted to participate in the negotiations.10 
Participants included nineteen European countries, plus South Africa, Brazil, Mexico, 
Saudi Arabia, Korea, Kuwait, and Turkey. Of these, only Korea and Turkey had ever 
been IDA-eligible, and they had graduated from the program in 1973. None of the 
participants in the negotiations would themselves be subject to the IDA rules they were 
writing, because they would never (or never again) qualify for IDA loans.11
Whatever marginal power developing countries enjoyed they exercised at the 
project level. Bank projects were collaborative efforts between Bank staff and country 
governments. While Bank staff sometimes ran the show, many projects genuinely 
originated with developing country governments and responded to government- 
identified needs. Country influence was potentially enhanced by the professional 
aspirations of Bank staff who, as the 1992 Wapenhans Report revealed, felt that career 
success rested on making large loans. Favorable relations with borrowers made it 
easier to suggest new projects and develop further borrowing.12
Multiplying conditionalities, however, restricted staffs technocratic freedom 
and narrowed the autonomy of borrower governments even in planning their own 
projects. Structural adjustment limited governments’ spending options and forced the 
privatization of national industries. Environmental reforms advanced by US and 
European campaigners inhibited borrowers’ freedom to calculate their own trade-offs 
between the environment and development. Granted, some conditionalities may have 
been beneficial to certain stakeholder populations. Bank social safeguards, for 
instance, may have limited the ability of borrowers to ignore the rights of minorities or
9 The EDs for FY1996 came from the US, Japan, Germany, France, UK, Austria, Canada, Netherlands, 
Mexico, India, Italy, Pakistan, Sweden, Brazil, Switzerland, New Zealand, China, Saudi Arabia, Russia, 
Kuwait, Malawi, Thailand, Argentina, and Comoros. Of these, India, Pakistan, China, Malawi, and 
Comoros were eligible for IDA funds.
10 Borrowers were granted observer status in the mid-1990s.
11 World Bank, “International Development Association”, http://go.worldbank.org/83SUQPXD20, 
accessed 14 July 2009.
12 One manifestation of this occurred during negotiations over information policy, in that Bank staff 
seemed particularly concerned with preserving borrower prerogatives.
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to forcibly resettle restive populations.13 Regardless of their ultimate impact, however, 
the increasing number of conditionalities sent a clear signal to the Bank’s staff: the 
Bank’s future would depend on pleasing donors, not cultivating borrowers.
Southern Governments and the IDA-10
Not surprisingly, most borrower countries opposed the various conditionalities 
imposed via the initial IDA-10 agreement, as well as subsequent lobbying on 
information disclosure and the Inspection Panel. Few ‘on-the-record’ statements exist 
recounting Southern government positions on specific conditionalities. However, a 
number of statements do exist regarding the environment.
Environmental conditionalities were a contentious issue even prior to the start of 
the IDA-10 negotiations. In discussions at the Earth Summit in Rio in June of 1992, 
developed nations raised the idea of making aid contingent on environmental 
preservation. As, Kamal Nath, India’s minister of environment and forests recounted:
They [developed countries] say, 'Yes, we are the major polluters, so 
we must pay. But now that we pay, we must dictate also'... That is the 
ridiculousness of it. I don't think you can shove the environment down 
anybody's throat.14
A delegate from Uganda echoed the sentiment. Jessica Ocaya-Lakidi, permanent 
secretary at the Ugandan environment ministry noted that, “We don't yet have the big 
industries. We are lagging so far behind that we don't talk of industrial pollution. 
Finance is the most important thing to us”.15
Northern civil society organizations were perceived by many Southern 
governments to be fomenting North-South tension. Even environmental campaigners 
themselves recognized that their priorities were not necessarily shared by the 
governments which would be impacted by environmental reform.16. However, they 
were quick to depict Southern governments as autocratic and unrepresentative,
13 During the 1980s, Bank funding was used for security-oriented resettlement by the governments of 
both Brazil and Indonesia, and had come under heavy attack by transnational activists.
14 Eugene Robinson, “At Earth Summit, South Aims to Send Bill North; Developing Nations, Putting 
Priority on Growth, Say Cleanup Is Possible -- for a Price”, The Washington Post, 1 June 1992.
15 Ibid.
16 See, for example, Barbara Crossette, ‘The Earth Summit: What Some Preach in Rio Is Not What 
They Practice at Home”, The New York Times, 15 June 1992.
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illegitimate regimes whose will could be easily dismissed.17 Thus it was unsurprising 
that India, when faced with the civil society-driven cancellation of the Narmada Dam 
project “viewed the criticism by environmentalists as an affront to its sovereignty”.18
This sense of tension was also highlighted by the Congressional testimony of 
Lisebo Khoali-McCarthy of FAVDO. Contrasting her statement with that of the 
Northern organizations also testifying, she stated that “African NGOs... want an 
openness, we want to work with our governments”. She warned that efforts to funnel 
more lending through private voluntary organizations would “undermine the 
legitimacy and impact” of African governments, and asked that African leaders be 
allowed to decide the economic affairs of their own countries.19 CARE, in its 
Congressional testimony, supported her statement.20
Attacking Borrower Legitimacy
Sentiments like those of FAVDO and CARE were in the minority among civil society 
organizations. A much larger group of CSOs attacked the legitimacy of borrower 
governments. One joint statement given by the Sierra Club and Environmental 
Defense Fund decried “gross negligence and delinquency on the part... of the Indian 
government” and denounced South Africa for giving aid to the dictatorial regime in 
Malawi.21 Narmada Bachao Andolan, writing of the Indian government, opined that 
“the elite in our own country are bent upon promoting projects that are highly 
centralized, that lack people's participation, and those that benefit are only the elite”.22 
The World Wildlife Fund argued that even in the democratic nations of the developing
17 See, for example, Barbara Crossette “Movement Builds to Fight Harmful Projects in Poor Nations”, 
The New York Times, 23 June 1992.
18 Steven Holmes “India Cancels Dam Loan from World Bank”, The New York Times, 31 March 1992.
19 Hearings before the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on International Development, 
Finance, Trade, and Monetary Policy on Authorizing contributions to IDA, GEF, and ADF, 5 May 
1993. See also Nelson (1997) p. 427.
20 Hearings before the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on International Development, 
Finance, Trade, and Monetary Policy on Authorizing contributions to IDA, GEF, and ADF, 5 May 
1993.
21 Hearings before the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing, and Related Programs on the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations for 1994, 1 March 1993.
22 Ibid.
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world, decision making that WWF would consider legitimate “doesn’t happen very 
often”.23
Most of the CSOs involved did not base their accusations of illegitimacy on a 
lack of functional democracy. Instead, many indicated that democracy was a moot 
issue. Bruce Rich, for instance, acknowledged that in a series of negative Bank 
projects in Brazil, it was ultimately the Brazilian legislature and courts that had 
brought redress for human rights victims and reined in the worst impacts (Rich 1994 
pp. 289-91). Nonetheless, he argued that “borrowing countries [bear] the 
responsibility for the environmental and social destruction caused by certain projects” 
(Rich 1994 p. 116). He further claimed that “[p]ervasive corruption [makes] many 
Southern governments as much a part of the problem of poverty as the solution” (Rich 
1994 p. 244). The Natural Resource Defense Council, in much more subtle terms, also 
indicated that democratic governments might mistreat their citizens.24 Even Church 
World Service and Lutheran World Relief contended that the IDA and IBRD should 
“begin to shift lending toward countries with the most effective and consistent pro- 
poor policies”.25 New conditionalities would pay no attention to whether countries 
were democratic or not: “the Bank can't make decisions on political grounds and that 
has been interpreted to mean that it can't look at a country's form of governance and 
then decide how it loans to that country”.26 All borrowers would need to be directed 
and supervised.
Guiding Borrower Development
As noted, the primary solution to borrowers’ perceived inadequacies was targeted 
interventions and strict conditionalities that minimized the borrower governments’ role 
in designing the loan or managing the funds. David Reed, director of the World 
Wildlife Fund’s International Institutions Policy Programs, reasoned that “we cannot 
pass a country through a filter and see [if] it is democratic or not... but we can assure
23 Hearings before the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on International Development, 




26 Glenn Prickett, Senior Associate, International Programs, NRDC, testimony during hearings before 
the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on International Development, Finance, Trade, and 
Monetary Policy on Authorizing contributions to IDA, GEF, and ADF, 5 May 1993. See testimony of 
David Reed of WWF for a similar statement.
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that the benefits go to the sector that needs it most”.27 Thus the IDA agreement 
included specific earmarks for anti-poverty spending and provisions for enforcing and 
expanding existing safeguard policies. However, campaigners also sought to develop 
a watchdog role for themselves, to limit Bank influence, and to create a new 
accountability mechanism, the World Bank Inspection Panel.
Civil society as watchdog: Certain organizations proposed a watchdog role 
that would codify international civil society involvement in future policymaking 
processes, especially inside developing nations.28 Whereas groups like Bread for the 
World spoke only of a need for greater ownership and participation for grassroots 
populations, more radical groups like Friends of the Earth stipulated that reforms 
“ensure that affected people and knowledgeable NGOs are involved in WB projects 
from the earliest planning to monitoring after construction”.29
This was in keeping with the claims made by many of the civil society 
organizations participating in the IDA-10 to speak for broad swaths of the world’s 
population, particularly developing country citizens. For instance, Church World 
Service and Lutheran World Relief reinforced their calls for new policies with the 
declaration that “for too many years donors, NGOs and the people of borrowing 
countries have settled for minor reforms in IDA lending”.30 The signatories of the 
October 1992 New York Times newspaper advertisements denouncing the Bank 
claimed to be speaking on behalf of Indians. Several groups jointly submitted an 
“International NGO Statement Regarding the 10th Replenishment of the IDA” that 
was, in fact, signed predominantly by organizations from donor countries. Other 
examples are discussed in the previous chapter. Thus, even as they questioned the 
right of developing country governments to represent their citizens, civil society 
organizations arrogated that right to themselves. Interestingly, some donor nations 
seemed quite willing to allow this to happen. The US already consulted American
27 Hearings before the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on International Development, 
Finance, Trade, and Monetary Policy on Authorizing contributions to IDA, GEF, and ADF, 5 May 
1993.
28 For instance, Church World Service/Luther World Relief opined during the May 5th Congressional 
hearings that the Bank “should ensure that affected populations and interested nongovernmental 
organizations are involved in all stages” of country poverty assessments. Other organizations 
advocating expansive roles for civil society included Friends of the Earth, Environmental Defense Fund, 
the Sierra Club, and Greenpeace.
29 Hearings before the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing, and Related Programs on the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations for 1994, 1 March 1993; emphasis added.
3^ bid.
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civil society organizations on policy towards the multilateral development banks via 
the Early Warning System and the Tuesday Group, and the US executive director, Pat 
Coady, had close relations with several US NGOs.31 Several interviewees for this 
research likewise indicate that Evelyn Herfkins, the Dutch executive director, was 
extremely accessible to civil society. US Treasury notes indicate that while some IDA 
representatives, including those from Germany and Australia, maintained that the 
deputies should only deal with member governments, others, including the French, 
British, and Italians, believed that the deputies could find “representative” NGOs.
Thus it is perhaps unsurprising to later find U.S. Representative Barney Frank, as 
described in the previous chapter, inviting the US-based NWF to speak for all of 
Asia.32
Slimming the Bank: Another solution put forth by campaigners was to reduce 
the power of the World Bank by cutting its funding. Although the campaigners 
accused developing country governments of persistent human rights abuses and 
environmental destruction, anti-ID A campaigners saw the Bank as “a key accomplice” 
(Rich 1994 p. 157). After other donors ratified the IDA-10 agreement, the anti-IDA 
NGOs lobbying Congress argued that the US should withhold funding from the Bank 
and instead redirect it, in the words of the Sierra Club and Environmental Defense 
Fund, through “bilateral, grass-roots, poverty-alleviation oriented efforts”.33 Such 
bilateral arrangements, of course, would have only magnified the power of the 
domestically connected NGOs pushing for the IDA cuts.
The Inspection Panel: The ultimate manifestation of these various trends -  
delegitimizing borrower governments, substituting civil society as an alternative 
representative, and reducing the Bank’s power -  was the World Bank Inspection Panel. 
The panel, which was heavily supported by Barney Frank and US environmental 
advocacy NGOs, was created in 1994 as part of the Bank’s bid to ensure that the US 
released the one third of the IDA funds that Frank’s committee had withheld. The 
panel’s rules stipulated that any group of two or more citizens in a borrower country
31 Information comes from a source working in the US ED’s office at the time.
32 Hearings before the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on International Development, 
Finance, Trade, and Monetary Policy on Authorizing contributions to IDA, GEF, and ADF, 5 May 
1993.
33 Hearings before the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export 
Financing, and Related Programs on the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations for 1994, 1 March 1993.
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could, under certain conditions, make an appeal for the review of a World Bank 
project.
Governments were ostensibly the originators and implementers of any given 
project in their territory. Thus while the panel allowed citizens to explicitly question 
the Bank’s performance, it was a de facto means of citizen appeal against government 
approval of any given project. Democratic and undemocratic governments alike would 
be subject to it. At the same time, civil society was legitimated. Although the panel 
specified that claims must be made by two citizens, this was a minimum number. In 
practice, claims would turn out to be made by organized groups, with Washington- 
based NGOs being very involved in the appeals process. This pattern was not 
unanticipated; to the contrary, informants indicate that US environmental NGOs 
supported the panel primarily as a means of enforcing the conditionalities for which 
they had already lobbied. In effect, civil society was given a permanent mechanism 
for policing the Bank. At the same time, the Bank was restrained. The panel was 
compelled to give each case preliminary consideration (although a full investigation 
required a board vote) and the criteria upon which the Bank would be judged would be 
its staffs adherence to the various rules and safeguards which some of the IDA-10 
CSOs had been promoting for a decade. The panel’s sponsors in both government and 
among the IDA-10 CSOs were seemingly unconcerned with the potential for such a 
system to be used by minority groups or a political opposition to bring extra-national 
pressure to bear on a local government or to use such pressure to overturn the policies 
of a democratically elected government. Indeed, two senior civil society staffers 
present during the IDA-10 negotiations who were interviewed for this thesis indicated 
that the US environmental NGOs supporting the panel viewed it as a means of 
enforcing the policies they had promoted, rather than as a means of empowering local 
populations. The potential for a panel appeal to overturn the decisions of a democratic 
government was demonstrated in the Panel’s first case, the Arun IE dam in Nepal.
This case will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.
In summary, the civil society campaigners in the IDA-10 used the 
replenishment to force a number of reforms on the Bank which diminished borrower 
autonomy. A wide variety of civil society organizations, including member-funded 
faith-based organizations and government-funded development service providers, 
pushed for a greater emphasis on pro-poor spending and popular participation. 
Environmental safeguards were strengthened. Later, after the Narmada Dam fallout
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and the schism between more radical reformers and moderates, the Bank-skeptic 
faction pushed through reductions in Bank funding, changes in the information policy, 
and the creation of the Inspection Panel. These restricted the types of funds available 
to borrowers and the ways in which borrowers could use them (cf. Stiglitz 1999). At 
the same time, NGO-driven activism by donor governments forced Bank staff to 
prioritize placating donors over cultivating relationships with borrowers. IDA-10 
activists questioned the legitimacy of borrower governments without regard to those 
governments’ democratic credentials, and emphasized themselves as alternative 
representatives of borrower citizen interests.
Civil Society, Governments, and Representation
As shown in the previous chapter, civil society, international institutions, and 
governments all play roles in the creation of international policy. However, during the 
IDA-10, activists helped undercut the influence of a particular subgroup within this 
triumvirate: borrower governments. Although a few civil society organizations 
supported borrower governments, the majority of those actively involved in the 
policymaking did not. Organizations challenged the legitimacy of member 
governments and encouraged donor states to attach conditionalities to the IDA-10 
which would limit the ways in which borrowers could use World Bank funds. Civil 
society influence effectively reduced the power of borrowers vis-a-vis donors, and 
created new mechanisms by which civil society could monitor or contest borrower 
activity.
Determining whether this impacts the representation of borrower citizens 
requires comparing the relative merits of civil society and governments as means of 
representation. As noted previously in this thesis, the representivity of any actor in 
international policymaking is difficult to prove. However, one can observe the impact 
of civil society activism on the functioning of democracy and the international 
influence of democratic states.
Undercutting existing democracies: Challenging the legitimacy of developing 
country governments may have seemed justified in 1992-93 when many of the Bank’s 
borrowers were nondemocratic nations. Yet within five years the majority of the 
Bank’s borrowing population would be living in democratic states, as countries like 
Mexico, Brazil, Indonesia, and Ghana became more fully democratic. Granted, there 
is some concern that some such states have ‘illiberal democracies’ (see Zakaria 1998).
184
Nonetheless, practitioners from the global South have themselves stated that most 
citizens now live under democratic governments and that the spread of democracy has 
altered civil society-state relations (Mobogori and Chigudu 1999; Naidoo and Tandon 
1999). The state has become a potential ally and collaborator for many civil society 
organizations in developing nations. Governments may fall short of ideal democratic 
performance, but they pass a certain threshold of real-world democracy at which they 
may be considered legitimate (cf. Moravcsik 2004).
Within a democratic state, it is natural for competing factions to seek influence. 
However, broad claims to representivity, such as those made by US NGOs claiming to 
speak on behalf of all Indians or Asians can undermine democratic debate by 
obscuring the identity of the faction for which the organization is actually speaking. 
(As shown in Chapter 4, the agendas and activities of these US organizations seemed 
closely tied to the desires of their American members and funders.) Attacking the 
government is likewise counterproductive, insofar as the government itself provides 
the arena in which claims can be contested and balanced. Thus one activist states:
‘We the people’ type of claims... are not only false and misleading; 
they can also undermine a CSO’s credibility and seriousness. In 
addition, these claims suggest that politicians and public officials do 
not act ‘on behalf of the people’ and that they en bloc are morally 
inferior to citizen activists. Although we all know of corrupt and 
immoral public officials, the generalization is false and unjust. 
(Marschall 1999 p. 173)34
Because of the ambiguous democratic credentials of many of the IDA-10 
borrowers, it is difficult to know whether the IDA-10 activists challenged the authority 
of democratic states. However, the type of behavior manifested by civil society 
organizations during the IDA-10 does appear to be unhelpful to the functioning of 
democracy.
Valuing democratization? Significantly, the majority of civil society 
organizations involved in the IDA-10 seemed unconcerned with whether their 
activities helped or hindered the development of democracy in borrower states.
Instead, most of the powerful international NGOs involved in Bank negotiations 
assessed government legitimacy based not on democratic credentials, but rather on
34 See also Mobogori and Chigudu 1999, and Wiesen, Prewitt, and Sobhan 1999.
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agreement or disagreement with their positions. Even civil society organizations 
without radical advocacy agendas were unwilling to acknowledge the legitimacy of 
specific governments. Instead, as described in Chapter 3, the majority of NGOs 
lobbied for strong conditionalities, targeted aid, and even the use of nongovernmental 
agents as service providers.
If civil society were replacing the unrepresentative borrower governments with 
some more representative voice, it could reasonably be said to be promoting 
representation. However, the IDA-10 CSOs did nothing of the sort. In addressing 
issues of domestic policy during the IDA-10, they used sweeping language and vague 
imputations that did little to facilitate the representation of specific populations. 
Moreover, the CSOs themselves seemed to care little about the democratic rights of the 
people they claimed to represent. It challenged the legitimacy of democratic and 
undemocratic governments alike and imposed policies via the World Bank that might 
otherwise have been the subject of vigorous local debate. At the international level, 
supporting the authority of democratic regimes might have given some developing 
country citizens direct input in international policy debates. Instead, transnational civil 
society actors involved undercut the authority of all borrowers, making borrower 
country citizens more dependent on transnational civil society for representation.
None of these things prove that the policies promoted by civil society were themselves 
unrepresentative. However, it does cast doubt on the claims made by practitioners and 
academics that civil society pursues the best interests of stakeholders.
Local Civil Society and Citizen Representation
One common means by which the transnational civil society organizations involved in 
the IDA-10 bolstered their representative claims was to associate themselves with 
developing country civil society. InterAction stressed its connections to African 
organizations by inviting FAVDO to testify on its behalf before Congress. EDF 
included statements from Narmada Bachao Andolan along with its testimony. The 
NGO Working Group on the World Bank drew credibility from its mix of Northern 
and Southern members. IDA deputies skeptical of Northern NGO demands also
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arranged a meeting with members of Southern organizations, in the expectation that 
these NGOs would be more representative.35
Nonetheless, an existing body of empirical research, referenced below, gives 
several reasons why developing country civil society involvement does not guarantee 
the accurate representation of local needs in the global arena. The key question is how 
local organizations become involved in international policymaking. As noted in the 
first chapter of this thesis, international advocacy requires resources and connections 
that many civil society organizations lack.
Some of the civil society organizations in developing nations with the strongest 
ties to international processes are, in fact, those that have been created by outside 
donors. Since the later 1980s, a number of donors have sought to fund civil society in 
developing nations. Donors have included foundations, Northern governments, 
international institutions, and well-resourced NGOs. Driven by a desire to circumvent 
an objectionable government, discourage bureaucratic build-up, or maintain influence 
while controlling costs, these actors have sought to develop local, nongovernmental 
channels to deliver services (Howell and Pearce 2002 pp. 89-93). Donors have also 
sought to encourage political activism and promote democracy by developing civil 
associations (Howell 2000 p. 12; cf. Putnam 2001).
‘Manufactured’ civil society organizations are not wholly lacking in agency. 
They may be able to repurpose donor funding towards their own ends. Nonetheless, 
donor involvement may encourage organizations to cultivate favor with funders rather 
than developing a strong, grassroots base (Kopecky and Mudde 2004). Donor interests 
may imbue the development or ‘strengthening’ of civil society with an element of 
donor perspective and influence. Where donors fail to understand local political and 
economic dynamics, they may ‘manufacture’ civil society organizations which are 
unable to act as effective watchdogs or advocates. Donors also tend to produce 
professional NGOs more than other types of civil society organizations (Howell 2000). 
Moreover, when cultivating civil society as a voice of the people, donors may give the 
most emphasis to the voices they like best (Howell and Pearce 2002 pp. 118-22).
Even where strong local organizations originate indigenously, international 
connections may compromise their local credibility and focus. In South Africa, for
35 US Treasury, “IDA Deputies Meeting, Dublin, July 1-2, 1992, ‘The Environment”’, 30 July 1992. 
Deputy interest in meeting with CSOs from borrower countries culminated in the meeting held 16 
September 1992 between deputies and six NGOs, hosted by the World Bank.
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instance, international partners have become more demanding and selective of their 
local partners since funding has decreased following the end of apartheid. This has 
resulted in a situation “favouring elite-based and mainly urbanized civil society 
organizations, and almost completely excluding smaller organizations with rural 
constituencies” (Fioramotti 2005 p. 78). This, in turn, distorts the current civil society 
representation of South Africa in global discussions:
A few big NGOs... interact with international donors and participate 
in global civil society networks. On the other hand, many grassroots 
community-based organizations that focus on advocacy and service 
provision show very low levels of sustainability and their capacity to 
influence political decisions is extremely limited. (Fioramotti 2005 
pp.78-9)
In short, international NGOs and global networks may cherry-pick their local partners, 
choosing those that best suit the agenda or operating style of the international 
counterpart. This Northern-selected coterie, in turn, becomes the face of the local 
population in international civil society campaigns and any resulting dialogues or 
negotiations.
Efforts to build genuine partnerships between Northern and Southern civil 
society organizations seem to have fared little better. Where funding comes from the 
Northern organization, the Southern counterpart is generally treated like a junior 
partner. Increasingly even such unequal partnerships have been redefined. The 
proliferation of objectives and reporting requirements set by the funding organization 
has rendered many Southern service-providers de facto subcontractors (Simbi and 
Thom 2000). Even in advocacy situations, Northern actors running a ‘global’ 
campaign may feel free to ignore the input of developing country partners in order to 
maintain a consistent political agenda. In Jamaica, for instance, local advocates 
favored a cooperative approach to reforming structural adjustment policies, seeking to 
recognize both the need for both macroeconomic reform and the protection of 
vulnerable populations. Their international partner, Christian Aid, however, was 
already running a much more adversarial global campaign with the objective of 
radically reforming structural adjustment and finding alternative processes. While 
Christian Aid did not obstruct local Jamaican advocacy efforts, it declined to 
incorporate its partners’ perspectives into its international, ‘partner-informed’ 
campaign (Nelson 2000). Similarly, in India and Sri Lanka, Oxfam’s work for fair
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trade in agriculture and improved working conditions for garment workers 
(respectively) helped bring credibility and contacts to local organizations and give 
their causes greater visibility in the global North. At the same time, however, Oxfam 
played a dominant role. In India, Oxfam selected local organizations as partners and 
allies for a program conceived of and run by the international organization. In Sri 
Lanka, Oxfam brought together the coalition of local NGOs working on the issue and 
helped provide them with funding (Atkinson 2006 p. 65). In both cases, Oxfam’s 
involvement “changed the terms of debate” and introduced an element of top-down 
influence into the advocacy campaign (Atkinson 2006 p. 68).
In short, there is no guarantee that developing country civil society involved in 
international advocacy will have strong grassroots ties. Local organizations enter into 
international policymaking through connections to international donors. Such 
organizations are likely to be beholden to those donors. Donors may also choose 
which organizations to fund based on the donors’ own agenda. This trend holds true 
regardless of whether such donors are states, institutions, or other civil society 
organizations. Well-resourced or well-connected civil society organizations may 
develop local partnerships, but in so doing they may select local partners purposively 
to match pre-existing goals, or otherwise ignore the input of de facto junior partners. 
The implication is that the involvement of developing country civil society 
organizations in transnational civil society campaigns does not guarantee that such 
campaigns are connected to the populations they generally impact.
The Sardar Sarovar Project
The challenge of determining who represents the populations affected by transnational 
policymaking is demonstrated in the activism surrounding the Sardar Sarovar project. 
The transnational civil society campaign which began against the project in 1989 also 
demonstrates some of the ways in which transnational civil society can challenge the 
authority and independence of national governments. The project, which funded the 
construction of a series of dams in the Narmada River Valley, was heavily influenced 
by both local activists and, later, an international civil society campaign. As noted in 
Chapter 3, the Bank’s decision to continue funding for the project in the face of 
activists’ protests helped catalyze the decision of certain NGOs to oppose funding for 
the IDA-10. The perception of Bank wrong-doing in the project, reinforced by the
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findings of the Morse Commission, also provided justification for the creation of the 
World Bank Inspection Panel.
This section uses primary source data to examine the claims made by civil 
society actors involved in the process. Travel to India or a thorough survey of 
stakeholders in the project was beyond the scope of this thesis. However, there was 
ample published data available. This section makes use of two published accounts by 
leaders of Narmada Bachao Andolan, including Medha Patkar (Dharmadhikary 1995; 
Patkar 1995). A leader of the first Indian NGO to be involved with the project, Arch- 
Vahini, has also written an account (Patel 1995). The government perspective is 
represented by an extended recounting of an Indian office (Gill 1995) and statements 
in the media. To understand involvement by international NGOs, I interviewed John 
Clark, who headed international advocacy for Oxfam UK when it was Arch-Vahini’s 
partner, and Bruce Rich, who initiated EDF’s relationship with NBA. Lori Udall, who 
worked for EDF and later International Rivers Network, has also written two accounts 
of the campaign (Udall 1995; 1998). Additional analysis is provided by Fisher 
(1995a), Mehta (1994), and others. With the exception of some of the international 
NGO staff and some of the commentators, all sources are Indian.
It should be noted that the purpose of this section is not to judge conclusively 
the representivity of the local or international civil society organizations involved with 
Sardar Sarovar, nor of the Indian government. Instead, the goal is to demonstrate that: 
(i) civil society claims to representivity, even when made by local organizations, must 
be critically assessed; (ii) drawing local actors into transnational advocacy campaigns 
may further obscure representivity or subvert local interests to an international agenda; 
and (iii) transnational civil society can successfully challenge the authority of 
sovereign states in global policymaking.
Origins o f the Project: 1946-1985
The idea for a series of dams in the Narmada Valley was conceived by Indian leaders 
in 1946, just prior to independence. Planning for the project began in 1965. The 
project was designed to provide drinking water, irrigation, and electricity for the 
inhabitants of India’s northwest, especially in the state of Gujarat (Fisher 1995a, pp. 
12-13). The government planning the project was internationally recognized as a 
democratic one. Jawal Nehru, India’s first prime minister, recognized that the project 
would negatively impact some of the indigenous people living in the project area.
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However, he believed the development would be for the good of the country (Mehta
1994). Moreover, the governments of each of the affected Indian states -  Gujarat, 
Maharastra, and Madya Pradesh -  were involved in project planning (Fisher 1995a). 
The government finalized its plans in 1979, and in 1985 the World Bank approved 
funding for the project.
The major problem with the project was that it would displace up to 250,000 
people as the dams flooded sections of the valley and irrigation canals were dug across 
farmland. Although the scale of displacement was truly massive, the Bank had been 
involved with other projects involving forced resettlement. In the case of the Narmada 
project, however, the government initially made no plans to resettle the majority of the 
citizens forced out by the project. This was because the Indian government had 
retained a British colonial act under which the colonial government had expropriated 
all forest land. The majority of the project-affected people lived on such timberland. 
Their presence on the land predated the British act; they had essentially had their rights 
to the lands taken from them by the colonial government. Nonetheless, the Indian 
government used the forestry law to declare the Narmada Valley inhabitants “illegal 
encroachers” who were not entitled to resettlement (Patel 1995 p. 180; cf. Fisher 
1995a; cf. Mehta 1994). Both the national and state governments treated them as such. 
The situation was compound by the fact that most of the valley residents were tribal 
people (or ‘tribals’) who were already socially and politically marginalized.
Indian Civil Society: 1985-1989
Arch-Vahini, an Indian development NGO working in the area, began hearing about 
the problem from local residents in the early 1980s. For Arch-Vahini, the issue was 
essentially one of human rights, particularly pursuing the recognition of the property 
rights of the valley tribals. In 1983, Arch-Vahini contacted the World Bank on behalf 
of the so-called encroachers and other valley residents. The Bank commissioned a 
study of the tribal situation, and the resulting report was very critical of the Indian 
government’s treatment of the tribals. In 1984, tribals in Gujarat and Maharastra held 
a protest against the project, which attracted massive press attention in India. Arch- 
Vahini also enlisted the help of Oxfam-UK, which acted to lobby the World Bank 
directly on behalf of the valley residents (Patel 1995). Participants from both Oxfam
36 Information confirmed in author’s interview with John Clark, 7 December 2007.
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and Arch-Vahini agree that, in this instance, the agenda was driven by the grassroots. 
However, there was also no international campaign. Instead, most activism took place 
within India, supplemented by careful and somewhat collegial efforts to lobby the 
Bank. As a result of these efforts, the final loan agreement for the project, signed in 
1985, included resettlement provisions for these previously unrecognized peoples. The 
late 1980s and early 1990s were spent using the Indian legal system and administrative 
appeals to enforce the resettlement provisions. The struggle was extremely difficult 
and contentious, but ultimately successful. Persons to be displaced by the project were 
referred to by local campaigners and government officials as ‘oustees’. The Gujarat 
oustees working with Arch-Vahini, the largest group of project-affected people, 
eventually received terms that, in Arch-Vahini’s recounting, satisfied the desires of 
villagers facing displacement. All male oustees over a certain age were promised plots 
of arable land; the ‘illegal squatters’ had become landowners (Patel 1995).37
Through the late 1980s, the emphasis of most of the activism had been on 
pursuing favorable terms of resettlement. In 1988, however, a new, anti-dam agenda 
emerged as other organizations became involved in the lobbying. The Environmental 
Defense Fund and its local partner, Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA), were at the 
forefront of this movement.
NBA, like Arch-Vahini, was a professional NGO from outside the river valley. 
However, it was more ecologically oriented and enjoyed the support from members of 
India’s intelligentsia and urban middle-class. As it began work in the Narmada Valley 
in 1986, it sought to “challenge the underlying assumptions and validity of the 
project,” rallying villages into direct opposition (Udall 1998 p. 395). It was led by a 
veteran activist named Medha Patkar. In 1987, one of the founders of the Indian NGO 
Lokayan (Voice of the People) contacted his friend Bruce Rich of the Environmental 
Defense Fund to discuss the project. Rich visited the Narmada Valley and toured the 
dams’ submersion area, guided by Patkar. Patkar requested Rich’s help in attracting 
attention to the project.38 Rich, working with Lori Udall, another key EDF staffer, 
began building an international campaign.
37 Ibid.
38 Author’s interview with Bruce Rich, 19 February 2008, Washington, D.C.
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Transnational Activism: 1989-1993
The international campaign, led by environmentalists, fundamentally changed the 
nature of the Narmada. Instead of fighting for just resettlement, international NGOs 
fought to stop the project. NGOs working in World Bank donor countries enlisted the 
aid of their governments in pressuring the Bank to cancel the project. NGOs also 
expanded the focus of protest, turning the project into a referendum on the World 
Bank’s behavior. In this regard, the Narmada campaign built on the earlier 
international protests against the Bank’s Polonoroeste project in Brazil. The project in 
India was run by an entirely different set of staff, and the Bank had been one of the 
primary advocates for the rights of the people to be displaced by the dam, pressuring 
the Indian government to adjust its plans in order to accommodate them (Patel 1995). 
Nonetheless, the Bank was depicted as a primary culprit.39 In 1989, the US Congress 
held hearings on the project and in 1990 Japanese NGOs held an international 
symposium to discuss the Narmada situation (Udall 1998; cf. Udall 1995). The 
Japanese government pulled bilateral funding from the project, and the Bank’s 
executive directors began discussing an independent review (Patkar 1995; cf. Fox 
1998). As noted in Chapter 3, these discussions eventually culminated in the Morse 
Commission and the resulting cancellation of the project.
As the international campaign flourished, however, it seemed to become further 
and further removed from the people in the Narmada Valley. Gill and Patel agree that 
the majority of locals were more interested in reasonable resettlement terms than 
stopping the dam (1995; 1995; cf. Mehta 1994). NBA itself was originally focused on 
the resettlement terms as well. Only after its partnership with EDF did it announce 
total opposition to the dam (Patel 1995 p. 912; Udall 1998 p. 396; Gill 1995 p. 239).
By 1989, Patkar was insisting that the people in the valley would rather drown 
than move from their homes (Udall 1998; Rich 1994). This statement was extremely 
surprising: even NBA’s allies recognized that the organization had had to work to 
develop local interest in its anti-dam, ecologically-oriented approach. Patkar herself 
noted ruefully that not all valley-dwellers were sufficiently committed to the cause 
(e.g. Udall 1998; Mehta 1994). Meanwhile, the majority of oustees, the Gujaratis
39 See, for instance, advertisement, “Your Tax Money - Funding Yet Another World Bank Disaster: 
Why thousands of people will drown before accepting the Sardar Sarovar Dam”, The New York Times, 
21 September 1992; Udall (1995) also exemplifies this.
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working with Arch-Vahini, had accepted the resettlement terms offered by the Indian 
government (Patel 1995).
To prevent a collapse in local support for the anti-dam movement, NBA 
cordoned off the areas in Maharastra state that would be inundated by the dam 
construction. No government officials or consultants were permitted into the area.
This inhibited the government’s ability to survey the villages to be submerged and 
make plans for resettlement. It also gave NBA primary control over contact between 
government officials and the villages. Many of the villages in the valley were 
extremely remote and only accessible on foot. When government officials sought to 
visit the villages to hear villager demands and negotiate resettlement, they were 
detained by members of NBA, and in some cases, threatened or beaten. Even 
government health and education staff were banned from the valley and government 
clinics were closed by the activists (Gill 1995).
Meanwhile, NBA declared itself the sole representative of a large group of 
Maharastra oustees, more than 30 villages. The oustees had earlier requested to be 
resettled on government land in the Taloda forest. After much negotiation, including 
pressure from the World Bank, this land was released by Indian forestry officials to be 
used for resettlement. Yet when NBA was informed of the arrangement in 1990, it 
unilaterally rejected the offer (Patel and Mehta 1995 pp. 403-4). Environmental 
Defense Fund and international allies exacerbated the impasse, declaring that the 
oustees did not want the Taloda land (Patel 1995 p. 193). It took almost two years for 
the tribals themselves to learn of the offer. When they did, in April 1993, they 
denounced NBA’s representation and chastised the Maharastra government for 
allowing the organization to speak on their behalf (Patel 1995 p. 196; Gill 1995; cf. 
Mehta 1994).
Despite this upheaval, Environmental Defense Fund and its allies still claimed 
in their October 1992 newspaper advertisements that the Narmada Valley dwellers 
would rather die than be resettled. In 1993, NBA joined American environmentalists 
in vehemently denouncing the World Bank. In a letter addressed to Barney Frank, and 
entered into the record during the hearings held by his Congressional subcommittee, 
NBA wrote of the “intense feelings that are brewing in India and, in fact, in the whole 
third world about the World Bank” and urged Frank to “to respond to the voices of
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millions of poor and disadvantaged all over the world” by eliminating the IDA and the 
IBRD.40
Loan Cancellation: 1992-1993
Pressure from Indian and international activists eventually forced the World Bank to 
initiate a review of the project. By 1991, civil society protests had convinced several 
key decision makers at the Bank that a review was necessary (Fox 1998; Udall
1995)41 The decision, however, was catalyzed by NBA and Medha Patkar. After an 
NBA-organized protest was prevented by police from occupying the dam site, Patkar 
began a hunger strike. She insisted that her strike would not end until a comprehensive 
review of the dam project was promised. The protest and hunger strike forced the 
Bank into action, and an independent review as promised (ibid; also Wade 1997).
US NGOs played a significant role in selecting personnel for the Independent 
Review. Bradford Morse, although the titular head of the review, was in poor health. 
Most of the work would be done by his deputy. US-based environmentalists helped 
ensure the selection of Thomas Berger, a Canadian lawyer with a strong record of 
supporting indigenous rights (Wade 1997).
Some of those involved with the review on the ground saw other signs of 
environmentalist influence. Arch-Vahini complained that they were never invited to 
meet with the reviewers, despite the organization’s longstanding involvement in the 
project (Patel 1995). In contrast, representatives of the US-based NGOs EDF, FoE, 
and BIC, along with the Canadian group Probe and the Indian organization Lokayan 
(which had introduced Rich to Patkar) all met with the review in Washington, DC, in 
August 1991, a month before it had even begun its official work (Udall 1995). The 
final report, released in June 1992, was extremely negative and seemed to call for a 
halt in the project. Arch-Vahini, however, questioned the report’s methodology and its 
findings: “far from being impartial, the Report of the Independent Review has gone out 
of its way to ‘prove’ or ‘establish’ facts that show the projects in a negative light”
(Patel and Mehta 1995, p. 413). Leaders of the group also held that the review was 
methodologically flawed and ignored key data (ibid).
40 Hearings before the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on International Development, 
Finance, Trade, and Monetary Policy on Authorizing contributions to IDA, GEF, and ADF, 5 May 
1993.
41 As noted in Chapter 3, Dutch executive director Herfkins had close relationships with many civil 
society organizations.
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The report was released in June 1992 but any concerns about its accuracy 
received no coverage in public discussions of the dam. Instead, anti-dam activism, 
including the threat to attack IDA funding, made in September 1992, took center stage. 
The Indian government and Bank staff fought to preserve the project. They were 
supported by other developing country governments; during the October board vote on 
the project, the board voted to preserve the loan despite calls from the executive 
directors representing the US, Germany, Japan, and several other developed countries 
to suspend the project (Udall 1995). Six months later, however, it was clear that the 
project had failed to meet benchmarks included in the Bank’s remediation plan.
Rather than face cancellation at the hands of the Board, the Indian government 
voluntarily cancelled the remaining installments of the Sardar Sarovar loans. A New 
York Times account of the cancellation noted that “The Indian government has viewed 
the criticism by environmentalists as an affront to its sovereignty, and an example of 
Westerners telling a developing nation how to run its affairs”.42
Analysis
It is impossible to know with exact certainty which organizations best represented the 
valley dwellers affected by the project. Both NBA and Arch-Vahini were professional 
NGOs and outsiders in the valley area. Both had international partners with the 
potential to influence them. Nonetheless, Arch-Vahini’s credibility seems somewhat 
sustained by the fact that the project-affected Gujaratis, who constituted the majority 
of those displaced by the project, accepted the deal it negotiated and that the oustees 
from Maharashtra also sought its help (Patel 1995). In contrast, at the height of its 
power, NBA found itself denounced by a significant number of the groups it claimed 
to represent and found its coalition of Indian partners disintegrating (Patel 1995; Mehta 
1994).
International NGOs were key to the policy work of both organizations. Arch- 
Vahini’s link to policymaking at the World Bank was via one of its funders, Oxfam- 
UK. Although Arch-Vahini met with some Bank staff and consultants in India, Oxfam 
also negotiated with Bank staff on Arch-Vahini’s behalf.43 NBA’s international 
influence was significantly bolstered by the Environmental Defense Fund and US 
organizations allied with EDF.
42 Steven Holmes, “India Cancels Loan From World Bank”, The New York Times, 31 March 1993.
43 Author’s interview with John Clark, 7 December 2007.
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Oxfam’s influence on Arch-Vahini is unclear. Although the relationship was 
one of donor and recipient, both sides suggest that Arch-Vahini determined the agenda 
(Patel and Mehta 1995).44 NBA and its international partners also claim that NBA led 
the campaign. Nonetheless, it is clear that NBA’s agenda shifted as it became 
involved in a powerful international campaign, reflecting more closely the agenda of 
its donors. The anti-resettlement agenda, while actively promoted by EDF and its 
allies, was instrumental in its loss of local support (Mehta 1994; cf. Patel 1995).
In short, the project featured two strong local civil society organizations, both 
with reasonable claims to represent project-affected people. However, although 
initially allied, the claims of the two CSOs became directly opposed. Each claimed to 
represent the whole of the persons being displaced in the valley, yet one stressed fair 
resettlement (and the continuation of the project) while the other insisted that the 
project be cancelled. There is nothing in the claims themselves that can allow us to 
determine which CSO represented the majority of stakeholders. The involvement of 
international NGOs only adds to the confusion. When Arch-Vahini and NBA shared 
the goal of fair resettlement terms for the oustees, their international allies (specifically 
Oxfam and EDF) worked alongside one another. When the two Indian NGOs pursued 
opposing agendas, so did their international counterparts. The massive, international 
anti-dam campaign that grew out of EDF’s efforts seemed to pay little heed to the 
interests of the project’s planned beneficiaries. To the contrary, even NBA itself 
admitted that it opposed the dam in part because the dam’s benefits would accrue to 
hundreds of thousands of city dwellers and farmers, rather than to the people being 
displaced. Yet it is also unclear that the international anti-dam campaign had the 
support of the people it claimed to represent, the Narmada oustees. Several sources 
indicate that better resettlement terms and jobs offers from the government had 
persuaded many indigenous people not to oppose the project (Mehta 1994; Patel 1995; 
cf. Gill 1995). It is true that in the short term Arch-Vahini and NBA were both 
effective in helping to protect the rights of the Narmada Valley dwellers and holding 
the Indian government accountable to its promises to the World Bank. The only clear 
benefit of the cancellation campaign, however, was for NBA’s international partners, 
who used the Narmada issue to great effect in attacking Bank.
44 Information confirmed in author’s interview with John Clark, 7 December 2007.
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Conclusions
As noted earlier, the representative claims made by civil society in the IDA-10 and 
elsewhere cannot not be proven. Despite lacking any provable claim to represent 
developing country citizens, civil society organizations during the IDA-10 willingly 
contested the right of developing country governments to represent their citizens in 
international negotiations. Although many of the Bank’s borrower nations lacked 
democratic regimes during the replenishment period, some significant players like 
India had well-established democracies. At least in theory, such governments were 
accountable to the majority of their citizens. Nonetheless, many of the international 
civil society organizations involved in the IDA downplayed the importance of national 
democracy. Rather than assessing the democratic credentials of any given 
government, they seemed to view as illegitimate any government that disagreed with 
their preferred policies. Moreover, the conditionalities that civil society organizations 
succeeded in attaching to IDA funding further impinged on borrower independence. 
Limiting the authority of democratic governments, either domestically or 
internationally, may limit the number of avenues of representation enjoyed by 
developing country citizens. The tendency to disregard even democratic governments 
and to conditionalize lending to them suggests that the majority of civil society actors 
may have been more interested in imposing their agendas than developing or engaging 
with possible representatives of Southern populations’ interests.
North-South partnerships may do little to ameliorate these challenges. Civil 
society actors from developing countries are often linked to international networks by 
their donors. Research, much of it from development studies, indicates that externally 
funded civil society organizations may lack strong grassroots support. This is not to 
say that all developing country civil society lacks independence. Many genuinely 
grassroots civil society organizations exist in the developing world and even some that 
are donor-funded retain significant agency. However, international civil society 
actors, particularly well-funded organizations coordinating international campaigns, 
may select local partners purposively to support pre-existing goals. Such local 
counterparts may also be treated as junior partners and freely ignored by more 
powerful organizations if their ideas conflict with established objectives.
The Sardar Sarovar case illustrates these various difficulties. Conflicting 
claims by two well-established local civil society organizations demonstrate the 
difficulty of establishing representivity. Each of the two major local civil society
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actors chose a different international patron. Arch-Vahini worked with its donor, 
Oxfam-UK, to engage with the World Bank. Narmada Bachao Andolan established a 
relationship with the Environmental Defense Fund. Even though NBA was financially 
independent from EDF, the international anti-Narmada Dam campaign EDF helped 
launch seemed to influence the policy positions of NBA. In particular, the decision to 
oppose the resettlement of project-affected people and push for wholesale cancellation 
was first generated by international NGOs, including EDF, and was only later echoed 
by NBA. Moreover, the international anti-Narmada campaign actually ignored the 
stated desires of project beneficiaries and the dissenting voice of a key local NGO, 
Arch-Vahini. The local and international pressure from civil society organizations 
initially helped force the Indian government to recognize the rights of the people 
displaced by the project and honor previous resettlement commitments. However, in 
the longer term the international campaign against the dam seemed to undercut the 
ability of the government to advance Indian’s interests internationally, and the 
cancellation of the dam may have been contrary to the interests of its numerous 
planned project beneficiaries.
Democratic Legitimacy
In short, the data from the IDA-10 lend support to those authors who express concern 
about the marginalization of developing country governments or about inequalities in 
North-South civil society. However, the data also demonstrate civil society’s potential 
for positive impacts. The tension between these two observations highlights the 
usefulness of the context-based criteria developed in Chapter 2.
Within the Indian context, global civil society sometimes sought to play the 
role of reformer or advocate. Civil society can help create and enforce transnational 
democratic norms, as it initially did in India by gaining government recognition for the 
rights of Narmada outsees. According to the definition of democracy used in this 
thesis, which requires the recognition of rights, civil society helped remedy a 
shortcoming in Indian democracy. This is an important, democratically legitimate 
output. Civil society also enhanced the transparency and accountability of both the 
Indian government and the World Bank. These are important democratic throughputs. 
If we were to judge civil society using either the reformer criteria (which emphasizes 
output) or the advocacy criteria (which emphasizes throughput) we might say that the
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Narmada case indicates that civil society is making positive contributions to global 
governance.
However, the larger picture reveals that transnational civil society is more than 
just an advocate or reformer. Rather than simply holding the state accountable to 
democratic principles in the Narmada case, civil society campaigners used 
international pressure to overturn the domestic policy of the Indian government. The 
CSOs involved acted in spite of Bank efforts to protect outsee rights and, in most 
cases, without reference to the interests of India’s broader, national population. The 
fact that transnational activists were able to overturn the decisions of a democratic 
government supports the concerns raised in Chapter 2 regarding transnational civil 
society interventions in domestic affairs.
The rest of the data from this chapter also emphasize civil society’s role as an 
authority. As occurred elsewhere in the IDA-10, civil society may compete with 
developing country governments for the power to speak for their citizens in 
international policymaking processes or work to undermine local government authority 
for the sake of advancing organizations’ agendas. Civil society exists as an 
independent actor in the international realm, capable of engaging with both 
governments and states.
Viewed through the lens of the authority criteria, the data in this chapter 
reinforce the pattern observed in Chapters 4 and 5: transnational civil society engaging 
with the World Bank produces some democratic outputs but its behavior may also 
obstruct democratic inputs. The data here, however, are more ambiguous than in 
previous chapters. Not all governments have equally valid democratic credentials and, 
although civil society cannot be proven to represent any given group of stakeholders, it 
cannot be proven not to represent them either. Overall, this chapter emphasizes the 
importance of a nuanced approach to evaluating civil society’s impact on the 
democratization of global governance, including a careful consideration of those civil 
society activities that impact domestic policy. As the data about the Bank engage with 
the existing literature on civil society and global governance, they also highlight the 
need for the continued exploration of North-South dynamics.
Reversing the Boomerang
One particular area meriting additional research are roles of Northern and Southern 
civil society actors in initiating activism. In their landmark work on global activism,
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Activists Beyond Borders, Keck and Sikkink present their boomerang theory of 
influence: civil society organizations in the global South enlist the aid of partners in 
the North to circumvent local government obstacles. The campaign begins in the 
South, moves to the North, and then returns to the South bearing increased power and 
influence.
The details of the 10th IDA, however, indicate that a ‘reverse boomerang’ is 
also possible. Civil society organizations in the global North selected Southern 
partners willing to support pre-existing agendas. Northern organizations then used this 
Southern support to bolster and legitimate their claims to represent large stakeholder 
populations, thus lending credibility to their policy goals. This, at least in the US 
Congressional hearings, helped convince key policymakers to support the positions of 
certain CSOs. The pattern of influence thus moved from the North (where the agenda 
was formulated) to the South (to acquire partners and legitimacy) and then back to the 
North (in the form of political pressure on key policymakers). This pattern, and 
possible implications for civil society’s capacity to democratize global governance, 
will be discussed in greater detail in the thesis’ conclusion.
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Chapter 7
Beyond the 10th IDA
This thesis has identified a number of key dynamics governing the behavior of civil 
society organizations seeking to influence World Bank policy. Individual 
organizations appear to work to advance their ideological goals without consulting 
many of the stakeholders impacted by their actions, particularly developing world 
populations. Financial interests play a key role in determining which organizations 
participate in a particular campaign or policy-making dialogue, giving funders 
disproportionate influence over the make-up of the campaign or the chorus of voices 
participating in the dialogue. Moreover, civil society organizations often make use of 
the influence of powerful nation-states in advancing their international agendas. Such 
assistance, in turn, is prompted by domestic political pressure or national concerns.
The result of these dynamics is that civil society organizations with good connections 
in powerful nation-states tend to have a disproportionate amount of power. Such elite 
organizations have little incentive to conduct meaningful policy dialogue with other 
civil society actors, particularly when conflicting financial incentives between 
organizations make compromise unlikely. Partnerships between elite organizations 
and civil society organizations in the developing world also seem to have limited 
impact on the behavior of the more powerful actors or on the representivity of a larger 
group or coalition.
As a result of the pressures and incentives facing individual organizations, the 
collective influence of civil society may do little to enhance stakeholder representation. 
Civil society’s collective pressure can help create or enhance transparency, 
accountability, and dialogue, and it has used such channels to impact particular 
policies and projects. However, the control of such channels is distributed in a highly 
unequal manner. Well-connected or well-resourced organizations dominate civil 
society’s collective impact.
This thesis suggests that civil society’s ability to democratize global 
governance must be judged by whether civil society improves democratic inputs and 
outputs in transnational policymaking. In the case of the World Bank, civil society
202
has eroded the World Bank’s independence, increasing stakeholder control over the 
institution. In terms of this thesis, this gives civil society some output legitimacy. 
However, civil society has done little to improve the equality of authority among 
stakeholders themselves, to ensure that Bank policies are representative, or to improve 
the accessibility or inclusivity of Bank policymaking. Indeed, transnational civil 
society may magnify existing imbalances in the power between North and South by 
attacking Southern governments in international policymaking negotiations. These 
factors, taken together, indicate that transnational civil society lacks input legitimacy.
The analysis of civil society engagement with the World Bank does support 
many aspects of the pro-civil society literature, particularly the work of those authors 
who suggest that civil society can improve the accountability and transparency of 
international organizations. In the terms of this thesis, however, these forms of 
throughput legitimacy are not sufficient to demonstrate a democratizing capacity, 
because there is no evidence that such improvements in throughput will serve 
stakeholders equally, rather than increasing the power of certain elites. Thus these 
findings challenge those aspects of the literature that suggest that transnational civil 
society is democratizing global governance.
The bulk of the data that informs these preliminary findings is drawn from the 
10th IDA negotiations and the events immediately surrounding them. As shown in 
Chapter 2 and elsewhere in this thesis, these conclusions are also supported by 
elements of the academic literature, including research from development studies and 
those voices within political science which are more skeptical of transnational civil 
society’s democratizing capacity. The question remains, however, as to whether the 
patterns observed in the 10 IDA are replicated in other interactions between the 
World Bank and civil society. This chapter seeks to answer that question by 
examining two additional case studies.
Choosing Additional Case Studies
It is difficult to find even one case study equivalent to the 10th IDA. When asked for 
equivalent examples, current and former Bank staff interviewed for this research all 
concurred that there has not been a civil society movement as large or as impacting as 
the 10th IDA. Other IDA replenishments have attracted civil society attention, but 
nowhere near the level of the IDA-10. Some specific project loans have attracted the 
attention of protestors, but most protest campaigns have had either a fairly narrow
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membership or have been ineffective in changing Bank policy. For example, the 
massive NGO campaign in 1999 against the China Western agricultural resettlement 
project drew support largely from existing pro-Tibet sentiments (Wade 2009; Clark 
and Treakle 2003).1 Other protests have had similar regional connections or an issue 
focus only tangentially linked to the Bank. One former Bank vice president also noted 
that after September 11, 2001, the volume of aggressive attacks by NGOs against the 
Bank had substantially diminished. He suggested that for a public confronted by the 
specter of violent terrorism, the idea of a development institution posing a serious 
threat to human well-being lacked credibility. Instead, underdevelopment itself has 
been seen as a factor encouraging terrorism. At the same time, isolated concerns over 
the environmental impacts of specific development projects have been upstaged by a 
focus on global warming and greenhouse gases. The raucous protests that once 
seemed to permanently reside in the park opposite the World Bank’s main Washington 
office are now largely a thing of the past.
The staff of those NGOs involved in the IDA-10, as well as many of their 
colleagues, likewise agree that no subsequent campaign has involved as many actors as 
the IDA-10 or produced such significant results. The lack is not a manifestation of 
satisfaction: many of the NGOs originally involved in Bank reform still have Bank- 
focused elements in their agendas. Newer organizations also continue to press the 
Bank for change. However, civil society has been unable to organize itself around a 
single cause, and no one issue or event has attracted as much widespread attention as 
the 10th IDA. These responses reinforce some of the theories suggested in this thesis: 
several of the NGO staff involved in the IDA-10 who were interviewed for this thesis 
suggested that the Bank reform movement has lacked a core group of coordinated 
activists since the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation began redirecting its funding to 
other areas in the mid-1990s.
Outside commentators sometimes point to the Jubilee 2000 anti-debt campaign, 
which was founded in 1996, as an important case study of civil society’s impact on 
global governance. However, the Jubilee campaign was not focused exclusively on the 
World Bank and its degree of impact on the Bank is unclear. The Bank was already 
developing debt relief procedures prior to the launch of Jubilee 2000. Interviews with
1 Officially the China Western Poverty Reduction Project, this project would resettle 60,000 poor 
farmers onto newly irrigated land near the Tibetan Autonomous Region. Opponents claimed that the 
project would displace Tibetan people and amounted to ‘genocide’ against Tibetans.
204
Bank sources indicate that the Bank was considering the importance of debt relief in 
the early 1990s, in response to staff pressure and pre-Jubilee lobbying by other NGOs.2 
The HIPC I debt-relief program was under development in 1995, and was launched in 
1996 -  the same year Jubilee 2000 was inaugurated.3 HIPC I was criticized as having 
excessive conditionalities, and pressure from CSOs like Jubilee helped prompt the 
creation of the Enhanced HIPC initiative (also known as HDPC II) in 1999.4 However, 
Jubilee was arguably encouraging a trend already present in the Bank. Also, Jubilee 
itself was skeptical of its degree of impact on the Bank, and focused much of its 
attention on the IMF and the G8.5 Thus, while Jubilee had a very important impact on 
debt relief, its impacts on the Bank are difficult to assess. Moreover, its general 
approach -  targeting several institutions at once -  makes it difficult to compare 
directly with Bank-focused campaigns like the IDA-10. For both these reasons, it was 
not chosen as a case study.
While there has been no recent equivalent to the IDA-10, the World Bank and 
civil society continue to engage with one another. Gatherings like the World Social 
Forum and Davos have given some organizations from less developed countries a 
more prominent voice, if not necessarily more influence. At the same time, many 
erstwhile development groups, most notably Oxfam, have been expanding their 
advocacy operations and launching global and regional campaigns. The combination 
of significant resources, ground-level networks, and a stock of credibility and public 
goodwill have made these “implementation” groups formidable advocates.
The Bank itself came away from the 10th IDA much more interested in 
dialogue with civil society, even if some of that interest was driven by the Bank’s need 
to protect its funding. Civil society dialogue was given a major boost by the 
presidency of James Wolfensohn (1995-2005). Wolfensohn, seeking to learn from the 
mistakes of his predecessors, sought to engage personally with the Bank’s major civil 
society critics. During his tenure, staff also codified procedures for ground-level 
consultations with local civil society and regional staff began engaging with civil
2 The UK-based World Development Movement, for instance, preceded Jubilee by at least five years in 
its work on debt relief. See http://www.wdm.org.uk/debt-campaign, viewed 19 July 2010.
3 World Bank. 2003. The HIPC Initiative: Progress and Prospects. Precis. World Bank Operations and 
Evaluation Department. Available at
http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/24cc3bblf94aellc85256808006a0046/b2e88ec35c7c6 
86885256ce60076439c/$FILE/HIPC_precis.pdf. Viewed 19 July 2010.
4 Ibid. See also Barett, Marlene (ed.) 2000. The World Will Never Be the Same Again. Available at 
www.jubileedebtcampaign.org.uk. Viewed 19 July 2010.
5 Ibid.
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society organizations in their areas (Pallas 2005). The combination of Wolfensohn’s 
influence, interest from within the Bank and the Bank’s member governments, and 
growth in the number of CSOs seeking to engage with the Bank led the Bank to begin 
to consolidate and strengthen its efforts to engage with global civil society. The Bank 
to established the Civil Society Team in 2002 and in 2005 the Bank’s board endorsed a 
paper titled “Issues and Options for Improving Engagement Between the World Bank 
and Civil Society Organizations” which included specific action items. In 2006, the 
team expanded and was re-titled the Global Civil Society Team.6 The team helps 
connect civil society organizations looking to engage with the Bank with those specific 
Bank staff whose work is most relevant to the organizations’ interests. It also keeps 
the Bank aware of new civil society trends and agendas, and seeks to develop best 
practices for Bank engagement with civil society actors.
In light of these evolutions, the thesis will examine two case studies, one from 
mid-1990s and the other very recent in the 2007-2008 period. The earlier case, the 
Bank’s cancellation of the Arun III dam project in Nepal, was selected because it is 
one of the few clearly effective civil society campaigns to have occurred since the 
IDA-10. The anti-dam campaign, which featured the first use of the World Bank’s 
Inspection Panel, not only resulted in the cancellation of a major project; it also helped 
cement the credibility of the Inspection Panel and encouraged future appeals.
Moreover, the international activism against the dam focused on a popular project in a 
democratic country. Nepal even held an election during the time of the international 
campaign, and the fate of the Arun-IH dam was openly debated among local political 
activists. Thus the process by which the project was ultimately cancelled represents an 
unusually strong opportunity to assess some of the theories outlined in thesis 
concerning national democracy and international activism.
The second case to be considered is the World Bank’s adoption of country 
systems for procurement. Between 2007 and 2008, the World Bank changed its 
standards for project financial management and purchasing to begin allowing 
borrowers to use their own national systems in lieu of the World Bank’s practices. The 
issue attracted significant attention from industry lobbyists, the International Labor 
Organization, and a number of concerned NGOs. These actors raised questions about
6 Information on the GCS Team comes from the author’s interviews with Bank staff with direct 
knowledge of the team’s activities, including a former team member. See also the team’s website, 
http://go.worldbank.org/8DJ82AMKB0, viewed 16 February 2008.
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the policy’s potential impacts on competition, labor standards, aid effectiveness, and 
corruption. The resulting advocacy effort was relatively small and met with only 
limited success. However, the case provides an opportunity to examine outside 
engagement with the Bank post-9/11 and in the context of growing global acceptance 
of a civil society role in governance; the case also involved the Bank’s Global Civil 
Society Team. In addition to these factors, the country systems case study was chosen 
because it has the virtue of being one of the Bank’s most recent places of policy 
engagement with civil society. Most of the key events took place during the writing of 
this thesis, and I was able to attend a number of key meetings as a participant observer. 
I developed a working relationship with one of the lead lobbyists and was thus made 
privy to email debates among the activists and discussions between activists and the 
Bank. As a result, the country systems policy change provides detailed insight into 
current Bank engagement with civil society.
The chapter finds that the data from these two case studies support the thesis’ 
conclusions about the behavior, influence, and impact of civil society organizations.
In particular, both cases show the self-interested behavior of civil society organizations 
and highlight their use of national governments for influence. Particularly clear in 
both instances are the ways in which civil society can enhance the control of some 
stakeholders (by enhancing transparency, accountability, or dialogue) while 
undermining equality of input. The Arun IQ case also demonstrates the potential 
conflicts between international campaigns and democratic governments discussed in 
the previous chapter, and the country systems case shows that the general patterns 
identified in this thesis have held true even a decade after the IDA-10.
The Arun III Project: 1994-1996
The World Bank’s Arun IQ dam project in Nepal was the first project ever appealed to 
the World Bank’s Inspection Panel. As such it was the subject of significant 
international attention, much of it fomented by the civil society organizations which 
had lobbied for the creation of the panel. Most of this attention was negative as 
environmental NGOs fought the building of another hydroelectric dam and sought to 
legitimate the Inspection Panel with a first round victory. The Bank, having just 
suffered a cut in US contributions to the IDA, had created the panel in response to US 
pressure. The Bank too was interested in signifying its responsiveness to both civil 
society and donor governments and demonstrating the legitimacy of the Inspection
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Panel. The citizens of Nepal, however, were much more ambivalent. A variety of 
evidence, discussed below, indicates that a majority of citizens, including most of 
those who would be directly impacted by the dam construction, supported the project.
International civil society organizations opposed to the dam created a vigorous 
campaign that eventually resulted in its cancellation. As will be shown, this campaign 
ignored much of the public sentiment on the ground, including the positions of two 
different democratically elected governments and the pro-dam sentiments of the 
communities living in the project-affected area. The Nepalese NGO filing the 
Inspection Panel appeal was allied with elements of the political opposition and based 
in the capital city, well outside the region affected by the project. Pressure from 
activists in donor countries helped force the Bank to review the appeal. Even when the 
appeal effectively vindicated the project, confirming that its design met all World 
Bank guidelines, international pressure resulted in a unilateral Bank decision to 
terminate the project. As the evidence highlights the capacity of civil society to impact 
international institutions and promote accountability and transparency, but it also 
showcases civil society actors’ use of nation-state influence and the tendency of 
international NGOs to manipulate or ignore local concerns.
Background
In the early 1990s, Nepal was a functioning democracy, albeit a young one. The Arun 
III dam, planned by the Nepalese government and the World Bank, was a hydroelectric 
project designed to exploit the energy of the Arun river. The proposed dam was 
unusual in that it was a run-of-the-river facility: the strength and consistency of the 
river’s flow was such that the dam could function without the massive reservoirs 
typical of hydroelectric dams (Bissell 1998). Given that such reservoirs are the main 
cause of the forced resettlement, soil salination, and waterborne disease often 
associated with big dams, the proposed project had relatively few negative human and 
environmental impacts. Significantly, even the project’s opponents failed to note any 
negative environmental impacts coming from the dam itself. Rather, they indicated 
that they believed the dam was inappropriate for Nepal’s level of economic 
development or that the road to the construction site would be environmentally
208
damaging (cf. Rich 2003). In contrast, the main concern of most villagers living in 
the Arun Valley was making sure that the dam’s access road would run close enough 
to their villages to increase their economic opportunities (Bissell 1998).
The dam, however, soon became a football for political parties opposing the 
government, which was pro-dam. While the government promoted the dam as a 
solution to Nepal’s energy needs, opposition politicians worried that government plans 
to sell surplus power to India would make the dam’s profitability dependent on India’s 
willingness to buy the electricity at a fair price. There was also some concern that the 
high cost of the dam would increase the price of power nationally, and that many of 
the benefits of the dam building would redound to India, which was supplying most of 
the subcontractors for the project (Udall 1998, p. 409-10).8
When the Inspection Panel opened its doors in 1994, Nepalese activists were its 
first claimants. In October 1994, a Nepalese NGO based in the capital city of 
Kathmandu requested a panel investigation of the project on behalf of just four people 
living in the Arun Valley (Shihata 2000, pp. 102-4). These claims, in contrast to cases 
like Polonoroeste or Sardar Sarovar, show no consistent evidence of government 
malfeasance. Two claims letters were attached to the Inspection Panel report. In one, 
the author complains that his claims for compensation for communal land taken to 
build the access road have been denied, adversely affecting his economic condition. In 
the second, the author complains that his economic condition was negatively impacted 
because the government compensated him in cash. “Since I was not used to the cash 
economy,” he writes, “I already spent the money I received”. Both authors note that 
they do not understand how the project will benefit them personally and that “I have 
been hearing that there have been many debate [sic] and controversies at local, national 
and international levels” (the letters use identical language). Thus, the writers each 
state, they are authorizing a representative of INHURED to act on their behalf.9
Although claiming to act on behalf of the residents of the Arun Valley, the 
national NGO INHURED “added a layer of macroeconomic issues on the claim of the
7 Also press release by Lori Udall, Washington Director, International Rivers Network, “Arun HI 
Hydroelectric Project In Nepal: Another World Bank Debacle?”, 1 March 1995. The World Bank 
Inspection Panel Report, ‘The Inspection Panel Report on Request for Inspection Nepal: Proposed Arun 
III Hydroelectric Project and Restructuring of the Arun HI Access Road Project (Credit 2029-NEP)”, 
confirms that the road was the only environmental issue associated with the dam.
8 Also, World Bank, Accountability a t the World Bank: The Inspection Panel Ten Years On, pp. 51-7.
9 The World Bank Inspection Panel Report, ‘The Inspection Panel Report on Request for Inspection 
Nepal: Proposed Arun III Hydroelectric Project and Restructuring of the Arun HI Access Road Project 
(Credit 2029-NEP)”, 16 December 1994.
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local people”, challenging the government’s macroeconomic policies and energy 
development plans (Bissell 1998). INHURED and its allies formed an umbrella 
organization called the Arun Concerned Group. The group’s primary objection to the 
project was that too much of its economic viability depended on the willingness of the 
Nepal’s neighbor, India, to purchase excess power generated by the dam. They also 
felt that the project was too big and would require too much debt. A lawyer for the 
group explained that, “It's no exaggeration to say that Nepal's economic future is at 
stake. Nepal is a poor country and this megaproject is completely inappropriate for 
it.”10 When the economic elements of the claim were denied consideration, the 
INHURED moved to withdraw the entire claim. Due to the rules of the Inspection 
Panel, however, the claim, once initiated, could not be withdrawn.
Civil Society Involvement
The claim attracted significant international attention. Anti-dam activists, who were 
gaining momentum following the Bank’s 1993 cancellation of the Narmada Dam 
project in India, seized on the issue, as did the anti-Bank NGOs involved in the Mott- 
funded Fifty Years is Enough campaign.11 The media outreach for the 50 Years is 
Enough campaign was led by the International Rivers Network (IRN), an anti-dam 
advocacy group that shared staff with the Environmental Defense Fund. IRN received 
money from the Charles Stewart Mott foundation specifically to coordinate the public 
messages of the 23 organizations involved in the 50 Years campaign.12 The 
Environmental Defense Fund, which had been at the forefront of the creation of the 
Inspection Panel and was a founding member of 50 Years is Enough,13 also played a 
key role (Udall 1998; cf. Rich 2002). 50 Years members that were interested in the 
Arun III project joined with opposition political forces based in Kathmandu, Nepal’s 
capital. Even Richard Bissell, an Inspection Panel member who later wrote in support
10 Gopal Siwakoti, quoted by Lori Udall, Washington Director, International Rivers Network, in “Arun 
HI Hydroelectric Project In Nepal: Another World Bank Debacle?”, 1 March 1995. See also Statement 
by Bikash Pandey (Alliance for Energy, Nepal) to the World Bank Board of Executive Directors, 
“Experience with the Arun (Nepal) Claim”, 3 February 1998.
11 Cf. Report by Environmental Defense Fund, Friends of the Earth, International Rivers Network. 
“Gambling with People’s Lives: What the World Bank’s New ‘High-Risk/High-Reward’ Strategy 
Means for the Poor and the Environment”, September 2003.
12 Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, “Mott Grants Program Areas: Reform of International Finance and 
Trade 1990-1994”, printout of relevant Mott grants made 22 May 2008. Provided to the author by the 
Charles Stewart Mott Foundation.
13 50 Years is Enough website, http://www.50years.org/pdf/10thAnniversary/history.pdf, accessed 13 
July 2009.
210
of the cancellation, confirmed that “the least support came at the local level” (1998 p. 
32)
Even prior to the Inspection Panel claim, some national and international 
NGOs were working to halt the project. The Nepalese NGO Alliance for Energy and 
the UK-based Intermediate Technology Development Group conducted independent 
evaluations of the project’s impacts, publicized their findings, and proposed alternative 
solutions to Nepal’s energy needs. Washington-based NGOs pressured the Bank to 
operationalize its newly liberalized information disclosure policies, with the result that 
the Bank finally released some of its own evaluations of the project (Udall 1998, pp. 
408-13).
Accountability was exercised primarily through public pressure and the 
Inspection Panel. NGO protests against the dam during the Bank’s annual meeting in 
September of 1994 helped attract the attention of the Bank’s future president, Jim 
Wolfensohn, to the issue (Mallaby 2004 pp. 113-4; cf. Rich 2003). Nepalese NGOs 
opposing the dam engaged pro-dam factions in the press (Bissell 1998).
The Inspection Panel claim, however, made an end-run around these debates 
and sought to use the Bank’s own mechanisms to force the reconsideration and 
possible cancellation of the project. In June of 1994, the Bank invited NGOs critical 
of the project to a Washington, DC consultation. NGOs attending included Alliance 
for Energy, Intermediate Technology, and the Arun Concerned Group, all of which 
were actively campaigning against the project. Some of these NGOs had “extensive 
meetings” with members of the World Bank’s board of directors and US government 
officials following the consultation, and later used such informal connections to 
influence the board’s consideration of the project (Udall 1998, pp. 411-2; see also pp. 
417-8).
Stakeholder Representation
International campaigners fighting the dam quickly relabeled the national groups 
opposing the dam as ‘local NGOs’ (Mallaby 2004; cf. Udall 1998). However, the 
project enjoyed substantial support among those citizens to be most directly affected 
by its implementation.14 Residents of the Arun Valley lived primarily in mountainous
14 World Bank press release, “World Bank and Nepal to Develop Alternatives to Arun Project”, 3 
August 1995. Release notes that the Bank has cancelled the project in spite of “support for the Arun in,
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villages in which all goods were moved by porters. They viewed the construction of 
the dam’s access road as a significant economic boon and local leaders lobbied heavily 
to have the road pass through their villages. Significant grievances with the project 
developed only when the Bank pushed to lay the access road along a cheaper, shorter 
path that would affect fewer villages. Aside from the debate over the course of the 
road, valley residents had few concerns about the project (Bissell 1998, pp. 29-33).
The project’s stakeholders also included the rest of the national population, 
who would be obliged to buy the power generated by the dam and, through their taxes, 
repay the debt the government would undertake in building it. Yet Nepal was a 
democratic country and the building of the dam was a subject of vigorous public 
debate; one contemporary commentator described the Arun EH as “being discussed 
threadbare” for “nine long years”.15 Only 12 per cent of Nepal’s population had access 
to electricity, and press accounts indicated that there was widespread support for the 
project.16 US NGOs claimed that the World Bank had pressured the Nepalese 
government to support the project despite government misgivings.17 Such claims, 
however, were contradicted by reports that “all Nepal’s political parties”, including the 
opposition, supported the dam.18 Any claim that the ruling government had acted 
against the wishes of the people was challenged by a national election in November of 
1994, in the midst of the dam controversy. Members of an opposition party, the 
Communist Party of Nepal, displaced the Congress Party as the dominant political 
faction. The new government also chose to support the dam project their predecessors
both among all of Nepal’s political parties and from most of the residents in the valley.” Bissell (1998) 
confirms general support in the valley.
15 Akhilesh Upadhyay, “Nepal-Development: New Rulers Seek Revival of Arun III”, Inter Press 
Service, 9 October 1995. See also Dr. Ram S. Mahat, ‘The Loss of Arun HI”, Nepal Study Center, 
University of New Mexico,
http://nepalstudycenter.unm.edu/MissPdfFiles/The%20Loss%20of%20Arun%20III 
Revised.pdf, accessed 13 July 2009.
16 Pratap Chatterjee, “No reconsideration of Arun HI: Wolfensohn”, Inter Press Service, reported in The 
N epal D igest, 23 October 1995; “Premier Unhappy with World Bank Cancellation of Hydropower 
Project”, text of report by Radio Nepal, 9 August 1995, reported by The N epal D igest, 13 August 1995; 
See also World Bank, “Memorandum of the President of the International Development Association to 
the Executive Directors on a Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report of the World Bank Group for 
the Kingdom of Nepal”, 18 November 2002. The report indicates that cancellation of the project 
“generated wide negative publicity for the Bank” in Nepal and that “even in 2002 there is frequent 
mention of the Bank and this particular project in the Nepali press”.
17 See press release by Lori Udall, Washington Director, International Rivers Network, “Arun HI 
Hydroelectric Project In Nepal: Another World Bank Debacle?”, 1 March 1995.
18“Meeting on Hydro Project Held in Nepal”, The N epal D igest, 10 August 1995. See also World Bank 
press release, “World Bank and Nepal to Develop Alternatives to Arun Project”, 3 August 1995.
212
had initiated and even pushed for the project to be reopened after its cancellation.19 In 
short, there was no evidence that the project was opposed by a majority of the 
Nepalese people or by a majority of people living in the Arun Valley. To the contrary, 
the project seemed to have significant support except among a minority of political 
elites based in the nation’s capital.
Outcomes
As the Inspection Panel moved to review the Arun IE claim, the Bank’s management 
submitted new plans to bring the project into full compliance with the Bank’s social 
and environmental safeguards. The final Inspection Panel report concluded that, with 
these modifications, the Arun HI project was in compliance with the Bank’s own 
policies. Although the panel expressed some reservations regarding the Nepalese 
government’s capacity to implement the project as planned, it affirmed that the project 
was “moving towards and intends to comply in substance with the requirements of [the 
Bank’s] operational directives”.20
Nonetheless, Jim Wolfensohn, who became Bank President in 1995, was 
extremely sensitive to the international NGO campaign. NGO representatives, 
including some Nepalese anti-dam campaigners who had traveled to the US, had met 
with US legislators sitting on the Congressional subcommittees overseeing Bank 
funding (Udall 1998 p. 441). While there is no record of an explicit congressional 
threat linking Arun HI with further cuts to Bank funding, the Bank was already waiting 
for the release of IDA contributions withheld by the US. In October 1995,
Wolfensohn was publicly begging Congress to continue IDA funding. The new 
Republican-led Congress had cut the second year IDA-10 disbursement by 50 per cent, 
and was refusing to enter into negotiations for the IDA-11 replenishment. Oxfam 
International, the Forum of African Voluntary Development Organizations, and 
InterAction joined Wolfensohn in his appeal, but organizations like the Rainforest 
Action Network remained strongly opposed.21
19 Pratap Chatterjee, “No reconsideration of Arun HI: Wolfensohn”, Inter Press Service, reported in The 
N epal D igest, 23 October 1995. See also “Premier Unhappy with World Bank Cancellation of 
Hydropower Project”, text of report by Radio Nepal, 9 August 1995, reported by The N epal Digest, 13
August 1995.
20 World Bank, Accountability a t the W orld Bank: The Inspection Panel Ten Years On, pp. 56-7. See 
also World Bank press release, ‘World Bank and Nepal to Develop Alternatives to Arun Project”, 3 
August 1995.
21 Lobe, Jim “Finance: IDA on the Edge” Washington, Inter Press Service, 9 October 1995.
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Wolfensohn was also just beginning his tenure at the World Bank. He was 
determined to put his own stamp on the institution and move beyond its recent 
negative publicity (Mallaby 2004; Rich 2003). The Bank’s public image had been 
badly scarred by the fallout over the Sardar Sarovar project and Wolfensohn “was not
99interested in inheriting the problematic projects of earlier presidents”. Thus, when 
the Inspection Panel gave tentative approval to the Arun III project, Wolfensohn 
commissioned his own review. On the basis of the results of this additional 
investigation, Wolfensohn made a unilateral decision to cancel the project in 1996. 
Ironically, Wolfensohn’s review “confirmed that the environmental and social 
mitigation actions that were currently stipulated in the proposed project were 
satisfactory”.23 Instead, Wolfensohn indicated that he was concerned that the Nepalese 
government would be unable to meet implementation standards established by the 
Bank after the project’s original approval; that building the dam and continuing to 
provide social services would require tax increases in Nepal which the government 
might struggle to implement, and that “some cofinancing partners did not feel that they 
were in a position to commit the necessary funds within the next 12-18 months”.24
The cancellation caused significant outrage in Nepal.25 Even one of the 
members of the Arun Concerned Group later admitted that, “after the cancellation, 
there was widespread panic that Nepal would perhaps end up in darkness since the one
9project that had been in preparation for eight years was suddenly no more”. 
International civil society actors, however, hailed the outcome as a major success.
They saw the cancellation as legitimating the authority of the Inspection Panel.27 The
22 Report by Environmental Defense Fund, Friends of the Earth, and International Rivers Network, 
“Gambling with People’s Lives: What the World Bank’s New ‘High-Risk/High-Reward’ Strategy 
Means for the Poor and the Environment”, September 2003.
23 World Bank press release, “World Bank and Nepal to Develop Alternatives to Arun Project”, 3 
August 1995.
24 Ibid.
25 World Bank, “Memorandum of the President of the International Development Association to the 
Executive Directors on a Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report of the World Bank Group for the 
Kingdom of Nepal”, 18 November 2002.
26 Statement by Bikash Pandey (Alliance for Energy, Nepal) to the World Bank Board of Executive 
Directors, “Experience with the Arun (Nepal) Claim”, 3 February 1998.
27 Bank Information Center, “BIC Toolkit for Activists: Issue 3. The World Bank's Policy Framework: 
The ‘Safeguard’ Policies, Compliance and the Independent Inspection Panel”. Available at 
http://www.bicusa.org/en/Article.295.aspx, accessed 14 July 2009. See also the Center for International 
Environmental Law, “Brief Summaries of Inspection Panel Claims”, 
http://www.ciel.Org/Ifi/ifibs.html#Arun, accessed 14 July 2009.
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success of the claim encouraged other groups to submit claims to the Inspection Panel 
(Bissell 1998 p. 40).28
Relevance for the Thesis
The Arun IE case study supports several of the key theories proposed in this thesis, 
particularly with regards to the mechanisms of civil society influence and the impact of 
global advocacy on citizen representation at the World Bank. While civil society
thparticipation was much narrower than during the 10 IDA, the same basic patterns of 
behavior and impact hold true.
Civil society position-taking: It seems clear that many of the organizations 
involved in protesting the Arun El dam were pursuing pre-existing, ideologically- 
informed goals. International environmental organizations perceived the campaign 
against the Arun IE to be a continuation of a larger, global anti-dam campaign. It was 
also part of a continued attack on the World Bank and its support for infrastructure 
development. Lastly, it was seen as a crucial opportunity to vindicate the Inspection 
Panel mechanism by proving that the Inspection Panel could genuinely overturn Bank 
policy. Anti-dam campaigners emphasized their partnership with local NGOs. 
However, even the international campaigners largely focused on the potential negative 
economic impacts of the dam on Nepal, rather than highlighting the project’s impact 
on a marginalized population as they had for campaigns against other projects, like 
Polonoroeste, Indonesian Transmigration, or Sardar Sarovar.
Even local NGOs acknowledged that the project had widespread support and 
that their economic concerns were not shared by the majority of Nepal’s population. 
They added their economic complaints to the four appeal requests they received from 
project-affected villagers, and when the panel refused to evaluate the economic 
complaints, the Nepalese NGOs sought to withdraw the entire claim.
In short, neither local nor international civil society organizations were 
responding directly to widely held stakeholder concerns. Both local and international 
civil society organizations were pursuing pre-existing agendas, so much so, in the case 
of local NGOs, that they attempted to drop the complaints of project-affected people
28 Cf. David Hunter, “The Planafloro Claim”, http://www.ciel.org/Ifi/planafl.html, accessed 14 July 
2009; Bank Information Center, “BIC Toolkit for Activists: Issue 3. The World Bank's Policy 
Framework: The ‘Safeguard’ Policies, Compliance and the Independent Inspection Panel”. Available at 
http://www.bicusa.org/en/Article.295.aspx, accessed 14 July 2009.
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when those no longer served the NGOs’ purposes. At best, local and international civil 
society acted in a paternalistic fashion, advancing a ‘we know best’ agenda in spite of 
local opposition. At worst, they treated local peoples as a mere vehicle for pursuing 
pre-existing interests.
Choosing to participate: As in the EDA-10, material interests seem to have 
played some role in organizations' decisions to participate in the Arun HI campaign. 
Several of the major US-based NGOs working on the campaign, including 
International Rivers, Environmental Defense Fund, and Friends of the Earth, were 
receiving funds from the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation. International Rivers, in 
particular, was receiving foundation funding designed to facilitate coordination. Many 
of the organizations involved were apparently also following up on their investment in 
the 10th IDA protests by making sure that the World Bank Inspection Panel became an 
effective tool for advocacy in its debut appeal. Organizations like International Rivers 
or the Environmental Defense Fund were also advancing an anti-dam agenda for which 
they already had donor or member support. Local Nepalese NGOs opposing the 
project had their own political agenda, as demonstrated by the fact that they sought to 
withdraw their claim when the political components of it were denied inclusion in the 
appeal.
The material interests of Nepalese NGOs seem to be less clear. As noted, 
however, they represented a Kathmandu-based population, which may explain why 
they chose to precipitate a campaign that was largely opposed by the rest of the 
country. Also, their attempt to withdraw the Inspection Panel claim when it no longer 
suited their agenda indicates, as described in Chapter 4, that organizations prefer to 
engage only in those activities likely to yield a good return (in terms of publicity, 
member or donor support, or policy success) on their investment of time and resources.
In summary, the data do not prove conclusively that material interests 
determined participation for all organizations. However, the idea that organizations 
participate in advocacy when their participation is funded or when they anticipate a 
high return on investment matches with the patterns of participation observed.
Mechanisms of influence: Civil society activism surrounding the Arun HI did 
enhance some means of citizen access at the World Bank, but the most powerful 
channels remained the exclusive domain of international NGOs based in donor 
countries. NGO activity helped increase the Bank’s transparency, and there is little 
question that civil society activity helped define and expand the mechanisms of
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accountability and dialogue. Developing the role of the Inspection Panel was 
extremely important. International civil society pressure, which built on the recent 
success of the anti-Sardar Sarovar effort, ensured that the appeal was heard. By 
creating a precedent for citizen influence and accountability via the Inspection Panel, 
civil society enriched the possibilities of citizen control over the institution. That 
citizen control, however, was still not equally distributed.
International civil society organizations played a disproportionate role in the 
campaign. As noted, they became involved in order to advance pre-existing agendas. 
They depicted a small group of Nepalese elites pursuing a political agenda as a local 
movement fighting for the well-being of project-affected people and the national 
populace. Civil society pressure also appeared to play a key role in Wolfensohn’s 
decision to cancel the project. As noted, Wolfensohn sought to break free from the 
broader pattern of civil society attacks on the Bank and to begin restoring its public 
image. He did this in part by initiating dialogues with NGOs and seeking to heed their 
criticism on controversial projects and policies (Rich 2002; cf. Mallaby 2004). He was 
also fighting for the full release of the remaining US funds promised for the IDA-10, 
while US environmental organizations sought to obstruct their release. His reasons for 
canceling the project, including concerns regarding implementation and Nepal’s tax 
regime, closely paralleled the economic concerns put forward by the campaigners. In 
this way, well-connected international civil society actors and a small Nepalese 
minority were able to force changes in Bank policy, despite pro-dam popular sentiment 
in Nepal and the will of the Nepalese government.
Local representation: A number of the NGOs involved in the Arun HI 
campaign have justified their actions by claiming that they were acting in the best 
interests of the Nepalese people. Such assertions are common in civil society activism 
and it is important to note that they are irrelevant to the question of democracy. The 
unique feature of democracy is that the people themselves, however misguided or 
benighted, are entitled to determine their own collective best interest, albeit indirectly, 
via their chosen representatives. Once an unelected minority is empowered to 
determine the collective good, governance has ceased to function democratically.
As noted, there is no evidence that the civil society organizations of the anti­
dam campaign represented a majority of local stakeholders, that is, Nepalese citizens. 
Instead, media accounts, local politics, and the Bank’s own assessments suggest that 
the project had significant local support. Moreover, there is little indication that civil
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society organizations acted to protect the recognized rights of a disadvantaged 
minority. To the contrary, the Arun Concerned Group sought to drop the appeal to the 
Inspection Panel once it was clear that the panel would consider only alleged 
violations of the rights of project-affected people.
International organizations, while making occasional mention of complaints 
among citizens along the dam access road, also largely emphasized economic issues. 
These international organizations partnered with the local NGOs of the Arun 
Concerned Group, but they apparently did so because the group’s agenda 
complemented the pre-existing goals of the international actors.
In spite of a lack of grassroots support, the anti-dam campaign used 
international influence and the Inspection Panel mechanism to challenge the policies of 
two different democratically elected governments. While permitting the Inspection 
Panel investigation might have been justified as a necessary adherence to Bank 
policies, but the Panel investigation did not conclude that the project needed to be 
canceled. Wolfensohn’s decision to cancel the project despite the findings of the 
Inspection Panel disregarded local democratic processes in favor of capitulation to 
NGO pressure. INHURED and other Nepalese actors clearly had a democratic right to 
contest the decisions of their government. However, the involvement of international 
allies and the use of the Inspection Panel moved the locus of decision making from the 
local to the international realm, where most Nepalese citizens lacked power or voice. 
Powerful international activism undermined the ability of the Nepalese government to 
carry out development in the manner it saw fit.
The bottom line is that civil society’s collective role in the Arun IE project 
produced mixed results. At the international level, it helped create the liberal 
environment necessary for democracy to flourish by fostering transparency, 
accountability, and dialogue, as well as stakeholder control over the World Bank. 
However civil society failed to foster equal authority among stakeholders or to 
improve stakeholder representation. To the contrary, civil society represented only a 
small Nepalese minority and along with many environmentally interested citizens from 
donor countries. Locally, results were similar. Local civil society organizations, with 
some outside assistance, fostered public dialogue within Nepal. However, 
international civil society ultimately reinforced the power of a small group of local 
elites and used international mechanisms to overturn the will of a democratic 
government.
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Country Systems for Procurement: 2007-2008
In 2008 the World Bank’s board of directors approved a plan, generated by Bank staff, 
to allow borrowers to use their own national systems to conduct procurement and 
manage finances for Bank-funded projects. In principle, the new policy will 
incentivize institutional reform, increase local ownership of projects, and facilitate 
donor harmonization. However, the policy raised substantial concerns from civil 
society about ways in which the use of national processes might facilitate corruption 
and undercut aid effectiveness. The lobbying against the policy during 2007-2008, 
while ultimately unsuccessful, demonstrates a number of the dynamics seen in the 
IDA-10, especially the reliance of activists on donor government influence. The case 
study is less robust than the 10th IDA, because it involves less than 10 CSOs, in 
comparison to the IDA’s 41. However, it does have some interesting attributes. At 
one level, it is interesting to study a case in which civil society failed in its objectives, 
since much of the literature on civil society and the World Bank has focused on 
successful campaigns. At another level, the case is interesting because it involves the 
Global Civil Society Team. Lastly, the case highlights the power of commercial actors 
who, although not traditionally considered part of civil society, worked alongside civil 
society on the country systems protest and manifested many of the same trends and 
tendencies.
Business and the World Bank
The involvement of business requires some explanation. The information 
liberalization measures forced on the Bank by civil society in 1993 had the unintended 
effect of making the Bank significantly more business-friendly. In 1990, the Bank’s 
phone directory was considered a confidential document. Within the decade, however, 
interested parties could use the Bank’s own website to identify the task team leader or 
project manager responsible for any given project. The Bank’s switchboard answered 
calls to the Bank’s main line and freely gave out the extensions of the requested staff 
before connecting the call. Project information appeared online, including preliminary 
Project Information Documents (PIDs) and more detailed Project Appraisal 
Documents (PADs). Such documents allowed companies to spot opportunities to sell 
goods and services to the World Bank. As a result, Bank-funded projects became a
219
potential beachhead for an increasing number of corporations looking to expand 
operations into the developing world.
During the same period, internal Bank assessments of its procurement and 
financial management procedures identified significant shortcomings (Pallas and 
Wood 2009 p. 216). The resulting policy changes increased the transparency and 
accountability mechanisms functioning in the purchase of goods and services for Bank 
projects, and raised Bank procurement procedures to the level of a ‘gold standard’. 
They were widely acknowledged to be the best in the world, even when compared with 
national governments. The result was that industry access to commercial opportunities 
through the Bank substantially widened, resulting in significantly increased business 
interest in Bank policy. As businesses began to recognize ways in which the Bank’s 
country systems proposal might limit the transparency and accountability that 
facilitated competition among potential suppliers, businesses began lobbying the Bank 
and allied themselves with some of the civil society organizations pursuing the same 
agenda.29
Background o f the Country Systems Policy
Country systems had its genesis in 2002 at the UN International Conference on 
Financing for Development. The conference resulted in the Monterrey Consensus, 
which committed donors to increase the quantity of aid, streamline funding processes, 
and address borrower governance problems.30 The OECD Development Assistance 
Committee (OECD-DAC) responded by setting up a working group on these issues. 
The Bank joined with the working group to develop a set of standards for evaluating 
borrower procurement procedures, since procurement (the purchasing of goods and 
services) was one of major governance issues affecting aid disbursement. In 2004 the 
Joint Venture for Procurement developed a benchmarking tool to assess borrower 
procurement procedures. After several revisions, this tool was became known as the 
‘OECD-DAC 3’.
29 Business interests were represented primarily by associations, such as the Federation of German 
Industries (BDI) and the US Council for International Business. Development Finance International 
(DFI), a DC-based consultancy serving corporations seeking to engage with the Bank, also played a 
prominent role. Some individual corporations participated directly; for instance, General Electric sent a 
representative to 10 December 2007 consultation in Washington, DC. Sources indicate alliances 
between civil society and business occurred through industry proxies, rather than with the 
representatives of individual corporations. For more details, see page 222.
30 UNESA, “Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for Development”, 
2004.
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The working group also convened a meeting of multilateral development 
banks, governments, and nonprofit donors, predominantly from the global North. Held 
in 2005, the meeting produced the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which 
called for increased aid harmonization, local ownership of development decisions, and 
the wider use of country systems. Donor harmonization refers to cooperation among 
donors, especially the use of common standards among donors for grant applications, 
reporting, and other aspects of aid bureaucracy. Aid recipients frequently face unique 
standards from each donor, resulting in a huge drain on staff time and finances, which 
can undercut their ability to manage projects well. By linking harmonization, 
ownership, and country systems, the Paris Declaration proposed a magic bullet of 
sorts: countries would use their own systems for procurement in all aid projects, 
resulting in greater local control and a common standard for use in all aid-financed 
spending.
The use of country systems for procurement was developed as a proposal for a 
change in Bank policy and submitted to the Bank’s board. The proposal, however, met 
with strenuous opposition from civil society and industry. Opponents in the US and 
Europe questioned whether replacing the Bank’s existing guidelines was even 
necessary.31 They also expressed concern that the OECD-DAC 3 tool was too weak to 
identify crucial flaws in borrowing country procedures and that the use of country 
systems would facilitate corruption and mismanagement. Bank management 
reluctantly withdrew the proposal from board consideration. It revised the 
benchmarking tool and resubmitted the proposal in 2007.
Renewed Protest
The Bank’s stated rationale for reintroducing the proposal was its belief that the use of 
local procurement procedures would develop local ownership and simplify lending. At 
the same time, it argued that the need to assess existing national systems would give 
the Bank grounds for evaluating a borrower’s governance practices and making 
recommendations for their improvement. Thus harmonization and good governance 
would develop simultaneously.32
31 See, for example, UK NGO Meeting with Executive Director Tom Scholar, 14 December 2004. 
Accessed at http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-90445, 19 February 2009.
32 Operations Policy and Country Services, “Use of Country Systems in Bank-Supported Operations -  
Status Report (Incorporating R2007-0079 and R2007-0079/3)”, 9 October 2007, pp. 1-3.
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Nonetheless, critics of the proposal, including large manufacturers, anti­
corruption watchdogs, and labor advocates, suspected that the Bank’s management 
was motivated by a desire to maintain market share. At one time, the Bank had been 
one of the only sources of development financing available for poor nations. By 2000, 
however, a large number of private financial institutions had become involved in 
sovereign lending. New bilateral donors, like India and China, were also becoming 
more active. Newer lenders required fewer conditions than did the Bank, giving them 
an advantage in making deals with developing country governments. The Bank was 
also facing significant pressure from some of its more powerful borrowers, countries 
like Brazil and Russia, to allow them to use their own procurement and financial 
management systems. The concern that the Bank was acting to maintain market share 
seemed well grounded: at one of the later country systems meetings, a senior Bank 
staff member opined that the new proposal was necessary for the Bank to “stay 
relevant”.
As a result of competition with other lenders, opponents feared, the Bank was 
engaging in a race to the bottom. Rather than focusing on improving borrower 
governance, the Bank was developing ways of sidestepping its own guidelines. Such 
fears were reinforced by two additional facts. The new benchmarking tool introduced 
in 2007 seemed weaker than the rejected OECD-DAC 3, a problem the Bank even 
admitted in one early meeting (although it later retracted the statement). The Bank 
also planned to keep the results of the borrowers’ systems evaluations confidential and 
to make confidential any agreed upon plan of remediation. Thus there would be no 
means of observing how the Bank applied the new standards, nor any means of 
verifying that the Bank was actually enforcing any borrower promises to upgrade their 
procedures. This latter point was particularly important, since the Bank proposed 
giving even some of those borrowers who failed to pass the benchmarking test 
conditional approval to use their own systems (Pallas and Wood 2009 pp. 221-2).
Opponents of the proposal made their displeasure known through the Bank’s 
donor governments. In response to potential opposition from the board, especially the 
US Executive Director, the Bank’s management announced that it would open the 
proposal for public consultation before submitting it to the board for final approval 
(Pallas and Wood 2009 p. 224).
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The Consultation Process
The Bank department responsible for the country systems proposal was Operations 
Policy and Country Services (OPCS). In response to the board’s demands, OPCS staff 
set up dozens of meetings with governments, industry, and civil society in Africa, 
Europe, Southeast Asia, Latin America, and the United States between September and 
December 2007. Many of these meetings were billed as public consultations.
The consultations helped establish a dialogue between the Bank and the 
industry and civil society members interested in the proposal. Usually either Bernard 
Becq, the Bank’s Chief Procurement Policy Officer, or Peter Harrold of OPCS 
attended each consultation. Civil society efforts were led by Transparency 
International and the International Labor Organization (ILO). The Bretton Woods 
Project, a watchdog group based in London, also played a role, as did Christian Aid. 
Industry-based civil society groups like the American Society of Civil Engineers also 
acted as advocates for their members. Commercial bodies such as the Federation of 
German Industries (BDI) and US-based National Association of Manufacturers 
(NAM) helped coordinate meetings between their members and the Bank. Many 
individual commercial concerns, including firms like General Electric and Philips, also 
advocated for their own interests, although some of these withdrew from the process as 
it lost momentum.34
The Bank expressed a strong interest in the public feedback it received. In a 
consultation in New York in December 2007, Bank staff stated that they welcomed the 
criticism they were receiving about the substance of the proposal. They added that 
specific, detailed feedback was particularly important, implying that public comments 
would be taken into account in the final draft of the policy.35
In spite of such statements, the consultations appeared to have little immediate 
impact. Although the Bank claimed to welcome public input, the staff posture at 
public consultations was defensive. The Bank’s responses to its critics changed 
regularly. Initially the Bank defended the latest version of the OECD-DAC
33 Bretton Woods Project, “World Bank and procurement: Development tool or TNC sop?”, 1 April 
2008. Accessed at http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-561019, 10 March 2009.
34 For more detailed notes on business participation, see meeting reports available at 
http://go.worldbank.org/B9QAG7P2X0. Viewed 19 July 2010.
35 Author’s coverage of the public consultation, New York, NY, 14 December 2007.
36 Author’s coverage of the public consultations in Washington, DC, 10 December and 13 December 
2007, and the public consultation in New York, NY, 14 December 2007, plus conversations with others 
present at additional consultations.
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benchmarking tool. When industry developed a detailed critique of the tool,37 
highlighting the numerous ways in which it was weaker than current Bank policy, 
Bank staff switched tacks. They began to emphasize that the evaluation of borrowers’ 
governance systems would be a three-stage process, of which the OECD-DAC 
benchmarking would only be the first phase. It would be followed by something the 
Bank called ‘paragraph-by-paragraph’ comparison, a qualitative process designed to 
assess borrower systems in detail. This would be followed by a computer-based 
modeling of the risk of system failure. However, these parts of the policy had not 
actually been written yet. They existed only as summary proposals. As such, they 
were easy to defend. The Bank responded to criticisms of the OECD-DAC 
benchmarking phase by saying that problems with this Phase 1 review would be dealt 
with in the Phase 2 and Phase 3 evaluations. The Bank responded to incipient 
criticism of Phase 2 and Phase 3 by arguing that opponents did not understand what 
the final product would look like.
Bank staff also mishandled the consultations themselves. Although most 
consultations were public, the Bank failed to release records of most of its meetings. 
Even though OPCS made audio recordings of many of the meetings, it refused to 
release recordings or transcripts of even the public consultations. Instead, it insisted 
on writing summary reports of each gathering. On several occasions these summaries 
were contested by the meetings’ participants. The BDI, for instance, complained that 
the Bank had downplayed the concerns of German businesses in one BDI-facilitated 
discussion. The report on a meeting with civil society in Washington, DC entirely 
omitted concerns raised by the DLO about labor standards. Many meetings never 
received a public report at all. Likewise, electronic comments sent to a website set up 
for the purpose were not published or publicly responded to (Pallas and Wood 2009 
pp. 226-7).
The Bank’s Global Civil Society Team was conscious of the problems in the 
consultation. Team members helped coordinate the DC meeting with civil society and 
attended the consultation. They were aware of the issues with the website feedback 
and more general problems with the consultation. In general, they felt that the OPCS 
team had not adhered to the Bank’s best practice on civil society consultations. 
According to a source familiar with these issues, the Global Civil Society Team’s role
37 DFI played a particularly prominent role in this process. See DFI PowerPoint attached to Bank report 
of 10 December 2010 consultation at http://go.worldbank.org/B9QAG7P2X0. Viewed 19 July 2010.
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was to assist Bank operational units in how to design and carry out consultations with 
CSOs on the proposed country systems on procurement policies. They also worked to 
guide Bank staff on their interaction with civil society. However, while they could 
identify and suggest best practices, they did not have the mandate to enforce them, as 
the Bank’s participation polices were not mandatory.
The country systems staff had designated a four-month period for public 
consultation, and they used this to their advantage. By holding dozens of consultations 
all over the world, they established a strong record of dialogue with key stakeholders. 
Yet because the minutes of the meetings were withheld or redacted, and the final text 
of the proposal was not yet written, the consultations created little record of public 
objections. When challenged about the missing meeting reports and the incomplete 
proposal, Bank staff replied that their commitment to extensive public commentary 
had used up the staff time that otherwise could have been used on reporting or policy 
writing.
Q O
This tactic overwhelmed most opposition from organizations like the ILO and 
Christian Aid. These organizations had never coordinated a joint policy position; 
instead, each pursued its usual agenda. The ILO pushed for labor standards to be 
included in the new system. Transparency International worked for greater 
transparency. Christian Aid emphasized local control over key decisions. Lobbying 
tactics were the subject of even less intra-civil society consultation.
Industry however, pushed back hard against the Bank. Individual corporations 
and industry-based civil society organizations worked to canvas the consultations and 
establish an independent record of the public meetings. Transparency International 
also allied itself with this effort.
This group of opponents also developed detailed criticisms of the proposal, 
which they shared with key staff in the US government.40 This apparently unnerved 
the OPCS staff, who requested meetings with the chief critics in January, after the
38 The ILO is a tripartite organization representing the interests of labor, business, and government. 
Representatives, however, attended the Washington consultation with civil society, where they focused 
particularly on the potential impact of UCS on labor standards.
9 Key participants shared with the author internal correspondence demonstrating this effort. See also 
World Bank: Country Systems Consultations: Summary of Feedback. Available at 
http://go.worldbank.org/B9QAG7P2X0. Viewed 19 July 2010.
40 One such criticism, authored by DFI, can be seen online at:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROCUREMENT/Resources/ConsultationTranscript- 
Presentation-HQ.pps. Viewed 19 July 2010. Evidence of discussions with government staff comes 
from author’s correspondence with key participants.
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consultation period had ended. The proposal that resulted called for a very limited 
implementation of the new system on a pilot basis and the creation of a Technical 
Working Group involving civil society, industry, and government representatives 
which would monitor and evaluate the implementation.
Opponents were still dissatisfied, however, and made their case directly to the 
US Treasury. Treasury staff had been monitoring the proposal and attending some of 
the consultations,41 but the Treasury had yet to take a public stand. Treasury Deputy 
Undersecretary Clay Lowery agreed to a meeting with the policy’s opponents to allow 
them to make their case. The morning of the meeting, however, coincided with the 
bankruptcy announcement of the Lehman Brothers investment bank. According to one 
of the participants in the meeting, the deputy undersecretary paid scant attention to the 
industry and civil society presentation while he sent and received messages on his 
Blackberry. Several days later, he told Bank staff that he thought that American 
industry was basically in agreement with the proposal and that the US would support 
it.
Once Bank staff realized that the proposal’s opponents lacked US support, they 
rapidly revised the country systems proposal. Two days before the Bank’s board voted 
on the proposal, they attached a confidential addendum to the policy undercutting 
previous concessions, reducing the authority and scope of the Technical Working 
Group. The oversight role of civil society in particular was weakened. The board 
approved the policy in April 2008, and by 2009 Bank staff were planning to implement 
the ‘pilot’ as widely as possible.
Relevance to the Thesis
In spite of the weak impact of civil society on the World Bank’s final country systems 
policy, civil society and its industry allies still had a profound effect upon the process. 
Like the Arun ID dam, this case study confirms several of the thesis’ core hypotheses.
Civil society behavior: As in the IDA-10, the civil society organizations that 
met with Bank staff each pressed their own agenda. This led to largely atomized 
behavior. The ILO focused almost exclusively on labor standards. Transparency 
International focused on prior review and other means of limiting corruption.
Christian Aid seemed ambivalent about the proposal and openly supported some
41 Including the 10 December 2007 meeting in Washington, DC at which DFI presented its detailed 
critique of the proposal.
226
elements of local control. Professional organizations like the ASCE focused on rules 
governing consulting contracts of the sort often sought by their members. It is also 
interesting to note that environmental organizations were involved in protesting the use 
of country systems for social and environmental safeguards in 2004.42 However, they 
refrained from involvement in the debate over the use of country systems for 
procurement. This pattern is in keeping with the IDA-10 finding that organizations’ 
interests and policy positions reflect their core mission or ideology.
The civil society organizations involved in the issue also lacked coordination, 
despite their small numbers. During the meetings I attended, the civil society 
organizations present appeared to have no prior knowledge of one another’s interests 
or goals in the consultation, nor did the representatives attending appear to use the 
consultations to establish relations with one another. At a tactical level, only 
Transparency International and some of the professional organizations allied 
themselves with business groups and participated in some of the additional meetings 
arranged between opponents of the policy and Bank and government officials.
The contrast between industry and civil society is informative. Industry 
lobbying of the Bank was initially highly coordinated, because industry shared a set of 
financial incentives. As certain actors began to sense that the Bank was unwilling to 
yield on the policy (and thus that the efforts spent on lobbying would yield a poor 
return on investment), they backed out of the process individually. In this regard, 
industry participation in activism, with its clear material links, was similar to the 
participation of civil society during the IDA-10.
Mechanisms of influence: As in the 10th IDA and Arun III cases, the country 
system activists reinforced a number of channels for citizen influence at the World 
Bank. The most profound of these was dialogue. Because of civil society pressure, 
dozens of dialogues were held in Bank donor and borrower nations, and included 
government, industry, and civil society.
Opponents of the policy change also helped enhance the Bank’s transparency. 
They canvassed meetings, exchanged information, and sought to establish a clear 
record of the Bank staff’s actions and statements about the new policy. Their effort to
42 See Bretton Woods Project, “UK NGO meeting with Executive Director Tom Scholar”, 14 December 
2004. Accessed at http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-90445,14 July 2009. See also Bank 
Information Center, “Country Systems Approach to World Bank Social and Environmental Safeguards: 
Concerns and Challenges”, 2 December 2004. Accessed at http://www.bicusa.org/en/Article.1775.aspx, 
14 July 2009.
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correct inaccuracies in the Bank’s public record of various meetings both aided 
transparency and made the Bank accountable for distortions in the record.
That being said, the activists continued to rely on donor power. It was pressure 
from the US executive director, prompted by industry and civil society, that was the 
primary impetus for the massive dialogue effort. Likewise, when the Bank realized 
that activists had lost US government support for changes in the new policy, the OPCS 
staff felt free to renege on many of the promises that they had made to civil society and 
industry. In this regard, the country systems debate presents an interesting null-case 
confirmation of this thesis’ hypotheses. Not only can it be shown that civil society 
lobbying succeeds primarily via the influence of the Bank’s donor states; when civil 
society activism lacks donor state influence, it fails.
The role of the Global Civil Society Team also highlights the importance of 
donor power. The GCS Team is tasked specifically with developing dialogue between 
Bank staff and outside parties. To a certain extent, the team also develops 
transparency, by recommending best practices for dialogues or exposing the Bank’s 
internal workings to outsiders looking for access. However, the mere development of 
norms was not enough to give the team authority. During the donor-mandated country 
systems negotiations, the GCS Team succeeded in facilitating or enhancing dialogue. 
However, the dialogues had relatively little effect on the final policy or on the long­
term behavior of the OPCS team. Even in the area of transparency, the GCS Team’s 
knowledge of best practices and its job as designated intermediary between civil 
society and the Bank gave it little traction. Instead, OPCS staff consistently misstated 
or withheld comments generated in the dialogues. Once the threat of board scrutiny 
was lifted, OPCS staff also restructured the Technical Work Group to limit its 
oversight.
In short, the country systems case confirms that much of civil society’s impact 
on the World Bank passes through donor governments. Although civil society utilized 
and reinforced practices of dialogue and transparency, these things themselves, even 
when aided by advocates within the Bank, were insufficient to effect policy change. 
When Bank staff feared donor opprobrium, they incorporated civil society suggestions. 
When staff felt the danger had passed, they ignored outside input almost entirely.
Civil society’s strength was directly related to its ability to persuade donor government 
agents to support its positions.
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Borrower governments and local representation: Unfortunately, the country 
systems case tells us relatively little about civil society and borrower governments or 
other modes of local representation. Ultimately the Bank provided very little 
information on its consultations in developing countries. Moreover, the inaccuracies 
in the records it provided from Europe and North America undermine any confidence 
one might have in the accuracy of any data the Bank might provide. At the same time, 
the civil society organizations involved in the policy negotiations made few explicit 
claims to represent developing country citizens. This may reflect the fact that two of 
the major organizations involved, Transparency International and the ILO, are 
organizations whose authority is established by either their technocratic expertise or 
UN mandate. Thus the authority of their claims rests on something other than claims 
to developing world representation. It is also possible that claims of developing world 
representation would have been weak. Sources indicate that pressure from emerging- 
market borrowers was one of the major drivers of the Bank’s policy change, a fact 
Christian Aid and the Bretton Woods Project acknowledged.
Agency of the Bank: Although this thesis takes a critical approach to assertions 
of transnational civil society’s representivity, the behavior of Bank staff during the 
country systems proceedings show that the Bank is also in need of reform. Bank 
actions supported some perennial accusations made against the institution: namely, 
that Bank staff are focused on their own agendas, uninterested in outside input, and 
deal with the public in dubious or duplicitous ways.
The role of this thesis is not to judge the appropriateness of Bank behavior. 
However, the Bank’s ability to undermine activists’ efforts reflects the substantial 
agency of Bank staff (cf. Barnett and Finnemore 1999). The fact that the Bank 
suffered such a stunning loss in its battle with civil society during the 10th IDA can 
easily eclipse the fact that the Bank was able to do battle. It used its connections with 
IDA deputies and member governments to seek to preserve its existing policies and 
independence, even though it was largely unsuccessful in stopping the specific policy 
changes proposed at that time. In the case of country systems, the situation is clearer. 
Bank staff worked hard to escape civil society and industry influence in order to 
implement the policy they thought would best serve the institution and its clients.
Once donors, particularly the US, had withdrawn support for civil society, Bank 
autonomy became even more pronounced. This agency is important to note. Too 
much research on the World Bank treats the institution as though it were only passive
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or reactive. Accurate modeling of global governance must encompass the complex 
three-way interactions between governments, civil society, and the Bank.
In short, although the country systems case study is small and involved only a 
limited number of actors, it provides interesting support for several of the key ideas 
advanced in this thesis. The case study reinforces observations about the atomization 
of civil society and the tendency of civil society organizations to advance established 
agendas. The behavior of self-interested corporations in forming and breaking 
coalitions also provides interesting parallels to the IDA-10. Civil society, as in the 
IDA-10 and Arun HI cases, helped enhance democratic preconditions at the Bank by 
developing dialogue and transparency. However, failure of civil society in the absence 
of strong donor support confirms that much of civil society’s influence at the Bank 
passes via the governments of donor states. Finally, the case reinforces the agency of 
the Bank and indicates that civil society, government, and international institutions all 
play important roles in global governance.
Conclusions
No interaction between civil society and the World Bank equals the scale and scope of 
the 10th IDA negotiations. The convergence of development, social justice, and 
environmental concerns around the IDA-10 led to an unusually large and diverse 
assemblage of civil society organizations. This diversity provides a unique 
opportunity to analyze interactions between civil society organizations and compare 
their behavior and their claims. The patterns identified in the 10th IDA, however, 
continue to hold true in other interactions between civil society and the World Bank.
GCS Behavior and Motivation
The IDA-10 research indicates that civil society organizations tend to pursue pre-
i L
determined organizational objectives. During the 10 IDA, the policy agenda of any 
given organization was closely linked to its ideology or mission. Decisions to 
participate in activism were often linked to material interests, including the existence 
of funding for the activism or a potential return on investment in the form of publicity, 
membership, aid grants, and the like. The adherence to pre-existing goals undermined 
organizations’ claims to be responding to the needs or desires of stakeholders. At the 
same time, the role of financial incentives in participation impacted civil society’s 
collective influence. The composition of the larger group of civil society organizations
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involved in the activism reflected the various financial incentives associated with the 
IDA, including interested donors and members, and funding from the Bank or member 
governments. Moreover, organizations often competed for funding and influence, and 
only coordinated their efforts when there was a financial incentive to do so. There was 
little evidence of dialogue or compromise among organizations, except where dialogue 
was required by a shared donor.
The case study of the Arun HI dam reinforces these conclusions. The major 
international civil society organizations opposing the project did so as part of a larger 
agenda of opposing dam construction, reducing Bank influence, and establishing the 
validity of the Inspection Panel. Local Nepalese NGOs opposing the dam were 
motivated by their own particular vision for Nepal’s economic future. Neither 
international nor local civil society organizations seemed to be responding to the will 
of the majority of Nepalese citizens, nor were they working primarily to protect the 
rights of a marginalized minority within Nepal. Several of the international 
organizations involved received funding specifically for Bank reform work or had 
members who were committed to anti-dam environmentalism. Local NGOs drew their 
support mostly from the Kathmandu-dwelling elite. The hypothesis generated from 
the IDA-10, that material incentives determine participation, seems to also explain the 
pattern of participation observed in the Arun HI campaign.
In the case of the recent country systems negotiations between the World Bank, 
civil society, and industry, several of these patterns are again repeated. The small 
number of civil society organizations involved makes it difficult to draw broad 
conclusions regarding civil society competition or behavior. However, those civil 
society organizations which were involved each pursued their pre-existing agenda, 
addressing those elements of the proposal most closely linked to the mission of their 
organization. There also appeared to have been little dialogue among organizations.
Mechanisms o f Influence
thDuring the 10 IDA, civil society activists helped to develop or reinforce a number of 
avenues of citizen influence over the World Bank. Civil society organizations 
improved transparency by generating and publicizing information. They fostered 
accountability through protests, formal oversight mechanisms like the Inspection 
Panel, and via financial pressure from donor governments. Civil society also 
encouraged the Bank to engage in dialogue with stakeholders regarding projects and
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policies. These channels of influence, however, were sometimes dominated by 
powerful actors. Well-connected civil society organizations acted as gatekeepers, 
dominating dialogues with Bank staff or donor government politicians.
Donor government influence played a key role in the IDA-10. US pressure was 
instrumental in forcing two of the biggest changes in Bank policy: increased 
information disclosure and the creation of an independent Inspection Panel. However, 
those civil society organizations with strong political connections within the US or the 
power to influence domestic politics were able to utilize this government influence. 
This too concentrated civil society power in a small minority of civil society actors.
The cases of the Arun III dam and the country systems policy both confirm 
these patterns, albeit in distinct ways. In the case of the Arun LH dam, civil society 
made significant strides in advancing transparency and accountability. It pressured the 
World Bank to implement its new, liberalized information policy and pushed for the 
World Bank Inspection Panel to investigate the dam project. To a lesser extent, civil 
society engaged in dialogue, sometimes interacting directly with Bank president Jim 
Wolfensohn. However, civil society’s influence with the US government also played a 
key role, by allowing civil society to put pressure on the Bank’s funding. This 
pressure was one of the major factors influencing Bank president Wolfensohn in his 
decision to cancel the project.
During the country systems negotiations, civil society (along with industry) 
successfully advocated for a massive dialogue between interested parties and the 
World Bank, with dozens of meetings across the globe. Civil society and industry also 
worked together to increase transparency, collecting and sharing information on the 
various meetings and correcting inaccuracies in the World Bank’s account. 
Nonetheless, it was actually pressure from donor governments via their executive 
directors, particularly the US ED, that was most influential in spurring the dialogue. 
Moreover, when US government supporters became distracted by other domestic 
concerns and withdrew their support from the country systems opponents, the Bank 
reversed previous concessions.
Local Representation
The IDA-10 findings indicate that transnational civil society’s involvement in 
policymaking may limit the influence of developing country governments, even 
democratic ones, thereby reducing stakeholders’ ability to influence international
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policymaking via their governments. Civil society claims to represent large groups of 
borrower country citizens could not be substantiated and partnerships between 
international civil society organizations and local actors did little to reinforce claims to 
representivity. These trends were evident in the Sardar Sarovar campaign which 
intersected with and influenced the IDA-10 negotiations
The country systems case study is unable to either confirm or contradict this 
pattern. The lack of reliable information on developing country interests makes an 
assessment difficult, and an investigation of such interests on a global scale was 
beyond the scope of this thesis. The Arun III case, however, provides dramatic 
confirmation of the IDA-10 patterns. During the Arun in campaign, international anti­
dam activists latched onto local anti-dam NGOs despite the fact that they lacked any 
significant support nationally and were not primarily interested in protecting the rights 
of the people in the area where the dam was being built. Their activism resulted in 
Wolfensohn’s unilateral cancellation the project, despite the support shown by two 
different democratically elected Nepalese governments for the project.
Conclusion
The two additional case studies examined in this chapter provide new data that lend 
further support for the major findings of this thesis. The case studies of the Arun m  
dam and country systems policy reinforce the findings on the motivation and 
participation of transnational civil society organizations, their mechanisms of 
influence, and their mixed impact on stakeholder representation. The two cases also 
support the idea that civil society is an authority in the international system, acting as a 
means of stakeholder influence that exists alongside states and international 
institutions.
At the same time, the Arun IH and country systems case studies reinforce this 
thesis’ findings regarding the democratic legitimacy of transnational civil society in 
the context of the World Bank. The data continue to indicate that transnational civil 
society has democratic outputs in the form of improved citizen control over the Bank. 
However, the data also indicate that transnational civil society lacks democratic inputs. 
Stakeholders do not have equal authority in determining its policy positions, nor do 
they enjoy equal control over its means of influence, either directly or via 
representatives. Moreover, transnational civil society does not appear to improve the 
representation of many of those stakeholders currently marginalized in international
233
policymaking; instead, it often appears to reinforce the power of stakeholders in 
already powerful nations. This assessment and its relevance for the existing literature 
on transnational civil society and global governance are discussed in the final chapter.
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Chapter 8:
Civil Society and the Democratization of Global Governance
As anticipated in the introduction, this thesis contributes to the academic 
understanding of transnational civil society and the democratization of global 
governance at two levels: by generating new data and by addressing current theories. 
The thesis makes available new information on transnational civil society and the 
World Bank. Using extensive archival research and bringing to light information in 
privately held documents, intensive interviewing, and participant observation, this 
thesis presents a detailed picture of interactions between civil society, the World Bank, 
and donor governments, particularly the US. The research on the IDA-10 constitutes 
the first in-depth academic recounting of one of the major turning points in World 
Bank policy, thus filling in an important chapter in the history of the World Bank and 
civil society. The research on the use of country systems for procurement has also 
attracted early attention as one of the only detailed academic examinations of an 
important evolution in Bank policy.
This thesis’ central question engages directly with the academic literature. It 
asks: do data about the World Bank support the idea that civil society is democratizing 
global governance? To facilitate answering this central question, the beginning of this 
thesis posed six sub-questions. With regard to the three case studies in this thesis, it 
asked:
1. Which civil society organizations are involved?
2. How do civil society organizations interact with one another?
3. How do civil society organizations choose their policy positions?
4. What impact has civil society had on the World Bank?
5. By what mechanisms has impact been achieved?
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6. What impact does civil society have on the power o f developing country 
governments in transnational policymaking?
This chapter will begin by summarizing this thesis’ findings with regard to 
these sub-questions and how these findings support or challenge aspects of the existing 
theory. The thesis finds that civil society is much more atomized and contentious than 
commonly modeled. Organizations choose their policy positions on the basis of pre­
existing values and determine their participation in policymaking largely on material 
factors. Activism has created new channels for stakeholder influence at the World 
Bank, but power accrues to a minority of organizations with strong connections to the 
Bank’s donor governments. The organizations demonstrate only limited partnership 
with grassroots actors and may act to further marginalize developing country 
governments, thus limiting the representation of some stakeholders by other, non-civil 
society means.
The second part of this chapter uses these answers to draw conclusions 
regarding whether civil society is democratizing the World Bank. It finds that civil 
society makes a number of positive contributions to stakeholder influence over the 
World Bank, including increasing the Bank’s transparency and accountability. 
However, it concludes that civil society ultimately fails to democratize the Bank 
because it fails to improve, and potentially worsens, the inclusion and representation of 
the majority of the Bank’s stakeholders in Bank policymaking. Should these findings 
hold true elsewhere, they would indicate that civil society is not democratizing global 
governance.
The chapter will then discuss the implications of the North-South-North 
patterns of campaign formation at the World Bank for existing theory on global 
advocacy networks. Next, the chapter will note some limitations in the thesis and 
suggest an agenda for future academic research that tests and builds on this thesis’ 
conclusions. Finally, the chapter will discuss this thesis’ policy findings and lay out a 
series of policy recommendations for the Bank and civil society organizations, 
suggesting ways they can enhance the democratization of international policymaking 
by engaging a more representative cross-section of civil society.
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Transnational Civil Society and the World Bank
The introduction of this thesis outlined two schools of academic thought regarding 
civil society, one that suggested that civil society would remedy the democratic 
deficits present in global governance institutions like the World Bank and another 
which challenged the capacity of civil society to democratize global governance or 
even suggested that civil society might worsen existing imbalances in power between 
the citizens of poor and rich nations. The data generated in this thesis support and 
challenge some of the contentions of each school.
To begin, research on the World Bank confirms the contention that civil society 
is indeed global. In the case of the IDA-10, numerous organizations from both 
developing and industrialized nations took part. Participants in the IDA-10 included 
advocacy organizations, development actors, and faith-based organizations. Many 
participants were professional NGOs, but these came from both the global North 
(including North America, Europe, Japan, and Australia) and the global South 
(including Indonesia, Africa, and India). In the IDA-10, Southern NGOs were 
sometimes local actors recruited as partners by Northern-based international NGOs, 
but they also included networks of developing world organizations. The other case 
studies in this thesis also confirm the diversity of civil society, albeit to a lesser degree. 
A diverse group of Northern NGOs participated in the Arun HI dam project, although 
Southern civil society participation seems to have come exclusively from local, 
Nepalese NGOs. In the case of the country systems debate, actors from North 
America and Europe participated in the international-level policy discussions. From 
these cases it seems clear that transnational civil society has global reach and 
membership, and that actors from the global South can and do participate 
independently in some transnational policy advocacy. In this regard, the emphasis of 
academics from Lipschutz to Florini on civil society as an emerging, global 
phenomenon is well warranted (1992; 2000).
Civil society organizations, both individually and in the aggregate, seem to 
manifest certain behaviors and trends. Most of the civil society organizations studied 
in this thesis were subject to similar pressures and many had similar responses. 
Therefore the thesis uses the term ‘civil society’ to refer to civil society organizations 
collectively. The experience of this thesis indicates that it is possible to build theory 
regarding civil society, just as one can build theory regarding organizations or local 
governments.
237
Nonetheless, the data about the World Bank indicate that civil society is neither 
unified nor homogenous. Similarities in behavior should not be confused with unity or 
consensus. This thesis finds that civil society is highly atomized, with each 
organization pursuing its own goals or interests. Alliances may form where interests 
or goals overlap, as in the case of development NGOs during the IDA-10 or anti-dam 
environmentalists during the Arun ID campaign. Similar objectives may also give the 
superficial appearance of unity even where organizations have had no official dialogue 
or coordination, for instance, in the common opposition of Transparency International 
and the ILO to aspects of the country systems policy.
Individual organizations seem to choose their policy activities based on a 
combination of ideological and material concerns. Ideology may be the primary 
determinant of an organization’s policy interests, be they in environmental 
conservation or labor rights. However, ideology alone does not seem to predict 
advocacy. Rather, the decision to participate in activism and policymaking appears to 
be heavily influenced by funding. Securing and maintaining funding is fundamental to 
the survival of nonprofit organizations. Development organizations often have 
significant funding requirements, but even small advocacy actors need to pay staff and 
overhead. Because funding resources are invariably limited, organizations will choose 
to participate in those activities in which there is a high return on investment in terms 
of publicity, power, increased membership, or revenue. In all three cases covered in 
this thesis, advocacy organizations participated in activism and policymaking when it 
served to advance their core agenda, defined as the agenda for which their members or 
their donors supported them. In the case of the IDA-10 and Arun in dam, some 
organizations also received funding specifically for undertaking advocacy activities.
In the case of the IDA-10, the participation of development organizations seems to 
have been incentivized by the potential for new policies to result in financial benefits, 
or concerns that alternative policies might snowball into wider cuts in development 
aid. This behavior challenges the depiction of civil society organizations as essentially 
altruistic, acting as a global conscience or rescuing the voices of the oppressed (cf. 
Gryzbowski 2000; Willetts 1996). It also raises concerns about the capacity of civil 
society organizations to act as representatives for individuals who are not among their 
funders or members or, more broadly speaking, are not part of those populations from 
which the organizations draw their funding and membership (cf. Rischard 2002).
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Funding, as much or more than ideology, seems to contribute to the 
aforementioned atomization of transnational civil society. Few of the civil society 
staff involved in any of the cases in this thesis recounted meaningful dialogue between 
their organizations and other organizations. Funding appears to calcify ideological 
views, insofar as organizations received funding (from their members or foundations) 
to support a particular agenda or were otherwise lobbying in order to protect or 
advance their financial interest. Particularly during the IDA-10, CSO staff were fully 
aware of such pressures. They therefore perceived compromise as impossible and 
dialogue as a waste of time. Even actors from organizations with similar views 
expressed some tension with one another. Informants indicated that organizations with 
overlapping agendas competed for funding, at times making them disinclined to 
collaborate or share credit. Furthermore, in many instances, whether of opposing 
organizations or likeminded ones, support seems linked to participation in activism 
(taking a public stand, raising awareness, etc.), rather than policy success. This may 
also disincentivize compromise between organizations and contribute to individualistic 
behavior. The major exception to this trend is North-South partnerships, such as those 
seen in the IDA-10 and Arun HI cases. However, evidence from both the IDA-10 case 
and the literature indicates that such relationships can be highly unequal.
These findings challenge those cosmopolitan theories that suggest that dialogue 
within civil society can form the basis of democratic global governance (for example, 
Nanz and Steffek 2004; cf. Held 2004; cf. Held 2006). At the same time, it reinforces 
the views of those authors who have previously argued that civil society may act in a 
self-interested fashion (Cooley and Ron 2002; Nelson 1997). It also lends support to 
the arguments of civil society skeptics who suggest that civil society may exacerbate 
differences in power when operating beyond the boundaries of the state (for example, 
Bowden 2006; Goodhart 2005).
In spite of civil society’s atomized behavior, its impact has been significant. 
Both activists and academics credit civil society for numerous actions and policy 
changes on the part of international institutions. Certainly in the cases of the IDA-10 
and Arun HI, such claims are well substantiated by the evidence. Indeed, the World 
Bank itself credits civil society with inspiring and shaping a host of policy changes,
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including the development of social and environmental safeguards and the creation of 
the Bank’s Inspection Panel.1
That civil society organizations have been able to have such impact without 
coordinating efforts begs the question of how civil society’s impact has been achieved. 
In the cases examined for this thesis, there is little evidence of civil society marshalling 
or representing overwhelming public opinion. To the contrary, in the case of the IDA- 
10, the most successful faction of activists was also the smallest, and in the case of the 
Arun in  dam, civil society defied both the wishes of a democratic government and the 
well-documented desires of the project-affected population.
Instead, it seems that civil society’s impact at the World Bank is linked less to 
its claims of popular representation or moral authority than it is to the political 
influence certain organizations have with key states. In both the IDA-10 and Arun IE 
cases, the Bank’s concerns about US threats to its funding weighed heavily in its 
decision to accede to the demands of actors with strong connections to key US 
politicians. Similarly, the Bank rejected the demands of lobbyists in the country 
systems case when it became clear that they did not have strong US government 
backing.
Recognizing the role of state power is not to say that civil society organizations 
lack the power or autonomy frequently attributed to them. Even though civil society 
influence at the Bank makes significant use of the leverage of powerful donor states, 
civil society retains some degree of independence. Some mechanisms of civil society 
influence, such as public accountability or the monitoring of institutional activities, do 
not rely on state donors. Even where civil society influence relies on donor leverage, 
civil society may be able to manipulate key donors via their domestic political 
processes. Naturally, however, this is most likely to be achieved by civil society 
organizations from those donor states, particularly those with large memberships or 
connections to key politicians. The result is an impactful but highly unequal 
transnational civil society, in which some members have far more power than others. 
These findings challenge more purely constructivist conceptions of civil society 
influence even as they confirm civil society’s fundamental independence and agency 
(cf. Price 2003). At the same time, the data lend support to those authors (for example,
1 See, for example, htlp://go.worldbank.org/UD8NDA4640. See also World Bank (2003) 
“Accountability at the World Bank: The Inspection Panel 10 Years On”, available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/TenYear8 07.pdf
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Fox and Brown 1998; Risse 2000; Keck and Sikkink 1998) who acknowledge the 
importance of civil society connections with the state.
Civil society organizations frequently claim to represent large groups of 
stakeholders and to use their influence on behalf of marginalized populations. Such 
claims may serve to enhance the credibility or influence of their policy proposals, 
particularly if claims to representivity are accepted by allied policy makers. The 
representation claims made by the organizations studied in this thesis, however, cannot 
be proven. To the contrary, there are significant indications that claims made by 
Western civil society organizations to represent the interests of the Bank’s poorest 
members are overstated. This finding was consistent regardless of whether Western 
organizations were partnered with civil society from developing countries. In the case 
of the IDA-10, many spokespersons from both Southern civil society and Southern 
governments contradicted statements made about the IDA by US environmentalists 
and their Indian ally. International development organizations were more likely to 
have the support of Southern governments and civil society in their policy lobbying, 
yet the data indicate that many development actors were motivated by organizational 
interests (i.e. the need for funding) rather than any concern for representation.
These claims to representivity are nonetheless central to the capacity of civil 
society organizations to challenge the authority or legitimacy of governments, 
particularly those of poorer countries. Civil society can force governments to become 
more transparent, accountable, or respectful of the rights of their citizens. However, 
the thesis confirms that civil society organizations can exploit their connections with 
powerful states to force their agendas on weaker states (cf. Woods 2000, 2005; Wade 
2009; Stiglitz 1999). During the IDA-10, civil society worked to delegitimize 
borrower governments in the eyes of donors, particularly the US, and to develop new 
conditionalities and Bank structures that would limit borrower autonomy. By limiting 
the agency of borrower governments, civil society may have also limited governments’ 
ability to actualize the desires of their citizens. Because civil society organizations 
attacked democratic and undemocratic governments alike, and sought to limit their 
authority in the policymaking process, civil society may have weakened the capacity 
of these governments to represent their citizens internationally, closing off a potential 
means of representation for developing country stakeholders.
The case of the Arun III project also demonstrates the benefits and potential 
hazards of transnational civil society intervention in local policymaking processes.
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International activists partnering with local actors initially helped foment debate 
around the dam project and increase the transparency of the policymaking process. 
Ultimately, however, international pressure enabled a small group of local opponents 
to contravene the decisions of two different democratically elected governments by 
forcing cancellation of the project. These findings again indicate that concerns raised 
in development studies about the power of civil society to undercut local governments 
(for example, Manji and O’Coill 2008) may also have validity in discussions of 
international policymaking.
Transnational Civil Society and Democratic Global Governance
In its introduction, this thesis uses the ideas of Dahl, Moravcsik, Held, and others to 
develop a definition of democracy as a system or pattern of equal citizen authority or 
value expressed via some representative mechanism and resulting in government or 
institutional responsiveness to the will of the majority, but under which the 
government or institution is also constrained to protect the liberal rights of its citizens 
or stakeholders. This definition is designed to escape state-centered understandings of 
democracy that are focused on voting or other structures, while still maintaining the 
core values and pragmatism inherent in state models (an effort in which I follow 
Moravcsik in particular).
Chapter 2 of this thesis mates this concept of democracy with the work of 
Uhlin, Dingwerth, and Scharpf. These authors disaggregate democratic legitimacy, 
dividing it into input, throughput, and output components. This thesis takes these 
components and links them to context. The thesis argues that in order to be 
democratically legitimate, civil society actors must seek to complete those elements of 
democracy which are lacking in their own context. This approach helps clarify some 
of the previous ambiguities embedded in the literature on civil society and 
democratization. It reveals that disparities in authors’ understandings of civil society’s 
impacts occur not just because authors use different definitions of democracy (for 
example, representative versus deliberative) but also because they examine civil 
society in different contexts (such as undemocratic states, democratic states, or 
transnationally).
As noted in Chapter 2, the input and output components are the most relevant 
components for assessing the democratic legitimacy of transnational civil society. 
However, for the purposes of engaging with the literature, I would like here to first
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discuss transnational civil society’s contributions (or lack thereof) in each of the three 
aforementioned categories.
Democratic inputs refer to civil society’s contribution to stakeholders’ equal 
representation or inclusion in global governance. In the case of the World Bank, civil 
society generally fails to contribute to equal representation or to inclusivity. As noted, 
organizations’ policy positions seem to be determined by pre-existing agendas rather 
than consultations with the stakeholders they claim to represent, and funding 
considerations may determine which organizations participate in a given policy 
campaign. Organizations with strong connections to the Bank’s major donor 
governments wield disproportionate power and may actively use their influence to 
restrict the input of some weaker organizations and developing country governments. 
Dialogue among organizations is rare and the absence of compromise prevents the 
creation of consensus positions. As a result, the power dynamics among civil society 
organizations may actively impede the capacity of civil society as a whole to improve 
equality of stakeholder access to policymaking or the inclusivity of decision-making 
processes. In short, this thesis finds that civil society largely fails to contribute to 
democratic inputs in the governance of the World Bank.
Democratic throughputs include transparency, accountability, participation, and 
deliberation. Civil society contributes heavily in most of these areas. Civil society 
organizations have significantly increased transparency at the World Bank by 
monitoring and researching the Bank’s activities; promoting self-monitoring in the 
form of environmental and social impact assessments; and forcing changes in the 
Bank’s information policy. CSOs have held the Bank accountable through public 
awareness campaigns and attacks on Bank funding, and by promoting the creation of 
the Inspection Panel. New dialogues between the Bank and civil society have 
facilitated the participation of those organizations invited to attend and possessing the 
resources to sustain involvement. On the whole, civil society has contributed 
significantly to throughput.
Democratic outputs include increased stakeholder control over policy and the 
protection of liberal rights. In general, the Bank’s scope of activity precludes its direct 
involvement in the formation of rights. However, there is some limited evidence that 
where the Bank’s activities have led indirectly to the abrogation of stakeholders’ rights 
(as in the case of initially uncompensated forced resettlement of the Narmada oustees), 
civil society has acted to protect liberal rights. At the same time, civil society has
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increased stakeholder control over the World Bank, making the Bank less independent 
and technocratic and more directly responsive to citizen input. In this regard, the data 
indicate that civil society has contributed to democratic outputs.
The Authority Role
To determine which of the components of democracy are most important in assessing 
transnational civil society’s democratic legitimacy, one must consider the context in 
which it operates.
This thesis suggests that within the anarchical transnational space, civil society 
acts as an authority: an independent and powerful means of citizen influence not 
subject to the regulation of any state or body. Because civil society is not answerable 
to any other actor or body, its impacts must be judged on the same terms by which one 
would judge other international institutions, that is, whether they reflect the core 
elements of democracy as defined by this thesis. This thesis’ definition of democracy 
specifies that democracy requires equal citizen input and majoritarian control over 
government. Thus the democratic legitimacy of authorities is judged by input and 
output.
Civil society, however, is not judged in a vacuum. It is judged for its impacts 
on the broader system of global governance. Currently, most decisions in the 
international space are made by technocrats or the representatives of a small number of 
powerful states. As discussed in Chapter 2, creating democracy in the international 
policymaking context requires developing equal representation and citizen control. 
Therefore, civil society must facilitate both democratic inputs and outputs in global 
governance.
In short, regardless of whether civil society is acting as an alternative to current 
means of global governance (as cosmopolitan theorists, for example, suggest), or is 
acting to reform the current system, it must recognize and understand the will of the 
stakeholders it represents, develop equal authority among stakeholders, and work 
towards outcomes that represent the will of the majority or which protect the rights of 
the minority. Only if transnational civil society meets these standards can it be 
considered democratically legitimate.
Joining context and legitimacy reveals the common ground between those 
critiques of transnational civil society that claim that civil society’s capacity to
244
contribute to national democratizations does not automatically make it capable of 
democratizing global governance (for example, Bowden 2006; Foley and Edwards 
1996; Goodhart 2005; cf. Lipschutz 1992). In the international context, none of the 
core elements of democracy are guaranteed by a state or meta-state structure. The 
logic of the context-based framework reinforces one of their hypotheses: that without 
the counterbalancing influence of state authority, civil society left to itself may become 
unaccountable or even tyrannical.
The Democratic Legitimacy o f Civil Society
Vis-a-vis the existing literature, the thesis supports the popular contention that civil 
society increases transparency and accountability (and even, to a limited extent, 
participation). However, the thesis’ framework suggests that improving throughput, as 
this does, is not sufficient to democratize global governance. Rather, democratic 
inputs and outputs are the key standards by which civil society’s impacts must be 
assessed. Because civil society fails to improve democratic input into global 
governance, it cannot be said to be democratizing global governance.
The empirical data about the World Bank support the validity of this judgment. 
In the three case studies researched here, civil society failed to improve, and even 
actively obstructed, democratic inputs into global governance. In the absence of such 
inputs, improved throughputs (accountability, transparency, and the like) only served 
to magnify the power of elite actors and led to outputs that seemed unlikely to reflect 
the majority will.
As a result, this thesis lends more support to those authors critical of civil 
society’s capacity to democratize global governance than to those who view 
transnational civil society as a key agent of democratization. Although the thesis’ 
observations support some of the expectations voiced by each group regarding civil 
society’s nature or behavior, with regards to civil society’s impact on global 
governance the concerns of the critics are better supported by the evidence than are the 
hopes of the optimists. If the trends manifest in the case of the World Bank hold true 
elsewhere, civil society may increase the control of some stakeholders over 
international policymaking. However, civil society as a whole will do little to increase 
the influence of marginalized stakeholders in international decision making or 
otherwise improve representation or equality of authority. Far from correcting the
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current imbalances in the global governance system, civil society may actually make 
the problem worse.
The Reverse Boomerang
As noted above, this thesis’ primary contribution to academic knowledge is through 
contributing new data to the ongoing debate on transnational civil society’s capacity to 
democratize global governance, and developing a new framework to analyze civil 
society’s impacts on democratization. However, as described in Chapter 6, the data 
generated by this thesis also suggest an addition to one of the dominant models of civil 
society advocacy, the Keck and Sikkink boomerang model. The current model holds 
that advocacy efforts usually begin in the global South, acquire partners in the global 
North, and return to the global South with increased influence (Keck and Sikkink 
1998). Some of the data in this thesis support the idea of Southern initiation. 
Information gathered on the Narmada Dam protests indicate that two of the leading 
Indian NGOs involved (Arch Vahini and Narmada Bachao Andolan) reached out to 
Northern NGOs (Oxfam-UK and Environmental Defense Fund, respectively) for 
assistance in engaging transnational policymakers. Both Indian organizations reported 
that Northern partnership assisted them in achieving their goals: Arch Vahini 
successfully negotiated better resettlement terms for the majority of persons displaced 
by the dam; NBA succeeded in having World Bank funding for the dam withdrawn.
Southern initiation, however, does not yield Southern control. Keck and 
Sikkink acknowledge that Northern organizations may join a campaign for reasons of 
their own. The data in this thesis indicate the impact such preexisting interests can 
have on the focus of a campaign. The involvement of EDF and its Northern allies in 
the Narmada Dam campaign apparently precipitated a shift in the focus of the 
campaign from better resettlement to outright cancellation. As noted in Chapter 6, EDF 
demanded cancellation of the dam before local spokespeople had made an equivalent 
demand. Although NBA later became a vociferous advocate of cancellation, several 
observers, including those from Arch Vahini, suggested that the Northern 
environmentalists had reshaped the campaign to match their own interest in opposing 
hydroelectric infrastructure projects. Researchers have observed a similar restatement 
of local interests in other cases of North-South partnership (for example Murphy 2005; 
Nelson 2000).
246
Moreover, there is real potential for a ‘reverse boomerang’. The data in this 
thesis indicate that transnational campaigns can actually begin in the global North, 
acquire partners in the global South, and then return to the North. A Northern civil 
society organization may strategize an international campaign based on its own values, 
agenda, or funding incentives. The anti-Bank efforts of the core environmental NGOs 
involved in opposing the IDA-10 replenishment are a good example. Northern 
organizations may then seek out local Southern partners, selecting those local civil 
society organizations whose interests or issues reinforce the Northern agenda. This 
local support, in turn, helps legitimate or globalize the campaign, giving it greater 
credibility with key decision-makers. This dynamic was manifested in the IDA-10, for 
instance, when Congressman Barney Frank asked the National Wildlife Federation to 
speak on behalf of the people of the global South.
The reverse boomerang also appears to occur in the Arun IE case. Nepalese 
civil society organizations filed the Inspection Panel appeal, but the impetus for an 
international campaign against the dam appeared to be certain northern NGOs’ interest 
in ensuring the authority of the new Inspection Panel structure. This interest bore little 
resemblance to the political and economic concerns of the Nepalese actors, and the 
North American and European NGOs continued their efforts past the point when the 
Nepalese had sought to withdraw their request for an appeal. Ultimately Northern 
NGOs used the Nepalese appeal to advance a Northern agenda that predated the dam 
loan by several years.
As noted, Keck and Sikkink acknowledge that Northern civil society 
organizations form advocacy networks with Southern actors for reasons of their own. 
They note that in some cases control of a network may become ambiguous. Potential 
Northern dominance, however, is distinct from the pattern observed in the IDA-10 and 
Arun IQ. Southerners do not simply reach out to interested Northerners; sometimes 
Northerners do the reaching out. Moreover Southerners may lose control of the entire 
international campaign, and their alleged interests may be restated and publicized 
without their consent.
Instead, it seems that at least two boomerangs exist: a South-North-South 
model, which may empower (at least some) Southern civil society organizations, and a 
North-South-North model which is driven by a Northern agenda. Within each model, 
questions of timing and control are crucial. One must ask exactly which organizations 
control the public face of a campaign; how decisions are made internally (assuming
247
there is some measure of internal deliberation within the campaign, which this thesis 
has shown should not be assumed); and when different organizations within the 
campaign espoused the campaign’s public agenda. Recognizing the two possible 
boomerang patterns and posing some of the questions described can lead to a more 
nuanced understanding of the mechanics of transnational advocacy and its implications 
for remedying the democratic deficit in global governance.
Limits of the Research
As noted in the introduction, the primary limitation of this research lies in the limited 
scope of its data. The World Bank is a prominent global governance institution and, 
among international institutions, it has arguably received more civil society attention 
over the past 25 years (in terms of volume of civil society organizations involved, 
intensity of protests, and duration of advocacy) than any other institution. These 
factors potentially make the World Bank a leading indicator of transnational civil 
society’s impacts on global governance (Edwards 2001). Nonetheless, it cannot be 
assumed that findings at the World Bank will necessarily hold true elsewhere. The 
Bank itself is just a single institution and the civil society organizations engaging it 
tend to focus on a specific set of issues, including the environment, development, and 
debt relief. Other institutions, such as the UN, and civil society organizations working 
in different issue areas, such as human rights, may behave differently.
Even in its consideration of the World Bank, this thesis faces limitations. The 
bulk of its data derives from the IDA-10 case study, which is nearly 15 years old. 
Although the IDA-10 findings are compared with the Arun HI and country systems 
case studies, these cases involve smaller cross-sections of civil society. Thus there is a 
possibility that the thesis does not fully capture the contemporary behavior of some of 
the civil society organizations engaging with the World Bank. The thesis also presents 
only limited data on the perspectives from the Bank’s borrowing nations. Although I 
was able to obtain interviews or initiate correspondence with key figures from many 
American and some European organizations involved in the IDA-10 and country 
systems, I was unable to locate, despite repeated efforts, equivalent figures from 
developing countries. Therefore these actors are represented through documentary 
research. The difference in the type and quantity of data available may lead to an 
overrepresentation of views from civil society organizations in Bank donor countries 
and the US in particular. These shortcomings should be remedied in future research.
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Further Research
The findings of this thesis suggest that further examination of transnational civil 
society and its contributions to global governance is merited. The use of a context- 
based model of democratic legitimacy to assess the impacts of transnational actors is 
already being explored by other academics, including Anders Uhlin (in his ongoing 
work), Eva Erman, and other contributors to the Transdemos project on democracy 
beyond the state. However, I would suggest that several other steps would be useful in 
overcoming existing limitations in the literature and testing the relevance of this thesis’ 
findings to the broader question of civil society’s role in democratizing global 
governance. These steps are outlined below.
An Empirical Approach
Other researchers have also empirically examined civil society’s impact on global 
governance and even its impact on the balance of power between different 
stakeholders. Authors like Scholte and Nelson have emphasized the importance of 
improving the accountability and transparency of civil society or discussed power 
imbalances between Northern and Southern organizations. Ngaire Woods has written 
extensively about the need for reform at the World Bank and IMF. She recognizes the 
ways civil society from powerful states can reinforce global imbalances, although her 
work focuses more on rebalancing the power of member governments within the 
international institutions’ formal governing structures.
Writing of this sort, however, is still relatively uncommon. Much of the 
academic research on civil society and global governance suffers from some of the 
problems identified in Chapters 1 and 2. Research on civil society tends to focus on 
impacts and assume representivity. Discussions of global governance tend to 
emphasize theory-building. Questions regarding representation, the mechanisms of 
civil society influence, and the internal dynamics of civil society coalitions have seen 
only limited research. Practitioners accounts are generally used in edited volumes in 
lieu of academic research (for example, as in Fox and Brown’s The Struggle for  
Accountability) rather than being critically assessed (as in Fisher’s Struggle over a 
River). Therefore I would suggest increased empirical examination of transnational 
civil society and efforts to generate theory that can be tested using contemporary 
events.
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Such research would be particularly helpful in testing the conclusions reached 
in this thesis. Additional research could transcend the narrow group of case studies 
presented here by drawing on data from other international institutions, other forms of 
global governance (such as international conventions and ad hoc negotiations), and 
other sectors of civil society activism. Exploring additional recent or contemporary 
cases could verify (or challenge) this thesis’ findings, which are shaped by a more 
historical perspective. Such cases might also permit closer examination of developing 
country perspectives. Additional data would develop a more comprehensive picture of 
transnational civil society and its impacts on global governance.
Interactions with the State
Within this effort, research in two specific areas seems particularly important: civil 
society-state dynamics, and the impact of material interests on policymaking. As seen 
in this thesis, transnational civil society addressing global issues has a complex 
relationship with nation-states. A number of other authors have suggested that civil 
society’s authority relies on or passes through states (including Keck and Sikkink 
1998; Risse 2000; Woods 2005). However, there has yet to be much detailed 
examination of the dynamics of this relationship. (Raustiala (1997) does address this 
relationship in great detail but the value of his analysis is limited by the fact that he 
depicts civil society primarily as subservient to the state.) Other authors write of civil 
society and global governance as though transnational civil society organizations and 
international institutions have a nearly binary relationship in which states play only a 
minor role. As seen in this thesis, however, civil society-state interaction is a major 
component of civil society influence in transnational policymaking. Developing 
realistic models of civil society influence and global governance requires exploring 
this dynamic.
Material Influence
Material interests have long been a part of the state-based model of international 
relations. Critiques of civil society’s material interests in development have been path 
breaking. (These include both popular works like Hancock’s Lords o f Poverty or 
Maren’s The Road to Hell, and academic works like Cooley and Ron’s “The NGO 
Scramble”.) Development researchers have also explored the role of funding in North- 
South partnerships among development actors. As this thesis has shown, there is
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reason to believe that material concerns also play a role in civil society’s involvement 
in policymaking and advocacy. Detailed research in this area could contribute to much 
more accurate (i.e. predictive) models of civil society involvement in activism and the 
dynamics of policymaking coalitions.
Defining Democracy
Lastly, I would suggest that such additional research be done with specific reference to 
the impact of civil society on the democratization of global governance. Democracy 
should be used as an analytical yardstick and, within a given piece of research, clearly 
defined. Using democracy as a measure has a normative value. Responding to citizen 
interests has become a primary concern of decision makers in certain international 
institutions, including the World Bank. Such decision makers recognize the usefulness 
of democratic credentials in establishing their institution’s legitimacy. The language 
of democracy is persuasive to key policymakers and thus can broaden the audience for 
research. Even more importantly, democracy is essential for stakeholders. Democratic 
mechanisms ensure that stakeholder concerns are heard and, ideally, that their rights 
are protected and their interests valued fairly. Using the language of democratic 
legitimacy helps shine a spotlight on issues of stakeholder access and influence.
From an academic perspective, using democracy as an analytical standard 
would facilitate comparison of different findings and pieces of research. Not every 
author will use the standard of democracy put forth in this thesis. Although I favor this 
standard, it would be unrealistic to expect that all others would use it. However, if all 
authors define the standard of democracy they are using in clear and explicit terms, it 
would greatly facilitate the comparison of their findings with those in other works.
Improving Stakeholder Representation at the World Bank
This penultimate section of the thesis recounts this thesis’ policy recommendations. 
These focus on managing or modifying civil society’s behavior in order to improve 
representation. The recommendations fall into two categories: recommendations for 
the World Bank and recommendations for civil society organizations.
Policy Findings
The findings of this thesis speak to the importance of four policy initiatives: increasing 
formal dialogues between the Bank and civil society; limiting state power; holding
251
individual civil society organizations accountable; and improving the composition of 
civil society organizations engaging the World Bank to make such groups more 
representative.
Formal dialogues are important because they can, in theory, provide an equal 
playing field for the civil society organizations involved. In the absence of formal 
dialogues, civil society organizations are prone to using personal connections or other 
informal channels to access and influence policymakers at the Bank. As shown in the 
various cases, these personal channels are often only accessible to elite organizations, 
particularly those NGOs which can afford to staff offices in Washington, DC where 
their staff hone their political skills and connections through regular interactions with 
staff at the Bank’s headquarters. Naturally this contributes to the preponderance of 
Western influence observed in the IDA-10 and Arun HI cases, and even strong US 
access to the country systems team.
It is important to note, however, that dialogues must be more than just spaces 
for conversation. As the country systems case shows, the Bank’s reputation for 
obfuscation and even deception is not undeserved. Bureaucrats within the Bank are 
likely to continue to seek to advance their own agendas regardless of civil society 
input, even if such input can be managed to better reflect stakeholder interests. Thus 
mechanisms must be developed to hold Bank staff accountable to agreements 
negotiated with civil society.
At the same time, there is no guarantee that civil society’s contributions will 
not mirror the imbalances inherent in the state-driven system. As things currently 
stand, resources determine civil society organizations’ participation in policymaking. 
Therefore wealthy populations tend to field more civil society organizations, 
particularly professional advocacy NGOs, than poor ones. Moreover, civil society 
organizations from powerful nations seem to have little hesitation in exploiting the 
power of their states to achieve their goals. Thus in order for formal dialogues to 
democratize decision making at the World Bank, policies must be developed that 
ensure a representative cross-section of civil society actors and limit state influence in 
the policy process.
Developing a representative group of participants requires determining whom 
each organization actually represents. Identifying representative civil society 
organizations on the basis of claims alone is difficult. Transnational actors rarely 
make modest claims. They assume that their values or principles (for clean water,
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women’s rights, etc.), if actualized, would be beneficial to large populations. They 
then count these alleged beneficiaries as stakeholders. Such overbroad claims are 
difficult to verify. It seems unlikely that an organization can be trusted to consistently 
represent a population to which it is not accountable.
Mere consultation between an organization and a local population is not 
enough to prove accountability, nor is partnership with grassroots organizations. As 
shown in both the Arun El and the IDA-10, core members of a campaign are 
particularly prone to cherry-picking local partners who back up the campaign’s core 
positions. This sort of homogeneity can create an echo-chamber effect that leaves the 
ideas of the dominant civil society members unchallenged. Claims made on the basis 
of some grassroots input, such as statements by the Environmental Defense Fund 
during the IDA-10 to act on behalf of certain Indian villagers, would not pass an 
accountability test. One means of demonstrating accountability may be via funding.
As discussed in Chapter 4, organizations seem to have at least some accountability to 
the population that funds them.
The following sections describe how the World Bank and civil society 
organizations can meet these challenges. Each section lays out a series of policy 
suggestions followed by notes on practical implementation.
Recommendations for the World Bank
The World Bank faces three main challenges: equalizing access among civil society 
organizations; ensuring that its interlocutors are representative; and responding to civil 
society in a consistent fashion. To achieve these goals, the Bank should focus on 
increasing the number of formal dialogues with civil society and imbuing such 
dialogues with greater power. It should limit the number of informal interactions with 
civil society, and manage civil society’s participation in formal dialogues in such a 
way as to both obtain a cross-section of representative participants and incentivize civil 
society organizations to develop their own credentials as stakeholder representatives. 
These steps would have the effect of regularizing and expanding civil society’s 
influence, while channeling that influence through representative and accessible 
mechanisms.
Negotiating policy: As noted, using civil society to democratize Bank decision 
making should begin with the creation of more formal policy dialogues. In the same 
way that the Bank has developed a standard practice of engaging with national and
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local civil society in its project decisions, so too it should engage with civil society 
regarding changes in its international policies. However, given the Bank’s potential to 
ignore outside voices or listen selectively, I would suggest that consultations be 
replaced with formal decision-making dialogues. Such dialogues would, in essence, be 
policymaking negotiations. Working together, Bank and civil society representatives 
would determine the objectives or broad parameters of specific policies.
Formal dialogues could mitigate some of the problems of elite influence. If 
major policies are more often shaped by formal dialogues, powerful NGOs may turn 
their attention towards gaining access to such dialogues or lobbying the other 
participants. They would doubtless also be influential in such a context, but at least 
they would have to contend with a more democratic setting.
Holding Bank staff accountable: While dialogues might determine the goals or 
parameters of a policy, technical details will probably remain the domain of Bank 
staff. Thus the policy, once written, should be returned to the dialogue group for 
ratification. (Such ratification could be a straight up or down vote, to avoid last minute 
wangling and revisions.) Ratification, however done, would be an essential measure 
of accountability, constraining Bank staff to adhere to the terms negotiated in the 
dialogue. Only once a policy was ratified would it be submitted to the Bank’s board 
for approval.
Alternatively, the final policy decision could be made at the level of the Bank’s 
board. Bank staff would engage in dialogue and the board would be given both the 
staff-generated policy and the output of the dialogue group, that is, whatever objectives 
or parameters the group agreed upon. Since such parameters would be explicitly 
negotiated by the original group, Bank staff would have little leeway to restate civil 
society concerns in advantageous terms (as was done following the country systems 
consultations, for instance). The board might, at times, ignore the dialogue’s 
conclusions but this process would still be a significant improvement over current 
practices, in which Bank accounts of civil society opinions are filtered through reports 
on consultations, and civil society input at the Board level comes mostly from 
powerful NGOs with relationships with a few executive directors.
Ensuring representation: Even if the Bank creates a dialogue structure geared 
towards eliminating the power disparities between civil society organizations, it still 
must manage the participation in those dialogues in order to create equal access. To 
facilitate this, the organizations involved in the dialogue must be accountable to a
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specific population. The dialogue itself can then be arranged to involve a cross-section 
of potential representatives of the impacted stakeholders.
Screening possible participants: To facilitate representation, the Bank would 
need to screen would-be participants to determine which are accountable to the 
stakeholders they claim to represent. As shown by the research, organizations have a 
de facto accountability to their funders. Therefore I propose that the Bank develop a 
means of using funding as its primary test of accountability. (Other mechanisms of 
accountability, such as internal democracy, are discussed in more detail under the 
recommendations for civil society organizations.) Organizations would only be 
considered representative of the populations funding them. The Bank could then 
develop mechanisms for choosing from among this pool when creating a new policy 
dialogue so as to assemble a group of organizations representative of a cross-section of 
the affected stakeholders.
It is possible that the emphasis on member funding might limit the access of 
developing-world organizations. However, I find this unlikely. To the contrary, I 
believe that it might expand access by developing world CSOs. The developing world 
is rife with civil society, in the form of village associations, church groups, and 
farmers’ collectives. All of these are funded by contributions from their members.
The Bank has already demonstrated a facility for locating such organizations for 
project consultations. Therefore it should be capable of identifying them for 
invitations to participate in international dialogues. Of course, for such organizations 
to participate, the Bank would need to fund the travel and expenses of their members 
and provide translation services. Such an effort would be costly, but should be feasible 
within the overall expense structure of the Bank.
Implementation Considerations for the World Bank
The World Bank is already moving in the direction of increased public participation. 
Dialogue with stakeholders has been part of project planning for over fifteen years 
now. Consultations on major policy reforms have become more common. The Bank 
commissioned civil society to review its structural adjustment program a decade ago; 
more recently the Board insisted that the Bank consult with civil society and other 
stakeholders regarding country systems. Thus the proposals given here are working 
with the Bank’s current momentum. The Bank could begin by using its current 
dialogues to generate concrete policy recommendations; screening civil society
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involvement in such dialogues; and selecting participants to develop a more 
representative cross-section. Such an undertaking would be a relatively small step 
forward from the Bank’s current activities, yet this moderate step would increase the 
democratic legitimacy of both the World Bank’s policymaking and civil society’s 
contributions thereto by an order of magnitude.
To implement this new process, I would suggest using the Bank’s own civil 
society staff. The Bank could empower the Civil Society Team, which is tasked with 
coordinating the Bank’s outreach to civil society organizations on a global level, to 
enforce best practice. These groups have already identified best practices and 
suggested directions in which the Bank should go. The key would be to give the unit 
more power to enforce best practice.
Punitive measures in an organization like the Bank are unlikely to be 
developed, let alone effective, so I use the word ‘enforce’ broadly. I would suggest 
that departments developing certain types of new policy be required to dialogue 
formally with civil society. The arrangement and management of each dialogue would 
be the responsibility of the civil society unit. This would add an extra measure of 
neutrality to the proceedings, and increase efficiency insofar as the civil society unit 
could develop and maintain a staff capacity in selecting participants and moderating 
policy discussions. Since the unit would control the proceedings, it would also be able 
to enact further best practices as they develop. Moreover, if using the model of civil 
society-informed board approval (rather than allowing civil society to ratify final 
policy), the civil society unit would be responsible for submitting the dialogue 
outcomes to the board.
Developing specialized capacity in a group like the civil society unit would 
consolidate knowledge and experience, possibly facilitating institutional learning.
This is important, given that many of the aforementioned suggestions are essentially 
experimental and thus subject to revision. Certain weaknesses would need to be 
overcome. The process suggested here, for instance, would require funding from the 
Bank and additional staff time. Such expenditures of resources would need to be 
managed in such a way as to keep the processes palatable to staff and administrators. 
The funding-based test of representation, while a significant improvement over the
2 1 have interviewed several current and former members of the team and interacted with them while 
observing the country systems negotiations. However, more information is available at 
http://go.worldbank.org/WZAC4X2A70, accessed 13 July 2009.
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‘whoever shows up’ structure of some current dialogues, may need to be refined over 
time.
In all, a system of formal dialogues involving civil society organizations 
selected for their representative qualities offers the potential for a far more democratic 
policymaking process than currently exists. If civil society, particularly transnational 
actors, were also to work to increase its democratic inputs, the process described here 
would be even more effective.
Recommendations for Civil Society
As shown in this thesis, civil society can act as an effective channel for citizen input 
into international relations. The problem is that such input is not evenly distributed or 
shared among all stakeholders. What civil society must do is increase its input 
legitimacy so that it can more equitably represent the interests of the people affected 
by its influence in policymaking. Two steps may be helpful in this process. First, civil 
society organizations must delimit their primary stakeholders and develop 
accountability to their stakeholder population. Second, organizations must engage in 
meaningful dialogue, incorporating disparate voices and developing commonly agreed 
proposals.
Defining representative claims: To become more accountable to their 
stakeholders, civil society organizations need to begin by defining clearly their 
stakeholder populations. A population might include all of the people affected by a 
certain development policy; the citizens of a certain country; or adherents to a certain 
faith. The key is to make clear on exactly whose behalf an organization is speaking. 
Organizations may lobby on behalf of certain ideas or principles, but even issue- or 
idea-based organizations should be able to define their stakeholder population. While 
it is true that organizations may propose new ideas and develop stakeholder bases 
around them (cf. Keck 2004), until a stakeholder base is clearly defined, any 
representative claims must be viewed skeptically.
Such populations, in turn, must be enumerated. Insofar as democratic 
governance, as described in this thesis, is a majoritarian affair, it is necessary to know 
approximately how large a given stakeholder population is. Then when international 
actors, including civil society, governments, institutions, or even corporations, make
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competing claims, those claims may be evaluated by a standard of majority rule, with 
the actor or coalition representing the largest group winning out.3
Testing claims to representation: If decisions within civil society are to be 
made on the basis of majority rule, organizations must not be allowed to skew 
decisions (either deliberately or inadvertently) by overstating their stakeholder 
population. To reduce this problem, claims to representivity must be evaluated by a 
set standard, applicable to all organizations. I propose that civil society organizations 
should seek to be directly accountable to the population they claim to represent, and 
that their stakeholders should be considered only that population to whom they are 
demonstrably accountable.
Establishing accountability: Accountability implies the potential for reward 
and punishment. Financial accountability has already been discussed. Other forms of 
accountability include an established creed or internal democratic structures. Faith- 
based groups may be considered representative in matters pertaining to the faith 
because both leaders and adherents are held to the same, immutable standard. Many 
grassroots organizations in the developing world allow members to elect their leader 
and chief officers. Certain US NGOs, like Bread for the World, hold annual meetings 
at which members vote on organization priorities. Unions also tend to use internal 
votes on key decisions. Provided that such populist mechanisms are binding on the 
leadership, such voting would also be considered proof of accountability.
Meaningful dialogue: Ideally, dialogues among civil society organizations 
should feature solutions-oriented negotiations among diverse partners. Organizations 
with an interest in a particular issue should endeavor to engage with other 
organizations representing stakeholders on the issue. If organizations have carefully 
defined their stakeholders and if the issues being discussed are truly global in nature, 
such dialogues should involve a wide variety of organizations, holding a variety of 
views.
Once actors are engaged with one another, their dialogue must involve a 
commitment to developing and supporting a common position. Civil society and 
stakeholders alike benefit from diversity, so the goal of dialogue is not to homogenize 
civil society. However, once dialogue is engaged, stakeholder interests must be
3 Naturally, this assumes that the majority is not acting to abrogate the democratic process or violate 
recognized rights of the minority. As noted elsewhere, the preservation of basic rights is prioritized over 
unfettered majority power.
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paramount. Dialogue must seek to determine the stakeholders’ will. For instance, the 
various organizations involved could put forward proposals and negotiate and modify 
them until a proposal is reached that seems to reflect the will of a majority of the 
stakeholders represented.
Implementation Considerations for Civil Society
Increasing transparency and accountability would require time and money from those 
organizations which do not currently release financial records or have internal 
democratic mechanisms. Organizations might also be reluctant to release funding 
information, particularly if their funding stream comes from a very limited set of 
powerful donors. Indeed, both organizations and donors might be resistant to 
increased transparency. Organizations might also be inclined to defend existing claims 
to representivity, rather than delimiting a narrower stakeholder group, lest they 
undermine the credibility of their previous advocacy work. It is important to 
acknowledge that the organizations with the most to lose are also the most powerful. 
Major advocacy NGOs based in the global North have significant power and many 
have already established their credibility with key policymakers. For such actors, 
reforming representation entails more risks that rewards.
Nonetheless, reform is not impossible. Organizations’ pre-existing values and 
the process of norm formation can facilitate reform. Representing marginalized 
populations is a commonly articulated value, particularly among advocacy 
organizations. If academic research continues to challenge claims of representivity, 
organizations may feel compelled to test their own claims, improve grassroots 
connections, or otherwise modify their behavior. Pressure from within an international 
network can also result in reform. For example, in 2002, within Friends of the Earth 
International, concerns were raised by Southern members about Northern domination 
of the network. Discussion led to a radical rethinking of the network’s strategy and 
objectives. Admittedly, this process was facilitated by the fact that the network 
already afforded equal votes to Northern and Southern members. However, both the 
original changes in the agenda and subsequent strategy discussions demonstrate that
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Southern civil society is not always cowed by wealthier Northern counterparts, and 
that Northern organizations are not always unreceptive to Southern demands.4
Given that many CSOs already claim representation as a value, if a norm 
develops around enhancing representation, it could become widely adopted over time. 
The development of such a norm would be an incremental process. If a few leading 
actors were to release financial records, improve stakeholder voice within the 
organizations, or engage more meaningfully with Southern partners, the reform 
process could snowball. The fact that some civil society organizations, including some 
American NGOs, practice internal democracy indicates that such practices are 
acceptable, at least to some actors. For instance, Friends of the Earth International 
practices meaningful North-South dialogue, granting all of its national members equal 
voice in deciding the organization’s agenda.5 Granted, this only shows that such 
practices are feasible, not that they are spreading. However, if reforms are feasible, 
then the primary barriers to widespread reform are ones of opinion or interest, not 
logistics or practicality.
One key issue to be resolved is facilitating the participation of Southern civil 
society. As noted in the discussion of World Bank-driven dialogues, actors from the 
developing world may lack the resources necessary to participate in international 
dialogues. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 6 of this thesis, developing country 
actors receiving funding from an outside organization may be inclined to adjust their 
positions to favor their patrons. Similarly, would-be patrons may be inclined to select 
partners based on the degree to which those partners support the patron’s view.
A possible solution involves two parts. First, wealthy civil society 
organizations involved in a particular campaign or policy process ought to pool a 
portion of their resources in order to fund the involvement of developing country 
actors. Although this may still incline those organizations receiving funding to favor 
the positions of their patron group, it limits the potential for a patron-client relationship 
between just two organizations. Alternatively, when dealing with a country- or region- 
specific issue, wealthier civil society organizations could seek to hold their dialogues 
in the affected locale, diminishing the costs of participation for local actors. Second,
4Brian Doherty and Timothy Doyle, ‘“We are heavily in solidarity in this room’: Accountability, 
Representation and Democracy in Friends of the Earth International”, paper presented at the European 
Consortium for Political Research -  Joint Sessions of Workshops, Lisbon, 14-19 April 2009.
5 Ibid.
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funding coalitions must seek to choose their partners on their merits as representatives, 
rather than their adherence to a particular policy position. Ideally, a funding coalition 
would choose its counterparts based on the number of stakeholders to whom they are 
verifiably accountable. However, an incremental step might be to build a coalition 
around interest in a broad issue (such as the environment, trade, or labor standards) 
before defining specific policy proposals or modes of action. Here again Friends of 
the Earth International provides a helpful example: it selects its local partners based 
upon their interest in environmental issues. Organizations must have an existing track 
record of local advocacy. Once organizations join the network, they continue to 
emphasize the unique concerns and preferred approaches of their national 
constituencies.6
Such dialogues may still be less diverse and equitable than those managed by 
the Bank. Civil society organizations from outside the developing world may lack the 
resources or knowledge to search out a wide variety of potential stakeholders and 
choose among them. Unlike the Bank, many Northern civil society organizations do 
not have staff presence in developing countries or regions or a mandate to engage with 
grassroots stakeholders. If civil society chooses its own counterparts, the process is 
likely to favor professionalized NGOs from urban centers, which have the expertise, 
connections, or resources necessary to reach out to global networks. Nonetheless, 
choosing among even this limited cross-section of organizations on the basis of 
representation rather than ideological agreement alone would yield more diverse and 
representative international networks than currently exist.
There are a number of challenges to this proposal, many of which, due to 
questions of scope and space, are not discussed here fully. Nonetheless, individual 
civil society organizations genuinely wishing to improve stakeholder representation 
and develop a more democratic system of international influence can take steps which 
may impact the representivity of transnational civil society as a whole. If some 
organizations were to increase transparency regarding funding, specify their 
stakeholders in transparent terms, cultivate accountability, or develop more democratic 
dialogues, there is a real possibility of creating new norms within transnational civil 
society, resulting in better stakeholder representation.
6 Ibid.
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Transnational Intervention in Domestic Processes
It is important to note that increasing the representivity of transnational civil society 
does little to deal with the problems associated with transnational civil society 
intervention in the affairs of democratic states. The passion most civil society 
organizations have for their issues (and the unfortunate contempt in which many 
Northerners seem to hold Southern governments) makes them unlikely to withdraw in 
favor of the government. However, as much as possible, civil society organizations 
should seek to distinguish between democratic and undemocratic governments. Tests 
of democracy could go beyond mere elections to encompass the protection of rights or 
a lack of corruption; however, the standards should be transparent and should not be 
more stringent than those applied to recognized Western democracies. When engaging 
with issues in such countries, international organizations might be well advised to seek 
to localize the discussion, by supporting local partners as they foment debate, rather 
than internationalizing local decisions through transnational campaigns.
Final Considerations
The vast majority of the world’s citizens live in poverty in underdeveloped nations. 
Some of these nations are undemocratic, and many of them lack strong influence in the 
global arena. If the growing importance of global governance is to impact these 
persons in a positive way, by protecting rights, alleviating poverty, or facilitating 
development, such populations must have an equitable say in the decisions. For civil 
society, claiming to speak on behalf of such populations is no substitute for creating 
institutions and mechanisms that allow them to speak for themselves. As this thesis 
has shown, civil society has the power to both enhance stakeholder authority and to 
inhibit equality and representivity. Incisive academic research and data-driven theory 
building can hold civil society itself accountable, helping to ensure that its 
contributions empower all peoples, particularly those in need.
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